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PART VI.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

March 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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135	„ „ ..	52	4,	Italy and Ægean isles. Editorial note in "Popolo Romano," Government organ, respecting suppressed religious procession in Rhodes. Defines part played by Italy in the islands.	66

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136	Sir F. Bertie ..	127	Mar. 7, 1913	Closing of post-offices at Cavalla. No. 378, Part V, acted on. Transmits reply from M. Jonnart informing of representations already made. Suggests further joint representation	66
137	Memorandum communicated by M. de Etter	Confidential	8,	The new Albania. Necessity of avoiding that future Prince should rely entirely on Austrian support. Turkish suzerainty should be maintained under international control	67
138	Sir R. Paget ..	50 Tel.	8,	Customs in occupied Turkish territory. Civilians in besieged towns. Refers to Part V, Nos. 457 and 516. Only German and Italian colleagues have instructions ..	68
139	Consul-General Lamb	15 Tel.	8,	Conflict between Greek and Bulgarian troops at Nigrita on road to Serres. Reports (see Nos. 184 and 253)	68
140	Sir G. Buchanan ..	76 Tel.	8,	Austro-Russian demobilisation. Refers to No. 51. Austrian Ambassador hopes to be able to satisfy Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting communiqué (see No. 148)	68
141	" " ..	77 Tel. Confidential	8,	Djakova. Refers to No. 86. Minister for Foreign Affairs wants to know what being done, as cannot understand Ambassador's telegram. He is opposed to International Commission. Roumanians pressing for immediate mediation	68
142	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	68 Tel.	8,	Galatz. Refers to No. 107. To bring incident to notice of Bulgarian Government (see No. 191)	69
143	To Sir G. Buchanan..	203 Tel.	8,	Albania. After resolutions of Ambassadors, seems urgent to stop bloodshed at Scutari. To ask Minister for Foreign Affairs if he would agree, if Austria agrees, to notify Servia and Montenegro that only question of Djakova in suspense (see No. 147) ..	69
144	To Sir F. Bertie ..	116 Tel.	8,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part V, No. 338. Has asked Sir H. Babington Smith to represent Great Britain. To ascertain, without mentioning his name, date and probable duration of commission (see No. 183) ..	69
145	Sir F. Elliot ..	25 Tel. Very Conf.	9,	Triple Alliance. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs told Russian Minister that he had ascertained that Bulgaria had no knowledge of Austro-German scheme in No. 119	70
146	Sir F. Bertie ..	32 Tel.	9,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 89. Minister for Foreign Affairs shares Sir E. Grey's view that representatives of allies should not be present at the earlier sittings of proposed commission	70
147	Sir G. Buchanan ..	80 Tel.	9,	Albania. No. 143 communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who approves, but wishes to omit mention of Djakova. Will send instructions in this sense to Ambassador (see No. 174)	70
148	" " ..	82 Tel.	9,	Austro-Russian demobilisation. Refers to No. 140. Minister for Foreign Affairs appears satisfied with communication of Austrian Ambassador. Hopes for arrangement (see No. 186)	70
149	Sir G. Lowther ..	132 Tel.	9,	Adrianople. Hears from good source that commander communicating with Grand Vizier respecting utility of holding out ..	70

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150	Sir G. Lowther ..	133 Tel.	Mar. 9, 1913	Advance to Turkish Government by Anatolian Railway. Refers to No. 129. Copy of contract unobtainable, but gives details (see No. 304)	71
151	To Sir G. Buchanan..	204 Tel.	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of negotiations with Hakki Pasha	71
152	Sir R. Rodd ..	55	5,	Salonica customs. Refers to No. 81. Transmits memorandum from Italian Government respecting Greek proposals for solving the commercial difficulty ..	72
153	Sir G. Buchanan ..	72	6,	Austro-Russian relations. Change for better since Part V, No. 426. Question of mutual demobilisation. Refusal of Austria to consent to publication of communiqué concerning troops on Servian frontier ..	73
154	Sir G. Lowther ..	134	6,	Aviation in Turkish army. Transmits report by military attaché concerning	74
155	Sir E. Goschen ..	90	7,	Djavid Bey. Arrived in Berlin yesterday. Interview in the "Tageblatt." Pessimistic regarding peace. Turkish loan to cover advances. Armenian question and decentralisation in Asia Minor (see No. 315)	76
155*	Note communicated by French Embassy	..	7,	Trade in Macedonia. French merchants at Salonica have called attention to damage to their interests which partition of Macedonia may cause. Question of commercial tribunal (see No. 416*)	76
156	Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff	Confidential	10,	Roumania. Will hold conference in St. Petersburgh if Bulgaria also desires it. Expects Silistria to be most difficult question. Suggests machinery, should six Powers be equally divided	77
157	Memorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff	..	10,	Proposed communication to Servian and Montenegrin Governments. Assumes that it would be accompanied by an intimation that they should evacuate at once territory no more in dispute. Anxiety caused by imminent arrival of Servian expeditions in Albania	77
158	Note communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires	..	10,	Ottoman Debt. Replies to Part V, No. 381. Urges that the amendment introduces totally new principle already rejected by France in 1912. Recapitulates reasons (see No. 200)	78
159	Memorandum communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires	Confidential	10,	Redistribution of Ottoman Debt. Compares the two proposed methods of calculation to the advantage of that proposed by French Commission (see Part VII, No. 185)	79
160	Count de Salis ..	17 Tel.	10,	Draft articles. Refers to No. 90. French, Austrian, and German representatives have made communication using text given in Part V, No. 447. Is he to use slightly different text in No. 90? (see No. 217) ..	81
161	" " ..	18 Tel.	10,	Scutari. According to Albanian sources, escaped Albanian says inhabitants taking active part in defence..	81
162	Sir G. Lowther ..	136 Tel.	10,	Khedivial Steam-ship Company's "Tewfikieh" fired at by Bulgarian troops when ran ashore at Heraklitza. Captain detained twenty-four hours. Requests that representations be made at Sophia (see No. 191)	81

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163	Sir G. Lowther ..	137 Tel.	Mar. 10, 1913	Peace negotiations. Since report of Djavid Bey from Vienna and Berlin. Inner circle of Committee to refuse peace except without war indemnity (see No. 205) ..	81
164	Consul-General Smith	6 Tel.	10,	Troops, especially artillery, moving westward to Volhynia	82
165	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	84 Tel. Confidential	10,	Adrianople. It has been decided to make concentrated bombardment and assault on the city (see No. 601)..	82
166	„ „ ..	85 Tel.	10,	Roumania. Refers to No. 58. French and Italian colleagues have no instructions in this sense. Russian Minister acting independently (see No. 167)	82
167	„ „ ..	86 Tel.	10,	Roumania. Refers to No. 166. Prime Minister accepts St. Petersburgh as the capital at which mediation is to take place. Will send M. Danef if representative besides Minister is needed ..	83
168	Sir F. Cartwright ..	35 Tel. Confidential	10,	Albania. Refers to No. 126. Communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thinks Powers might declare definite north and north-east frontier of Albania, leaving Djakova to be decided by commission. Anxious to secure Scutari to Albania and withdrawal of Servians from Adriatic (see Nos. 192 and 193) ..	83
169	„ „ ..	36 Tel.	10,	Austro-Russian demobilisation. Russian Ambassador has seen Minister for Foreign Affairs and settled text of two communiqués respecting. He is very satisfied with text	83
170	To Sir G. Buchanan..	208 Tel.	10,	Djakova. Endeavours in vain to persuade Berlin and Vienna that if Austria ceded respecting Djakova Russia would join other Powers in applying pressure respecting Scutari. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Nos. 171, 173, and 185)	84
171	To Sir F. Bertie ..	119 Tel.	10,	Djakova. Refers to No. 170. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs	84
172	To Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir F. Cartwright	122 Tel. 109 Tel.	10,	Roumania. Refers to No. 119. Can he obtain any information confirming rumour as above?	84
173	To Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir F. Cartwright „ Sir R. Rodd ..	124 Tel. 102 Tel. 96 Tel.	10,	Djakova. No. 170 repeated for information only	85
174	To Sir F. Cartwright	51	* 10,	Albania. Refers to No. 147. Transmits the above. Told Austrian Ambassador that he thought he wished additions in text suggested. Draft will be made as soon as Count Benckendorff receives instructions	85
175	„ „	52	10,	Servian outrages. Transmits communiqué from Austrian Ambassador respecting specific cases	85
176	„ „	53	10,	Albanian frontier. Count Mensdorff wishes to know exact nature of assurances that Russia is willing to give respecting Scutari, Djakova, and Servian troops in Albania	86

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177	Sir R. Paget ..	45	Mar. 7, 1913	Scutari. M. Pasitch says that should it not fall and be only stumbling-block to peace, Servia would recommend Montenegro to abandon claim. M. Stefanovitch distinctly anti-Montenegrin. Probably represents views of Cabinet (see No. 306).. ..	87
178	„ „ ..	46	7,	Albanian feeling against Servia. Transmits copy of despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub reporting conversation with Ottoman-Albanian army doctor respecting	87
179	„ „ ..	47	7,	Reported massacres by Servian komitajis in district of Ghilan. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Uskub giving details of evidence. Statement by Catholic curé in Uskub	88
180	Count Benckendorff..	Confidential	10,	Mediation between Turkey and the allies. Transmits copy of telegram from M. Sazonof giving his views respecting ..	91
181	Memorandum communicated by Count Trauttmansdorff	..	11,	Customs in occupied territories. Thanks for proposal of collective *démarche*. Asks that influence be used to bring Russian Government to agree	92
182	Memorandum communicated by Austrian Ambassador	..	11,	Customs in occupied territories. Asks His Majesty's Government to support Austrian *démarche* in St. Petersburgh	92
183	Sir F. Bertie ..	33 Tel.	10,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 144. French Government does not intend international committee to meet here till peace likely. Would be glad of reply to note of 12th February (see Part V, No. 338) (see No. 236)	93
184	Consul-General Lamb	16 Tel.	10,	Graeco-Bulgar conflict at Nigrita. Refers to No. 139. Reports losses both sides. Bulgarians have made excuses and wish to hush matter up (see Nos. 223 and 253) ..	93
185	Sir G. Buchanan ..	84 Tel.	11,	Albania. No. 170 communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will reply to-morrow, but has taken very strong line. He cannot consent to use of force (see No. 224)	93
186	„ „ ..	85 Tel.	11,	Austro-Russian demobilisation. Refers to No. 148. Communiqués will be published to-morrow in St. Petersburgh and Vienna (see No. 258)	94
187	Sir F. Cartwright ..	87 Tel.	11,	Bulgaria. German Ambassador has held very anti-Bulgarian language, saying Bulgaria will be under guidance of Russia. Urges Count Berchtold to bring Servia and Roumania into Triple Alliance ..	94
188	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	87 Tel. Confidential	11,	Turco-Bulgarian mediation. Refers to No. 120. Prime Minister hopes to reply to proposal of Powers in two or three days. Greeks insist on conditions, and allies will insist on indemnity as *sine qua non* (see No. 227)	94
189	Sir G. Lowther ..	138 Tel.	11,	Old German battleships for Turkey. Turkish Government negotiating for two at 120,000*l.* each	95
190	To Sir G. Lowther ..	137 Tel.	11,	Mediation. No. 194 sent for information in case Sir E. Grey's action misrepresented at Constantinople. Otherwise to say nothing	95

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191	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	73 Tel.	Mar. 11, 1913	"Tewfikieh." Refers to No. 162. He should act as in previous case (see No. 142) (see No. 232)	95
192	To Sir G. Buchanan..	210 Tel.	11,	Albania. Refers to No. 168. May communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs as much as he thinks desirable	95
193	„ „ ..	213 Tel.	11,	Albania. Refers to No. 168. Proposal in first paragraph to be communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs in any case ..	95
194	To Sir F. Bertie ..	120 Tel.	11,	Mediation. Information indicates unfavourable reply of allies or excessive conditions. Outlines reasonable basis. To ask views of Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting (see Nos. 190, 208, 210, 212, 215, 223, and 231)	95
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	126 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	97 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	103 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	212 Tel.			
195	To Sir R. Paget ..	58 Tel.	11,	Albania. After Ambassadors' meeting Sir E. Grey handed Servian chargé d'affaires resolution that Servia should evacuate as soon as notified by the Powers. This applied to Scutari as well. Further bloodshed therefore useless (see Nos. 198, 208, 228, 229, 349, and 353) ..	96
196	To Count de Salis ..	20 Tel.	11,	Montenegro. After Ambassadors' meeting Sir E. Grey handed Montenegrin delegate resolution that Montenegro must evacuate Albania on being notified by Powers. Further bloodshed therefore useless (see Nos. 208 and 274)	96
197	To Sir F. Bertie ..	176	11,	Peace negotiations. French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests collective note to allies, threatening refusal of financial assistance if reply should prove unsatisfactory. Agrees. Or possibly present definite conditions	97
198	To Sir R. Paget ..	23	11,	Servia. Refers to No. 195. Has told chargé d'affaires that in view of Servian communication on subject he could not believe that reinforcements sent to North Albania were with view to permanent occupation	97
199	To Treasury ..	..	11,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part V, No. 340. Transmits Part V, No. 492. Asks for observations as soon as possible (see Nos. 243 and 388)	98
200	„ „ ..	..	11,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part V, No. 340. Transmits observations of French chargé d'affaires (No. 158) on proposal in above. If their Lordships adhere to their view, would they forward full exposition of it? (see No. 388)	98
201	Foreign Office Minutes	..	11,	Repartition of Ottoman Debt. M. Rafalovitch's exposition of Russian attitude. Considers calculation on sums assigned as security unfair. Matter has been rushed	99
202	Sir G. Barclay ..	30	8,	Roumania. Refers to No. 68. Suggests possible compromise. Line from Danube above Silistria passing south of Medjidia Tabia, reaching Black Sea at point 6 kilom. south of present frontier. Sets forth Roumanian case	99
203	M. Madjaroff ..	..	11,	Ottoman Debt. Acting on instructions of his Government, transmits memorandum on the share of the debt to be borne by the Balkan States, and map (see No. 336)	100

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204	Sir R. Paget ..	51 Tel.	Mar. 12, 1913	Servian troops for Scutari. Consul-general at Salonica reports that about 5,000 men and three batteries have left (see No. 246)	105
205	Sir G. Lowther ..	141 Tel.	12,	Muzzling of press. Refers to No. 163. Committee commandant of capital has sent secret circular to all papers prohibiting all references to differences in Cabinet and transfers to provincial posts. Internal tension	105
206	Sir G. Barclay ..	59 Tel. Confidential	12,	Roumania's claim to Silistria. Minister for Foreign Affairs says he has instructed Roumanian Minister to explain importance of admitting claim (see Nos. 347 and 592)	105
207	Sir F. Bertie ..	34 Tel.	12,	Flags of Powers for Ottoman Debt offices. Refers to No. 128. French Government agree that it would be inadvisable to hoist them	106
208	„ „ ..	35 Tel.	12,	Peace negotiations. No. 134 communicated to Political Director. Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees, and will inform Russian Government. Suggests economic pressure. Nos. 195 and 196 shown to Minister for Foreign Affairs. He concurs	106
209	Sir G. Buchanan ..	87 Tel.	12,	Financial conditions of peace should be put before Commission in Paris. Refers to No. 87. In accordance with decision of Ambassadors' meeting, Russian Government thinks draft articles in No. 90 should be referred to Paris	106
210	„ „ ..	88 Tel.	12,	Peace negotiations. Refers to No. 194. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that if allies put forward excessive conditions, Powers should formulate preliminaries of peace, but not refuse outright claim to indemnity	106
211	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	88 Tel. Very Conf.	12,	Roumania. Refers to No. 72. Austria has advised Bulgaria to cede Silistria. Negotiations between them respecting Monastir-Salonica-Dedeagatch Railway ..	107
212	Sir F. Cartwright ..	38 Tel.	12,	Peace negotiations. No. 194 communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs and memorandum left. Mediation should not be broken off. He has no confirmation that Russia opposed indemnity. Suggests financial pressure on allies	107
213	„ „ ..	59 Tel.	12,	Djakova. Minister for Foreign Affairs conveys thanks for support. Regrets that Russian reply delayed, as situation would be very grave if Scutari falls ..	107
214	„ „ ..	40 Tel.	12,	Roumania. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges that conflict should be quickly terminated to prevent Roumania seizing Silistria by force of arms. Admits possibility of finding compensation for Bulgaria in Salonica and for Greece in the islands or in South Albania	108
215	Sir R. Rodd ..	39 Tel.	12,	Mediation. Refers to No. 194. Substance communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs. He does not think mediation should be declared at an end, even if allies demand excessive conditions. Pressure seems impossible. Commercial restrictions would react more on the Powers	108

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216	Consul-General Barnham	Telegraphic	Mar. 12, 1913	Steamship "Tewfikieh." Captain reports stranded in Sea of Marmora, near Eregli, on 2nd March, and exposed all day to Bulgarian rifle and shell fire, in spite of British flag (see No. 232)	108
217	To Count de Salis ..	21 Tel.	12,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 160. Explains word	108
218	To Sir F. Elliot ..	26	12,	Greek Debt in occupied territory. Transmits Part V, No. 384, which contains Treasury observations on Part II, No. 642. Would be glad to hear further observations of Mr. Beaumont (see Part VII, No. 399) ..	108
219	„ „ ..	28	12,	Greco-Bulgarian conflict at Nigrita. Transmits memorandum from M. Skouloudis respecting. Sir E. Grey reassures him respecting rumoured intervention of Powers between allies. No answer yet respecting mediation	109
220	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	36	12,	Peace negotiations. Bulgarian Minister has no instructions, but thinks mediation would be accepted on principle of Rodosto–Midia line and indemnity	111
221	„ „	37	12,	Albanian frontier. Bulgarian Minister transmits statement and maps relevant to mediation with Roumania. Surprise at Roumania selecting St. Petersburgh ..	111
222	Memorandum communicated by Herr von Kühlmann	..	13,	Financial Commission. German Government agree that financial questions shall be referred to commission	112
223	Sir E. Goschen ..	49 Tel.	12,	Balkans. No. 194 acted on. Has seen Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-night. Imperial Government agrees with all views, except that they do not see what pressure could be put on the allies	112
224	Sir G. Buchanan ..	89 Tel.	12,	Albania. Refers to No. 185. Transmits reply to memorandum. Russia will accept commission proposal only if previously decided in principle that Djakova would be assigned to Servia (see Nos. 234, 239, 260, and 467)	112
225	Sir F. Elliot ..	26 Tel.	13,	Greco-Bulgarian conflict at Nigrita. Refers to No. 184. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs estimates Greek losses at 60, Bulgarian the same, and 110 prisoners. Mixed commission to make provisional settlement	113
226	„ „ ..	27 Tel.	13,	"Hamidieh." Bombarded San Giovanni di Medua, sank two Greek transports, damaged others	113
227	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	89 Tel. Confidential	13,	Mediation proposals. Refers to No. 188. Answer of allies promised for to-morrow. Delay due to stringent demands of Greek Government	113
228	Sir R. Paget ..	52 Tel.	13,	Scutari. No. 195 communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who replied that Servia is bound by her treaty of alliance (see No. 350)	114
229	„ „ ..	53 Tel.	13,	Evacuation of Albania. Refers to No. 193. Difference in text of decision, so omitted reference to it in speaking with Prime Minister. Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs assures him that Servia will keep promise to evacuate (see No. 349) ..	114

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230	Sir R. Paget ..	54 Tel.	Mar. 13, 1913	"Hamidieh." Appeared before Durazzo, fired ten shots without damage, then bombarded San Giovanni di Medua, damaging ships and causing fifty casualties	114
231	To Sir E. Goschen ..	132 Tel.	13,	Mediation. Refers to No. 194. If reply of allies is unfavourable, suggests that Powers should formulate conditions and ask allies to accept them, without mentioning question of pressure (see Nos. 248, 250, 253, and 428)	114
	„ Sir F. Bertie ..	124 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	103 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	224 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	109 Tel.			
232	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	76 Tel.	13,	"Tewfikieh." Refers to No. 216. To act as in previous similar cases (see No. 191)..	115
233	To Sir G. Buchanan..	113	13,	Ottoman Debt. Transmits telegram communicated by Count Benckendorff, and observations on it by Sir A. Nicolson and M. Cambon	115
234	„ „ ..	119	13,	Albanian frontier. No. 224 shown to Count Benckendorff, who gives up on his own responsibility southern part of Lake of Boyana	116
235	To Sir E. Goschen ..	105	13,	Albanian frontier. German Ambassador says it is impossible for Austria to give up Djakova. Used same arguments as to Count Mensdorff	116
236	To Sir F. Bertie ..	179	13,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 183. Reply already made to French note (see Part V, No. 502). Transmits copy of note (No. 240) respecting draft articles given to French Ambassador to-day (see No. 341)	116
237	To Sir F. Bertie ..	188	13,	Mediation between Turkey and allies. Suggestion that allies be admitted to discussion respecting Ottoman Debt in Paris if they renounce indemnity. Otherwise Powers cannot recommend Turkey to accept terms	117
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	117			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	55			
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	104			
238	To Sir F. Cartwright	56	13,	Albanian frontier. Has transmitted M. Sazonof's reply to Count Mensdorff. Russia cannot take anti-Slav side both respecting Scutari and Djakova ..	117
239	To Sir G. Buchanan..	118	13,	Albanian frontier. Refers to No. 224. Has pointed out to Count Benckendorff that if Russia agrees to a line it must be respected by Montenegro and Servia	118
240	To French Ambassador	..	13,	Ottoman Debt. Since Great Powers not agreed as to wording of draft articles, suggests that question should be dealt with by proposed International Commission at Paris (see Nos. 236 and 343, and Part VII, No. 4)	118
	„ Russian Ambassador				
	„ German Ambassador				
	„ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador				
	„ Italian Ambassador				
241	Memorandum communicated to Russian Ambassador	..	13,	Customs in occupied territories. Refers to No. 7. Disagrees. Recalls regulations of Hague Convention 1907 and their application to present case. Allies also bound by Capitulations	119
242	*Aide-mémoire* communicated to Russian Embassy	..	13,	Roumania. Proposals of M. Sazonof respecting mediation. Agrees, but thinks such division unlikely. Asks for M. Sazonof's views respecting instructions for Sir G. Buchanan	120

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244	Sir F. Elliot ..	44	8,	Meeting of Chamber. Studiously moderate statement. Budget submitted. Opposition most cordial (see No. 358)	120
245	Sir R. Rodd ..	58	10,	Speech of Marquis di San Giuliano in Senate. Review of situation. Perfect accord with Austria and cordial relations with France	121
246	Sir R. Paget ..	55 Tel.	13,	Salonica. Refers to No. 204. Further dispatch of troops suspended owing to exploits of Turkish cruiser at San Giovanni di Medua	122
247	Count de Salis ..	20 Tel.	13.	Scutari. Refers to Part V, No. 521. Collective representation made this morning. Lengthy reply that Government will allow consuls and foreigners, but not civil population, to leave (see Nos. 283 and 457) ..	122
248	Sir E. Goschen ..	50 Tel.	14,	Balkans. Refers to No. 231. German Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agrees (see No. 249)	122
249	„ „ ..	51 Tel.	14,	Proposed refusal of financial support to allies. Refers to No. 248. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs became quite excited, saying that France and Russia continually furnish money to allies (see No. 282) ..	123
250	Sir R. Rodd ..	42 Tel.	14,	Conditions of peace. Refers to No. 231. Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agrees	123
251	„ „ ..	43 Tel.	14.	Roumano-Bulgarian mediation. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested at Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh that Silistria should be given to Roumania, and Salonica to Bulgaria	123
252	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	20 Tel.	14.	Reply of allies to offer of mediation by Great Powers. Gives text. Insist on Rodosto-Malatra line. Scutari, indemnity, cession of Ægean islands, and Crete (see No. 278)	123
253	„ „ ..	91 Tel. Confidential	14,	Greek success at Nigrita. Refers to Nos. 139 and 181. Greek Minister has read to him official account, which is same as in "Times." Strong protest to Bulgarian Government respecting lack of reports of killed and wounded (see No. 318) ..	124
254	Sir G. Lowther ..	143 Tel.	14,	German cruiser "Breslau" arrived this morning	124
255	„ „ ..	144 Tel.	14,	Seizure of French merchant-vessel by Turks outside the Dardanelles, on plea that cargo of potatoes and biscuits are contraband. French Embassy has protested, and "Léon Gambetta" left for Dardanelles ..	124
256	„ „ ..	145 Tel.	14.	Arab tribes of Tigris seek British help against Turks. From consul at Bussorah: Sheikh Ehel-Benaiyeh visited him in disguise. Asks that Turkish Government be advised to grant land contracts for fifteen years. Revolt threatened (see Nos. 257 and 326)	124
257	„ „ ..	146 Tel.	14,	Arabs of Tigris. Refers to No. 256. Has instructed His Majesty's consul at Bussorah to discreetly refuse (see No. 326)	125

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258	Sir G. Buchanan ..	89 Tel. Confidential	Mar. 14, 1913	Refers to No. 186. Asked Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting attitude of Austrian press respecting assurances published in Russian press. It was published with full agreement of Austrian Ambassador (see No. 426)	125
259	„ „ ..	91 Tel.	14,	Indemnity. No. 231 communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Approves. Has impressed on Bulgarian Minister the necessity of his Government renouncing the idea of the war indemnity	125
260	To Sir G. Buchanan..	226 Tel.	14.	Albania. Refers to No. 224. Has communicated Russian reply to Austrian Ambassador, who has referred it to Vienna (see No. 276)	126
261	To Sir G. Barclay ..	12	11,	Roumania. Roumanian Minister urges that cession of Silistria to Roumania essential to future good relations with Bulgaria ..	126
262	To Sir R. Rodd ..	80	11,	Albanian frontier. Italian Ambassador anxious and disappointed about the last Russian proposal respecting Djakova. Thought commission a Russian proposal. M. Sazonof has, however, never committed himself	126
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ERRATA.

Page 2, No. 2, date of despatch.—For "February 1" read "February 24."
Page 46, No. 81, line 3.—For "telegram of the 8th" read "telegram No. 8 of the 14th February."
Page 64, No. 133, line 1.—For "telegram No. 11" read "telegram No. 111."
Page 69, No. 144, line 1.—For "8th February" read "18th February."
Page 72, No. 152.—The serial number of the despatch should be "(No. 55)."
Page 151, No. 306, line 15.—For "28th February" read "24th February."
Page 177, No. 336.—The serial number of the despatch should be "(No. 82)."
Page 310, No. 595, line 3.—For "(your telegrams to Sophia Nos. 78 of the 15th and 150 of the 20th March" read "(your telegrams to Sophia No. 78 of the 15th March and to Constantinople No. 150 of the 20th March)."
Page 319, No. 603, line 1.—For "25th April" read "25th February."

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part VI.

[9827] No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 150.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 23, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on the situation in that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Acting Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Adana, February* 11, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency the following report:—

Committee of Union and Progress Club.—The club of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had been closed by the police about the 15th ultimo, was reopened on the 25th idem (my telegram No. 4 of the 26th ultimo). Some of its old adherents have rejoined it, but its influence is far from being what it was a year ago. The more extreme members wished to have the local Liberty and Entente Club suppressed, but now appear to have given up that intention. I am informed that the Liberty and Entente Club has lost but few of its members, the majority of whom are shopkeepers and well-to-do "esnafs." The Committee of Union and Progress Club is once more frequented by Government officials, and its efforts appear to be directed chiefly to obtaining subscriptions for the war fund. As there is no proper check on the sums received by its members, there is probably good reason for the statement that much of the money collected finds its way into the pockets of individual collectors. Merchants are approached by members of the club, who assess what they have to pay, and, as a rule, payment is made without question.

Salaries of Officials.—Government officials complain that they find it difficult to subsist, as their salaries are now more than a month in arrear.

Disquieting News.—The news of the assassination of Nazim Pasha and of the fall of Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet produced a bad impression upon the population, and later news, such as that of a mutiny at Chatalja, has added to the existing anxiety. The information telegraphed here on the 7th instant by the Agence ottomane that an internal loan was to be floated has not yet been understood. On one side it is stated that a share of the 5,000,000*l.* which it is proposed to borrow will be assigned to each vilayet, and that valis will be instructed to raise their shares as best they can; on the other side it is explained that Treasury bonds will be issued. One thing is certain, that an internal loan is an impossibility, for no one with any means will subscribe to such a loan at present. The situation is one of anxiety and tension. Responsible Moslems expect nothing good from the present Government, while the Christians have

excellent reasons for fearing the worst. No one believes that the present Government will be long in power, and it is hinted that a change of Sovereign will take place.

Public Meeting.—A public meeting was held on the 5th instant at the Konak, at which subscriptions to the war fund were invited. A small sum, below 20*l.*, according to reliable information, was raised.

Coal Supply.—The supply of coal is running short, many factories having only sufficient for a fortnight, after which they will be obliged to close down. A serious situation will then arise, and there is certain to be much suffering.

Movement of Troops.—As reported by telegraph on the 23rd ultimo, the passage of troops through this district ceased about the 13th ultimo. It is reported that two battalions of troops from Syria passed through here about the 7th instant.

Italian Vice-Consulate.—An Italian vice-consul arrived here on the 8th instant, and is making arrangements to establish a vice-consulate here. He called on me yesterday, accompanied by the dragoman of the German consulate. Italian interests may be described as non-existent, and very few Italian subjects reside in this district. The appointment of a paid vice-consul has not unnaturally given rise to some speculation.

Hajin.—Your Excellency is aware of the history of the Armenian deserters at Hajin, whose suppression led to the recent disturbances there (my despatches Nos. 5 and 6). I have no doubt that these men deserted from the Turkish army owing to ill-treatment at the hands of their Moslem comrades and superiors. To make so stubborn a resistance and to sell their lives so dearly, these Armenians were evidently actuated by strong motives; it is to be noted, moreover, that repeated offers of pardon on condition of surrender had been made to them during the seven months preceding the 29th January. The spirit they showed is sufficient proof that they represented real grievances. Such men must be regarded not as ordinary "brigands," but rather as rebels against intolerable misrule. With all diffidence, I submit that, when Armenian affairs come to be settled, something effective should be done to secure the execution of article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, and article 32 of the Armenian Reform Scheme of October 1895. In this vilayet, the kaza of Hajin can justly claim to participate in any ameliorations and reforms that may be decided upon.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[9645] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 152.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram, No. 109 of to-day, reporting the severe criticisms of a committee organ on Hakki Pasha's alleged recent utterances in London to Reuter's agent, and to forward a translation in résumé of the leading article in question in the "Tasvir-i-Efkiar."

The writer admits that mediation of the Powers may be an eventual step in the peace negotiations, but criticises any mention of it as premature at a moment like the present "when the whole country is expending its energies in a supreme effort to defend its rights by warlike methods." Needless to remark, the whole country is sick of the war, and it is only the committee and its adherents who are bent on continuing it and that with a view to their own cause. Their calculation is that if they make peace without retaining Adrianople, they will be driven from power by some popular outburst and that they are safe as long as they continue the war, regardless of what happens to Turkey and her finances.

They feel convinced that by one means or another they can by the sale of concessions, &c., procure money to pay salaries, and that, if Adrianople holds out for some weeks, the Allies will be exhausted financially and be forced to agree to peace without insisting on the cession of Adrianople. That fortress, like other beleaguered places in the South African and Russo-Japanese wars has so far disappointed the expectations of the besiegers and belied many calculations. During the past few days there has been a fresh crop of rumours as to the imminence of its surrender and of its being reduced by famine. It is stated that the garrison and townspeople numbering about 120,000 souls have lately been reduced to eating horseflesh and the barley intended for the horses. Despite optimistic assertions of extremists that it can hold out for weeks, there would seem to exist in official circles a certain anxiety as to its condition and fate in the near

future. The siege of Plevna lasted 144 days and to-day is about the 120th since Adrianople was invested.

As regards mediation of the Powers as opposed to a direct settlement of the preliminaries of peace between Turkey and the Balkan allies, the committee seem anxious to avoid the latter contingency and the mission of Hakki Pasha and their general diplomacy would seem directed to postpone a definite solution and thus avoid the "San Stephano stage" of the present war, or in other words they believe that internationalisation of the situation is in their interests and contrary to those of the Balkan States. Although viewed solely from Constantinople, where it is impossible to gauge the general situation, it would seem in the best interests of both belligerents to compel them, if possible, to conclude the preliminaries of peace by direct negotiation in matters primarily affecting both parties before proceeding to the "Berlin" or international phase of such issues.

The article in the "Tasvir-i-Efkiar," which, as usual, contains a considerable element of "bluff," is generally taken as a premonitory signal of Hakki Pasha's supercession by Djavid Bey, who, it is reported, is shortly to visit Paris and London in connection with financial operations and to take up the rôle in which Hakki Pasha would appear to have failed. Djavid Bey is already known to you as a negotiator in connection with the famous loan in 1910 and the questions of the Bagdad Railway and 4 per cent. Customs increase. His mission then was anything but a signal success, and on his return here he was credibly reported to have indulged in committee circles in far from tactful remarks regarding the personages with whom he was brought into contact in London.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

[9646] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 153.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a summary translation of an unsigned and undated pamphlet on Jihad,* or the Moslem Holy war, which has lately been printed here "unofficially" and distributed among the military and others. I am informed that large numbers of copies have been sent to India, Egypt, the Caucasus, &c.

Though apparently of the nature of a theological disquisition on the subject of Jihad, the object in producing such a pamphlet at the present moment is obviously to stir up the fanaticism of the Moslem masses in connection with the Balkan war restarted under the auspices of the Committee of Union and Progress. The latter body, though professedly constitutional and non-sectarian, has, as you are aware, during the last four years persistently endeavoured to use Panislamism as one of its levers, but, so far, Panislamism, engineered by Moslem adepts of Voltaire and Jean Jacques Rousseau, has not had the effects anticipated in Constantinople *milieux*, where the ordinary Mahommedan has now begun to understand the unreality of the Faith being championed by these who have none. The case may be different to a certain extent in the provinces and Moslem countries far from the centre of the caliphate. But even in India, &c., the Mahommedans have by now begun to have an inkling of the real nature of the neo-Panislamism of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[9649] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 157.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 25, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 141 of the 21st instant, forwarding a "notice" from the Porte to the effect that the consuls and foreign subjects at Adrianople had accepted Kara Agatch as a neutral zone, I have the honour to report that my French, Russian, Austrian colleagues and myself have received what purports to be a circular

* Not printed.

telegram in Turkish from the four consuls at Adrianople, saying that, as they found that "the departure of the foreigners would have a bad effect on the rest of the population, and was contrary to the humanitarian ideal, they had abandoned the idea and accepted the proposal of the local authorities that Kara Agatch should be made a neutral zone." They further ask for an acknowledgment of receipt of this telegram.

As the Porte's communication notified the same decision, neither my colleagues nor myself have attempted to acknowledge receipt, and it is impossible not to feel to a certain extent sceptical as to the authenticity of some of this correspondence over which we have no control.

The first telegram received by us on the subject was also a circular from the consuls, and was in French. The second, also a circular, was in Turkish, a language with which the French consul alone of the four was conversant. It described "the continuous bombardment of the fortress day and night for four days as contrary to the laws of humanity." It seemed doubtful whether Major Samson ever wittingly used such an expression. It asked for an acknowledgment of receipt, and I sent a draft telegram to the Ministry of War, the only channel of communication with Adrianople, in the following words: "Two telegrams signed by you and your colleagues, and dated the 3rd and 7th February, have been received."

The Under-Secretary at the Ministry of War begged that the dates should be deleted, and gave as his reasons that the "wireless apparatus was too delicate to transmit a long message." This was peculiar, as the telegram to which my telegram of seventeen words was a reply contained some sixty-five words.

Again it is difficult to conceive that Shukri Pasha, the general officer commanding at Adrianople, should have allowed the consuls to telegraph, asking that the foreigners should be allowed to leave the town and subsequently oppose the suggestion on obviously sound military grounds when made to him, while the consuls are made to say in their last telegram that "they have abandoned the project as contrary to humanitarian ideals."

There are only about half-a-dozen British subjects, Maltese and Jews, in the town. The French community there consists mainly of missionaries and nuns, who would not leave the place; while the number of Austrian, German, and Russian subjects is not great. There are several points in the whole incident which seem to require elucidation.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
GEORGE KIDSTON.

[9662] No. 5.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. —(*Received March* 1.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Berlin, February* 25, 1913.

A QUESTION was put in the Reichstag last week as to whether negotiations were in progress or arrangements had been made to enable German nationals in Adrianople, as well as French, Russian, English, and Austrian nationals, to leave the besieged city.

To this question the Secretary of State for the Foreign Office gave the following written reply:

"When at the beginning of February hostilities were resumed between the Balkan States and Turkey, the German Government made representations at Sophia with a view to obtaining permission for the German nationals in Adrianople to leave the city. Instructions to make these representations were issued to our Minister on the 4th February. Similar steps were taken by the Governments of the other Powers interested.

"The Bulgarian Government at first raised military objections, but later accepted the proposal on the condition that the number of foreigners was not too great. The Imperial Minister at Sophia reported on the 16th February that enquiries on this point were to be made by an officer under a flag of truce. The Austro-Hungarian consul, who represents German interests in Adrianople, was intructed to furnish the number of German nationals.

"According to a report from the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople dated the 18th February, however, Schukri Pasha, the commandant of the besieged city, opposed

the departure of the foreigners because he was afraid of indiscretions in regard to the condition of the fortress. Negotiations are now in progress at Constantinople as to the measures to be taken in view of this refusal. It cannot be said at present what the result of these negotiations will be. Perhaps a solution will be found in the constitution of a neutral zone, which, in the view of the consuls at Adrianople, would suffice. The German Government will, of course, insist on German nationals being permitted to leave the fortress as soon as such permission is granted to the nationals of other States."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[9715] No. 6.

General Post Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 1.)

Sir, *General Post Office, London, February* 28, 1913.

WITH reference to your letters dated the 20th instant, respecting the closing of the French and Austrian post-offices at Dedeagatch and Cavalla, I am directed by the Postmaster-General to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that correspondence posted in the United Kingdom addressed to the places in question is sent for onward transmission to the Austrian post-office at Vienna in the case of correspondence for Dedeagatch, and to the British post-office at Salonica in the case of correspondence for Cavalla. Copies of letters received from the British postmaster at Salonica respecting the disposal of correspondence addressed to Cavalla are enclosed.

I am, &c.
A. F. KING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

Postmaster Routh to General Post Office.

Sir, *British Post Office, Salonica, January* 27, 1913.

I BEG leave to report that the Bulgarians, who have occupied Cavalla, refuse to allow any mails to be either landed at or dispatched from that port, and that I am therefore, for the present, obliged to retain all correspondence addressed to that place which reaches this office in the mails from London.

The delayed correspondence will be dispatched to its destination at the very earliest opportunity when order is restored.

I have, &c.
R. A. C. ROUTH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

Postmaster Routh to General Post Office.

Sir, *British Post Office, Salonica, February* 3, 1913.

WITH reference to my report of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that all the delayed correspondence addressed to Cavalla was handed over to the Bulgarian Post Office Agency at Salonica on the 1st instant for transmission to their agencies at Cavalla.

I have, &c.
R. A. C. ROUTH.

[10064] No. 7.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, March 1, 1913.

LES questions soulevées par la communication austro-hongroise, présentant un caractère nettement juridique, devraient être réglées conformément à la lettre et à l'esprit des dispositions contenues dans la convention de La Haye de 1907 concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

La réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres ne nous paraît pas compétente pour toucher les difficultés qui se présentent dans la voie de l'interprétation des principes du droit international relatifs au régime juridique des territoires occupés et de leur application à des points de fait qui, d'ailleurs, ne sont pas entièrement éclairés.

Le Gouvernement Impérial propose, par conséquent, que la réunion se borne à exprimer le vœu de voir les questions susindiquées trouver leur solution par la voie diplomatique normale.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 1er mars, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Communication autrichienne faite à la Séance du 21 février, 1913, *de la Réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres par le Comte Mensdorff.*

DANS les territoires turcs occupés actuellement par les alliés balkaniques le régime douanier turc tel qu'il était avant la guerre doit être rétabli et doit rester en vigueur jusqu'au règlement définitif des questions territoriales.

Les Grandes Puissances ne peuvent pas admettre :

1. La double perception des droits de douanes pour les marchandises importées.
2. La perception de surtaxes sous le nom de contribution de guerre pratiquée par la Serbie.
3. La perception de surtaxes sous le nom de taxe de consommation ou d'équivalent de taxe de monopole.
4. La prohibition d'importer certains articles à raison qu'ils sont des articles de monopole dans les États balkaniques.
5. Le traitement préférentiel appliqué aux provenances des États alliés importées dans les territoires occupés au détriment des marchandises pareilles provenant des autres pays.

Sur l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, la réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Sophia, Belgrade et Athènes de faire une démarche collective dans ce sens.

[9784] No. 8.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 1, 1913.*

BALKAN War.

No news of importance has reached here lately from seat of war, but about 900 troops have arrived in or passed through Sophia in badly frozen condition. Of the above, about 300 were Servians.

It is reported here from private sources that several hundreds have been frozen to death, and sufferings of the army in general are very great.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[9785] No. 9.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 80. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 1, 1913.*

PRIME Minister, during a visit to me to-day, informed me very confidentially that Bulgarian Government would probably be prepared to make peace on condition of the cession of Adrianople and Enos-Midia frontier line. I gathered that his Excellency personally might even yield on the indemnity question, but the Cabinet generally are opposed.

Change of attitude from that reported in my telegrams Nos. 36 of 3rd February and 50 of 7th February is undoubtedly due to sufferings of the troops and to growing uneasiness regarding the possibility of indefinite prolongation of the war.

I cannot help feeling that conclusion of peace on the above terms, even without an indemnity, would be a popular measure here.

Interviews with leading Bulgarian statesmen continually appear in the press insisting on some such preliminary stipulation as the above "on the field of battle."

Regarding question of indemnity, I gathered that Prime Minister is issuing instructions to Bulgarian Minister in Paris to discuss matter fully with French Minister of Finance.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[9786] No. 10.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 1, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram of 17th February : Salonica customs.

The German Government consider the Greek proposals calculated considerably to mitigate the existing abuse pending definite settlement of Balkan affairs. They think that it would, however, be desirable in the interests of foreign exporters and shipping lines, as well as of Salonica middlemen, if it could be made clear that Greek proposals apply not only to goods passing through Salonica in bulk, but also to goods repacked or otherwise dealt with by middlemen in Salonica before being forwarded to the interior. Should, however, elucidation of this question delay settlement, German Government are prepared to waive discussion of this point of view for the present until any abuses arise in this connection which may render its consideration necessary.

[9787] No. 11.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 1, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 23rd February acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regrets that in view of fact that Austro-Hungarian Government have given him to understand they would prefer that no further pressure should be brought to bear on them as regards concessions, he does not see his way to urging them to give up Djakova. After some discussion I said that, if he found it impossible to use influence of Imperial Government in favour of that concession, it might in any case do some good if he would place arguments used in your telegram before the Austro-Hungarian Government and support them. He said that he would certainly inform them of your arguments, but must leave course to be pursued to their own judgment.

In subsequent conversation he said that unfortunately whole question had become one of prestige for Austria-Hungary, and naturally so, because mere fact that Russia was acting as if nearly all the Balkan States were under her protection implied a diminution of Austria's influence and prestige in the peninsula. The more Austria gave way the more that impression would gain ground. I asked him whether he did not think that the elimination of very dangerous question of Scutari was worth the cession of Djakova, but he expressed considerable doubt whether, if the latter were ceded, and Scutari in the meantime fell and was occupied by Montenegro, Russia would stand by and see Montenegrins evicted.

Finally, he begged me to express to you his regret that after all you had done to secure a settlement he was unable to do more to assist you in your arduous task.

[9775] No. 12.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 1, 1913.*

MY telegram 109 of 24th February.

Djavid Bey is leaving to-day for Berlin and London. The object of his journey is apparently to get into contact with financiers in connection with future financial arrangements.

I gather that he may also occupy himself with the question of war indemnity.

His mission is presumably complementary to that of Hakki Pasha, who I am now informed is to remain on and to be furnished with credentials.

(Sent to Berlin.)

[9721] No. 13.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 1, 1913.*

USKUB telegram No. 1 of 27th February.

I have no information regarding massacres beyond that contained in my despatch No. 36 of 24th February, and which was given me by the Austrian Minister.

As I had instructed His Majesty's vice-consul to come to Belgrade this week to talk over various matters I had not yet referred for information to him. He cannot come till Monday.

[9778] No. 14.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day contents of your telegram No. 175 of 28th February.

His Excellency said that he could think of no way out of the present difficulty. Russia could not make any more concessions, and, even if she did, the Servians would never withdraw their troops. Austria, he added, forgot the concession Powers had made to her in consenting to the creation of an autonomous Albania. He would think over your proposal with regard to an international commission, and let me know his views.

[10167] No. 15.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 1, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister called to-day to say that he had heard that the Greek monasteries at Mount Athos had protested against the reported decision arrived at by the Powers in regard to the future status of that locality. He wished to point out that no serious attention need be paid to the Greek protest, as the Greek monks formed a small minority among the general body at Mount Athos—at least two-thirds of the monks were Orthodox Slavs. The Russian monastery of Pantcleimon alone contained over 2,000 Russian monks out of a total monastic population at Mount Athos of 5,000. It was true that seventeen out of the twenty monasteries were nominally Greek, but the vast majority of the Skits were not Greek, and the Greek monasteries themselves were in a decadent condition.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9436] No. 16.

Memorandum communicated to Count Mensdorff, March 1, 1913.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of the memorandum communicated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador on the 24th February, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform Count Mensdorff that His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub now reports the recent massacre of sixty Moslem Albanians in the Ghilan district, at Lynbishta. The vice-consul states that there seems no room for doubt that Servian troops participated in this massacre. He adds that, in the same district, at Terpess and Julekar, massacres have also taken place; and he is informed that in other villages also similar excesses have occurred.

Foreign Office, March 1, 1913.

[9782] No. 17.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 1, 1913.*

I UNDERSTAND that at request of Montenegrin Government Servian Government are preparing a division of 20,000 men for attack on Scutari, but that its departure is now being delayed for political reasons.

[9789] No. 18.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 27th February to Bucharest: Bulgaria and Roumania. Italian Minister in Roumania has received similar instructions.

[9801] No. 19.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 2, 1913.*

MOSS Line steamer "Mœris" signalled in passing out to Black Sea to His Majesty's ship "Zealandia" that yesterday five shots were fired at her from shore near Dokan Aslan, south-west of Charkeui. She was holed, but captain of "Zealandia" states that she did not appear to be seriously damaged.

It seems probable that shots were fired by Bulgarians, who may have taken red ensign for Turkish flag and mistaken ship for Turkish transport.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[9779] No. 20.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March 2, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 68 of the 26th February.

Russian Government have decided to disband their reservists as soon as Austrian forces on Galician frontier are reduced to a figure below that of Russian normal peace effective.

(Confidential.)

I am informed by M. Sazonof that the above-mentioned reservists number 380,000 men, but that their loss would not be felt, seeing that the recruits called up in October last were already fit for service.

[9814] No. 21.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, February 22, 1913.*

IN accordance with instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 33 and 35 of the 10th and 12th instant respectively, I took the opportunity of a recent visit to the Prime Minister to hand unofficially to his Excellency a memorandum with regard to the forcible conversion of Mohammedans by the Bulgarian population and officials, and to other reported outrages committed in the newly acquired territory in Macedonia.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of this memorandum which his Excellency received, saying that he would read it, and he remarked that he had no reason whatever to believe that any atrocities had been committed by Bulgarian regular troops.

He informed me to-day that he had sent the memorandum to the Minister of the Interior, from whom it would receive careful attention.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Memorandum communicated to Bulgarian Prime Minister.

REPORTS continue to reach His Majesty's Government regarding certain excesses that appear to have been committed by the Bulgarian population of the newly occupied territories, openly abetted in many cases by the military and civil authorities.

These reports relate principally to the compulsory conversion to Christianity of the population of the Ruptchos and Novrokop districts, and many instances of the forcible unveiling and violation of Mussulman women.

While making all due allowances for the possibility of exaggeration, so many and such detailed complaints have been received that it is impossible not to be convinced that, on the whole, these accounts of excesses represent truthfully the actual state of affairs in many districts.

On the 27th January for instance, it would appear that eighty or ninety inhabitants of the village of Beden, in the Ruptchos district, were driven into the small town of Shiroka Laka and forcibly baptised. After three days they were taken back to Devlen and made to figure as voluntary converts for the encouragement of the rest, being compelled by threats of actual violence to sign a written declaration that they had themselves petitioned for admission into the Christian Church. Similar proceedings are alleged to have taken place at Breza, Mihalkova, Tchurukova, and Seltche, and in all the other villages of the district where the mosques are closed, the women compelled to cast aside their veils and the Mouktars and Imams removed and kept under surveillance at Devlen.

These actions are reported to have been carried out by the gendarmes and reservists "under the personal direction of the military commandant and Civil Governor of Devlen, who declared that it was by order of King Ferdinand that there should be no more Moslems on Bulgarian soil."

It is not necessary to enter into details regarding the outrages on women, of which the individual details are necessarily rarely capable of substantiation, but enough information on this subject has reached His Majesty's Government from various sources to warrant the conviction that such acts have occurred with deplorable frequency.

That there are many honourable exceptions amongst the military and civil officials in these territories is well-known to His Majesty's Government, but that many of the authorities have connived at these disgraceful scenes is, it is to be believed, but too true.

His Majesty's Government feel impelled to point out to the Bulgarian Government in a friendly and unofficial manner how detrimental to the best interests of Bulgaria the currency of such reports as the above must be, and it is to be feared that the suspicion, even without the confirmation of their accuracy, would alone suffice to alienate sympathy from all those who might be held morally responsible for such occurrences.

His Majesty's Government therefore hope that the Bulgarian Government will interpret this communication in the spirit which has prompted it.

Sophia, February 1 (14), 1913.

[9922] No. 22.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir, *Odessa, February 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a reliable person who has just returned from travelling near the Austrian frontier, that is to say, in the Governments Volhynia, Podolia, and Grodno, tells me that everywhere he saw great accumulation of troops, especially cavalry, and warlike stores. He could not give me any details as to what units had been moved or completed, but he said that officers with whom he talked all expect war in a short time, and that constant arrests are being made of persons thought to be Austrian spies. It is impossible for me to complete or check this information without enquiry nearer to the parts affected.

At Odessa there are no visible preparations. At Sebastopol the fleet remains in commission, but I am told that there is no excitement.

I have, &c.
C. S. SMITH.

[9895] No. 23.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Bucharest, February 24, 1913.*

IN view of the discrepancy between the action recently taken by the representatives of the Great Powers at Sophia and that taken by those at Bucharest the following record may be of interest, though much of it has already been reported by telegraph or by despatch:—

In your telegram No. 11 of the 13th instant you informed me that you had urged upon the Roumanian Minister that, while a settlement by direct negotiation between Roumania and Bulgaria was far the best solution, yet, if that failed, resort to the mediation of all the Powers, or of one of them, would be preferable to resort to war. In pursuance of your instructions to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of your language to M. Misu, I read a translation of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 14th instant, leaving with his Excellency at his request the rough pencilled translation which I had brought with me. On the following day I was received in audience by the King and in course of conversation I repeated your language to His Majesty. On the 16th instant the German Minister received and acted on instructions to support the suggestion of mediation, and on the 17th the Austrian and Italian Ministers took action in the same sense. It was only on the 18th that I received your authorisation to join in a collective proposal to the Roumanian Government that they should submit the solution of their differences with Bulgaria to the decision of the Powers. On receipt of your telegram No. 16, which conveyed this authorisation, I saw my colleagues and found that only the French and Italian Ministers had received similar instructions. It was thus clear that no collective action could be taken in the sense indicated, and that afternoon, at the Minister for Foreign Affairs' weekly reception, his Excellency told the representatives of the Great Powers that he accepted in principle the proposal that the mediation of the Powers, or of some of them, should be sought. I should mention that that afternoon the Russian Minister and the French Minister, the former of whom had had no instructions regarding either the mediation proposal or regarding the collective step, both spoke in favour of submitting the decision to the Powers, though M. Majorescu would have none of it and chose to interpret what they said, as said in support of the mediation proposal.

On the following day my Russian colleague received instructions in regard to the collective step, and it was only on the 22nd instant that the German Minister received these instructions, and not till yesterday—the day after the Roumanian Government's formal acceptance of the mediation proposal—that the Austrian Minister received them.

It will be seen, therefore, that no collective action in the sense taken at Sophia yesterday was possible in Bucharest until after the Roumanian Government had formally accepted your suggestion of recourse to mediation which had had the express support of the German, Austrian, and Italian Ministers, and, according to the construction

placed by M. Maioresco on the advice tendered to him by M. Schébéko and M. Blondel on the 18th instant, the support of the Russian and French Ministers also.

Sir Henry Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 66 of the 17th instant had seemed to point to the favourable reception by the Bulgarian Government of your suggestion for mediation, and it was only last evening that I learned what an important divergence there had been between the action of the representatives at Sophia and that of those at Bucharest. This regrettable divergence has produced a somewhat awkward situation, Bulgaria having accepted a proposal of the Great Powers which has not been made to the Roumanian Government. Things can hardly be left to stand as they are, and I presume that an amending and explanatory representation will have to be made at either Sophia or Bucharest. In my opinion, it would be wiser to make this representation at Sophia than at Bucharest, advising the Bulgarian Government to accept mediation rather than to advise the Roumanian Government to submit the solution to the decision of the Powers. It is true that at Sophia the action taken by the representatives appears to have been collective, whereas that taken by the legations here had not that character; still, Bulgaria, having accepted something very like arbitration, should not properly be averse to mediation, a procedure which is of course technically less binding than arbitration; whereas, on the other hand, whatever may be the feeling of King Charles and of his leading Ministers—and they would themselves doubtless not be averse to arbitration—a clamourous outcry in the country against arbitration has been aroused by our representations in favour of mediation, and to press the Cabinet now to submit the solution of the dispute with Bulgaria to the decision of the Powers might precipitate a Ministerial crisis, and, were the King compelled to call the Liberals to power, war would be appreciably nearer. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the advice of the six Great Powers given to Roumania, as the result of the mediators' discussions, would not prove as effective in practice as a technically binding decision.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[9817] No. 24.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 24. Secret.)

Sir, *Sophia, February 25, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 15, secret, of the 6th instant, I had the honour to state that, in my opinion, the Servian Government would probably not be prepared to give their further unconditional aid to the Bulgarian Government in the resumption of hostilities beyond that already extended by the presence of 50,000 Servian troops at Adrianople.

At the same time I had the honour to point out that Servia would take advantage of the present situation in order to force the Bulgarian Government to permit Servia to remain in permanent possession of the triangle of Old Servia, which comprises the towns of Kuprulu, Perlepé and Monastir. This triangle, as you are aware from previous communications, is at present ear-marked as future Bulgarian territory.

I have now the honour to forward herewith translation of the four official notes which have passed between the two Governments on this subject up to date, which I have succeeded in obtaining: the enclosures are all marked "Secret" and the last one is also headed "Confidential."

An official request of this description, addressed by the Bulgarian Government to the Servian Government, shows, to those who are behind the scenes, the straits to which the former are reduced, and bears out the information contained in my telegram No. 73 of yesterday's date. It is only as a last resort that the Bulgarian Government would so humble their pride as to ask, not only the troops to aid in the investment of Adrianople, but also for artillery and ammunition.

Meanwhile the Bulgarian Government thoroughly understand what the Servian Government are really aiming at, and they in their turn hoped, in the first instance, to satisfy the Servian Government by the payment of an indemnity.

The Servian Prime Minister informed the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade of the impossibility of such a method of settlement, and added that his Government would consider a pecuniary indemnity for services thus rendered as an insult. M. Gueshof again, however, alludes to it in his note of the 4th (17th) instant (Enclosure 2). On receipt of this note, I am informed on the best authority, the Servian Minister called on

M. Gueshof and told his Excellency that he regretted that the Bulgarian Government had officially written respecting a pecuniary indemnity, as his Excellency well knew that a true Slav would sell "neither his sword nor his wife," and in this case Servia was sending her forces and all her war *matériel* to help her ally, without asking for any immediate recompense.

The result of this interview was the last obscure enclosure in the present despatch. On receipt of this the Servian Minister at once left for Belgrade to discuss the contents directly with M. Pasitch, and at the time of writing he has not yet returned.

To sum up, Servia is endeavouring to obtain an increase of territory at the expense of her ally, in compensation for the Adriatic littoral, which she considers she has been unjustly deprived of by Europe.

If she can persuade the Russian Government to obtain for her Dibra and Djakova with the surrounding districts, it will be so much gained. In any case she will work for the Old Servian triangle.

The question is not now likely to be of such a nature as seriously to disturb the European situation, as in the last resort both countries would appeal to Russia and she will probably decide in favour of Servia.

I shall hope to be able to continue to keep you informed of the course of these negotiations.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

Servian Minister to Bulgarian Government.

(Translation.)

M. le Président du Conseil, *Sophia, January 31 (February 13), 1913.*

BY order of the Royal Servian Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 27th January (9th February), M. Toshef, Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade asked M. Pasitch in the name of the Royal Bulgarian Government for Servia to aid the Bulgarian Government by sending them her siege guns, especially those just received.

The Bulgarian Government will accept the conditions that the Servian Government demand. On the same date the Servian Government received by the Servian military attaché, now at head-quarters, an identic request. The Servian Government have decided after a Cabinet Council held on the 11th February to send the guns asked for on condition that the Bulgarian Government returned them when no longer required; as regards a compensation, a further communication will be made to the Bulgarian Government.

In bringing the above to your Excellency's notice, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Servian Government will send the following:

1. Ten Schneider guns, 1897, with 300 shells each.
2. Eight Howitzers, 15 centimeters last model, as soon as they are mounted, with 500 shells each.
3. Sixteen new Howitzers, 12 centimeters, as soon as mounted, with 500 shells for each.

The above guns are now at Nisch. The first can be sent immediately, and the second and third lots in four or five days.

I avail, &c.
SPALAIKOVITCH

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

Bulgarian Government to Servian Minister.

(Translation).

M. le Ministre, *Sophia, February 4 (17), 1913.*

THE Royal Government has learned with satisfaction from your letter of the 31st January (13th February), that the Royal Servian Government have consented to send guns and ammunition for the siege of Adrianople, of which you send me the list annexed in your letter. The Bulgarian Government have charged me to ask your Excellency to transmit to the Servian Government their most cordial thanks for the

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promptitude with which they have replied, expressing their willingness to give satisfaction in the question, which is one of obvious necessity for the attainment of our joint aims.

As regards an indemnification to Servia for the guns and ammunition, the Bulgarian Government, as M. Toshef, our Minister at Belgrade has already stated, are ready to indemnify the Servian Government in an amount which will be fixed later.

I avail, &c.

J. E. GUESHOF.

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

Servian Minister to Bulgarian Government.

(Translation.)

M. le Président du Conseil, *February* 5 (18), 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received your note yesterday in reply to my letter of the 31st January (13th February). I willingly agree to your request and will at once transmit to my Government the expression of your cordial thanks for the promptitude with which the Servian Government have consented to send their heavy artillery and ammunition for the siege of Adrianople.

As to what concerns the question of compensation, this question, as I mentioned in my last communication, will be settled later on between the two Governments. I take this opportunity however to emphasise the fact that this compensation cannot be of a pecuniary nature, for the reasons which M. Pasitch has already given to M. Toshef, and which I also gave to your Excellency in our conversation on the 14th February.

I avail, &c.

SPALAIKOVITCH.

Enclosure 4 in No. 24.

Bulgarian Government to Servian Minister.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre, *February* 8 (21), 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 5th (18th) instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that as we knew that the Servian Government had guns and ammunition at Nisch, we proposed to take them against a pecuniary indemnity. If, however, the Servian Government, taking into consideration the fact that the work for which we requested these guns and ammunition is of importance to both of us as allies, will not accept an indemnity of this nature, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that we, while again thanking your Government, understand that in that case it can only be a question of another sort of indemnity, except (*sic*) the clauses of our treaty with Servia, and the military annexes therein contained, and especially article 7 of the agreement between the Bulgarian and Servian head-quarter staffs (chapter III concerning a war between Bulgaria, Servia and Turkey), of the 29th June (12th July), 1912.

I avail, &c.

J. E. GUESHOF.

[9818] No. 25.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Sophia, February 25*, 1913.

MILITARY operations have been at almost a complete standstill during the past fortnight, the last half of which has been marked by the absence of any official news from the front. The sorties made by the Turks on the 10th and 12th February were repulsed, according to Bulgarian reports, with a loss of over 1,000 men. On the 20th I learned that twenty-six new Creusot guns from Servia had been put into position, and were ready for use against the city and garrison of Adrianople. No news has, however, been received since then that would tend to show that any progress had been made thereby in reducing the fortress.

The last few days have, however, been marked by the belated advent of a typically vigorous Balkan winter, accompanied by a heavy fall of snow. These climatic conditions are considered by the Bulgarians as being in favour of their own troops rather than

of the Turks, whose ranks, they state, must be largely filled with men from the southern portions of Asiatic Turkey, whose light clothing and lack of experience of a northern winter must be occasioning amongst them severe sufferings and losses.

Private and trustworthy information reaches me to the effect that the Bulgarians have now almost literally "their last man in the field," and that they possess no more material for filling any further gaps in their ranks. Should any serious losses now be sustained they will inevitably have to fall back on their Servian and Greek allies. The only armed force in Bulgaria proper is a small territorial army kept in readiness near Varna to resist any possible Turkish attempt at a landing on the Black Sea coast.

This somewhat critical state of affairs renders all the more remarkable the calmness with which the whole nation contemplates the possibility of a war with Roumania. In my despatch No. 16, Confidential, of the 13th instant, I had the honour to report that the situation was undoubtedly more critical at that time than at any previous moment. The Roumanian Minister had actually spoken to me of his intention of leaving Sophia, with his whole staff, within a few days, should Bulgaria not show a proper spirit of concession.

The only offer of the Bulgarian Government appears, however, to have been one made in writing on the 15th instant—to agree to a rectification of frontier, to cede a portion of the Black Sea littoral, with its hinterland, north of Cape Shabla, together with Medjid Tabya. This offer on the part of the Bulgarian Government was evidently due to the action taken by my Russian and French colleagues and myself.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 38 of the 13th instant I took an early opportunity of speaking to the Prime Minister in the sense of your statements to the Bulgarian Minister in London; my Russian and French colleagues also spoke in the same sense, expressing the hope that Bulgaria would make the best offer she could to Roumania. The Prime Minister, who is personally inclined to mediation, informed me that he was meeting with much opposition in his Cabinet.

On the 15th instant, at the urgent request of M. Nekludof, I met the Russian and French Ministers at the French Legation, and we discussed the situation at some length.

The Russian Minister had, he informed us, received a visit the night before from M. Danef, who had shown himself quite obdurate on the question of making any further concessions than those he had made in London. After an hour's conversation, in which M. Nekludof appears to have used very firm language, his Excellency informed M. Danef that he was in no sense of the word a negotiator, and that he was unable to comprehend why he had ever undertaken that rôle. His Excellency had then seen King Ferdinand's "chef de cabinet," and had requested him to inform His Majesty that a rupture of negotiations was certain to occur should the Bulgarian Government continue to maintain their present attitude and refuse to make any further concessions to Roumania. M. Nekludof then made a proposal that he should address a strong unofficial letter to the Prime Minister, pointing out how grave the situation had become, and expressing the hope that the Bulgarian Government would offer to cede to the Roumanian Government at least an extension of territory on the Black Sea littoral up to and inclusive of Cape Shabla, lying north of Kavarna, together with Medjid Tabya. The letter concluded with the statement that if the Bulgarian Government remained obdurate in the matter they would to a large extent forfeit the support of the Russian Government and of the other Governments well disposed towards them. I have the honour to enclose a copy of M. Nekludof's letter. M. Panafieu and I both approved of the tenour of the communication, which was duly sent, with the result mentioned above.

The uncompromising attitude of M. Danef is undoubtedly due to the fact that, as the chief of an important political party, and as a probable successor to M. Gueshof as Prime Minister, he is making a bid for popularity with the masses of the nation.

The most hopeful sign of a possible pacific solution is the continuance in office of M. Gueshof, who is sufficiently patriotic to incur the risk of losing office and of retiring into private life, an eventuality which his advanced age and his large personal fortune, as well as the eminent services which he has rendered to his country, enable him to contemplate with comparative equanimity. Whatever the ultimate decision of the Bulgarian Government may be, their prime object at present is to gain time; the rumours as to the concentration at Varna of forces for use against Roumania are entirely without foundation.

On the 17th I was able to inform you that the Bulgarian Government were understood to be contemplating instructing their Ministers to inform the Great Powers that they were willing to accept mediation.

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Considerable excitement was caused on the 19th by the news received by the Cabinet from the Bulgarian representative in Bucharest to the effect that the Roumanian Government purposed calling out their reserves, and at the same time summoning Prince Chika, the Roumanian Minister at Sophia, to Bucharest to discuss with him the critical situation of affairs. This information appears to have been premature, as Sir G. Barclay telegraphed on the 20th (Bucharest telegram No. 38) that no decision had been actually taken in this sense. The report, however, of such an inopportune and untimely display of pressure produced on the Bulgarian Government the most unfortunate impression, and M. Téodoroff, the Minister of Finance, who came to see me on that day, informed me that his colleagues in the Cabinet considered such a step most reprehensible, and that they were indignant at the proposed method of procedure, adding that such ill-feeling would thereby be created that they would have to depart from their present policy and call on their Servian allies to aid them in resisting the Roumanian territorial pretensions.

His Excellency went so far as to inform me that Bulgaria could count on obtaining six divisions from Servia, and that the Bulgarian Government could detach one division from Adrianople and combine it with the 8,000 troops at Varna for this purpose.

The Prime Minister confirmed this news on the following day, and requested me to inform you that he earnestly hoped that you would use all your influence at Bucharest to prevent any such step on the part of the Roumanian Government.

The views of the Bulgarian Government are that the question of the cession of territory by them is naturally a vital question, while the demand for territory on the part of Roumania, being merely prompted by *amour-propre*, the responsibility of endangering the peace of Europe would fall entirely upon the Roumanian Government.

This argument may appear somewhat different from the Roumanian perspective, but it is generally considered sound by all my colleagues in Sophia, and would undoubtedly have weight in any international and impartial decision.

On the 23rd instant a further step was taken in the direction of peace when I joined with my colleagues of the Great Powers, in accordance with instructions received from you in your telegram No. 44 of the 17th instant, in a collective *démarche*, requesting the Bulgarian Government to submit the solution of their differences to the Powers. A written identic reply was returned to us on the following day, 24th, in which the Prime Minister stated that :—

" Le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie, confiant dans l'esprit de haute justice des Grandes Puissances, accepte la proposition de s'en remettre pour la solution du différend bulgare-roumain à la décision des six Puissances si la Roumanie l'accepte aussi."

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Russian Minister to Bulgarian Prime Minister.

Sophia, le 2 (15) *février*, 1913.

PERMETTEZ-MOI, à cette dernière heure, et vu l'extrême gravité de la situation, de vous répéter encore une fois ce que je vous ai dit hier.

Le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg, dans sa grande sollicitude envers la Bulgarie, considère, comme vous le savez, qu'aujourd'hui à la séance décisive qui va avoir lieu entre les délégués bulgare et le Ministre de Roumanie, les premiers n'ont qu'un moyen d'empêcher la rupture des négociations, qui est celui de répondre aux propositions que va faire le Prince Ghika par la contre-proposition convenue entre vous et moi et entre M. Sazonof et M. Bobtchef.

Cette proposition serait que la Bulgarie, pour prouver son sincère désir d'éviter le conflit le plus regrettable, offre à la Roumanie, en sus de ce qui était consigné dans le protocole de Londres, le fort de Medid-Tabia et une extension du littoral à céder jusqu'à la hauteur du village de Sabla.

J'ai vu hier M. Danef et ce qu'il m'a dit sur la façon dont il veut procéder à la réunion d'aujourd'hui m'a donné l'impression la plus désastreuse, car ce serait la rupture certaine ; en effet, déclarer au négociateur de la partie adverse, comme veut le faire M. Danef, que les délégués bulgares refusent sa proposition et ne font des contre-propositions nouvelles qu'à titre tout à fait personnel—et encore, sous condition qu'elles seraient retirées si elles n'étaient pas acceptées immédiatement—déclarer cela, ce serait

mettre tous les torts du côté bulgare et forcer, dans le fond, la partie adverse à rompre les négociations.

Je ne puis vous cacher, M. le Président du Conseil, qu'une pareille façon de procéder ferait la plus mauvaise impression auprès des Gouvernements qui s'intéressent sincèrement à la cause bulgare et les mettrait peut-être dans l'impossibilité de soutenir cette cause avec succès.

Les présentes lignes, je tiens à le marquer, n'ont aucun caractère officiel. Elles ne sont dictées exclusivement par le profond intérêt que je porte à la Bulgarie et par la conviction qu'elles expriment fidèlement non seulement les vues et les intentions de mon Gouvernement, mais aussi celles des Gouvernements amis. Je vous supplie, par conséquent, de faire part du contenu de la présente à vos collègues et à MM. Danef et Saratof.

NEKLUDOF.

[9819] No. 26.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Sophia, February* 25, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a document handed to me by M. Teodorof, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance.

His Excellency called on me the other day on his return from London and stated that after the war his Government wished to raise in England a loan for 4,000,000*l.*, and he was anxious that it should be taken up in Great Britain by British bankers.

I explained to his Excellency that neither His Majesty's Government nor His Majesty's Legation occupied themselves directly in such matters, in contradistinction to the French Government and the French Legation.

I consented, however, at M. Teodorof's personal request, to transmit the document to the Foreign Office. His Excellency trusted that it would be brought to the notice of some of the leading London bankers.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Note communicated to Sir H. Bax-Ironside by Bulgarian Minister of Finance.

LE Gouvernement bulgare désire faire en Angleterre un emprunt d'État pour la somme de capital nominal 100,000,000 de francs, soit 4,000,000*l.*, dans le but de procéder à la conversion de l'emprunt d'État bulgare 6 pour cent, 1892, montant à 80,000,000 de francs en titres de 4½ pour cent du nouvel emprunt. L'émission d'un nouvel emprunt peut être ajournée jusqu'après la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, mais les conditions de l'emprunt peuvent être arrêtées dès à présent, pour que le contrat puisse être présenté à l'Assemblée nationale jusqu'au 15 (28) mars de cette année. Les titres à convertir sont placés : 25,000,000 environ en Bulgarie, 20,000,000 en Angleterre, 20,000,000 en Autriche et 15,000,000 en Allemagne.

[9820] No. 27.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Sophia, February* 25, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 34 of the 10th instant, I presented a memorandum to the Bulgarian Government, pointing out that the levying of customs duties by the Bulgarian authorities at Kavalla on British goods which had already paid duty to a similar amount at Salonica was inconsistent with British rights under the Capitulations, and expressing the hope that such action would be discontinued. I have the honour to

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enclose herewith copy of the memorandum in question, together with copy of the reply which I have to-day received from the Bulgarian Government.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Memorandum presented to Bulgarian Prime Minister.

REPORTS have reached His Majesty's Government to the effect that a 10 per cent. import duty is being levied at Kavalla on British goods which have already paid duty of a similar amount at Salonica.

His Britannic Majesty's Minister has accordingly the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to point out to the Bulgarian Government that such action is inconsistent with British rights under the Capitulations, and to express, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the hope that it may be discontinued.

Sophia, January 30 (*February* 12), 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Note verbale.

LE Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de communiquer à la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique, en réponse au mémorandum en date du 30 janvier (12 février), les détails ci-dessous fournis par le Département des Finances.

Les autorités bulgares n'ont pas été en mesure de procéder à une double taxation en douane des marchandises de provenance étrangère importées en Macédoine par la voie de Salonique, pour la bonne raison qu'il n'a pas même été pourvu jusqu'à ce jour à la désignation d'un bureau de douane qui serait chargé de taxer ces marchandises.

Il se peut que les autorités douanières bulgares de Kavala, Dédéagatch et Karaagatch (Port-Lagos) aient perçu des droits d'entrée à l'importation des marchandises de provenance étrangère, retransportées par voie de mer de Salonique à destination de ces trois ports—en admettant que le cas de ce double transport se soit produit—mais cela s'explique par le fait qu'il est très difficile d'établir si ces marchandises arrivent de Salonique en transit ou autrement, étant donnée la présence en ce dernier port d'une administration douanière étrangère. La meilleure solution en ce cas serait que, au moment de l'arrivée de leurs marchandises à Salonique, les armateurs étrangers déclarent ces marchandises en transit, ou bien les fassent transborder sur un autre navire, à destination de Kavala, Dédéagatch ou Karaagatch (Port-Lagos) sans les décharger préalablement dans le port; de cette manière, ils ne seraient pas inquiétés par la douane de Salonique et ne paieraient les droits d'entrée que dans le port où les cargaisons seront définitivement déposées à terre.

Du reste, il est douteux que des cas de cette nature se présentent souvent, vu que Kavala et Dédéagatch reçoivent directement de l'étranger tout ce qui est destiné à leur rayon et ne dépendent guère sous ce rapport de Salonique.

Le Ministère des Finances estime, par ailleurs, que la double taxation en douane des marchandises qui sont réexpédiées par la voie de terre pour les régions occupées par les armées serbes ou bulgares, peut être évitée au moyen d'une démarche auprès du Gouvernement Royal de Grèce, qui serait invitée à laisser passer ces marchandises en transit et, par suite, à ne pas le soumettre à des droits d'entrée.

Sophia, le 12 (25) *février*, 1913.

[9832] No. 28.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 161.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 27, 1913.

IN my telegram No. 103 of the 20th instant I had the honour to report that by the sale of the barracks situated in the Taxim quarter of Pera, with the large piece of

ground immediately opposite known as the Champs de Mars, the whole of a superficies of some 150,000 square metres, and the Bourse building in Galata, the Government has been able to obtain some temporary and small financial relief to the extent of £T. 500,000.

Although all the conditions of sale have not been disclosed, it is, however, understood that £T. 200,000 of the purchase-money is to be paid at once, and that in the event of more advantageous terms being subsequently offered by other would-be purchasers the Government retain the right to repurchase the property at any time within a year from the date of the present sale, the present buyers receiving £T. 50,000 over and above the amount originally paid.

The property has been acquired by the Société nationale pour le Commerce, l'Industrie et l'Agriculture dans l'Empire ottoman, a company founded in Constantinople in 1909, and having on its board the following:—

Marshal Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha;
E. Eugenidi, local banker;
Prince Ferid Pasha;
Ismail Djenani, Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Palace;
Mehmed Hamdi Bey;
J. Azarian, local banker;
L. Pissard, director-general of the Public Debt Admistration;
E. Salem, a prominent Jewish lawyer of Salonica;
L. Zarifi, local banker;
M. J. Thors is the vice-president of the Paris board, and Benac, G. de Fredaignes, A. Mirabaud, J. E. Moret, Baron de Neuflize, A. Turettino are members.

It is interesting to note that the transaction just concluded between the Government and the Société nationale is nothing more than the realisation of the negotiations which took place between the Société and the Government in 1910 and beginning of 1911. The contract of sale of the property was at the time submitted to Parliament, and was severely criticised in the Chamber, and also in the local press, and claims to the property were, moreover, put forward by the Greek Patriarchate. The Greek claims do not seem to have had much weight, but in view of the criticism which had been aroused the Chamber seems to have reserved its decision pending a further consideration of the whole question. I would add that the Banque d'Anvers took part in the recent negotiations, and competed with the Société nationale for the purchase of the property, but it has transpired that that financial institution was only acting for the Deutsche Orient Bank.

The German Ambassador, in the course of conversation, wished to convey the impression that the action of the Deutsche Orient Bank through the Banque d'Anvers was solely prompted by the desire of putting French protestations against giving any financial assistance to the Turkish Government to the test. The German bank were perfectly well aware they had no chance of success, and merely competed with the object of exposing the French.

By the sale just concluded the Government will be enabled to pay some of the salaries due; the total amount of these at present amount to about £T. 800,000.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[9833] No. 29.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 162.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 26, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose translations in résumé of articles in the "Ikdam," concerning Hakki Pasha's utterances in London, and in the "Tanin," on "The question of the islands and England."* In the first the writer comments on the Porte's anxiety to avoid direct negotiations with the allies and to rely rather on the good offices of Europe; in other words, to prevent a San Stefano stage in the peace pourparlers and to bring about another "Berlin," based on the doctrines of the *status quo* and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The latter doctrine was ignored by Austria in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina; by Italy in the case of Tripoli and

* Not printed.

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Cyrenaica; and by the Balkan allies in the extent to which their territorial gains will be confirmed. Its reaffirmation, coupled with the *status quo*, will have the opposite effect in the matters of Egypt and the Aden hinterland, as in the case of such islands as may remain "Ottoman." The Balkan States, on the other hand, feel that the doctrine of the *status quo* has meant that Europe has been bound to close her eyes to a perpetuation of maladministration and other evils. If Turkey wishes the integrity of her remaining possessions to be guaranteed by Europe, such guarantee ought at least to be made conditional on her having a form of government in the capital that would enable her to dispense with the secret and irresponsible court-martial, which, with the exception of a brief interlude, has been the pivot of government here since the dethronement of the ex-Sultan in April 1909, and on her ensuring a decent administration in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians and Kurds.

In the second article in the "Tanin" the writer points out that, as far as Turkey is concerned, the future of the Ægean Islands is a more important question than that of Adrianople, the statement being an indication of a weakening on the subject of the latter town, the retention of which a few weeks ago was held to be absolutely indispensable to Turkey's continued existence.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the views of the present Turkish Cabinet on the subject of the islands coincide with the policy in the matter of the Triple Alliance, and more especially with that of Italy. The present tendency here is to make capital out of the question by pointing out to the Ottoman public that while the Triple Alliance is rendering a service to Turkey, the Triple *Entente* is siding with the allies against Turkey.

The writer in the "Tanin" further endeavours to represent that in virtue of the Cyprus convention England is specially bound to defend the integrity of Turkey's Asiatic possessions in the matter of the islands, on the theory that the latter virtually form part of Asia Minor. It will be remembered that after the Armenian massacres in 1895–6, the present Lord Curzon, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, in reply to a question on the subject in the House of Commons, stated that, in view of Turkey's failure to carry out the promised reforms on Armenia, Great Britain's obligations arising out of the Cyprus convention had "lapsed."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[9923] No. 30.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Odessa, February 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that a friend who arrived this morning by way of Volochisk from Austria informs me that in that country great numbers of soldiers are to be seen near the frontier, and that all culverts, bridges, &c., are strongly guarded.

I have, &c.
C. S. SMITH.

[9852] No. 31.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February 28, 1913.*

AN article on the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance appeared in the Paris "Temps" of the 25th instant, in which it is stated that "the boundary line between the Turkish territory which might become respectively Servian and Bulgarian was traced in detail and in a definite manner in the instrument which binds the two countries. This line excludes Veles, Prilep, Okrida, and Monastir from the regions to which Servia can lay claim. There have been no subsequent arrangements between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments, and it is most unlikely that there will be any, for the treaty foresaw all possible eventualities."

These statements, which are thought here to originate with my Bulgarian colleague, M. Toshof, have, I am told by M. Stefanovitch, caused an unfortunate impression both in Government circles and in the public.

M. Toshof's views on the subject were referred to in my despatch No. 3 of the 7th January last, and I have but little doubt that he is in fact the "source absolument sûre" from which the correspondent of the "Temps" states that he drew his information.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[9841] No. 32.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, March 1, 1913.*

I CALLED upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and laid before him the views concerning Scutari and Djakova contained in your telegram No. 96 of the 28th ultimo.

I also furnished his Excellency with an *aide-mémoire*, giving the substance of the telegram itself.

Herr von Jagow at once said that he was really unable to see his way to urging the Austro-Hungarian Government to make any further concessions. He had already gone as far as he could in the way of advice in persuading them to yield on the question of Dibra, and he knew that they would make no further concessions. I asked him whether he meant that the Austro-Hungarian Government had told him that they absolutely refused to give Djakova to Servia. He replied that they had given him clearly to understand that they would be glad if he would not press them to make any further concessions. I said that I knew how anxious he was personally to see the question settled, and I reminded him that he had often told me that it was also the earnest desire of the Austro-Hungarian Government that all dangerous complications should be avoided. Scutari was a question of extreme delicacy, and if, as you had said, the cession of Djakova and the consequent agreement by Russia to the rest of the Austrian line would make her a party to an arrangement which would have the effect of preventing Montenegro from acquiring or, if she should take it, from retaining Scutari, was it not worth the sacrifice of a comparatively unimportant town like Djakova to secure the elimination of what was generally admitted to be the most dangerous point in dispute? To secure this result was, I venture to add, certainly worth any amount of trouble, and so I hoped that he might be induced to make some further effort to persuade Austria-Hungary to give way on the question of Djakova. On his again expressing his inability to do so, I said that at all events I hoped he would inform the Austro-Hungarian Government of your views and recommend them seriously to their consideration. He replied that he would certainly communicate your arguments to Count Berchtold, but that he must leave it to his judgment whether or not to adopt the course which you recommended. His Excellency added that he quite saw the point of your argument, and that no one more than he desired to see the question of Scutari out of the way, but he could not, for the reason he had given me, press any further advice on the Austro-Hungarian Government. After I had enlarged on the difficult position in which the Russian Government would be placed if, besides having let Austria-Hungary have her own way in the Adriatic port question, they now became parties to an agreement which would deprive both Montenegro and Servia of towns on which they had set their heart, his Excellency again repeated his conviction that Austria-Hungary had made far greater concessions in matters that directly affected her interests than Russia had done. Moreover, he added, although the Austro-Hungarian Government attached great importance to the retention for Albania of as many towns as possible, it was now, in his opinion, not only a question of retaining Djakova, but one involving Austria-Hungary's prestige. There was no doubt, he said, that the net results of recent events in the Balkans had been unfavourable to Austria, and she had had, apart from the concessions she had made, to give up many of her cherished ideas. Now the very fact that Russia had made herself the advocate, and in fact become the mouthpiece, of most of the Balkan States, in itself gave the general impression that Austria-Hungary's influence and prestige in the Balkans was at the vanishing point. That was very hard for Austria to bear, and to give way further would certainly strengthen that impression. Public opinion in Austria would become still more excited even than it now was, and Count Berchtold's position would become

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one of the greatest difficulty. He must remind me, moreover, that the maintenance of Austria's prestige and influence was a matter of vital interest to Germany.

Returning to the subject of Scutari, Herr von Jagow expressed some doubts as to whether, if Austria yielded on the question of Djakova and in the meantime Scutari fell and was occupied by the Montenegrins, Russia would stand quietly by should it be found necessary to expel the Montenegrins by force. I repeated to him your view that if the Austrians gave Djakova to Servia, and Russia agreed, as was most probable, to the rest of the Austrian line, the mere fact of that agreement would tie Russia's hands as regards Scutari; and that, moreover, if it was clearly understood in Montenegro that Russia would stand aloof, it was more than likely that no force would have to be used. He said, however, that whatever arrangement might be made between Austria-Hungary and Russia, he could feel no confidence that Russia would remain quiet if the Montenegrin troops once entered Scutari and pressure of any kind was brought upon Montenegro to evacuate it. Not that he thought that Russia cared so very much for Montenegro; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that Russia was working for Servia and was speculating on the chance of the Montenegrin dynasty falling, and the country being incorporated into Servia. Such an arrangement would give Servia all she wanted, and would no doubt be highly agreeable to Russia.

I endeavoured to combat this view, and reminded him that his suspicions hardly tallied with what he had said to me in previous conversations, namely, that Russia was really anxious to avoid war as she knew it would be her ruin. He did not, however, argue the point, and only said that he hoped and trusted that Scutari would not fall before peace was made between Turkey and the allies, when the general sense of relief would no doubt contribute greatly to a satisfactory settlement of the Albanian question and others of similar difficulty.

Finally, he begged me to assure you that both he and the Imperial Government highly appreciated the efforts you have made and are making to smooth the way to a settlement, and to express to you his great regret that for the reasons he had given he was unable at the present moment to assist you in your arduous task by bringing further pressure to bear upon the Austro-Hungarian Government.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[10207] No. 33.

Note communicated by Italian Embassy, March 3, 1913.

THE Associazione Cotoniera Italiana have expressed their hope that the Governments of the Great Powers will exercise their influence to secure that whatever tariff changes may be brought about as a result of the present conflict, the position of exporters to the territories acquired by the allies at the expenses of Turkey shall not be prejudiced by the imposition of any higher duties than those which are levied at present.

It is understood that a similar demand has been put to His Majesty's Government by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.

Italian Embassy, March 3, 1913.

[9989] No. 34.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 27th February.

The following is the identic telegram sent this evening to the respective Governments by the Ministers of the Great Powers:—

"Nous avons fait aujourd'hui la démarche collective prescrite.

"Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères nous a répondu que le Gouvernement ne pouvait revenir sur la détermination qu'il nous a notifiée, le 22 février; que ce serait mettre en péril les intérêts de la paix, que nous envisageons, car le Gouvernement, en présence d'une nouvelle décision, telle que celle que nous [? proposons], serait probablement renversé, et le Cabinet qui viendrait au pouvoir serait certainement

plus belliqueux que le Cabinet actuel; qu'à son avis il vaudrait mieux que la réunion d'Ambassadeurs, qui sera plus tard chargée de préparer la transaction à recommander à la Roumanie et à la Bulgarie, fût dès maintenant appelée à mettre d'accord les réponses roumaine et bulgare; qu'il se portait garant que la proposition formulée par les Puissances serait, quelle qu'elle soit, respectée par la Roumanie; et que, s'il était sûr que le secret fût gardé à Sophia, il n'hésiterait pas à nous confirmer formellement cette opinion. Cette combinaison, nous a-t-il dit, en terminant, permettrait à la Bulgarie d'aller devant la réunion des Ambassadeurs en n'invoquant qu'une médiation qu'ils sauraient être l'équivalent de l'arbitrage et qui n'obligerait pas le Gouvernement roumain à avouer publiquement qu'il a préalablement accepté la décision des Puissances."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks that our representations may be treated as secret, and especially his own remarks about being bound by the decision of the mediators.

[10054] No. 35.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 3, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 35 of 27th February: Interference with administration of Ottoman Debt.

Foreign Office state that German Government are considering the question, and will probably join proposed protest at Belgrade.

[10044] No. 36.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 3, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 1st March: Massacres in Albania.

Vice-consul from Uskub arrived here. He has no reliable evidence as yet, but is investigating certain facts which have come to his notice and which he thinks may prove definitely the perpetration of outrages by Servian soldiers.

[10045] No. 37.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 51 of 28th February: Mediation of Powers.

All my colleagues except the Russian have received instructions and are prepared to act. This has occurred in almost every instance here when a collective step has had to be taken.

[10068] No. 38.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 3, 1913.*

DJAKOVA.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that on this last point deadlock had now occurred. Austria would not yield, and Germany had exhausted her efforts at Vienna, and would go no further from fear of indisposing the Austrian Government. Such measures as Italy's efforts also ceased to be profitable. He

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was therefore now supporting suggestion which had been discussed between Russian and Italian Ambassadors in London that appointment of a technical commission to examine geographical and ethnographical conditions should be resorted to, but only for Djakova, other issues being practically settled. He felt that it would become easier for Russia to yield if, as he anticipated, the commission decided that it should be Albanian. Time would be gained and appearances saved.

[10063] No. 39.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 3, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that he had received the answer of the Roumanian Government to the effect that they accepted mediation of the Powers, but not the acceptance of their decision. Any other reply would involve the fall of the Ministry and their replacement by a more warlike combination. This would also result from a withdrawal of claim to Silistria. On the other hand, the reports that he had received showed that Bulgaria was now on the point of yielding as regards Silistria, and if she did so Roumania would probably diminish her claims on the Black Sea coast. The difficulty was the opposition of Russia to cession of Silistria, but he was convinced of the necessity if a conflict was to be avoided.

[10069] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 3, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 111 of 26th February.

During last few days Government has been effecting arrests in connection with an alleged plot, which it is asserted is traceable to Prince Sabahedin, nephew of the Sultan, and had for object to bring about a *contre-coup d'État* to that of 23rd January in the event of fall of Adrianople. Opposition assert plot is not genuine, and is manufactured to give Committee pretext for terrorising or getting rid of their political adversaries, and believe return of Enver Bey and present concentration of troops in neighbourhood of capital are with a view to dealing with internal situation.

A fresh crop of rumours as to imminence of capitulation of Adrianople has sprung up in native circles during last few days.

(Sent to Sophia and Athens.)

[10072] No. 41.

Consul Clive Bayley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Warsaw, March 3, 1913.*

ON 1st March sudden orders were issued by police to house-owners to obtain from all reservists their books and tickets and to deliver them to police. If this is not a war preparation it may be a precautionary measure against a proposed anti-Russian demonstration during Romanoff fêtes.

[10352] No. 42.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.*

THE reply of the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as given in Sir George Barclay's telegram, No. 54 of the 2nd instant, was read to the meeting of Ambassadors to-day.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 160), Sir E. Goschen (No. 91), Sir R. Rodd (No. 71), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 104).

The meeting came to the following resolution :—

"Sir E. Grey a reçu du représentant britannique à Bucarest un télégramme du 2 mars relatant un entretien avec M. Majorescu, lequel a déclaré sous le sceau du secret qu'il se portait garant que la proposition formulée par les Puissances serait, quelle qu'elle fût, respectée par la Roumanie, et qu'il conviendrait d'appeler dès maintenant à chercher un accord entre les réponses roumaine et bulgare à la réunion d'Ambassadeurs, qui sera chargée de préparer la transaction sur les différends actuels.

"Vu cette déclaration, la réunion pense qu'il importe de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Bucarest et à Sophia de s'enquérir auprès des Gouvernements roumain et bulgare de leurs préférences au sujet de la capitale où devrait s'exercer la médiation, et de charger les Ambassadeurs réunis dans cette capitale de proposer les communications à adresser aux deux partis."

The Austrian, Italian, German, and French Ambassadors stated that their Governments had sent instructions to their representatives to join in asking the allies to accept mediation on the same terms as Turkey had accepted it. The Russian Ambassador assumed that his Government had done the same.

The Austrian Ambassador stated that his Government had instructed their representatives to make the same *démarche* about the civil population in the besieged towns, if the other representatives were similarly instructed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10090] No. 43.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Athens, February 27, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a Royal decree, prohibiting the transfer of real property, otherwise than by will or other post-obituary instrument, in the territories occupied by the Greek armies. The decree has retroactive effect up to the day following the declaration of war, but is subject to ratification by the Chamber on the first opportunity.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 43.

(Translation.)

Royal Decree concerning Prohibition of the Transfer of Ownership of Real Estate situated in the Territories which have been occupied or which shall be occupied by the Army.

ARTICLE 1. Every legal transaction during life by which is transferred the ownership of, or is established another substantial right over, any real property whatsoever situated in the territories which have been or which shall be occupied by our troops, is prohibited under penalty of the absolute invalidity of the transaction and of the transfer or establishment of the substantial right.

Art. 2. The cession of any right of leasing, working, or prospecting in mines, quarries, excavations, fisheries, mineral waters, forests, salt pans, rivers, lakes, or other waters is prohibited under penalty of the absolute invalidity of the cession, not even a right of priority being accorded to those who demand such rights.

Art. 3. The prohibition in the foregoing articles includes also every preliminary agreement containing any of the above prohibited covenants.

Art. 4. The operation of the present decree commences retrospectively from the 5th (18th) October, 1912, until its legal removal.

Art. 5. The present decree shall be submitted for legislative ratification to the Chamber as soon as it meets.

Salonica, January 25 (February 7), 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[10123] No. 44.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received March 4.)

Sophia, February 27, 1913.

My dear Mallet,

ENCLOSED is from Mr. Young, the vice-consul at Philippopoli, who has recently returned from distributing relief in Macedonia, with the consent of the Foreign Office.

I think you will find his letter of interest.

Yours sincerely,
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(Private and Confidential.)

Philippopoli, February 12, 1913.

Dear Sir Henry,

I HAD hoped to send you to-day or to-morrow a report of the five weeks' tour from which I have just returned, but I am in bed with a bad chill and fear there may be some delay. The state of things in the districts of Serres, Drama, Gumuljina, and Dedeagatch is at present very unpromising. In all these districts the Bulgarian forces met with practically no opposition; yet they have laid waste the country-side, and pillaged almost all the towns. The number of murders committed in the towns can be estimated, but the horrors perpetrated in the villages will never be known with accuracy, and were perhaps better left alone. It may be said that this is "war" and inevitable; but the fact is, so far as the districts in question are concerned, it never was war, but an unopposed raid. No doubt much of the harm was done by komitajis; but, until the Bulgarian military authorities take steps to discriminate and punish, it is difficult for foreigners to distinguish between the deeds of one arm of their forces and those of another. When I was at Serres the other day, Tchernopeief (the author of the Kavalla murders) and Sandansky were both stopping at the principal hotel, and they and their followers were obviously on the best of terms with the authorities.

The Moslem population of the district mentioned above is, taken as a whole, ruined. This, in view of the absence of opposition, seems a piece of incredible folly on the part of the occupying State; and may perhaps be accounted for by one of two hypotheses, viz., (1) the Bulgarians, not dreaming that they would be permitted to retain permanently all the territory through which they advanced, acted as though in the enemy's country and simply pillaged, murdered, and devastated to the utmost; (2) it may perhaps have been decided at Sophia that, in view of the extent of the occupied territory, the only possibility of holding and administering it lay in wiping out the Moslem element. However it may be, the country has suffered a cruel and utterly needless blow from which it will take at least a generation to recover.

It is superfluous to criticise the present administration, which is, no doubt, only provisional. The best part of Bulgaria is probably still in the field, which is sufficient to account for the circumstance that the occupied provinces are just now for the most part in the hands of a very questionable crowd of adventurers from Sophia and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the sufferings of the Moslem population are enhanced by a mediæval attempt to convert them to Bulgarian Christianity. Missionary priests and komitajis are the instruments of this policy, and the means adopted would create sensation at Exeter Hall.

In short, the occupation of these provinces is a sad story of needless cruelty, petty corruption, and administrative folly, which, under the most favourable conditions, it will take years to redeem. Trade and industry (tobacco especially) are dislocated, and business is at a standstill. All this, of course, is inevitable in parts of Thrace, &c., where there has been fighting; but might, I am convinced, have been in great part avoided, *e.g.*, in these rich provinces where there has been no fighting, where, on the contrary, the troops were received with open arms by the population, and where a decent administration would have been welcomed by Christian and Moslem alike. It seems to be the hope of all that Europe may still find the means to take a practical interest in their fate.

Yours sincerely,
H. W. YOUNG.

P.S.—Reading one's English newspapers for the first time for five weeks, it seems curious how little the state of things is realised. But the fact is that the difficulty of obtaining a permit to travel, and the uncertainty of all communication, have divided the country into watertight compartments, with a result that at Serres, for instance, little or nothing is known of events at Gumuljina and *vice versâ*. The outside world, of course, knows less still. No newspaper-men are admitted, and the only travellers I met were a few buyers of tobacco. In the circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that the "Times" correspondent at Constantinople should rather give himself away. In the "Times," too, of the 29th January, there is a letter (probably from P. Howell) which may be very true as regards northern Thrace, but is hopelessly misleading if intended to cover other parts of the Adrianople vilayet. The same applies to various letters from the Quakers and others who travel by courtesy of the Bulgarian authorities and, of necessity, get their "facts" and impressions through the medium of a Bulgarian interpreter.

H. W. Y.

[10197] No. 45.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 13.)

Belgrade, March 1, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 24 of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit copy of a note which I have received from the Servian Government stating that the salt works of Cavaya are not now and have not been at any time occupied by Servian military.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 45.

Note communicated to Sir R. Paget by Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

EN se référant au mémorandum en date du 3 février dernier que la Légation Royale a bien voulu lui adresser, le Ministère Royal des Affaires Etrangères s'est enquis auprès des autorités militaires du fait d'occupation signalé concernant les salines de Cavaya (circonscription de Durazzo).

Ce Ministère a par suite l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de la Légation Royale que, du rapport transmis à ce sujet par le commandant de la garnison de Cavaya, il résulte que lesdites salines ne sont maintenant nullement occupées par des autorités militaires serbes, non plus qu'elles ne l'ont été à aucun moment.

Belgrade, le 13 (26) *février*, 1913.

[10198] No. 46.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 44.)

Belgrade, March 1, 1913.

Sir,

MY French colleague tells me that M. Spalaikovitch, the Servian Minister in Sophia, called upon him last week and in the course of conversation expressed the fervent hope that questions pending between the Balkan allies would be settled by a conference of the Powers. He said the allies were altogether incapable of settling their several claims regarding boundaries and possession of certain places between themselves, and that if the Powers did not come to their assistance there would certainly be disagreement and disaster.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[10216] No. 47.

National Bank of Turkey to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received March 4.)

50, *Cornhill, London, March 3, 1913.*

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 26th February, I am instructed to point out that article 7 of the contract of the 1st (14th) February, 1912, assigns the revenues referred to, to the contracting banks "in order to ensure the payment of capital and interest of the Treasury bills," and states specifically that the payment of these revenues is to be made to the National Bank of Turkey "en exécution de la garantie accordée par le présent article au paiement en capital et intérêts des susdits bons." The principal and interest being payable to the holders of the bills, which are to "bearer," it is submitted that the sale of the bills by the bank to them has, *ipso facto*, transferred the benefit of the security to the holders of the bills. Under these circumstances, it appears that the British holders, on whose behalf we are soliciting the assistance of the Government, have a direct interest in the guarantee.

The National Bank of Turkey must technically be considered as a Turkish entity, although, as Secretary Sir Edward Grey is aware, practically the entire capital is held in this country.

Referring to the final paragraph of your letter, I am instructed to state that the bonds issued in connection with the Bagdad Railway are understood to have a preferential claim on the customs only in so far as the "additional" 5 per cent. import duties are concerned, which are by clause 7 excluded from the security assigned to the Treasury bills. The National Bank of Turkey has no actual knowledge as to the method followed in connection with the issue of the Bagdad Railway bonds; but it may safely be assumed that they were issued in the first instance to the Bagdad or Anatolia Railway Company, and sold by them to the public.

I have, &c.
(For National Bank of Turkey)
R. HECHT, *Manager.*

[10252] No. 48.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, March 4, 1913.

LES questions soulevées par la communication austro-hongroise présentent, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, un caractère nettement juridique et devraient être réglées conformément à la lettre et à l'esprit des dispositions contenues dans la Convention de La Haye de 1907 concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre. La réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres ne nous paraît pas compétente pour trancher les difficultés qui se présentent dans la voie de l'interprétation des principes du droit international relatifs au régime juridique des territoires occupés et de leur application à des points de fait.

Le Gouvernement Impérial propose, par conséquent, l'amendement suivant :—

"Conformément à l'article 48 de la Convention de La Haye sur les lois de la guerre dans les territoires turcs occupés actuellement par les alliés balkaniques, le régime douanier turc tel qu'il était avant la guerre doit rester autant que possible en vigueur jusqu'au règlement définitif des questions territoriales. Les Grandes Puissances ne peuvent admettre, en tant que ces mesures sont contraires à l'article 49 de ladite convention : la double perception des droits de douane pour marchandises importées, la perception de surtaxes, taxes de consommation, ou équivalents de taxes de monopole."

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 4 mars, 1913.

[10250] No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 3, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 120 of 2nd March.

A British correspondent recently returned from Dardanelles declares positively that the military positions north of Dokan Arslan are Turkish. It would thus seem that it was the Turks, and not the Bulgarians, who hit British steamer. The Ottoman Government's account, to the effect that incident occurred at Charkeui, is probably intended to discredit the allies and to influence feeling against them in shipping, &c., circles.

A French ship was also hit at the same time.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[10251] No. 50.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 4, 1913.*

MY despatches Nos. 85 and 108 of 3rd February and 10th February.

Whittall and Co. propose to purchase salt from Debt and ship it in their own name in non-Turkish bottoms for sale in Turkey and elsewhere. They enquire whether, in the event of seizure by Greeks, they could depend on the support of His Majesty's Government to obtain indemnity for losses.

[10254] No. 51.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 70 of 2nd March.

Negotiations have been proceeding between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador as to the text of a communiqué to be published with regard to proposed reduction of troops. The former has all along desired that it should contain some assurance that Austria would not attack Servia, and it seems from what my German colleague tells me in confidence that his Excellency some days ago gave Austrian Ambassador a text which, as he told him, had already been approved by Emperor, containing an assurance of this kind. The fact that he should have drawn up this document without previous consultation with Austrian Ambassador, as well as his insistence in the matter, has, the German Ambassador believes, produced a bad impression in Vienna, and according to him the situation is not quite so good as it was a few days ago.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the Austrian Ambassador had yesterday submitted to him a text in which happy result of reduction in armaments is ascribed to initiative taken in a spirit of conciliation by the Emperor of Austria, and to friendly response made by Emperor of Russia. While containing friendly reference to Russia, it said nothing about Servia, and spoke of the action taken by the two Emperors in a manner intended to lay stress on the monarchical principle, which he said was symptomatic of Austria's desire to revive alliance of the three Emperors. His Excellency substituted "the two Governments" for "the two Emperors," and again urged insertion of some assurances with regard to Austria's pacific intentions towards Servia. Ambassador reproached him with always mistrusting Austria. His Excellency replied that this was not true of himself, but that distrust felt by Russian public opinion was a factor that must be reckoned with, and it was for this reason that he wished to publish an assurance that would have a tranquillising effect. On my enquiring when the communiqué was likely to be published, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was to see Emperor this afternoon, and that if an agreement with Austrian Government was eventually arrived at it might be published during tercentenary celebrations.

To a remark made by Austrian Ambassador, that when once reduction of armaments was effected the last cause of difference would be removed, Minister for

Foreign Affairs replied that there was always Djakova. His Excellency told me that suggestion that part of the town containing religious institutions should be left to Servia and the rest given to Albania would never be accepted by the former. The only possible compromise was to guarantee commercial facilities of some kind to the Albanians.

On my remarking to German Ambassador that the approaching tercentenary celebrations afforded Austria an excellent pretext for making a graceful concession to the Emperor of Russia, his Excellency replied that bad feeling created by recent negotiations rendered it somewhat difficult for her to make "un beau geste."

[10255] No. 52.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 4, 1913.*

IN speaking to me to-day of Roumanian question Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he thought that it would be a mistake for Powers to insist on arbitration, as we should only irritate Roumanians. He has apparently reason to believe that, were we to be content with mediation, Roumania would in the end accept our advice. Whichever course is adopted, he fears that Austria and Germany will insist on Silistria being ceded to Roumania, and that if, as is probable, Italy sides with them, there will be a deadlock, as the Powers would then be equally divided.

[10256] No. 53.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 4, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had proposed to Russian Government that mediation should take place at St. Petersburgh, and I understand that Bulgarian Government has made a similar proposal. His Excellency, who seemed to think that you might consider his preference for St. Petersburgh discourteous, begged me to explain that his reason for not suggesting London was that Ambassadors' meeting at latter capital had been constituted to deal with other troublesome questions, such as Austro-Servian differences.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his earnest hope that, in the interest of peace, mediation would be started without delay, and said that a formal but confidential assurance could then be given to mediators that Roumanian Government would respect proposals formulated by them.

[10257] No. 54.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 4, 1913.*

IT may be foreseen that the nearer the prospect of peace between Turkey and the allies approaches, the more active will be the agitation for mobilisation in Roumania, for it is clear that with the Bulgarian army liberated in Thrace and still on a war footing Roumania would be at a disadvantage unless mobilised.

Starting of mediation would naturally strengthen peace party in the Cabinet.

[9786] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 42 of 1st March.

The difficulty of goods breaking bulk at Salonica has been pointed out by His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica (see telegram sections and confidential print), and this is certainly an objection to the Greek proposals. But I understood the Austrian

proposals (see my telegram of 25th February) laid before the Ambassadors' meeting were intended to supersede those described in my telegram No. 8 of 11th February to Salonica, and that the Ambassadors' meeting approved the Austrian proposals.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 81; Rome, No. 81; St. Petersburgh, No. 183; Constantinople, No. 122; Paris, No. 107; Salonica, No. 14; Belgrade, No. 53; Athens, No. 33; and Sophia, No. 61.)

[9787] No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 43 of 1st March.

It seems to me that if Austria gets her way about the Adriatic port and Scutari, which are the two big questions, she will have a balance of diplomatic prestige to her credit on which she could well afford to draw the small amount that would be required to concede a little place like Djakova, which is hardly known to the public by name.

And German Minister for Foreign Affairs seems not to realise that, if Djakova as well as Dibra were conceded, and Russia (as I believe would then be the case) accepted the rest of the last Austrian line, the Scutari difficulty would be disposed of. For Russia would be bound to take part or to acquiesce in whatever measures were necessary to exclude Montenegro or Servia from taking or retaining places on the Albanian side of the agreed line.

It is precisely because acceptance of the last Austrian proposal would entail upon Russia consent to excluding both Montenegro from Scutari and Servia from Djakova by force that Russia cannot accept it. She must sacrifice some prestige in becoming a party to use of compulsion against either Montenegro or Servia. It is too much to expect her to be put in this position against both simultaneously. All it seems to me that Russia asks is an agreement that will relieve her from the necessity of consenting to compulsion of Servia as well as of Montenegro. This should hardly be construed as acting in such a way as to diminish Austrian influence and prestige.

I realise the good-will of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the difficulty of his position, and I cannot press him to do what he thinks is unfair, but you should give him substance of this telegram, if only to explain the difficulty of my position in pressing Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to give way further.

If Servia were allowed to retain Djakova, I think any reasonable compromise about commercial conditions or anything else favourable to neighbouring Albanian territory that Austria put forward should be considered, but German Ambassador here fears that neither this nor certainty that concession of Djakova would settle all difficulties about Scutari will be sufficient to induce Austria to give way.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 108; Vienna, No. 82; and Rome, No. 85, for information.)

[9778] No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 69 of 1st March.

In view of the fact that neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary feels able to make any concession in regard to Djakova, and as it is undesirable, at a moment when all the Powers are about to mediate between Turkey and the allies, that a deadlock should ensue on the Albanian question possibly entailing the breakdown of the Ambassadorial meetings, I trust that M. Sazonof will soon be in a position to give me his views as to an international commission to examine the Djakova question. The appointment of a commission, supposing that Austria-Hungary were to agree, would ease the situation, and would assist in tiding over an awkward phase.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[10352] No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Government are ready to accept the decision of the Powers respecting the dispute with Roumania. The Roumanian Government will only accept mediation. I assume, however, that Bulgaria, having been ready to go further than Roumania in this matter, will make no difficulty about accepting mediation on the same terms as Roumania.

Roumania has now made a further communication to the Powers as follows :—

"Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères nous a répondu que le Gouvernement ne pouvait revenir sur la détermination qu'il nous a notifiée, le 22 février; que ce serait mettre en péril les intérêts de la paix, que nous envisageons, car le Gouvernement, en présence d'une nouvelle décision, telle que celle que nous proposons, serait probablement renversé, et le Cabinet qui viendrait au pouvoir serait certainement plus belliqueux que le Cabinet actuel; qu'à son avis il vaudrait mieux que la réunion d'Ambassadeurs, qui sera plus tard chargée de préparer la transaction à recommander à la Roumanie et à la Bulgarie, fût dès maintenant appelée à mettre d'accord les réponses roumaine et bulgare; qu'il se portait garant que la proposition formulée par les Puissances serait, quelle qu'elle soit, respectée par la Roumanie; et que, s'il était sûr que le secret fût gardé à Sophia, il n'hésiterait pas à nous confirmer formellement cette opinion. Cette combinaison, nous a-t-il dit, en terminant, permettrait à la Bulgarie d'aller devant la réunion des Ambassadeurs en n'invoquant qu'une médiation qu'ils sauraient être l'équivalent de l'arbitrage et qui n'obligerait pas le Gouvernement roumain à avouer publiquement qu'il a préalablement accepté la décision des Puissances."

But, this being secret, you can make no use of it at Sophia.

At my meeting with Ambassadors yesterday, they came to the following resolution :—

"Sir E. Grey a reçu du représentant britannique à Bucarest un télégramme du 2 mars relatant un entretien avec M. Majoresco, lequel a déclaré sous le sceau du secret qu'il se portait garant que la proposition formulée par les Puissances serait, quelle qu'elle fût, respectée par la Roumanie, et qu'il conviendrait d'appeler dès maintenant à chercher un accord entre les réponses roumaine et bulgare à la réunion d'Ambassadeurs, qui sera chargée de préparer la transaction sur les différends actuels.

"Vu cette déclaration, la réunion pense qu'il importe de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Bucarest et à Sophia de s'enquérir auprès des Gouvernements roumain et bulgare de leurs préférences au sujet de la capitale où devrait s'exercer la médiation, et de charger les Ambassadeurs réunis dans cette capitale de proposer les communications à adresser aux deux parties."

You should make the enquiry desired in the second paragraph of this resolution as soon as your colleagues receive similar instructions.

[10405] No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

M. SKOULOUDIS has by instructions of Minister for Foreign Affairs represented to me that it would be difficult for Balkan States to accept mediation of the Powers without knowing preliminary conditions of peace, and whether the Powers would be disposed to take into consideration the conditions of peace that the allies would have to put forward.

I replied that Turkey had originally made difficulties about accepting mediation of the Powers without knowing conditions, but had now done so, and I did not see why the allies should not do the same.

It was, however, not an arbitration but mediation that was proposed, and, in my personal opinion, if the allies accepted it, the Powers, though they had not yet

discussed this point, would enter into communication with the allies as to the conditions of peace.

The Powers could not, however, do anything till they heard that their mediation was accepted.

M. Skouloudis asked me whether the Powers would then invite the allies to formulate conditions of peace or would themselves put forward a project. I replied that the Powers had not yet discussed or settled the procedure which they would adopt if mediation were accepted.

M. Skouloudis thanked me, and said that the opinion I had expressed would, he thought, remove the apprehension of the Greek Government respecting the pending *démarche* of the Powers.

[10352] No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

AT my meeting with Ambassadors yesterday, the following resolution was adopted : —

"Sir E. Grey a reçu du représentant britannique à Bucarest un télégramme du 2 mars relatant un entretien avec M. Majoresco, lequel a déclaré sous le sceau du secret qu'il se portait garant que la proposition formulée par les Puissances serait, quelle qu'elle fût, respectée par la Roumanie, et qu'il conviendrait d'appeler dès maintenant à chercher un accord entre les réponses roumaine et bulgare à la réunion d'Ambassadeurs, qui sera chargée de préparer la transaction sur les différends actuels.

"Vu cette déclaration, la réunion pense qu'il importe de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Bucarest et à Sophia de s'enquérir auprès des Gouvernements roumain et bulgare de leurs préférences au sujet de la capitale où devrait s'exercer la médiation, et de charger les Ambassadeurs réunis dans cette capitale de proposer les communications à adresser aux deux parties."

You should make the enquiry desired in the second paragraph of this resolution as soon as your colleagues receive similar instructions.

[9749] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

ON the 24th February Tewfik Pasha gave to Sir A. Nicolson the memorandum of which I transmit a copy herewith to your Excellency.° Sir A. Nicolson asked his Highness whether it was meant as a reply to the memorandum which had been given him as the expression of the views of the Powers regarding mediation. Tewfik Pasha said that he believed it was. Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness that he could not quite regard it as such. What was desired was a simple affirmative or negative from the Porte as to whether the Turkish Government were prepared to accept the advice of the Powers. The paper which his Highness had now communicated seemed to be the expression of the views of the Porte, and would not advance matters. The views of the Porte were of interest, but Sir A. Nicolson could not say if they would all be realised. In any case the Porte had not yet placed the Powers in the position of addressing themselves to the allies. Sir A. Nicolson enquired if his Highness could not ask his Government to authorise him to give a definite reply to the enquiry made in the memorandum which had been handed to him last week. Tewfik Pasha said that he would telegraph for this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

° Part V, No. 130.

[10592] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires repeated to me to-day, by instructions from his Government, all the arguments in favour of the retention by Servia of Ipek, Djakova, and Dibra.

I said that for some weeks I had used every diplomatic effort to secure that the four places—Prisrend, Ipek, Djakova, and Dibra—should, by agreement, be excluded from Albania. I quite understood the Servian point of view, but the chargé d'affaires must know our point of view, which was that, while as much as possible should be obtained by diplomatic methods, and if, say, two or three out of these four places could be obtained by diplomacy, it would be quite intolerable that a European war should take place about the one or two places that diplomacy could not obtain.

The chargé d'affaires expressed his Government's gratitude for what we had done, and said that he was instructed to make it clear that Servia did not contemplate the threat of a European war. But Djakova, of which I had spoken as a town of only 6,000 inhabitants, was essential to Servia as a strategic frontier. If Servia did not get Djakova, the Albanian frontier would be a constant source of trouble and danger to Servia. She would not force a war about Djakova, but, as she was in possession of the town, she could not possibly consent to withdraw, and could be compelled to do so only by force. It would therefore not be her fault if there was war. Austria would certainly acquire influence in Albania, and there would still be a Macedonian question after the war with Turkey was over. It was therefore essential that Servia should have a good strategic frontier.

I said that, if there were to be a Macedonian question and future developments after the war with Turkey was over, these would not really be affected by the question whether Djakova was given to Albania or not at present. I did not know what the Servian arrangements with Bulgaria were, but I assumed that Servia was certain to get the sanjak and Uskub, including a large part of Macedonia. In addition, she could probably secure that Prisrend and Ipek should go either to her or to Montenegro. Was she really prepared to put all this to the risk of war with Austria because she could not get both Djakova and Dibra? If she was, she would seem to me to be like a man who, having come sooner than he expected into a large estate, committed suicide because there were one or two fields on the boundary which he could not obtain.

The conversation continued for some time, and I urged that Servia should be content with the very large gains that certainly could be secured by diplomatic methods, even if it were eventually found that these methods were not sufficient to secure everything that she desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10514] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 164.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

M. CAMBON informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Servian Minister at Paris had, by order of his Government, informed the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia would not, unless compelled by force, in any circumstances evacuate Djakova.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10515] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 108.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

THE Russian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Russian Government had sent instructions to their representatives at the capitals of the allies to

associate themselves with their colleagues in ascertaining whether the allies would accept the mediation of the Powers in the same terms as the Ottoman Government had done.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9361] No. 65.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th November last, relative to arrangements for chartering or detaining steamers to secure the safety of British subjects at Constantinople in case of need, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit copy of a letter from the Ellerman Lines (Limited),* on the subject of their claim in connection with the detention of their steam-ship "City of Khios" for this purpose.

I am to state that, in the course of two interviews which took place with a representative of the company at this Office, the statements contained in their letter were verified and substantiated and the claim reduced by about 200*l.*

It has been ascertained through His Majesty Ambassador at Constantinople that for a vessel of the character of the "City of Khios," which is a liner with a regularly timed service, the charge for demurrage would be 6*d.* a ton a day, which would work out at 2,796*l.*, exclusive of extra disbursements. Wages and maintenance would, however, be included.

The present claim is for:

	£	s.	d.
Loss of profit	2,372	16	0
Wages	277	12	0
Maintenance	116	16	0
	2,767	1	0

as compared with the figure 2,796*l.* given above.

The total claim amounts to 3,390*l.* 8*s.* 3*d.*, which appears to be reasonable in the circumstances.

I am to state that an expenditure amounting to about 80*l.* was incurred in providing the means of communicating with the "City of Khios" while she was lying off Constantinople. This was an indispensable precaution to enable British subjects to go on board in case of emergency, and I am to express the hope that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury will sanction this outlay.

Claims have also been received from shippers of goods on board the vessel, but hitherto only one of these has been recognised (the amount involved being 84*l.* 5*s.* 2*d.*), which it is hoped to settle by a small payment.

There remains the question of the claim of the Khedivial Steam-ship Co., to which reference was made in the letter of the 5th November last from this Office.

The claim of the company amounts to 3,150*l.*, and Sir E. Grey anticipates that it may be necessary to pay about 3,000*l.* I am to state that no offer will be made until the matter has been referred to your department for consideration.

I am to express Sir E. Grey's hope that, as the total expenditure in this connection will amount to between 6,000*l.* and 7,000*l.*, the Lords Commissioners may see their way to deal with it specially and to charge it to "Civil Contingencies" as in the case of the refugees from Crete, which formed the subject of the letter from your department of the 18th September, 1897.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Part V. No. 190.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

[10276] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 40. Commercial.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-consul at Monastir reporting prohibition to import tobacco or to sell in Monastir district any except Servian tobacco, and that business of the Régie has ceased.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Monastir, February 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, the importation of tobacco and the sale of any except Servian tobacco having been prohibited, the business of the Régie has ceased.

The local director, after fruitless protests, has referred to his superintending authorities in Constantinople, who, he states, have appealed through diplomatic channels to the competent authorities in Belgrade.

It is evidently the intention of the Servian Government to extend their monopoly to this district, although it is not yet a recognised part of Servia.

The director informs me that a large consignment of tobacco, which recently arrived here for the Régie and now has to be re-exported, is being detained at the railway station through the dilatory proceedings of the custom-house, the sole purpose of which would appear to be the exaction of fees. Incidentally there is much loss for demurrage.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[10275] No. 67.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 173.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 1, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160 of the 25th of last month, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica relative to Serbo-Bulgarian relations in Macedonia, as also two despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir bearing on the same subject.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Salonica, February 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to Mr. Vice-Consul Greig's despatch No 8, Confidential, of the 19th and to my immediately preceding despatch of the 17th instant concerning the growing feeling of hostility between the Serbs and Bulgarians in Macedonia, I have the honour to subjoin a translation of a further extract from the Bulgarian paper "Pravo" of the 18th.

My impression is gaining strength that an agreement is in course of negotiation between the Greeks and the Serbs for mutual defence against an ally who is coming to be regarded as the common foe.

Extract from the "Pravo" of February 18, 1913.

"Our correspondent at Tikvesh writes:—

"The Servian authorities here are forbidding parents to send their children to the Bulgarian gymnasium at Salonica and compelling them to seek their education at Belgrade. With this object they are refusing to issue passes for Salonica, and the few that succeeded in getting down to that place have had to do so secretly.

"The Bulgarian school in the village of Beglishta has been locked up by a Servian band, which offered the teacher a high salary if he would consent to become Servian. Other village schoolmasters have been expelled and their schools closed by force.

"The population is deeply grieved and incensed at this conduct of the Servian provisional authorities. Cannot they put an end to these violent and provocative acts?"

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, February 19, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 4, which I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 12th instant, it was reported that certain Bulgarian voivods were preparing to leave this district to join the Bulgarian armies in the field, and that the Servian authorities, for reasons then not certainly known, refused to permit the departure of some 400 komitajis who proposed to accompany them.

For some days after that the voivods too were detained, and up to the present only Tshaoulef and Milan Matof have with great difficulty succeeded in departing. They left yesterday.

The unwillingness of the Servian authorities to sanction this movement is part of a policy for the systematic repression of national sympathies and aspirations amongst the non-Serbs in the districts occupied by them.

At present this policy is pointedly directed against the Bulgars.

A party of Bulgarian officers who have been for some days in this town have met with an almost hostile reception by their Servian brother-officers.

One of the objects of their visit was to obtain recruits. There is little doubt that they have also been keeping alive in the Bulgarian community the belief that the Servian occupation is not permanent.

A notice recently issued forbidding the inhabitants of Monastir to be in the streets after 9 P.M. or to take part in unauthorised assemblies at night is attributed to their presence.

It is noticed with misgiving by the people of this town that all Government notices are now drawn up in Servian only.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 3 in No. 67.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, February 20, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that, apart from the reasons already reported, the Bulgarian voivods were detained here by the Servian authorities for the following considerations:

1. Petitions addressed by them to the Bulgarian Government have recently been intercepted by the Servian authorities, who state that they contained strictures upon Servian administrative methods and exhortations to put an end to the Servian occupation before their nationality is irretrievably effaced.

2. The Servian authorities believed that their destination is not Chataldja or Adrianople, but Serres, where, they state, a congress of voivods is being held with a

view, amongst other things, to urging the Bulgarian Government not to abandon the Bulgarians of this district.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[10290] No. 68.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, March 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a memorandum communicated to me this morning by the Roumanian Government on the dispute between Roumania and Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Memorandum by Roumanian Government on Roumano-Bulgarian Dispute.

(Confidentiel.)

JUSQU'À présent la Roumanie a gardé la plus stricte neutralité pendant toute la crise balkanique.

Au début, cette attitude était d'autant plus indiquée que les Gouvernements de Bulgarie, de Serbie et de Grèce n'affirmaient d'autre but à leur action que d'améliorer le sort des congénères soumis à la domination ottomane.

La Roumanie, qui en 1877–8, collaborant avec les armées russes, avait elle-même gagné son indépendance dans une guerre contre la Turquie—guerre qui marque la naissance de la Bulgarie moderne—ne pouvait se montrer hostile aux efforts d'émancipation d'autres États chrétiens.

La neutralité que nous avons gardée, malgré certaines sollicitations de prendre des mesures menaçantes envers notre voisine bulgare, nous a valu l'expression formelle de la reconnaissance du Gouvernement de Sophia, transmise au Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Roumanie par le Ministre de Bulgarie à Bucarest le 26 septembre (9 octobre), 1912.

C'est donc la deuxième fois depuis Plevna que la Bulgarie se voit obligée de reconnaître la part prise par la Roumanie à sa formation et à son agrandissement.

Tant que les Grandes Puissances manifestaient leur intention de maintenir le *statu quo* et se déclaraient ouvertement contraires à tout changement territorial dans la presqu'île balkanique; tant que la Bulgarie elle-même, comme l'expliquait encore sa note du 5 (18) octobre, 1912, remise au Gouvernement roumain, parlait de l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin, la Roumanie ne pouvait que persévérer dans sa neutralité, d'autant plus que la note précitée visait les intérêts de tous les chrétiens de Turquie sans exception et leur promettait "ordre, liberté et progrès."

Mais lorsque, après les premiers succès des alliés balkaniques ce langage fut changé; lorsque les Grandes Puissances elles-mêmes, à l'ancienne formule du *statu quo* substituèrent la formule: "Les Balkans aux États balkaniques"; lorsque, par là, le Traité de Berlin recevait la plus profonde atteinte, la Roumanie, dont les grands intérêts dans la péninsule balkanique étaient prévus dans ce traité, devait légitimement songer à leur donner une nouvelle base dans le droit public de l'Europe.

Deux intérêts de la Roumanie devaient être surtout assurés après le renversement de l'ordre des choses établi en 1878:

1. C'était d'abord le sort futur des "Roumains" de Turquie, ainsi désignés à l'article 4 du Traité de Berlin, appelés aussi Macédo-Roumains ou Koutzo-Valaques, placés eux-mêmes sous la sauvegarde de l'article 23 et destinés maintenant à changer de domination.

Quoique la Sublime Porte n'ait jamais eu recours à l'avis de la commission européenne prévu par l'article 23, néanmoins les Roumains de Turquie jouissaient de fait sous le régime ottoman d'une certaine protection de l'administration. Leurs communautés distinctes avaient été reconnues officiellement, leurs églises et écoles étaient entretenues, au vu et au su de la Sublime Porte, par le budget de l'État roumain.

Depuis 1864 déjà, mais depuis son indépendance surtout, la Roumanie a fait, année par année, de grands sacrifices pour ses congénères de Turquie; et le budget roumain, actuellement en exercice depuis le 1er (14) avril, 1912, prévoit à l'article 13 le montant des "subventions accordées aux écoles et églises roumaines de Turquie."

2. C'était ensuite la frontière qui sépare la Dobroudja de la Bulgarie, frontière imposée aux deux États par le Traité de Berlin, sans que leur agrément ait été demandé et sans qu'il ait été tenu compte des protestations de la Roumanie.

Au soin du Congrès de Berlin même des voix s'élevèrent, comme celle de la France et de l'Italie, pour constater que la Roumanie, après une guerre glorieuse pour elle, avait été traitée "un peu durement," et pour réclamer notamment en sa faveur une frontière meilleure qui comprendrait Silistrie.

Dans la commission européenne, réunie pendant l'automne de l'année 1878, le délégué anglais, le Colonel Home, exprime l'opinion que, quoique Silistrie ait été laissée en dernier lieu par le Congrès à la Bulgarie, néanmoins la proposition de M. Waddington, insérée au protocole, prouvait que le congrès avait en définitive entendu que la frontière partît d'un point près de Silistrie, point qui serait le plus propice à l'établissement d'un pont. Le délégué d'Angleterre appuyait ainsi la légitime demande roumaine exposée à la commission par deux mémoires, et d'après laquelle le point d'attache sur le Danube devrait presque toucher à Silistrie, car c'est seulement par cet endroit que la Roumanie pourrait facilement communiquer avec sa nouvelle province. Plus à l'est les marais, les lacs et îles, désignés sous le nom de Balta, qui avoisinent Calarasi, rendraient très difficiles les communications entre l'ancienne et la nouvelle rive roumaine. C'était là le minimum des desiderata de la Roumanie, minimum imposé par le fait que le congrès avait en dernier lieu abandonné Silistrie au nouvel État bulgare. Sans cela, le point de vue roumain eût été que le point d'attache sur le Danube fût porté à l'ouest de Silistrie, entre Tataritza et Ardemir, comprenant donc Silistrie. En amont de Silistrie, en effet, les rives sont fermes, le lit du Danube est net d'obstacles et la construction d'un pont s'effectuerait dans des conditions avantageuses. Pour obtenir que le point d'attache fût porté à l'ouest de Silistrie, malgré le texte de l'article 46 du Traité de Berlin, la Roumanie cita un précédent relatif à la frontière de la Bessarabie, fixée le 7 janvier, 1857, par un protocole qui remplaçait le texte de l'article 20 du Traité de Paris.

Les raisons fournies par la Roumanie dans les deux mémoires présentés à la commission en 1878,* n'ont rien perdu de leur valeur. Elles ont été renouvelées par la Roumanie dans les mémoires présentés à la Commission technique européenne en 1879.† La Roumanie n'y a jamais renoncé. Silistrie se trouve en face de la seule communication naturelle de la Roumanie sur le Danube pour une zone de 130 kilom.; c'est le seul point avec lequel toute communication ne se trouverait pas interrompue au temps où la navigation est suspendue; c'est le seul lieu propre à l'établissement d'un pont destiné à relier les deux rives.

Malgré les insistances du Gouvernement roumain, malgré l'avis favorable de plusieurs délégués des Grandes Puissances dans les commissions de 1878 et 1879, non seulement Silistrie fut laissée à la Bulgarie, mais encore ce n'est qu'à grand'peine que la Roumanie put occuper les hauteurs environnantes d'Arab-Tabia qu'elle détient encore.

Ce qui plus est, bien que l'article 11 du Traité de Berlin ait expressément stipulé que toutes les anciennes fortereses seraient rasées et que de nouvelles ne pourraient être construites, la Bulgarie, restée en possession de Silistrie, a construit de nouveaux travaux de fortification au sud et à l'ouest de Medjidié-Tabia, comme on le voit sur la petite carte ci-jointe ‡.

En signant en 1886 avec la Bulgarie six protocoles pour la délimitation de la frontière de la Dobroudja, la Roumanie n'a pas manqué de rappeler qu'elle entendait se limiter à un bornage matériel sur le terrain de la frontière telle qu'elle avait été imposée par les Puissances, et les négociations de 1884 entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie en vue de la délimitation avaient échoué justement parce que la Bulgarie aurait voulu trancher en principe la question de la délimitation, tandis que la Roumanie n'entendait qu'appliquer, sans la discuter, la frontière qui lui avait été imposée contre sa volonté.

Silistrie est devenue ainsi pour la Roumanie le symbole d'une injustice commise dès l'abord par l'Europe et d'une menace effectuée ensuite par la Bulgarie.

* Correspondence respecting the European commissions appointed for the demarcation of frontiers under the Treaty of Berlin. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1879. Pages 77 and 178.

† Further correspondence respecting the European commissions, &c. (Suite au livre bleu précédent.) Présenté au Parlement anglais en 1880. Pages 416, 425, 439, 441.

‡ Not reproduced.

Cette menace est encore accentuée par les documents officiels bulgares, qui ne cessent de prévoir une éventuelle annexion de la Dobroudja à la Bulgarie. Dans son étude "La Roumanie et son Armée," l'état-major bulgare a soin de noter "qu'il n'existe pas d'obstacle naturel qui sépare la Dobroudja de la Bulgarie du nord"; et le Colonel Cantargief, dans son cours de géographie, enseigne aux élèves de l'École militaire que, "sous le nom de Dobroudja, les Roumains entendent cette partie de la Bulgarie du nord qui leur a été cédée après le Traité de Berlin."

Dans le "Manuel pour les jeunes Soldats de toutes Armes," approuvé par le Ministère de la Guerre Bulgare sous le No. 75 du 14 mars, 1907, et recommandé aux chefs de troupes par des circulaires du 21 mars, 1907, et du 10 mars, 1908, se trouve une carte de la "Bulgarie indivisible," sur laquelle la Dobroudja est portée sous le titre "Parties de la Bulgarie non encore délivrées."

Pourtant, cette Dobroudja nous a été donnée en 1878 en échange de la Bessarabie et alors que du sang de nos soldats naissait la Bulgarie moderne. Elle nous a été donnée avec une frontière que nous n'avons cessé de déclarer insuffisante et qui nous a été imposée. Après l'annexion nous n'avons épargné aucun sacrifice pour relier étroitement au royaume la nouvelle province. Le pont jeté à tant de frais sur le Danube à Cernavoda n'est pas tout à fait à l'abri d'une attaque, et le trou béant de Silistrie reste une porte ouverte aux mains étrangères. Ce pont si peu couvert est cependant notre unique voie sur terre vers notre unique débouché à la mer, vers ce port de Constantza, autre grande œuvre qui exigea tant de millions et dont le commerce de la Roumanie n'est pas le seul à tirer profit. La veille même enfin que la crise balkanique éclatât, nous avons définitivement associé à la vie constitutionnelle du royaume les habitants de cette province que nous avons outillée non seulement pour nos propres besoins économiques, mais aussi pour ceux de l'Europe entière.

Et cette Dobroudja qui est donc bien roumaine par les droits du sang versé comme par ceux du travail, est dominée par Silistrie, qui au quatorzième siècle faisait partie de la Valachie, qui garde les vestiges des œuvres de piété et de bienfaisance dues à la générosité des princes roumains, et où, enfin, en 1870 encore, fonctionnait une école roumaine dont dépendaient les écoles roumaines des villes de Rassova et de Rassova et des villages d'Ostrov, Bugeac, Satul Nou, Oltina, Aliman. C'est que, comme le constataient les délégués de Russie au sein même du Congrès de Berlin, "De Rassova à Silistrie il y a une bande de terrain sur laquelle la population roumaine est assez nombreuse."*

En 1878, il y a trente-quatre ans, la ville de Silistrie, d'après les évaluations du Colonel Home,† comptait: 7,000 musulmans, 2,500 Roumains et 1,500 Bulgares. Depuis l'annexion de Silistrie ces proportions ont naturellement changé, cependant la population bulgare ne représente encore aujourd'hui que la moitié de la population totale. Le dernier recensement bulgare connu et qui date du 31 décembre, 1905, accuse à Silistrie seulement 12,065 habitants, dont 6,143 Bulgares, 4,136 Turcs et le reste d'autres nationalités. Si de 1878 à 1906, soit en vingt-huit ans, la population de Silistrie n'a augmenté que dans la proportion de 11,000 à 12,000 habitants, il est difficile de croire, comme l'affirment les journaux bulgares, que cette ville compte aujourd'hui une population de 20,000 ames, soit une augmentation de presque 8,000 habitants en huit années. Du reste, il ne manque pas de voix bulgares qui avouent que Silistrie "est de plus en plus en décadence, comme d'ailleurs à peu près toutes les localités bulgares de la rive du Danube."

Une autre affirmation des journaux mérite aussi d'être examinée de plus près. On parle des sacrifices exceptionnels de la garnison de Silistrie pendant la guerre actuelle. De fait, le régiment de Silistrie porte le nom "Dobroudja"; il a été au feu à Lulé-Burgas et a perdu relativement peu d'hommes. Les grandes pertes ont été essuyées par les régiments de Rustchuk, de Viddin et de Plevna, dont les deux premiers comptaient beaucoup de Roumains.

Et enfin, Silistrie entre les mains des Roumains est exclusivement un moyen de défense pour eux: jamais elle ne peut être un point d'attaque contre la Bulgarie; la zone d'action de la Roumanie serait à 200 kilom. à l'ouest. Au contraire, Silistrie entre les mains des Bulgares est un point offensif contre la Roumanie. Il suffirait de cette simple constatation pour résoudre un différend relatif à cette petite ville autrement insignifiante, s'il s'agit d'arriver à une entente amicale entre les deux États voisins.

Passant à un autre ordre d'idées, il paraît évident que, dans la pensée du Congrès de

* Protocole X du Congrès de Berlin, 1er juillet, 1878.

† Protocole VIII de la Commission de Délimitation, Constantinople, le 26 novembre, 1878.

Berlin, il y avait une corrélation entre l'étendue de l'État bulgare nouvellement constitué et les limites de la province attribuée à la Roumanie. Si la Roumanie n'a pas eu alors Ruschuc ou Turtucaia, malgré la présence indiscutée d'éléments roumains en ces régions et l'existence en cette dernière, de nos jours encore, d'une école roumaine entretenue aux frais du budget roumain; si elle n'a même pas eu Silistrie, malgré les considérations exposées ci-dessus, c'est que les limites de la nouvelle Bulgarie constituée par l'article 1er du Traité de Berlin, "en principauté autonome et tributaire," étaient elles-mêmes réduites beaucoup en deçà des aspirations du peuple bulgare et du traité préliminaire de San-Stefano. Il en eût été autrement, sans doute, si la Bulgarie avait acquis dès lors les frontières qu'elle semble devoir s'assurer par la guerre actuelle et qui ne sauraient se justifier dans leur ensemble par des considérations ethnographiques.

Il reste certain que la part prise par l'armée roumaine à la guerre de 1877-8, à laquelle la Bulgarie doit son existence, de même que la neutralité de la Roumanie, qui a puissamment contribué au succès des armées bulgares pendant la crise balkanique actuelle, ont été des facteurs décisifs aux yeux mêmes des cercles actuellement dirigeants de la Bulgarie, puisque, avant même que la Roumanie ait formulé officiellement ses exigences quant à la situation future des Macédo-Roumains et à la rectification de frontière, la seule pression des circonstances nouvellement créées et la situation que la Roumanie, sous le règne du Roi Charles, s'est assurée en Europe, ont déterminé le Président du Sobranié, M. Danef, en route pour Londres, à s'arrêter à Bucarest. Ayant assisté, le 26 novembre, 1912, à l'ouverture du Parlement roumain, reçu en audience par Sa Majesté le Roi Charles, M. Danef a eu, avec les hommes d'État roumains, notamment avec le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, des entretiens—sans forme obligatoire, il est vrai—dans lesquels il a abordé le premier la question des Macédo-Roumains aussi bien que celle de la rectification de frontière. Il a constaté la possibilité d'un arrangement facile au sujet des églises et écoles des Macédo-Roumains qui passeraient sous la domination bulgare, et, quant à la rectification de frontière, tout en affirmant qu'il ne pouvait siégir ni de compensations, ni de ligne stratégique, il a laissé entrevoir une solution qui remplacerait l'ancienne frontière, imposée, par une autre, librement consentie.

Dès cette première entrevue le Président du Cons il, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Roumanie, a touché à la question de Silistrie au point de vue de la signification morale et politique qu'elle présentait pour la Roumanie, s'il s'agissait d'arriver à un arrangement amical et fécond pour l'avenir des deux États voisins.

C'est depuis lors que les pourparlers entre les deux Gouvernements ont pris une forme officielle. M. Danef a reçu mandat de traiter avec le fondé de pouvoirs roumain, M. Misu, nouveau Ministre de Roumanie à Londres.

La question des Macédo-Roumains a trouvé dès le commencement de négociations une solution acceptable. Nous la mentionnons telle qu'elle est consignée dans le protocole signée à Londres le 16 (29) janvier, 1913, entre MM. Misu et Danef:

"Le soussigné, délégué de la Roumanie, prend acte de la déclaration que la Bulgarie consent à donner une autonomie aux écoles et aux églises des Koutzo-Valaques de la Macédoine se trouvant dans les futures possessions bulgares, en tant que ces écoles seront fréquentées par les enfants koutzo-valaques, et à permettre la création d'un épiscopat pour ces mêmes Koutzo-Valaques, avec la faculté pour le Gouvernement roumain de subventionner, sous la surveillance du Gouvernement bulgare, lesdites institutions culturelles."

En faisant cette citation, extraite textuellement du protocole de Londres, le Gouvernement roumain considère que tout ce qui a été convenu entre les délégués des deux États est acquis et que le différend roumano-bulgare se réduit aux points, sur lesquels les délégués respectifs ne sont pas tombés d'accord.

Dans la dernière conférence qui a eu lieu à Sophia entre le Ministre de Roumanie, M. D. J. Ghika et les délégués bulgares, MM. Danef et Sarafof, le 2 (15) février, 1913, ces derniers ont, il est vrai, déclaré leurs offres "nulles et non avenues au cas où les négociations en cours n'aboutiraient pas," lesdites offres étant faites "dans le but d'arriver à un accord à l'amiable et aussi prompt que possible entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie." Mais le Gouvernement roumain est d'avis que la médiation des six Grandes Puissances ne peut évidemment être considérée que comme la continuation des essais faits pour arriver à un accord à l'amiable et que, donc, les points sur lesquels un accord s'est établi étant acquis, le différend est limité actuellement par les dernières concessions bulgares d'une part et les dernières demandes roumaines d'autre part.

A ce point de vue, le Gouvernement bulgare a concédé jusqu'ici :—

(*a.*) Par le protocole de Londres du 16 janvier, 1913, l'obligation qu'il prend de démanteler les forts entourant Silistrie, et le droit qu'il reconnaît que la Roumanie conserve de fortifier la frontière sud de la Dobroudja.

(*b.*) Par le même protocole, la cession à la Roumanie des deux triangles qui s'enfoncent actuellement dans la Dobroudja, ainsi que d'un autre triangle ayant pour base du côté de la mer Noire une ligne descendue à 5 ou 6 kilom. au sud de l'attache actuelle de la frontière.

(*c.*) A la conférence tenue à Sophia le 2 (15) février, 1913, une extension non précisée de cette base du triangle sur la mer Noire au delà des 5 à 6 kilom., probablement jusqu'à Sabla.

(*d.*) "Cession de la position stratégique Medjidié-Tabia." Cette concession a été ainsi communiquée dès le 26 décembre, 1912, au nom de la Bulgarie par le Ministre de Russie à Bucarest.

Il est à noter que cette proposition faite dès le 26 décembre, 1912, n'a pas été mentionnée par M. Danef dans le protocole de Londres du 16 janvier et qu'elle a été formulée à peine le 2 (15) février, 1913, à Sophia, dans la dernière conférence de M. Ghika avec les délégués bulgares comme une concession nouvelle.

Une observation qui s'impose après les offres mentionnées, ci-dessus, sous (*a*) et (*d*), c'est que la ville même de Silistrie, étranglée comme une espèce d'enclave au bas des fortifications roumaines, n'a plus de viabilité sous la domination bulgare et ne peut avoir d'avenir que par son annexion à la Roumanie.

Le différend à trancher entre les deux États ne consiste donc plus qu'en ce que la Roumanie demande une ligne frontière ayant son point de départ à quelques kilomètres à l'ouest de Silistrie, comprenant donc la ville même de Silistrie, et aboutissant à Balcik sur la mer Noire.

Les arguments de la Roumanie pour justifier sa demande d'annexion de Silistrie ont été exposés plus haut.

Si la Roumanie demande que le point d'attache de sa frontière du côté de la mer Noire soit descendu à Balcik, c'est que pour mettre l'important port commercial de Constantza à l'abri, il lui faut sur la mer Noire un port militaire et que Mangalia, trop rapprochée de la frontière actuelle et trop exposée en outre aux vents du nord et de l'est, n'est pas propre à une telle destination comme le serait un endroit situé à l'ouest de Kaliakra.

Reste à expliquer pourquoi la Roumanie qui, dans le protocole de Londres, précise la ligne frontière Turtukaia–Balcik, se déclare satisfaite aujourd'hui par la cession de la ligne Silistrie–Balcik. L'explication en est simple et doit être connue par le Gouvernement bulgare et son délégué M. Danef, parce qu'elle résulte du fait de la Bulgarie même.

En effet, le 28 décembre, 1912 (10 janvier, 1913), le Ministre de Bulgarie à Bucarest, sur la base des instructions que M. Guéchof, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, venait de lui envoyer de Sophia, a exprimé au Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Roumanie, l'ardent désir du Gouvernement bulgare de conclure avec la Roumanie une convention des plus larges, "qui garantit l'intérêt et la dignité des deux États." D'autre part, M. Guéchof avait fait savoir au Ministre de Roumanie à Sophia que M. Danef à Londres avait été instruit de ce désir du Gouvernement bulgare.

C'est en vue d'une éventuelle proposition concrète de cette "convention des plus larges" que M. Misu a dû formuler le maximum des demandes de la Roumanie, contre-partie naturelle des demandes bulgares possibles, et en quelque sorte annoncées. Mais puisque depuis lors aucune suite n'a été donnée au désir exprimé par M. Guéchof et que M. Danef n'en a même pas fait mention aux délégués roumains, à Londres et à Sophia, il est clair que la Roumanie se borne au minimum de ses exigences, la ligne Silistrie–Balcik, dont le fondement a été exposé dans les pages précédentes.

En terminant ce mémoire, il est peut-être juste de constater que la Roumanie, depuis les trente-quatre ans de son existence comme état indépendant, n'a cessé un seul instant d'être un des facteurs les plus signalés de l'ordre européen dans cette partie de l'Orient. Sa politique internationale a été toujours dirigée dans le sens de la paix, et son Souverain a été plus d'une fois sollicité, et a pu effectivement contribuer, à la sauvegarder, à l'accélérer ou à localiser la guerre.

La tâche a été souvent ardue, et particulièrement pendant les derniers cinq mois. Ce n'était pas seulement l'importance des intérêts traités avec le Gouvernement bulgare

qui rendait la situation difficile, c'était aussi la manière de procéder employée par nos voisins dans ces pourparlers.

Nous n'avons cependant pas perdu l'espoir d'arriver à un arrangement à l'amiable avec la Bulgarie, étant convaincus qu'un pareil arrangement répond le mieux aux véritables intérêts des deux pays, pour le présent et surtout pour l'avenir.

Bucarest, le 15 (28) *février*, 1913.

[10715] No. 69.

Albanian Delegates to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

Excellence, *Londres, le 5 mars*, 1913.

NOUS avons l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence qu'à la suite des informations que nous venons de recevoir, la population entière en Albanie se trouve, par suite de l'état de guerre actuel, dans la plus affreuse détresse.

Cernés, d'une part, par les Grecs, qui ont établi le long du littoral un blocus rigoureux, ainsi que par les Serbes, qui ont envahi une grande partie du pays ; d'autre part, harcelés par les soldats turcs, débris de l'armée de Monastir, qui ont vécu jusqu'ici sur le pays, les habitants de Vallona surtout et de ses environs sont infailliblement destinés à périr si l'on ne parvient, dans le plus bref délai, à remédier à cette triste situation en intervenant auprès du Gouvernement hellénique pour leur permettre de se procurer les vivres nécessaires à leur existence.

Nous ne relèverons pas ici le côté humanitaire de la question : nous sommes persuadés que votre Excellence voudra bien prendre en considération l'état précaire de cette population, qui, quoique non belligérante, subit injustement les calamités de cette guerre désastreuse.

Veuillez, &c.
Les Délégués du Gouvernement
provisoire albanais,
RASSHI DINO.
MEHMED KONITZA.
M. NOGGOFF.

[10279] No. 70.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March* 4, 1913.

MEDIATION of the Powers.

My colleagues having received similar instructions, I to-day enquired of the Prime Minister whether the Servian Government would be disposed to accept mediation of the Powers with a view to obtaining peace with Turkey.

The Prime Minister expressed his thanks for the interest shown by the Powers, and said that he must consult Servia's allies before giving a reply. He thought that, before accepting mediation, as circumstances had altered considerably since the first peace negotiations, it would be necessary to know what conditions Turkey was prepared to offer, and he presumed that the allies, in their reply to the Powers, which it will require a few days to formulate, would, for their part, exact certain conditions, and he gave me to understand that one of these would be an indemnity.

[10264] No. 71.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March* 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 29 of 28th February : Mediation.

Representatives of the Great Powers have made communication as instructed. French Minister added that Turkish communication was a new departure, not referring to previous proposals. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs told each of us that he would answer after consulting the allies.

[10280] No. 72.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 20. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, March 4, 1913.*

DURING the conversation recorded in my telegram No. 19 of this date, M. Coromilas said to me that to accept an offer of mediation so vague as that which I had just put before him would, in his opinion, be very dangerous for Greece. He said this to me as a representative of one of the Powers of the Triple *Entente;* he would not say it to the members of the other group.

To my French colleague M. Coromilas said that very serious things were going on, and that he had grounds for believing that a secret arrangement or understanding was being prepared between Bulgaria and Austria. As the other representatives were awaiting their turn to make the agreed communication to him, his Excellency had no time to make a more explicit statement.

Telegrams in the above sense are being sent to their Governments by the French and Russian Ministers.

[10399] No. 73.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 30. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 5, 1913.*

I AM informed that news has reached the Minister for Foreign Affairs from Austrian consul at Scutari which gives very unfavourable account of the state of besieged.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs still holds firm in his language with regard to the retention of Scutari and Djakova for Albania, but a well-informed person tells me that much doubt seems to prevail as to what the Minister for Foreign Affairs will do in the event of Scutari falling. He is accused of allowing things to drift, and my informant thinks it possible that, rather than use force to recover Scutari from Montenegro, he might come to some compromise which would raise a strong feeling against him here.

[10408] No. 74.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 5, 1913.*

I AM informed that negotiations which are being carried on at St. Petersburgh for a joint demobilisation in Russia and Austria are progressing slowly, but not unfavourably. I am told that the maximum number of Austrian troops which will be demobilised will not exceed 30,000.

[10410] No. 75.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 5, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

I have carried out, in conjunction with my colleagues, the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 59 of 28th February.

The Prime Minister wished me to convey his thanks to you for the proposals, which he will at once communicate to the Cabinet. The Bulgarian Government will have to ask the views of their allies, and, when these have been obtained, his Excellency will send a written reply to my colleagues and to myself.

(Confidential.)

The Prime Minister asked me and my colleagues whether we knew if Turkey had made any conditions prior to accepting the mediation of the Powers. We all replied that we knew of none.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[10416] No. 76.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 186 of 4th March.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed Russian Ambassador to put forward proposals for granting certain commercial facilities to Albanians at Djakova, and would prefer to wait till he knows how Austria receives them before expressing an opinion with regard to international commission. We ought not, he says, to start both questions at the same time. He evidently fears that such a commission might be influenced solely by ethnographical considerations, and not take sufficient account of religious institutions, &c. He maintains that question is a most important one, on which it will be very difficult for Russia to yield.

[10420] No. 77.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 101 of 4th March.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will communicate your arguments to Austro-Hungarian Government, but he fears that impertinent attitude of Servia and Montenegro will not have made matters easier.

I endeavoured in vain to remove his Excellency's fears that, if Austria ceded Djakova, and Scutari in the meantime fell, Russia would not be able to stand aloof if force had to be used to evict Montenegrins.

[10413] No. 78.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 5, 1913.*

THE local Committee organ, which is frequently inspired, to-day remarks that, partly owing to omission of revictualling clause in armistice, Adrianople cannot hold out indefinitely, that, though the object of the renewal of the campaign was to save Adrianople, the decision as to its fate must be left to the judgment of the Cabinet. [Group undecypherable] magnify the importance of the islands question as compared to that of Adrianople, and, despite official disclaimer by the Grand Vizier published to-day to the effect that Adrianople has not yet been ceded, idea would seem to be to prepare the public mind for cession or fall of that town.

(Sent to Sophia and Athens.)

[10411] No. 79.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 5, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 123 of 4th March.

Captain of "Mœris" has now sent a statement to agents, according to which firing took place off Sar Kioi.

I have asked consul at Kustenje to obtain detailed report from him.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[10414] No. 80.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 5, 1913.*

ANATOLIAN Railway has signed contract for immediate advance to Turkish Government of £ T. 300,000, guaranteed on surplus of revenues expected on new developments of line, and extending over considerable period. Money is to be expended in paying salaries, &c.

[10398] No. 81.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 25th February to Sophia.

Italian Government are disposed to accept Greek proposals specified in your telegram of the 8th to Salonica with reservations regarding the customs zones contained in your circular telegram of 17th February. As, however, they maintain that no European goods consigned in advance to interior are landed at Salonica, but that traders from hinterland only buy there, and often months after landing, Greek concession has no value if it merely refers to goods to be sent on at once after landing. They are therefore first enquiring at Athens as to the interpretation of the Greek proposal.

Translation of the note follows by post.

Meanwhile I have explained that you regard the Austrian proposals at Ambassadors meeting as superseding those above referred to.

[10417] No. 82.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 5, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

I asked Prime Minister yesterday what would be the attitude of Servia supposing the Turkish peace proposals were found acceptable and Turkey disinterested herself entirely with regard to Albania, but Scutari still held out?

He replied that he hoped Scutari would fall, since he did not think Austria would be prepared to resort to force to eject the Montenegrins once established there. If this assumption were correct, it would be simplest solution. As an ally Servia was obliged to assist, and was assisting, Montenegro to the best of her ability, but he added that if it became evident that Powers were determined to give Scutari to Albania Servian Government would recommend Montenegro not to insist on its possession. If Montenegro refused to listen to this recommendation, the other allies would have to discuss what course to follow.

I subsequently saw Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose tone was rather different and less guarded than that of the Prime Minister. He complained of the sacrifices in men and money which Servia was making to send assistance to Montenegro, and asked what benefit Servia herself would derive. He seemed to think that Austria was quite determined about Scutari, and that it would therefore be better that it should not fall, as otherwise there would only be fresh serious complications. Austria and Russia and the other Great Powers had doubtless come to an agreement on the subject, and if that were the case it would be absurd for Montenegro to expect Servia to help her to resist the will of the Great Powers and thus incur their enmity. He hinted that personally he thought it would be a good thing if the Powers would make a communication both here and at Cettinjé to the effect that Scutari would be secured to Albania irrespective of its capture or otherwise. I enquired whether he had given me his personal sentiments or views of the Servian Government. He said the latter, in so far as I might be sure that Servian Government did not want to run into fresh trouble for the sake of Montenegro.

The only manner in which I can account for the divergence in the statements of the Prime Minister and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is that the

former, speaking to me officially, felt obliged to lay stress on Servia's obligation to support Montenegro.

News has arrived that a transport carrying Servian troops to Durazzo has been wrecked on the coast of Greece. Only one soldier drowned, but a number of horses, some ammunition, and other war material lost. This does not tend to make the dispatch of assistance to Montenegro more popular.

[10418] No. 83.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 5, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, 3rd March:—

"Servian military authorities now refuse absolutely to provide for goods trucks at Gumendje. Forty of their loaded goods trucks being accumulated there, railway company is compelled to decline further consignments even by "grande vitesse." This completely puts a stop to all trade with Uskub, and seems to be Servian answer to complaints of illegality of imposts."

I have spoken unofficially on this subject, but the reply is that trucks are required by military authorities for transport of troops and war material, &c., and that they are themselves short of rolling stock.

[10419] No. 84.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 5, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from Monastir yesterday:—

"Servian authorities at Resna and Struga have taken possession of offices of Ottoman Public Debt, and seized the registers and keys of the safes. Consequently my French colleague and I have protested here against violation of domicile, and have requested the local authorities to give instructions for the restitution of property seized. They state that the action taken was in pursuance of instructions from the head-quarters of the first army, and they have undertaken to telegraph our complaint and request to that quarter.

"In view of arbitrary treatment of Ottoman Debt, it might be desirable to place the flags of protecting Powers over all its establishments in this district, but I hesitate to suggest this because most of its employés are Turks, who are likely to take improper advantage of such protection and cause serious incidents."

My French colleague is reporting similarly to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[10407] No. 85.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, March 5, 1913.*

I HAVE been requested by Kiamil Pasha to inform you that the Greek Prime Minister has sent him a message, through the Greek Chargé d'Affaires here, to the effect that the Balkan allies could not reopen peace negotiations with the Government at present in power at Constantinople, as the latter were not representative either of the Sultan or the nation. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires then went on to sound Kiamil Pasha as to whether he would be willing, with a view to the conclusion of peace, to return to Turkey and form a Government with whom the allies could negotiate. The Pasha objected that such a task would be impossible unless he could count on the support of the *Entente* Powers, and more especially of England. He added that he thought the situation should be laid before you.

When informing me of the above, his Highness expressed the wish that you might give your consideration to the question whether some adequate foreign control might not be established in regard to administration in Turkey. Such a course was, in his opinion, the only means of preserving Turkey from extinction, and he would be very glad to undertake the task. He added that it would of course be necessary for England and the Powers of the *entente* to impose proper foreign control, as he could not undertake to introduce it himself. Were they, however, to adopt such a policy he would gladly carry it out.

His Highness subsequently hinted to me that he did not expect the present Turkish Government to last very long, and that information had reached him as to the probability of another revolution at Constantinople in the near future.

[10503] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 190. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has suggested that the meeting of Ambassadors should discuss the Albanian question with the view of putting on record that Djakova is the outstanding point of difference.

I have reminded him that Russian concessions as regards Scutari, &c., were conditional upon cession of both Djakova and Dibra. Austrian Ambassador replied that Austrian concession of Dibra, Ipek, and Prisrend were also conditional upon cession of Scutari, &c., to Albania.

Ambassador said that if it were once agreed that Djakova was only district in dispute he thought some compromise could be found. Austrian Government might then perhaps agree to refer district of Djakova by itself to an international commission, or the difficulty might be solved one way or the other by a free commercial zone round Djakova.

This seems to show a little light through the cloud, and I told Austrian Ambassador that as a matter of fact I believed whole question of Albanian frontier would be settled if Djakova was conceded to Servia, and that I thought it would be well worth while to put something on record showing that the difference had been reduced to this point.

I have informed Russian Ambassador, and we shall discuss question at meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow, but you should say nothing to Minister for Foreign Affairs till you hear result of that meeting unless Minister for Foreign Affairs speaks to you, as I am not sure that Russian Ambassador will inform Minister for Foreign Affairs before meeting takes place.

[8224] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.[*]

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

PLEASE inform Government to which you are accredited of my instructions to His Majesty's representatives at Cettinjé, Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens respecting the Ottoman Debt (see my circular telegram of 5th March).

[8224] No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.†

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

PLEASE inform Italian (French) Government that I have to-day instructed His Majesty's representatives at Cettinjé, Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens to communicate to Government to which they are accredited the text of the three draft articles in the second form given in Turkish War print, Section 2, 20th February, and to express the hope that they will agree to embody these articles in the treaty of peace with Turkey.

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 86) and Sir E. Goschen (No. 105)
† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 111).

[10502] No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

THE Russian Government have intimated to me that they are prepared that the question of details relating to the assumption of a portion of the Ottoman Debt by the allies should be examined by the proposed commission in Paris, but they suggest that the allies should also be represented on the commission. I am not sure that this would be advantageous in the earlier sittings of commission, but I should like to know the view of the French Government in the first instance.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 103; Vienna, No. 84; St. Petersburgh, No. 188; Constantinople, No. 127; Rome, No. 87; Belgrade, No. 54; Sophia, No. 64; Athens, No. 35; and Cettinjé, No. 17.)

[8224] No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.[*]

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

PLEASE communicate to the Government to which you are accredited a copy of the three draft articles given below, and express the hope that they will agree to their insertion in the treaty of peace with Turkey:—

"1. Chacun des États signataires du présent traité qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers: toutefois la contribution annuelle des Etats cessionnaires ne sera pas inférieure au rendement moyen de l'ensemble des revenus donnés en gage aux porteurs étrangers dans les territoires cédés.

"La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

"La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

"2. Les Etats cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate des lignes exploitées par elle avant la guerre, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord avec les intéressés; ils s'engagent en outre dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

"3. Les modes d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances et qui se réunira à , le ; les procès-verbaux et les protocoles de cette commission seront annexés au présent traité."

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 104; Vienna, No. 85; and St. Petersburgh, No. 189.)

* Also to Sir H. Rax-Ironside (No. 65), Count de Salis (No. 18), and Sir R. Paget (No. 55).

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[9564] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

TEWFIK PASHA called on the 28th February and handed to Sir A. Nicolson the paper of which I transmit a copy herewith to your Excellency. Sir A. Nicolson asked the Ambassadors to come to the Foreign Office on the same afternoon and gave them copies of the Turkish reply, which they all regarded as quite satisfactory. The following resolution was then adopted :—

"L'Ambassadeur de Turquie a fait aujourd'hui par écrit à Sir Arthur Nicolson la communication suivante :

"'Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman accepte la médiation des Grandes Puissances dans le but d'arriver à la paix.'

"La réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de le faire connaître aux Gouvernements alliés, en leur demandant s'ils acceptent la médiation des Puissances dans les mêmes termes."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, February 28, 1913.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ottoman accepte la médiation des Grandes Puissances dans le but d'arriver à la paix.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 28 février, 1913.

[9446] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 31 of the 20th ultimo respecting a protest by the Mair de Bolton Cigarette Paper Company against the action of the Servian authorities in regard to the duties levied on goods exported from Salonica to the territory in Servian occupation, and I approve your action in the matter as reported therein.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10927] No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 24. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.*

M. SKOULOUDIS called on the 5th March and gave Sir A. Nicolson the information contained in the telegram of which I transmit herewith a copy. Sir A. Nicolson told him that his Government must have been misinformed, and in any case that we had received no information, nor indeed any indication, that such a transaction was even contemplated by Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Powers were in all probability about to mediate between Roumania and Bulgaria, and it was not at all likely that two of the Powers should independently act as reported. M. Skouloudis said that he had mentioned the matter yesterday to M. Cambon, and that the latter had treated the information received by the Greek Government as a legend.

M. Skouloudis further said that M. Paléologue had told the Greek Minister at Paris that though the French, British, and Russian Governments were of opinion that Greece

should obtain possession of all the islands, it was possible that those which were in Italian occupation would be formed into an autonomous group under Turkish suzerainty. This news had much depressed the Greek Government.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Skouloudis that he was aware that the Powers had suggested to the Porte that the question as to the future of the islands should be left in the hands of the Powers. This proposal had been made some time back, and since then the question had not been discussed or examined, as the Powers had been occupied with some more pressing matters. M. Skouloudis appeared satisfied.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Copy of Telegram communicated by M. Skouloudis, March 5, 1913.

NOUS avons appris hier, de source sûre, qu'Allemagne et Autriche insisteront que Silistrie soit cédée à la Roumanie par la Bulgarie, à laquelle on assurera Salonique. On gagnera par là et Roumanie et Bulgarie avec leur entrée probable dans Triple Alliance, dont prépondérance en Europe deviendra écrasante. En outre, si Bulgarie possède Salonique, elle sera sous peu si puissante matériellement qu'elle aura les moyens, en s'attachant à la Triple Alliance, de prendre et Constantinople et les Détroits, et c'est contre ce danger que nous devons nous garer. La Russie a presque abandonné la Serbie et le Monténégro dans la question de l'Albanie ; mais abandonner la Grèce dans la question de Salonique, lui enlever des mains ce qu'elle a conquis au prix de sang, pour faire une Bulgarie formidable, constitue une faute grosse de dangers pour l'avenir. Devant la désertion prochaine de la Bulgarie, désertion à laquelle ses propres intérêts la poussent, il ne reste à la Triple Entente que de favoriser la Grèce et la Serbie. L'Autriche et l'Allemagne voulant faire dépendre l'attribution de Salonique à la Bulgarie et de l'incorporation de Silistrie à la Roumanie, les Puissances de la Triple Entente pourraient facilement déjouer ce plan en insistant sur la nécessité de ne pas céder Silistrie à la Roumanie ; leur insistance ne pourraient nullement paraître comme étant faite en notre faveur, mais elle serait interprétée comme un appui de la Triple Entente à la Bulgarie contre la prétention roumaine et ne saurait porter ombrage à l'alliance des États balkaniques.

[10929] No. 94.

Memorandum communicated by Herr von Kühlmann, March 6, 1913.

(Translation.)

THE enclosed circular from the president of the Ottoman Public Debt contains the inaccurate statement that the ambassadorial meetings in London have neither examined hitherto the financial questions arising out of the war in the Balkans nor are they called upon to do so, whereas, in reality, the basic principles have been laid down in London, and only the settlement of details has been reserved for an international commission to be summoned to meet in Paris.

It appears from the circular that M. de la Boulinière, in his capacity as president of the Public Debt, regards himself as entitled without further preliminaries to represent the Turkish State creditors at the forthcoming deliberations in Paris. The Imperial Government certainly consider it necessary that the Debt should be represented at these deliberations. But the safeguarding of the specific German interests cannot be entrusted to the president of the Debt alone. On the contrary, the Imperial Government must attach importance to the German interests, which by no means consist solely of the Unified Debt and the bonds ("Lose"), but are connected to a far greater extent with the fate of certain special loans and railway loans being in the charge of the German representative on the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

German Embassy, London,
March 6, 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

Enclosure in No. 94.

Circular Note.

D'APRÈS les renseignements précis qui me sont fournis par le président du syndicat français et aussi par l'Ambassadeur de France, la réunion des Ambassadeurs qui s'occupera de la question financière n'est pas imminente ; elle se tiendra à Paris, et le droit du conseil d'être en mesure d'y présenter la défense de ses intérêts est dès à présent revendiqué par moi en son nom.

A l'heure actuelle il ne s'agit encore que d'études préliminaires faites par les différents Gouvernements intéressés.

La conférence des Ambassadeurs à Londres n'a pas abordé et n'est pas appelée à aborder l'examen des intérêts économiques qui vont se trouver soulevés.

Dès que le représentant du Conseil de la Dette pourra être admis à présenter la défense des intérêts que nous avons à sauvegarder, j'en serai avisé et je partirai sans retard pour remplir la mission qui m'est confiée.

Je serai très obligé à mes collègues de vouloir bien se réunir lundi en conseil à 11 heures du matin à la Dette, pour fixer nos décisions à l'égard de la question du revenu du tabac et examiner aussi la situation au point de vue de mon prochain départ.

Le Président du Conseil,
J. DE LA BOULINIÈRE.

Constantinople, le 7 (20) février, 1913.

[10449] No. 95.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 5*, 1913.

RUSSIAN Minister has made a friendly communication to the King to the effect that, in the opinion of the Powers, Scutari should belong to Albania ; Russia would find herself alone if she supported Montenegrin claim. The continuation of the struggle for the town and the sacrifice of fresh victims would be useless.

[10450] No. 96.

Count de Salis to Sir EdwardGrey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 5*, 1913.

IN reply to confidential enquiry from the Bulgarian Government, the King of Montenegro has stated that he claims war indemnity of 144,000,000 fr.

Please compare this figure with those given in last annual report respecting total revenue expenditure of this country balanced at about 4,000,000 fr.

The King also enquired whether the allies would support the proposal that the Turks should evacuate Scutari immediately on termination of hostilities.

[10458] No. 97.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 5*, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 28th February : Mediation.

Collective enquiry was made this morning. Montenegro replied this evening by asking for time to consider the matter with their allies.

[10469] No. 98.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 5*, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

In reply to collective enquiry this morning, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs commenced reading a statement which began by declaring that Montenegro accepted mediation, but excluded from its scope such questions as Scutari.

I told him at once that I could not undertake transmission of such a message to you, as the enquiry we were instructed to make appeared to admit of only a simple affirmative or negative answer. The other representatives agreed. The reply reported to you in my immediately preceding telegram was subsequently returned to us.

[10480] No. 99.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 12)
(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, March 5*, 1913.

"TIMES" correspondent at Salonica learns on authority which commands respect that the Triple Alliance decided to endeavour to attach to itself both Bulgaria and Roumania.

The scheme supposed to be to assure Salonica to Bulgaria in exchange for Silistria. This does not appear to have been yet disclosed at Sophia.

The cable being interrupted, the "Times" correspondent cannot send this direct, and would be grateful if you have no objection to inform the "Times."

[10596] No. 100.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, March 6*, 1913.

BERLIN telegram No. 42 of 1st March.

The point raised by German Government was indicated in my telegrams of 24th January and 17th February. It is, however, partly met by system of private bonded warehouses (see my despatch No. 14) which I understand to have been already inaugurated by Greek authorities. On the other hand, all trade with Uskub line is now suspended by refusal of Servians to provide goods trucks at Gumendja.

[10501] No. 101.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, March 6*, 1913.

GREEK transport, conveying a Servian battery to Durazzo, reported wrecked on the coast of Eubœa.

[10542] No. 102.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 6*, 1913.

AFTER attack lasting for two days, and capture of fortifications to the west of Janina, Essad Pasha capitulated to Crown Prince at 2 this morning.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[10594] No. 103.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, March 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 86 of 5th March: Ottoman Debt.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon text of three articles contained in your circular telegram of 5th March. His Excellency told me that he would send his reply through Count Mensdorff after having studied the matter carefully. At first sight he thought that he would be able to give Austro-Hungarian representatives at Balkan capitals instructions to support British proposal.

[10595] No. 104.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 6, 1912.*

I ENQUIRED of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether he saw any prospect of a solution being reached on the question of Djakova. He said that he had just received a telegram from Count Mensdorff stating that he had discussed the question with you and that you had referred matter back to St. Petersburgh. Impression I received from his rather vague language was that it was not quite hopeless to expect to see him give way with regard to Djakova in return for suitable compensations. His Excellency laid much stress on necessity for Powers to come to a rapid settlement of Albanian frontier question. He also said that it was essential that the future of Scutari should be definitely settled and not left in uncertainty. He meant by this that the European Powers should definitely inform Balkan States that they had drawn frontier line of Northern Albania and would permit no further discussion of it. He thought that if the six Powers did so there was a probability that Montenegro and Servia would resign themselves to their decision.

[10548] No. 105.

Sir C. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 6, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 4th March.

At an audience accorded to the French Minister last night the King emphasised the importance of expediting mediation as much as possible.

French Minister tells me that he has received no instructions to make enquiry indicated in your telegram No. 23 of 4th March. It is probably, however, well known already by the Governments of the six Powers that both Roumania and Bulgaria desire that the Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh should deal with the question.

[10593] No. 106.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 6, 1913.*

BALKAN war.

Janina capitulated this morning to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Greece. Greek Minister informs me that heavy fighting has been proceeding there during the last three days.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[10588] No. 107.

Consul Baldwin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Galatz, March 6, 1913.*

STEAM-SHIP "Trevelyan," flying British flag, on the way to Sulina, reports being fired on from Heraklitza in Sea of Marmora 27th February by Bulgarian artillery. Ship struck by shrapnel bullets; no one hurt.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 67.)

[10251] No. 108.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 124: Ottoman Public Debt: Salt.

The action of His Majesty's Government would depend on the precise circumstances of the case, and they could not pledge themselves generally to intervene, as, in the contingency contemplated, it would probably be a matter in which recourse should, in the first instance, be had to the prize court of the captor.

[10469] No. 109.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913*

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 5th March: Balkans and mediation.

Your language approved.

[10715] No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.*

THE Albanian delegates have given to me and to the Ambassadors here a memorandum emphasising the miserable situation of the inhabitants of Vallona and its neighbourhood, who, being surrounded on all sides by belligerents, cannot procure food, and are exposed to starvation.

The meeting of the Ambassadors here consider that it is urgent to ask the Greek Government to allow these people to get supplies of food, while taking all measures that it considers necessary to exercise surveillance over ships performing this service.

You should make this request to the Greek Government. Your colleagues will no doubt do the same.

[9819] No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 26 of 25th February: Bulgarian loan.

You should suggest to Bulgarian Minister of Finance that he should apply direct to the firms whom he has in mind.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[10407] No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 21 of 5th March.

Greek Government have never hinted any such condition to me, and are apparently ready to discuss terms of peace with Powers as mediators.

[11178] No. 113.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 10. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.*

M. CATARGI, formerly Roumanian Minister at this Court, called to-day and told Sir A. Nicolson that he had no official mission, but that his Sovereign, with the approval of the Prime Minister, had requested him to come here to explain the case of Roumania.

This he did at very considerable length, but his exposition, which commenced in 1876 and led by slow stages to the present day, contained no novel facts.

The sum and substance of it was that Roumania must have Silistria and either Balchik or at least Kavarna. Unless she obtained some concessions the country would insist on war, but this he stated as a secret, which was not to be divulged.

He also said that Roumania wished to shake herself free from the Triple Alliance and join the Triple *Entente;* that the next liquidation, as all knew well, would be that of the Dual Monarchy, as it was impossible, now that the Balkan confederation had arisen and Turkey was practically removed from Europe, for the Slavs and the Roumans (there are close on 3,000,000 of the latter in Hungary) not to gravitate to their brothers across the frontier. A break-up was therefore inevitable.

Sir A. Nicolson said that he would report M. Catargi's communication to me.

M. Catargi said that he would like to see me, not to go over the ground again with me, but to pay his respects and to tell King Charles that he had seen me.

On leaving he added that he wished no one to know that he was on a private mission, but Sir A. Nicolson told him that the German Ambassador had seen him here, and had been told that he was discussing the Roumano-Bulgarian question, as it was not known that his visit was to be kept so secret.

M. Catargi said that it did not really matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11179] No. 114.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors this afternoon, the following resolution was come to :—

"En ce qui concerne la délimitation du nord et du nord-est de l'Albanie, la réunion pense qu'un accord général est possible sur les différents points qui ont été abordés dans des conversations particulières.

"La solution de la question de Djakova, qui reste en suspens, étendrait cet accord à toute la frontière.

"Cette question étant réservée, la réunion pense qu'on pourrait discuter la délimitation de la frontière au sud-est et au sud de l'Albanie."

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 171), Sir E. Goschen (No. 99), Sir R. Rodd (No. 74), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 109).

There was a general feeling that this resolution, though it did not settle the question of Djakova, would make the settlement of this question more easy, and that real progress had been made by putting on record the fact that this was in effect the only outstanding question of importance. The tone in which the matter was discussed was most friendly on all sides, and there was a general feeling that settlement was in the air.

The following resolution, bearing on the question of the Albanian frontier, was then agreed to :—

"La réunion se demande si, après les récentes communications des représentants serbe et monténégrin, il ne serait pas opportun de renouveler à Belgrade et de faire à Cettigné la communication faite au chargé d'affaires de Serbie par Sir E. Grey de la part de la réunion, le 23 janvier dernier, au sujet de l'évacuation, après la délimitation de l'Albanie, des points occupés par les troupes serbes.

The Ambassadors as well as myself had all received the same communication from the Albanian delegates on the subject of the distress in Albania, particularly at Vallona.

I said that I was prepared to send instructions to the British Minister in Athens to make to the Greek Government the desired representation, and the following resolution was agreed to :—

"Les délégués albanais à Londres ont remis à Sir E. Grey et aux Ambassadeurs un mémorandum signalant la triste situation des habitants de Vallona et de ses environs, qui, bloqués de tous côtés par les belligérants, ne peuvent se procurer des vivres et sont exposés à mourir de faim.

"La réunion pense qu'il y aurait urgence à demander au Gouvernement hellénique de permettre le ravitaillement de ces populations, en prenant toutes les mesures qu'il jugera utiles pour la surveillance des bâtiments chargés de ce service.

"Sir E. Grey envoie des instructions dans ce sens au représentant britannique à Athènes."

Finally, the following resolution was agreed to on the subject of the Ottoman Debt :—

"Les Ambassades à Paris ayant été invitées par le Gouvernement français à se faire représenter dans la commission technique chargée d'étudier les questions financières qui feront l'objet de dispositions spéciales dans le futur traité de paix, la réunion pense qu'il convient d'adresser à Paris toutes les communications relatives à ces questions."

I said that we were satisfied with the "projet" which had now been drawn up, as far as it went. If no further alterations were to be made in it, it was unnecessary to discuss the matter here. If there were to be further alterations they had better be discussed in Paris. So far as we were concerned, we had no more to suggest.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Identic Note.

Excellence,

NOUS avons l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence qu'à la suite des informations que nous venons de recevoir, la population entière en Albanie se trouve, par suite de l'état de guerre actuel, dans la plus affreuse détresse.

Cernés, d'une part, par les Grecs qui ont établi le long du littoral un blocus rigoureux, ainsi que par les Serbes qui ont envahi une grande partie du pays ; d'autre part, harcelés par les soldats turcs, débris de l'armée de Monastir qui ont vécu jusqu'ici sur le pays, les habitants de Vallona surtout et de ses environs sont infailliblement destinés à périr si l'on ne parvient, dans le plus bref délai, à remédier à cette triste situation en intervenant auprès du Gouvernement hellénique pour leur permettre de se procurer les vivres nécessaires à leur existence.

Nous ne relèverons pas ici le côté humanitaire de la question ; nous sommes

persuadés que votre Excellence voudra bien prendre en considération l'état précaire de cette population, qui, quoique non belligérante, subit injustement les calamités de cette guerre désastreuse.

Veuillez, &c.
Les délégués du Gouvernement provisoire albanais :
RASSIH DINO.
MEHMED KONITZA.
M. NOGGA.

Londres, le 5 mars, 1913

[10616] No. 115.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Bucharest, March 3*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that all my colleagues of the Great Powers having received instructions similar to those contained in your telegram No. 22 of the 27th ultimo, it was decided that, in order to carry out our instructions in a manner which would be as little conspicuous as possible, the French Minister, the doyen of the representatives of the Great Powers, should visit the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his house and should speak on behalf of all the six Ministers.

M. Blondel accordingly saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening, and read to him the following communication, leaving it with his Excellency as an *aide-memoire* :—

"A l'occasion du différend roumano-bulgare et la proposition que lui avaient adressée les six Grandes Puissances, le Gouvernement bulgare a fait la réponse suivante :—

"'Le Gouvernement bulgare, confiant dans l'esprit de haute équité des Grandes Puissances, accepte la proposition de s'en remettre pour la solution du conflit roumano-bulgare à la décision des six Grandes Puissances, pourvu que le Gouvernement roumain l'accepte également.'

"L'acceptation par le Gouvernement bulgare de la proposition formulée par les Grandes Puissances se trouve ainsi subordonnée à l'acceptation de cette même proposition par le Gouvernement roumain. Il appartient, en conséquence, au Gouvernement roumain de faire connaître si, afin de hâter la solution du conflit roumano-bulgare, il est disposé à s'en remettre à la décision des six Puissances."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Roumanian Government could not revoke ("revenir sur") its decision, which it had notified to the legations on the 22nd ultimo (see my despatch No. 25 of the following day). To do so would be to endanger the interests of peace; for the Government, if it took the decision which we desired, would very probably be upset, and the Cabinet which would then come to power would certainly be more warlike than the present Ministry. In his Excellency's opinion, it would be better that the meeting of Ambassadors, which would later be charged with the task of preparing the compromise to be recommended to Roumania and Bulgaria, should be forthwith called upon to bring the Bulgarian and Roumanian answers into harmony. His Excellency would guarantee that the proposal formulated by the Powers, whatever that proposal might be, would be respected by Roumania, and, if he were sure that the secret would be kept at Sophia, he would not hesitate to confirm this to us formally. This would enable the Bulgarians to come before the Ambassadors' meeting invoking no more than their mediation, which the Bulgarians would know was tantamount to arbitration, and would not compel the Roumanian Government to avow publicly that it had bound itself beforehand to accept the decision of the Powers.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs was most anxious that it should not be known that we had made our collective representation or that he had given any assurance that Roumania would accept the compromise eventually proposed by the Powers, though it is obvious that it loses much of its practical value unless it can be used in Sophia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[10744] No. 116.

Memorandum communicated by Austro-Hungarian Embassy, March 7, 1913.

DANS la réunion du 21 février, Sir E. Grey a porté à la connaissance des Ambassadeurs un amendement anglais au projet d'articles concernant la dette publique à insérer dans le traité de paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques.

Le Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie est d'avis que dans l'article 1er le mots "aux porteurs étrangers" devraient être supprimés, autrement il y aurait danger que les Gouvernements balkaniques limiteraient leur obligation à la partie de la dette publique ottomane garantie se trouvant en possession des porteurs non turcs, faisant déduction des titres détenus par des Ottomans.

Après le mot "toutefois" il y aurait, d'après l'opinion du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie, lieu d'insérer "en ce qui concerne les emprunts jouissant de gages spéciaux dans lesdits territoires." Cette insertion paraîtrait nécessaire pour sauvegarder contre toutes les éventualités les droits des porteurs de titres des emprunts garantis.

L'amendement proposé par le Gouvernement britannique avait certainement aussi en vue la sauvegarde des droits des porteurs de la dette dont le service est assuré par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane.

Si ces deux modifications sont introduites dans l'amendement anglais, le Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie donne son adhésion et espère que cette rédaction est acceptée aussi par les autres Puissances.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres, le 7 mars, 1913.

[10669] No. 117.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, March 7*, 1913.

JANINA surrendered unconditionally, 33,000 prisoners, but large bodies of troops under Ali Riza Pasha withdrew northwards. Military attaché witnessed final operations.

[10740] No. 118.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March 7*, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 37 of 6th March.

The Greek ironclad was quiet recently at Valona in friendly communication with the town and received no complaints of scarcity, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs will enquire whether the commander-in-chief still objects to the entrance of supplies, now that Janina has fallen.

(Confidential.)

See my despatch No. 40. Besides arms and ammunition, the Minister tells me that some Turkish officers also reached Albania, viâ Austria.

[10747] No. 119.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 24. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, March 7*, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 20 of the 4th instant.

M. Coromilas has spoken to me to the following effect: he has learnt from a source which he regards as sure, but which he is bound not to reveal, that a plot is on foot between Austria and Germany to induce Bulgaria to give up Silistria to

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Roumania in return for a promise on their part to give a firm support to the Bulgarian demand for Salonica, the calculation being that in this manner the Triple Alliance will acquire the friendship of both Roumania and Bulgaria. His Excellency fears that in Paris and London this information is not taken seriously enough, but he himself has no doubt of its accuracy. Until lately he had thought that nothing was yet known of the scheme at Sophia, but doubts have been raised in his mind by the coincidence that the Bulgarians have recently tried to oust the Greeks from certain places in their occupation to the north-east of Salonica. There has already been an exchange of shots, and artillery is being brought up by the Bulgarians.

Force alone will induce the Greeks to give up Salonica.

My French and Russian colleagues have also been given the above information.

[10748] No. 120.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 7, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

I have reason to believe, before accepting the mediation of the Great Powers, the Ilies will put forward certain conditions, probably as follows:—

1. Cession of Adrianople.
2. War indemnity.

The above they propose to insist on as a *sine quâ non.*

They will suggest Midia-Rodosto line, with the intention, however, of yielding on this point and accepting the Midia-Enos line.

Pourparlers are proceeding with the Greek Government respecting their claims to the Ægean islands. Athens has been informed that this Government would like Thasos. Bulgarian Government are, however, unlikely to insist on the acquisition of this island.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[10743] No. 121.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 7, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 76 of 26th February.

Roumanian Minister at Sophia is leaving Bucharest to-day for St. Petersburgh, for the purpose, I understand, of assisting the Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburgh unofficially in connection with the mediation.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[10738] No. 122.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 7, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 46 of 5th March.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that the Russian Government have stated both at Cettinjé and here that Montenegro must not count on anything more than diplomatic support from Russia on the question of Scutari.

He again repeated that it would be well if all the Powers would declare at Cettinjé that the limits of Albania have been definitely fixed and that Scutari remains Albanian. He added that the surrender of Scutari will be among the peace conditions formulated by the allies, but he thought that none of the allies except Montenegro would wish to insist.

[10737] No. 123.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 7, 1913.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 73 of 4th March.

In spite of Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement to me yesterday that the Austro-Russian negotiations for demobilisation were making good progress, I am informed that they are not satisfied here with the turn they have taken of late. I learn that an article laudatory of Russia had been written for publication yesterday in the "Fremdenblatt" on the occasion of the tercentenary celebrations, but that it was stopped at the last moment by Minister for Foreign Affairs' orders and a purely historical one written to replace it.

[10749] No. 124.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, March 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 6th March.

Sir H. Babington Smith fears he may have difficulty in finding time for commission. Can indication be given of date of meeting and probable duration?

[10594] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 32 of 6th March: Ottoman Debt.

It was not intended to ask Minister for Foreign Affairs to support this proposal, which is not specially British. My communication to allies was only made because I understood that Germans, French, and, I thought, Austrians also had all at one time or another separately communicated one version or another of these three articles to the allies, and as I had now agreed to the latest version, I followed suit. Any further discussion respecting the debt will take place at Paris, and my circular telegram No. 86 of 5th March was solely for information of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was not intended to suggest any further action or discussion.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 196; Rome, No. 91; Paris, No. 113; and Berlin, No. 109.)

[10595] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 33 of 6th March.

At the meeting with Ambassadors yesterday the Albanian question was discussed, and the following resolution was agreed to:—

"En ce qui concerne la délimitation du nord et du nord-est de l'Albanie, la réunion pense qu'un accord général est possible sur les différents points qui ont été abordés dans des conversations particulières.

"La solution de la question de Djakova, qui reste en suspens, étendrait cet accord à toute la frontière.

"Cette question étant réservée, la réunion pense qu'on pourrait discuter la délimitation de la frontière au sud-est et au sud de l'Albanie."

I think this marks an advance towards an agreement.

It was followed by a further resolution:—

"La réunion se demande si après les récentes communications des représentants serbe et monténégrin, il ne serait pas opportun de renouveler à Belgrade et de

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faire à Cettigné la communication, faite au chargé d'affaires de Serbie par Sir E. Grey de la part de la réunion le 23 janvier dernier, au sujet de l'évacuation, après la délimitation de l'Albanie, des points occupés par les troupes serbes."

These two resolutions imply that, if there was agreement about Djakova, Count Berchtold's desire that the future of Scutari should be definitely settled and not left in uncertainty, and that the European Powers should definitely inform Balkan States that they had drawn the frontier line of Northern Albania, and would permit no further discussion of it, could be realised. It would entail an intimation from all the Powers to Montenegro that she must renounce Scutari.

The difficulty is to find some compromise which would avoid a similar intimation to Servia that she must evacuate Djakova. It seems impossible to expect Russia to become a party to anything that would entail both intimations. The language of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to me has never varied on this point.

On the other hand, I believe Russia would not exclude consideration of any compromise which secured material advantages, especially commercial, for Albanians in district of Djakova, but obviated necessity of ordering Servians to evacuate the town.

I am ready to discuss the possibility of this with Russian Ambassador and Austrian Ambassador here separately, whenever they desire it, and to bring the question before the meeting with Ambassadors directly there is a prospect of agreement. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Berlin.)

[10595] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 93 of to-day to Vienna.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir F. Cartwright and of his No. 33 of 6th March to me, omitting third sentence, beginning "Impression" and ending "compensations."

[10419] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 48 of 5th March: Ottoman Public Debt offices.

Please inform French Government that I should deprecate placing flags of the Powers concerned over Ottoman Debt establishments, on the ground, amongst others, that, if any incident occurred, the Powers would be more directly involved than would at present be the case.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 111; Vienna, No. 92; St. Petersburgh, No. 198; Rome, No. 93; and Belgrade, No. 56.)

[10414] No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 128 of 5th March: Advance to Turkish Government by Anatolian Railway.

Has the Anatolian Railway received any sort of concession in return for advance, or is it merely a financial transaction? Has it made the advance alone, or in concert with the Deutsche Bank? It would be interesting to see a copy of the contract, if obtainable.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 113, and Paris, No. 115.)

[11177] No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.*

THE Roumanian Minister came to see me to-day, and told me, by instruction from his Government, how anxious they were that mediation should not be delayed. The situation was very difficult for them internally, and would become increasingly difficult if there was delay.

I asked him to express the satisfaction which I felt that Roumania had accepted mediation, and to say that, as far as I was concerned, I would do everything in my power as opportunity arose to facilitate mediation. I would take care that no delay arose in our sending instructions to the British Ambassador in whatever capital was selected for the place where mediation was to be arranged. I understood that a preference was being expressed for St. Petersburgh.

The Minister said that he had been surprised, seeing the special view which Russia had in the matter, that this preference had been expressed in Bucharest. He himself would have thought that the Ambassadors in London were more familiar with the subject, as it had already been under their consideration, and therefore more ready to proceed with it.

I observed that, on the other hand, it must be remembered that the Ambassadors here had to deal with the whole question of mediation and terms of peace between Turkey and the allies, and it might therefore have been a little difficult, or at least have taken some time, to carry on two sets of mediation at once.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10794] No. 131.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Athens, March 1, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 33 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to the 28th February. It is extremely meagre.

Rumours are current of disaffection and demoralisation in the army before Yannina, owing to the prolonged inaction and to the hardships which the troops are suffering. (Numerous cases of frost-bite continue to be brought to Athens for treatment.) Possibly on this account, possibly also in connection with a demand of the Crown Prince, which has not been complied with, for the despatch of a force to the west of Yannina via Santi Quaranta, M. Venizelos visited His Royal Highness's head-quarters during the third week of February.

General Danglis, chief of the staff of the commander-in-chief, having returned from London, rejoined His Royal Highness on the 15th.

The prohibition of the dispatch of messages in cypher, including those from foreign consuls, from the telegraph offices in Epirus and those at Agrinion, Missolonghi, Patras, and Corfu, reported in my telegram No. 17 of to-day, was ordered at the instance of the Crown Prince, who alleged that without it he was unable to keep the movements of his troops secret.

The extension of the blockade of the coasts of Epirus and Albania, reported in my telegram No. 16 of the 25th ultimo, is intended to prevent the passage of arms and ammunition which, the Greek Government are informed, are arriving in considerable quantities from Italy, and still more from Austria. The blockade is also to be made more effective than it has been up to the present.

A later notice states that the town of Durazzo is not included in the blockade, as was indeed apparent from the limits of latitude assigned to it.

The whereabouts of the "Hamidieh" remain unknown, but she is believed to have visited Beyrout. The batteries erected on the coast near Phalerum in expectation of her appearance were exercised at target practice on the 27th. The withdrawal of the "Paarà" from the Greek fleet and her presence at Corfu is also no doubt a measure of precaution against a raid from the "Hamidieh."

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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Enclosure in No. 131.

Diary of the War for period February 15 to 25, 1913.

February 18: Announcement by the Ministry of Marine.—Yesterday morning there appeared at the entrance of the Dardanelles, where they remained until 11 o'clock, a battle-ship of the Barbarossa type, a cruiser of the Medjidieh type, and two destroyers.

February 21: Official Announcement.—It is announced from Philippiada that an engagement took place near Manoliassa between our infantry and the enemy's, during which our men took an important hill, whence the enemy were expelled with great loss.

February 28.—Our troops came into contact yesterday near Molista with a strong detachment of the enemy. The fight lasted over six hours, and resulted in the heavy defeat of the Turks, 180 of whom were taken prisoners. The same day the Turks, having been reinforced, made a counter-attack, but were repulsed. After the battle our men buried 112 bodies of the enemy, eight of whom were officers. We lost only four wounded. The population of Konitsa and that district are celebrating the splendid victory.

[10796] No. 132.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Athens, March 3, 1913.*

AMONG the print which reached by the last messenger I find a telegram from Sir H. Pax-Ironside (No. 59 of the 14th February) to the effect that the Greek and Servian Governments have agreed to constitute a condominium of the town and district of Salonica, and that the assent of the Bulgarian Government is expected, although it has not yet been given.

I have asked M. Coromilas about this. His Excellency declares that no such project has even been mooted. He says that the Greek Government hope to keep Salonica, and to make it into a free port with a free district, on the lines of Trieste or Genoa, modernised and improved. They hope in this way to encourage industries, and to give every facility for the traffic of the hinterland.

Before the war they had been considering a similar project for the Piræus, together with an ambitious and costly scheme for the enlargement and improvement of the port, and they had by no means abandoned it, but hoped to carry it out when means allowed, as well as the Salonica scheme. At the latter port considerable expenditure would be required to prevent the silting up of the entrance by the deposits of the Vardar.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

[10822] No. 133.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of the 26th ultimo, alluding to indications that the internal situation was somewhat precarious, I have the honour to report that, following on several political arrests, the Government has now issued a statement as to the discovery of some secret organisation to bring about a *contre-coup d'État* to that of the 23rd January against Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet.

The general public profess to regard it as a plot manufactured by the Committee Cabinet as a handle for dealing with its political adversaries, and judging by the official accounts in the papers, as also by the version which the Grand Vizier gave me, the plot would not so far seem to be serious.

The Government's official statement throws suspicion on the nephew of the Sultan, Prince Sebaheddin, who with his father, Mahmoud Damad Pasha, fled the country during the reign of Abdul Hamid and spent years in France, Egypt, and England. His private secretary, Safvet Loutfi Bey, who has so far escaped arrest, is alleged to be the chief organiser of a movement to bring about a public demonstration against the present Cabinet in the event of the Bulgarians invading the peninsula of Gallipoli, and

Adrianople being obliged to surrender, contrary to the professions of the Committee when it took power, that it would save Adrianople by a forward movement.

It is alleged that 5,000 proclamations, to be distributed in the Trebizond and Erzeroum districts, were printed at the offices of a Hellenic subject named Pantazi; that a Persian subject, Mehmed Ali, was approached with a view to the manufacture of bombs to be thrown during a demonstration at the Porte, and that two youths were suborned to throw the bombs. So far Pantazi and the proclamations have not been forthcoming, while the Persian, Mehmed Ali, has no knowledge of bombs or their manufacture. Some non-Committee officers, supposed to be implicated, have not responded to the call of the military commandant, and are believed to have fled the country. The military commandant of the capital, Colonel Jemal Bey, ex-vali of Adana and Bagdad, and one of the chief actors in the *coup d'État* of the 23rd January, has sent an open letter to Prince Sebaheddin, inviting the latter to send his secretary, Savfet Loutfi Bey, accompanied by a legal expert, and offering to release the Prince's secretary in half-an-hour if he is able to disprove the evidence against him. So far no reply has been received from the Prince.

There is no doubt that the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress during the last four and a-half years, and especially since its capture of power on the 23rd January, has created a large volume of smouldering dissatisfaction both in the army and among the Moslem masses, and it is generally asserted that the "Opposition," which has been rendered inarticulate by the repressive measures now in force in the capital, was only awaiting the fall of Adrianople, or the signature of peace involving the cession of that place, to avenge itself by some popular outburst on the assassins of Nazim Pasha and on the principal Committee leaders who are held responsible for the disasters which have fallen on the Empire. The Committee, well aware of this tendency, has taken, and is taking, stern measures to muzzle the press and to prevent any attempt at organisation, thus driving discontent below the surface.

The Committee was lately reported to be divided in opinion, some being in favour of concluding peace on the basis of ceding Adrianople, while others, arguing that the Opposition would keep quiet as long as the state of war continued, were opposed to making peace as long as Adrianople held out. The recent action of the Cabinet in "going for" its political adversaries is interpreted to mean that Adrianople will soon be reduced by famine, and that, as its capitulation would be used by the Opposition and the non-Committee element in the army against the present Cabinet, the latter has decided to forestall any hostile movement.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[10785] No. 134.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Rome, March 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 61 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that it would appear to have crossed with my despatch No. 42 of the 22nd, in which the views of the Italian Government on the subject of the administration of the Ottoman Debt in the occupied territories were expressed with more completeness than in my telegram No. 32 of the previous day.

I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the sense of your despatch above referred to, and expressed your earnest hope that the Italian Government would participate in the suggested representation at Belgrade. His Excellency said that there were not many Italian bondholders, and that therefore for the Italian Government the question had less importance than for other countries. I urged that nevertheless in questions of this kind the solidarity of the Great Powers was a first consideration, and that, as it was by no means yet determined precisely what areas of the occupied territories would eventually fall to the respective States, it was very important that the situation should not be compromised by premature appropriation of the revenues. The Marquis di San Giuliano was disposed to agree with this view, and said that the matter was one which had to be submitted to the Ministry of Finance. He would therefore be glad if I would send him a memorandum containing the various

documents which we had been discussing and it should then receive the earliest attention.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[10790] No. 135.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Rome, March 4, 1913.*

AS I have on former occasions had the honour to point out, the "Popolo Romano," a journal published in this city, is often used by the present administration as a means of giving the official view, and under these circumstances it may be worth while to report the terms of a brief editorial note in the issue of yesterday referring to certain criticisms which have been made in the Greek press against the Governor of Rhodes, General Ameglio, for having prohibited a traditional religious procession because he had been unable to obtain the required assurances that it would not be connected with a demonstration in favour of annexation with displays of the Hellenic flag. The note in question contains the following observation:—

"Italy occupies in these islands the position of a judicial caretaker who has to look after the property in deposit with a view to handing it over to whomsoever the court indicates. The court in this case is the Great Powers, towards whom Italy has undertaken a responsibility which she cannot disregard without disloyalty. If the Powers decide that the islands are to be assigned to Greece, we shall hand them over to M. Venizelos with the best grace possible. If they decide that they are to be restored to Turkey, we shall restore them to Mahomet V. with the guarantees which, in the interests of the populations, were stipulated by the Treaty of Lausanne."

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[10813] No. 136.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Paris, March 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply to the communication which I addressed to his Excellency on the receipt of your despatch No. 132 of the 20th ultimo, relative to the closing of the French and Austrian post-offices at Cavalla.

M. Jonnart informs me of the representations already made at Sophia on the subject, and suggests that His Majesty's Minister there should join with his French colleague in further representations to the Bulgarian Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 136.

M. Jonnart to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 7 mars, 1913.*

EN me référant à la communication de votre Excellence en date du 22 février dernier, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire connaître que le consul de France à Salonique, ayant eu connaissance des mesures prises par les autorités militaires bulgares en ce qui concerne le bureau de poste français de Cavalla, est intervenu immédiatement auprès du plénipotentiaire du Roi Ferdinand à Salonique en vue d'obtenir le retrait.

Cette démarche n'ayant pas abouti au résultat désiré, le Ministre de France à Sophia a été à deux reprises, les 9 et 24 janvier dernier, invité à presser le Gouvernement Royal de transmettre aux autorités militaires les instructions nécessaires en vue d'assurer le libre fonctionnement des bureaux en question.

Le Ministre Royal des Affaires Étrangères ayant fait connaître au représentant de la république que les dispositions en question ne pourraient être modifiées durant la

période des hostilités, cette manière de voir ne m'a paru pouvoir être acceptée. En conséquence, j'ai invité M. de Panafieu, à la date du 24 février, à appeler à nouveau la plus sérieuse attention de M. Guéchof sur cet incident et à insister pour qu'il soit mis un terme à un ordre de choses préjudiciable aux intérêts des neutres et du commerce international.

Il y aurait sans doute avantage si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique partage le point de vue du Gouvernement français à ce que le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne à Sophia reçoive pour instructions de se joindre à son collègue français pour faire des représentations au Gouvernement bulgare.

Agréez, &c.
Pour le Ministre,
PALÉOLOGUE.

[11222] No. 137.

Memorandum communicated by M. de Etter, March 8, 1913.

(Confidential.)

APRÈS la délimitation de l'Albanie, la réunion des Ambassadeurs devra s'occuper du statut organique et administratif de la nouvelle Albanie.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, on le sait, désire une Albanie indépendante; de son côté, le Gouvernement russe s'est prononcé en faveur du maintien en Albanie de la souveraineté du Sultan. Il paraîtrait que l'Autriche-Hongrie pense pour le trône d'Albanie à un prince catholique; l'Italie préférerait un prince protestant.

Ces points de vue différents des Gouvernements austro-hongrois et italien ont été signalés à Saint-Pétersbourg confidentiellement par le chargé d'affaires d'Italie, qui a offert au Gouvernement Impérial l'appui du Gouvernement italien pour l'opposition qu'il compte faire au projet austro-hongrois.

Il paraîtrait qu'en ces circonstances le mieux serait que les Puissances abandonnent à l'Autriche-Hongrie et à l'Italie le soin d'élaborer le statut futur de l'Albanie, quitte à y introduire les amendements qu'elles jugeraient nécessaires.

Le Gouvernement Impérial pense toutefois qu'il importerait de maintenir le principe que l'Albanie constitue une province autonome sous la souveraineté de la Turquie. Le point essentiel serait d'éviter l'établissement d'une prépondérance politique exclusivement autrichienne. Le futur prince, pour affermir sa position, devra nécessairement s'assurer d'un appui ailleurs qu'en Albanie, un appui que le Cabinet de Vienne sera tout disposé à lui accorder.

Introduire un élément dynastique ne ferait, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, que compliquer la tâche que devra assumer le futur Prince d'Albanie au moment de son avènement.

D'autres considérations militent en faveur du maintien en Albanie de la souveraineté du Sultan

La cession éventuelle de Scutari à l'Albanie sera de fait due moins aux efforts de la diplomatie autrichienne qu'à la résistance tenace de la garnison turque; le droit moral de la Turquie de conserver la souveraineté en Albanie, acquis par la force des armes, ne pourrait donc guère être mis en question.

Il est douteux que les mesures élaborées à Londres par les Puissances réussissent et suffisent à garantir pleinement l'ordre et la sécurité, et à prévenir des collisions entre les populations albanaises—de race et religion différentes—si l'autorité administrative locale ne dispose pas d'une force réelle suffisante. On ne voit pas sur quelle force pourrait s'appuyer un prince étranger au début de son administration. La nécessité d'un détachement international pour protéger son entrée en pouvoir, ainsi que son installation, s'imposera vraisemblablement; mais l'exemple de la Crète semble démontrer l'insuffisance d'un pareil ordre de choses et ses conséquences souvent fâcheuses.

Les Puissances auront de même à pourvoir à l'impérieux devoir de veiller à la protection des populations chrétiennes, qui, après l'évacuation des troupes serbes, resteraient livrées à leurs propres ressources et exposées aux actes de vengeance et de fanatisme des tribus turbulentes de l'Albanie.

C'est en s'inspirant de toutes ces considérations que le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir se prononcer en faveur d'une Albanie neutre, franchement autonome, confiée à l'administration d'un vali turc et placée sous le contrôle international européen, conformément à celui qui a déjà été accepté et dont les détails devront être empreints du même esprit.

[10950] No. 138.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 25th February to Sophia, and No. 113 of 28th February to Constantinople: Customs in occupied Turkish territory: Civilians in besieged towns.

I have taken no steps on either, as all my colleagues have not received instructions.

The French Minister has no instructions regarding either, but handed in a memorandum on the subject of "war contribution" only some time ago, and also spoke regarding permission for civilian population to leave Adrianople. The reply regarding the latter was that it is not a question in which Servian are concerned, as all the forces before Adrianople are under the chief command of the Bulgarians.

The Austrian Minister has received no instructions regarding the war contribution and customs.

The Russian Minister has no instructions on either subject.

Both German and Italian representatives have instructions.

[10968] No. 139.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, March 8, 1913.*

AN encounter took place between Greek and Bulgarian troops on 5th March at Nigrita, between here and Serres. Bulgarians are said to have brought up guns and bombarded Nigrita. Greek reinforcements left here yesterday.

Other small encounters are also reported.

[10980] No. 140.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 73 of 4th March: Reduction of troops.

Austrian Ambassador, who was waiting to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs when I left his Excellency's room this afternoon, told me that he hoped to be able to satisfy him with regard to the proposed communiqué. Austrian Government will, I gather, consent to publish in the "Fremdenblatt" some statement that will amount to an assurance of their pacific intentions towards Servia.

[10981] No. 141.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 190 of 5th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said this afternoon that he was anxious to know what was being done about Djakova, as owing to an apparent omission he had not understood a telegram which he had received from the Russian Ambassador. He repeated that he was opposed to the idea of an international commission, as Russia could not consent to handing back Christian minority to a Mussulman Government, more especially as Servians had already taken over the administration of the district. As he apparently knew nothing of the alternative solution of commercial zone referred to by the Austrian Ambassador, I did not feel authorised to say anything without further instructions.

His Excellency seemed to think that, now that Servians are reinforcing Montenegrins, Scutari may fall before long.

His Excellency enquired whether I was acquainted with your views with regard to the appointment of a sur-arbiter in the event of the six Powers being equally divided on the question of Silistria. On my replying in the negative, he said that the Roumanians were pressing him to commence mediation at once.

[10588] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, March 8, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram (repeats Galatz of 6th March).

You should bring incident to notice of Bulgarian Government.

[11186] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 203.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 8, 1913.*

AFTER resolutions come to at meeting with Ambassadors on Thursday it seems urgent to make some communication that will stop useless bloodshed at Scutari, and indeed all along the Albanian frontier. Very ugly reports reach me from time to time through British consuls of massacres in districts in Servian occupation, though it is difficult to be sure how much is authentic. All this would cease if a firm intimation could be made both to Montenegro and Servia that the destiny of places of chief importance on the frontier has been settled by the Powers and will not be affected by anything that Servia and Montenegro may do.

The meeting with Ambassadors on Thursday suggested that the previous communication, "Les Puissances considèrent que la Serbie sera tenue d'évacuer le littoral et le territoire de l'Albanie après sa délimitation par les Puissances, dès que lesdites Puissances lui auront notifié leur décision," should be repeated to Servia and made also to Montenegro.

You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would agree, if Austrian Government will also agree, to add to this a notification that the Powers have practically come to an agreement that will exclude Ipek, Prisrend, and Dibra from Albania, but will give Scutari to Albania, and that the question of Djakova remains for the moment in suspense.

It would not be necessary to discuss in this connection smaller outstanding points such as the banks of the Boyana.

I am aware that agreement of Russia as regards Scutari was dependent upon concession of both Djakova and Dibra to Servia, and that agreement of Austria respecting Dibra was dependent on concession to Albania not only of Scutari, but of whole of the rest of Austrian line, but it seems very desirable not to let this point of form stand in the way of an intimation at once to Servia and Montenegro that Powers are practically agreed about all the populous centres on north and north-east frontier of Albania except Djakova. It seems really of great importance that this intimation should be made.

[10749] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 8, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 90 of 8th February: Ottoman Debt.

I have asked Sir H. Babington Smith to represent His Majesty's Government on the commission, but he fears he may have difficulty in finding time, and he asks for some indication of date of meeting and probable duration. Please endeavour to ascertain this without mentioning his name at present to French Government.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 29, and Constantinople, No. 131.)

[10958] No. 145.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 25. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 9, 1913.*

GREEK Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Russian Minister that he had ascertained that the Bulgarian Government did not yet know about the Austro-German scheme reported in my immediately preceding telegram of 7th March.

[10983] No. 146.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, March 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 110 of 5th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs shares your view that it would not be desirable that the Balkan allies should be represented at the earlier sittings of the proposed commission to examine the allotment of their share of the Ottoman Debt. His Excellency adds that it would not be possible to invite the Balkan allies without Turkey, and that to bring delegates of belligerents into contact during hostilities might be objectionable.

[10955] No. 147.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your telegram No. 203 of 8th March, and left with him an *aide-mémoire* embodying the terms of the proposed notification.

He has already spoken strongly both at Cettinjé and Belgrade, and quite approves your suggestion. He objects, however, to the mention of Djakova, and wishes to restrict communication to the one given in French in your telegram, with additional words to the effect that the Powers have practically come to an agreement that will give Scutari to Albania. All mention of the other towns should be omitted. Powers might at the same time appeal to King Nicholas to put an end to further useless bloodshed. His Excellency will send instructions to the Russian Ambassador in the above sense.

[10957] No. 148.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 76 of 8th March: Reduction of troops.

Minister for Foreign Affairs appears satisfied with communication made to him by the Austrian Ambassador yesterday. He is to submit it to the Emperor to-day, and hopes that the matter may now shortly be arranged.

[10978] No. 149.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 9, 1913.*

I HEAR from a fairly reliable source that the commandant at Adrianople is in correspondence with the Grand Vizier as to the expediency of prolonging the resistance of the town.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[10979] No. 150.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 130 of 7th March: Advance to Turkish Government by Anatolian Railway.

Copy of the contract not obtainable.

Contract was signed by Gunter, assistant director of the railway.

Transaction is in two sections:

1. £ T. 69,000 Government share in surplus traffic receipts of the Anatolian Railway and Bagdad Railways for 1912.

2. Refund by the company of a portion of the annuity of construction loans, series 2 and 3, in respect of unconstructed portion of the railway (see article 35, paragraph 3, of the Bagdad Railway concession, 1903). Sum involved is £ T. 208,000.

In normal conditions these two sums would presumably have been retained by the railway company to cover £ T. 280,000 for military transport, but for this latter sum the railway company last year agreed to accept Treasury 6 per cent. bonds. Operation seems to be nothing more than a plausible device for concealing acceptance of Treasury bonds. Relations between the railway and the Deutsche Bank are so intimate that it is inconceivable that the latter should not be concerned in the transaction.

I have not been able to learn whether any concession has been granted in this connection.

Despatch follows.

[11389] No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 9, 1913.*

PLEASE make a communication in the following sense to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for his confidential information:—

Hakki Pasha has been discussing informally here various questions connected with the assent of His Majesty's Government to the proposed 4 per cent. customs increase. As the Russian Government are aware, the recognition of the frontier *status quo*, in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah, as described in the British note of 18th July, 1912, forms one of the desiderata put forward by His Majesty's Government.

Hakki Pasha said that he recognised that the question must now be settled, and that the adoption of a definite line would be in the best interests of Turkey herself; but he said the whole frontier line was interdependent, and the south could not be settled and the north left undecided. He was informed that this was our view; and that the Russian note of 1912 seemed to outline a very just and desirable solution.

He then said that he would like to lay before the Grand Vizier, and strongly recommend the adoption of, a formula, which his Highness could put forward at Constantinople. The formula he is understood to contemplate is as follows:—

"1. Admettre que la frontière, dans toute son étendue, depuis le Mont Ararat jusqu'au Golfe Persique, se trouve dans les limites de la zone indiquée sur la carte 'identique.'

"2. Pour la partie septentrionale de la frontière, depuis le Mont Ararat jusqu'à la hauteur du 36e degré de latitude, accepter la ligne indiquée dans la note russe de 1912.

"3. A partir du 32e degré de latitude jusqu'au Golfe Persique, accepter la ligne indiquée dans la note anglaise du 18 juillet, 1912.

"4. Pour les régions comprises entre les 32e et 36e degrés de latitude, accepter le *statu quo* actuel, tout en offrant à la Turquie comme compensation dans les régions au nord et au sud de Zohab (ville) les districts occupés par les tribus Sunnites, ainsi que, du côté de Mendali, quelques endroits à déterminer ultérieurement. Les villes de Zohab et de Kasr-i-Shirine resteraient en possession de la Perse."

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE EXTRACT

Hakki Pasha said that it was necessary to save the Government from adverse criticism, and that to do this the settlement must appear in the light of a compromise and not of a Turkish surrender all along the line. He also said that Turkey might ask for certain minor compensations in the north, but within the "zone." He asked if His Majesty's Government would support Turkey in this formula.

He was informed in reply that it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to undertake to do this without consultation with the Russian Government, who were even more interested than His Majesty's Government; but that, if the Grand Vizier replied to the Russian and British notes at Constantinople, and put forward proposals on the above lines, they would be examined there on their merits: while His Majesty's Government attached great importance to a final settlement of the whole question without further delay, and had therefore taken the opportunity of the informal discussions with him to emphasise this wish, they would deprecate transferring the formal negotiations from Constantinople to London. He recognised that this would be undesirable.

This gist of his argument was that if Turkey accepted Russia's wishes in the north, and our wishes in regard to the south, she ought to receive some compensation in the middle.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 115, and Constantinople, No. 132.)

[11080] No. 152.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Rome, March 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 38 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a *pro-memoriâ* from the Italian Government, containing their views regarding the Greek proposals for the solution of the commercial situation at Salonica.

If, as would appear from your telegrams Nos. 80 and 84 of the 26th ultimo, and the 4th instant, respectively, the Greek proposals have now been superseded by those put forward by the Austrian Ambassador in London and accepted at the meeting of Ambassadors on the 21st February last, the views contained in this *pro-memoriâ* have no further practical interest, and I have addressed a note to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day enquiring whether his Government have accepted the Austrian proposals as superseding the Greek ones.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
GEORGE MOUNSEY.

Enclosure in No. 152.

Pro-memoriâ by the Italian Foreign Office.

(Translation.)

IN their memorandum of the 18th February, 1913, the British Embassy in Rome stated that the British Government were ready to accept the following proposals made by the Greek Government to the Servian Government for the settlement of the question of the levy of customs duties on goods imported viâ Salonica:—

1. Goods passed through the Customs during the Turkish régime, but owing to lack of transport facilities, still warehoused at Salonica, shall enter Servian and Bulgarian occupied zones duty free, provided that they are accompanied by a Greek certificate and the duties already levied by Servian or Bulgarian authorities shall be paid back;

2. Goods on which the Greeks have exacted duties at Salonica shall enter the Servian or Bulgarian zone duty free provided that they are accompanied by a Greek certificate enabling the Servian or Bulgarian Government to recover from the Greek authorities at Salonica the duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* paid there;

3. Goods sent direct viâ Salonica to the Servian or Bulgarian zone shall pass in free transit through the Greek zone, presumably paying duty on arrival at the Servian or Bulgarian zone.

The acceptance by the British Government of these terms is made conditional on the understanding that the existence of these zones shall be recognised expressly as provisional and without prejudice to the reservations required by the Powers for the safeguarding of their commercial interests on the conclusion of peace.

The Italian Government are likewise ready to accept the Greek proposals with the above reservations, in so far as they may contribute to ease the commercial situation at Salonica.

But with this object in view, they would make the following observations:—

Goods from Europe are never landed at Salonica already consigned to districts in the interior, but are sold at Salonica, often many months after landing, to traders from the interior. Thus if the Greek Government include in the term "goods in transit" only such goods as are disembarked at Salonica and then immediately dispatched to the interior, their concession appears to be of no value whatever. On the other hand, it would be of value if all goods disembarked at Salonica were secure of exemption from customs duties, provided that they were not locally consumed but eventually re-exported to Servia or Bulgaria. An arrangement of this nature could eventually be effected by means of free zones and, for the moment, by the repayment by the Greek authorities of the duties levied on goods disembarked at Salonica when these goods cross the Servian or Bulgarian frontier.

As, however, it seems advisable in the first place to ascertain the real significance of the above-mentioned proposals, the Royal Government have instructed their representative at Athens to obtain information regarding the precise instructions issued by the Greek Government on the subject.

Rome, March 3, 1913.

[10990] No. 153.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 72.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March 6, 1913.*

THE situation has undergone a change for the better since I last reported on it in my despatch No. 62 of the 19th of last month, so far, at any rate, as the relations between the Austrian and Russian Governments are concerned. The same cannot, however, be said as regards either the tone of the Russian press or public opinion in general, which would appear to be as violently anti-Austrian as ever. The bourse, which a fortnight ago showed signs of considerable nervousness, recovered from its temporary relapse when it became known that the prospects of peace were bright, that the differences between Roumania and Bulgaria were to be submitted to the mediation of the Powers, and that, with the exception of Djakova, an agreement had been arrived at on the Albanian question. A report was also current that the approaching celebration of the tercentenary of the House of Romanof was to be inaugurated by the publication of an Imperial manifesto announcing the removal of all causes of difference between Austria and Russia and the resumption of normal and friendly relations.

There seems to have been some foundation for this report, as my French colleague tells me that M. Sazonof last week spoke to him as if the issue of some such manifesto was in contemplation. Whether this was the case or not, the idea has now been abandoned, though as soon as the negotiations that are proceeding for the reduction of armaments on either side are concluded, a communiqué announcing the fact will be published. Since the Austrian Ambassador first suggested some ten days ago that the Russian reservists should be disbanded when the Austrian forces on the Galician frontier were reduced to a figure below that of the Russian normal peace effective, M. Sazonof has insisted that some guarantee should be given that Austria would not use the forces which she has concentrated on her southern frontier for any aggressive action against Servia. The Austrian Ambassador was authorised to give verbal assurances to the above effect; but this did not satisfy M. Sazonof. He wanted these assurances embodied in the communiqué, which was to be published simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh; but to this the Austrian Government would not consent. He subsequently presented to Count Thurn the text of a communiqué embodying these assurances, and already approved by the Emperor, which he proposed to publish, leaving it apparently to the Austrians to publish it either in an identic or in a somewhat modified form, as they preferred. From what my

German colleague tells me, I gather that this action was resented at Vienna, and that in consequence of the bad feeling created by M. Sazonof's persistence in a course which was regarded by the Austrian Government as prompted by mistrust of their good intentions, the situation is not so good as it was a few days ago. On my remarking to Count Pourtalès that the occasion of the Romanof fêtes afforded Austria an excellent pretext for making a graceful concession to the Emperor Nicolas on the subject of Djakova without incurring the slightest loss of prestige, his Excellency said that the recent negotiations had been conducted in a manner that rendered it now very difficult for Austria to make a "beau geste." It must, on the other hand, be admitted that it was but natural that M. Sazonof should have wished to tranquillise Russian public opinion by some official announcement of this character, as without it the Russian Government might be severely taken to task for consenting to dismiss their reservists after Austria had refused to reduce the forces which she had massed near the Servian frontier.

On the 3rd instant Count Thurn submitted to M. Sazonof a counter-draft communiqué which made no reference to Servia. It attributed the happy result arrived at to the initiative taken in a spirit of conciliation by the Emperor Francis Joseph and to the friendly response made by the Emperor Nicolas. It emphasised the monarchical principle by speaking always of the action taken by the two Emperors without any reference to their Governments—a proceeding which M. Sazonof regarded as a fresh indication of Austria's desire to re-establish the *Dreikaiserbund*. When I saw his Excellency on the following day he told me that he was to see the Emperor the same evening in order to take His Majesty's orders on the subject, but he gave me clearly to understand that he personally held the view that some mention must be inserted in the text of Austria's pacific dispositions towards Servia. He spoke, however, as if it was still possible that a communiqué announcing the reduction of armaments might be published during the course of the tercentenary celebrations.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[11074] No. 154.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 184.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 6, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell, military attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the subject of aviation in the Turkish army.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 154.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 4, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that two "Mars" biplanes, type 1913, were received here from Germany about a fortnight ago, and that there arrived here at the same time three officers, or ex-officers, of the German army—Berkner, Krey, and Gulitsch—who have been engaged by the Turkish Government as aviation officers at a salary of 2,000 marks a-month, and given the rank of captain in the Turkish army.

These officers have resigned their commissions in the German army, but whether they had already done so prior to their contract with the Turkish Government and were really officers of reserve or on the retired list, or whether, being officers on the active list, they have resigned temporarily, in the fashion described in my No. 10 of the 18th ultimo, I am unable to say.

One of the aeroplanes was taken on from here to Gallipoli, accompanied by the German Renzel as aviator and by Berkner as observer. (Renzel is the civilian whose engagement by the Turkish Government last year, along with Lieutenant Jannow (who has now left the Turkish service), was reported in my No 60 of the 19th August, 1912.)

The other was sent up by train to the aviation ground near San Stefano. It will be flown by Krey, with Gulitsch as observer.

It is intended to fly the machine from Gallipoli to Adrianople almost at once, and I find that there is some expectation of the flight taking place to-day if the weather at Gallipoli is favourable.

These two machines, which come from the Deutsche Flugzeug-Werke at Lindenthal, have not yet been paid for, or even bought, by the Turkish Government, but are on approval, so to speak, under special arrangements made by a certain Mehmed Zekki, a renegade of Jewish extraction and of many nationalities and tongues, who now appears to be in Mahmud Shevket Pasha's confidence, and who was recently sent to Germany to negotiate for the supply of these machines and for the engagement of the officers.

The contract, of which I have seen a copy, was signed at Berlin on the 7th February, and presents some features of interest. It is stated that the machines shall be transported at the risk of the Turkish Government, and shall be put together and looked after by employés of the Company until such time as the Turkish Government decides to buy them, when payment will be made by instalments according to the usual practice. The term "risk" is held to include war risks, and in particular the Government is held responsible if the machines fall into the hands of the enemy or are damaged in war. The price shall be the same as that paid by the German Ministry of War. The company places at the disposal of the Government for six months an aviator who is bound to obey the orders of the Minister of War in all matters appertaining to aviation, whether in peace or in war. The proof of his not carrying out such orders shall be the fact of the same order being given to another aviator. Until the conclusion of peace between the Turkish Government and the nation with which it is at war, the Governments will pay the company 2,000 marks per month as wages for the aviator. In time of peace his wages will be 1,400 marks. In case of fatal accident the Government will pay to the family of the aviator an annual pension of 2,000 marks, or of an accident which is not fatal, 200 marks per month during the period of disablement.

(The company's aviator, to whom the above provisions apply, is a man called Scherf, of Argentine extraction.)

Mechanics, supplied by the company, to be paid at the rate of 500 marks per month in war and 400 in peace.

The four quick-firing howitzers, the order for which was mentioned in my No. 1 of the 22nd January, have also recently arrived here. They are from Krupp, of 15-cm. calibre, and are, I believe, not yet paid for, though I have no reliable information as to the conditions under which they were purchased. I am told that they have been sent up to Hadenkeui.

I have, &c.
E. G. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 154.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 5, 1913.

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date on the subject of the two "Mars" biplanes recently received from Germany, I have the honour to report that the aviator Renzel has just returned from Gallipoli and reports that his machine was wrecked in the blizzard of last Sunday, the 2nd instant, as well as one of the Deperdussin monoplanes, which the Turks also had at Gallipoli.

There had been no attempt to fly the machines, but the wind was so violent that tents were blown away and much damage was done besides the wrecking of the two aeroplanes.

Renzel is now to proceed at once to San Stefano, and if the weather permits he is to fly the other "Mars" biplane to Adrianople to-morrow, taking Captain Krey with him.

As the Bulgarian aeroplane which recently descended within the precincts of the fortress is said to be undamaged, the Turks reckon that they will thus have two aeroplanes and two aviators at the disposal of the commander of the fortress. They say that there is plenty of petrol there.

Captain Gulitsch is to be attached to Izzet Pasha's staff.

I have, &c.
E. G. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[11002] No. 155.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 90.)

Sir *Berlin, March 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Djavid Bey arrived in Berlin yesterday. It is stated that he proposes to remain here for some days before proceeding to London.

In the course of an interview with a representative of the "Berliner Tageblatt," Djavid Bey is reported to have expressed pessimistic views as regards the prospects of an early conclusion of peace. According to the "Tageblatt" report, he denied that the Turkish Government had placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of the Powers. Wide divergencies of opinion still existed, he said, between Turkey and the allies, both in regard to territorial questions and in regard to the question of an indemnity. On the latter question it was impossible for the Porte to give way. They could not consent to the payment of any indemnity, and they must insist on the Balkan States taking over a share of all the Turkish debts, whether consolidated or not, proportionate to the extent of the territory ceded by Turkey.

As regards the future, Djavid Bey is reported to have said that the Turkish Government proposed to raise a loan to cover their advances, and that his visit to Berlin was connected with this loan and with other financial questions. Turkey intended, he said to pursue a policy of decentralisation in Asia Minor and to bestow a completely decentralised Government on the Anatolian provinces. The Armenian question, which was an agrarian rather than a political one, would be solved by restoring so far as possible the land taken from the Armenians, and the 250,000 refugees now to be provided for would be settled in Asia Minor under favourable climatic and economic conditions.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[11253] No. 155*.

Note communicated by French Embassy, March 10, 1913.

IL résulte d'informations provenant du consul général de France à Salonique que les principaux négociants importateurs établis dans ce port ont appelé l'attention des représentants consulaires étrangers sur les conséquences qu'entraînera, pour leurs opérations commerciales, le partage éventuel de la Macédoine entre la Grèce, la Serbie et la Bulgarie.

Ces négociants font observer notamment que, dans la plupart des contrats passés entre eux et les commerçants des villes de l'intérieur, il est d'usage d'insérer une clause stipulant que le tribunal de commerce de Salonique aura seul qualité pour trancher les litiges qui surviendraient à l'occasion de l'exécution de ces contrats. Tant que Salonique et toute la Macédoine ont dépendu de la même souveraineté, l'application de cette clause n'a présenté aucune difficulté. Mais lorsque Salonique et le reste de la Macédoine auront été divisés entre des souverainetés diverses, il est à craindre que les débiteurs passés sous une domination nouvelle, serbe, bulgare ou grecque, n'excipent d'un changement de nationalité et de domicile légal pour éluder l'application de la clause en question et finalement pour échapper à l'exécution de leurs engagements. C'est la raison pour laquelle les négociants importateurs de Salonique, inquiets pour le recouvrement de leurs créances, ont exprimé le vœu que les engagements antérieurement contractés envers eux par leurs clients de l'intérieur, en ce qui concerne le tribunal de Salonique, fussent déclarés obligatoires par une disposition du futur traité de paix.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'État de lui faire savoir si le Gouvernement britannique a été saisi de cette question par son agent à Salonique et, dans l'affirmative, quelle suite il croit possible de donner aux vœux des négociants de ce port.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 7 mars, 1913.

[11612] No. 156.

Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff, March 10, 1913.

(Confidentiel.)

M. SAZONOF n'a pas cru pouvoir se refuser au vœu exprimé par le Gouvernement roumain que le siège de la médiation des Puissances entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie soit Saint-Pétersbourg. Il a pourtant posé comme condition que la Bulgarie exprime le même désir.

M. Sazonof prévoit que la question la plus épineuse à résoudre sera celle de Silistrie. Il se rend compte de la difficulté d'obtenir sur ce point une opinion unanime des Puissances. Il croit qu'il est prudent d'envisager qu'elles pourraient se diviser en nombre égal. Il y aurait lieu, selon lui, de se prémunir contre ce cas et à titre préliminaire et confidentiel il propose le procédé suivant :—

Un accord des Puissances que le vote de la majorité des Puissances serait accepté par celles qui resteraient en minorité.

Pour le cas où il y aurait partage égal de voix entre les six Puissances, chaque groupe choisirait dans son sein un représentant du groupe. Les deux Puissances ainsi choisies s'adresseraient, d'un commun accord, à une Puissance qui ne ferait pas partie de la médiation, avec la prière de nommer un président pour une délibération dont feraient partie les deux Puissances mandataires de leur groupe. La décision de cette délibération spéciale serait d'avance reconnue obligatoire par toutes les autres. Les délibérations des Puissances médiatrices resteraient absolument secrètes.

M. Sazonof ne se fait pas d'illusions sur le caractère compliqué de cette procédure, dont il ne fait d'ailleurs mention que pour le cas où une majorité dans le vote ne pourrait être acquise.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 10 mars, 1913.

[11607] No. 157.

Memorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff, March 10, 1913.

COUNT BERCHTOLD expresses his best thanks to Sir E. Grey for all his endeavours in the interest of peace, which he hopes will be successful.

We assume that the communication intended to be made to the Servian and Montenegrin Governments would be accompanied by an intimation that they should evacuate at once the territory which is no more in dispute.

Count Berchtold wishes me not to conceal from Sir E. Grey that the news received in the last days, and also frankly admitted by the Belgrade Government, according to which considerable Servian forces sent to Albania viâ Salonica are already at sea, have very considerably increased his anxiety, whether these troops are meant to force the capture of Scutari, or—which would be even worse—whether they are intended to effect a definite settlement of Servia on the Adriatic coast, ignoring the decision of the Powers. Anyhow, the landing of these troops, which must be expected in the very next days, would very materially modify the situation. It would make it clear to the whole world that Servia does not intend to take any notice of the decision of the Powers, or of the interests of the neighbouring monarchy, which could not fail to be looked upon by our public opinion as a provocation.

We had, and we have still the earnest desire to assert these interests through the concert of the Powers, interests which we are obliged to defend under all circumstances.

The imminent arrival of the Servian expeditions on Albanian soil threatens to make the situation a very critical one indeed, unless the praiseworthy efforts of Sir E. Grey succeed, and the action of the Powers at Belgrade and Cettinjé can be made immediately.

[11466] No. 158.

Note communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires, March 10, 1913.

L'AMBASSADEUR de France s'est empressé de communiquer à son Gouvernement le mémorandum britannique du 20 février dernier, relatif au projet d'article à insérer dans le futur traité turco-balkanique au sujet de la participation des Etats alliés aux charges de la dette ottomane; la question à laquelle se réfère ce mémorandum sera étudiée par la commission internationale réunie à Paris, mais M. Cambon croit devoir communiquer à Sir Edward Grey les observations que soulève l'amendement proposé par lui à l'article 1er.

La réduction adoptée le 29 janvier dernier par la réunion des Ambassadeurs établissait un principe d'après lequel devait être calculée la quote-part de la dette ottoman à attribuer aux Etats balkaniques; ce principe est celui du "rapport existant entre les revenus des territoires cédés et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman."

L'addition proposée par le Gouvernement britannique: "La contribution annuelle des Etats cessionnaires ne sera pas inférieure au rendement moyen de l'ensemble des revenus donnés en gage aux porteurs étrangers dans les territoires cédés," introduirait un autre principe, celui de la participation des Etats balkaniques à la dette ottomane d'après les gages donnés aux créanciers de la Turquie dans les territoires cédés.

Ce second principe avait été, en 1912, proposé par les porteurs allemands de la dette ottomane dans des termes presque identiques à ceux de l'amendement britannique: il a été mûrement étudié par la Commission technique du Ministère français des Affaires Etrangères, qui, pour les raisons suivantes, l'a écarté et fait abandonner par les porteurs allemands:—

1. Introduire dans le traité de paix le principe de la spécialisation des gages, ce serait inviter les alliés à opérer une stricte revision du montant répartissable de la dette publique ottomane; ce ne serait plus l'ensemble de cette dette qui ferait l'ensemble du partage, et les alliés ne manqueraient pas de faire valoir qu'ils ne sont pas obligés de contribuer au service des emprunts qui n'ont pas reçu d'affectation sur les recettes des territoires cédés; la complication serait infinie et la liquidation finale très difficile.

2. La comparaison des chiffres fournis par les porteurs allemands et calculés sur la base de la spécialisation des gages et des chiffres établis, d'après le principe du rapport des revenus a montré que les deux systèmes arrivaient au même résultat pratique; il serait donc préférable d'adopter le plus simple.

3. L'application rigoureuse de l'amendement britannique aurait pour effet d'accroître la quote-part des alliés d'une manière excessive et sans avantages pour les porteurs de titres ottomans. Les revenus donnés en gage à la Dette publique ottomane ont en effet fourni en 1910–11 un excédent de £ T. 2,582,261, qui a été versé au Trésor ottoman et confondu avec les autres recettes de la Turquie. Il paraît équitable de ne tenir compte dans l'établissement de la quote-part des alliés que des revenus effectivement versés aux créanciers de l'Empire ottoman.

4. Les deux principes de la proportion des recettes et de la spécialisation des gages ne se complètent pas l'un l'autre: il faudrait choisir entre les deux; et le Gouvernement français, après un long examen, a préféré le système de la proportionnalité des recettes, parce qu'il lui a paru plus équitable et surtout d'une application plus simple et plus aisée.

5. Enfin, les Puissances semblent disposées à accepter le système de la proportionnalité des recettes la Russie adhérerait difficilement à l'amendement britannique.

Le Gouvernement français espère donc qu'après un nouvel examen, le Gouvernement britannique n'insistera pas pour le maintien de son amendement du 20 février, 1913.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 10 *mars*, 1913.

[11466] No. 159.

Memorandum communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires, March 10, 1913.

(Confidentiel.)

Note pour le Président du Conseil.

LA question de la contribution des États balkaniques au service de la dette publique ottomane, à raison des cessions territoriales envisagées, peut être résolue d'après deux systèmes principaux.

La part de la dette mise à la charge de ces États peut être en effet calculée soit d'après la proportion existant entre le revenu budgétaire global de l'Empire ottoman et le total des recettes effectuées dans les territoires cédés, soit en ne tenant compte que des perceptions effectuées dans les territoires cédés pour le service des différents emprunts spécialement gagées sur certains revenus de ces territoires.

Le premier système est celui dont la commission française a proposé l'adoption dès le 17 novembre dernier. Le second, basé sur la spécialisation des gages, est envisagé avec faveur tant par le Gouvernement allemand que par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane. Pour apprécier la valeur de ces deux systèmes, il importe d'entrer dans quelques détails.

Le mode de calcul préconisé par la commission française a certainement pour lui l'avantage d'être simple et clair. La répartition de la dette est faite d'après la proportion des impôts d'État respectivement payés par les territoires cédés et par le reste de l'Empire. Ce chiffre global des revenus perçus dans chaque division administrative pour le compte de l'État est facile à déterminer. Il en est tout différemment si l'on s'attache à la spécialisation des gages, car il faut alors entrer dans le détail des revenus particuliers donnés en gage dans tel ou tel sandjak. Or, la plus grande variété règne dans ce domaine, et telle dîme se trouve concédée dans une circonscription territoriale qui n'a point été donnée en gage dans la conscription voisine dépendant du même vilayet. Il est apparent, dans le premier système, qu'on ne met à la charge de chaque territoire que ce qu'il peut équitablement supporter, puisque la part est établie en raison directe de ses ressources. Dans le système de la spécialisation des gages, au contraire, il s'agit d'une proportion arbitraire *à priori*, puisqu'elle pourrait aller jusqu'à l'affectation de la totalité de revenus d'une province au service de la dette publique, en supposant que toutes les sources de revenus de cette province aient été données en gage à la sûreté d'un emprunt particulier.

A un autre point de vue, le système de la commission fait entrer en ligne de compte pour la détermination de la part mise à charge des territoires cédés, l'ensemble de la dette extérieure de l'Empire ottoman, tandis que le système basé sur la spécialisation des gages ne peut s'appliquer par définition qu'aux emprunts pourvus d'une garantie particulière. Pour être mis en œuvre, ce dernier mode de calcul exige une ventilation très délicate et minutieuse des divers éléments de la dette publique ottomane, car il s'agit de déterminer dans le cas de chaque emprunt pour qu'elle part il se trouve effectivement gagé sur les revenus des territoires cédés, et cette part varie nécessairement d'un emprunt à l'autre. Le système de la commission française, à l'inverse, fait des obligations des États balkaniques en un seul chiffre qui représente la contribution globale des territoires cédés au service de l'ensemble de la dette, sans qu'il y ait lieu de rechercher si tel emprunt est pourvu ou non d'un gage et intéresse à ce titre (dans une proportion d'ailleurs variable) les territoires cédés.

Le système de la commission présente ce troisième avantage de faciliter la liquidation ultérieure des engagements assumés par les États balkaniques, en favorisant la capitalisation de l'annuité mise à leur charge et par là même leur libération définitive, tandis que le système de la spécialisation des gages, rigoureusement appliqué, entraîne normalement le maintien du système actuel de garanties jusqu'à l'extinction par voie d'amortissement ou de conversion des emprunts actuels.

Le système de la commission par sa simplicité même échappe à la critique, le calcul qu'il préconise est basé sur une équitable proportion dont le principe même est difficile à combattre, et qui paraît acceptable *à priori* même, c'est-à-dire avant de connaître exactement quelles sont les ressources effectives de tel ou tel territoire. Un tel principe peut être inscrit dans un traité sans réserver aucune surprise ultérieure.

Le système basé sur la spécialisation des gages ne saurait être, au contraire, accepté par les parties intéressées que sous bénéfice d'inventaire. Le proposer aux alliés, c'est ouvrir la porte à la discussion et au marchandage. Ceux-ci n'en accepteraient pas le principe sans se réserver d'examiner si les charges qu'il leur

imposerait ne seraient pas excessives, injustifiées et par conséquent réductibles : excessives, au cas où la spécialisation des gages mettrait à la charge des territoires cédés une part de la dette publique qui absorberait une part trop grande de leurs ressources financières ; injustifiées, au cas où un emprunt gagé sur les revenus des territoires cédés aurait été affecté à des travaux intéressant exclusivement la Turquie d'Asie (ce qui est le cas des emprunts du Bagdad) ; enfin, réductibles aux sommes réellement nécessaires au service des emprunts, déduction faite des excédents de perceptions qui faisaient jusqu'ici retour au Trésor ottoman.

Enfin, l'annuité ainsi calculée ne saurait être dans le système de la spécialisation des gages que temporaire, étant donné qu'elle pourvoit non seulement au service des emprunts gagés, mais encore à leur amortissement. Ce sont là des éléments nombreux de discussion et de marchandage ; placer la question sur ce terrain, c'est admettre les alliés à faire valoir leurs droits dans des conditions nettement défavorables aux créanciers de l'Empire ottoman pris dans leur ensemble. Et si certains créanciers obtiennent une garantie entière et absolue de leurs droits, ce sera au détriment de ceux dont les droits sur la sûreté spéciale, qui leur avait été donnée, sont moins nettement établis ou plus discutables.

A un autre point de vue encore, le système français a pour lui l'autorité d'un certain nombre de précédents ; c'est ce mode de calcul qui a été suivi lors du partage, en 1839, de la dette publique entre la Hollande et le nouveau royaume de Belgique, et ce règlement amiable n'avait pour lui que l'équité.

C'est également le mode de calcul inscrit dans l'article 10 de la convention de 1881 mettant déjà, à la charge de la Grèce, une part de la dette ottomane, qu'elle n'a d'ailleurs pas assumée.

Le système de la spécialisation des gages a pu, à la vérité, inspirer un certain nombre de règlements intéressant en particulier l'Empire ottoman, mais la solution intervenue a toujours eu l'apparence d'un compromis basé sur un ensemble d'éléments d'appréciation très divers, au milieu desquels l'idée de spécialisation des gages perdait toute sa netteté. Cette compensation, à raison de la perte d'un territoire, a été parfois calculée d'après l'excédent des revenus sur les dépenses de ce territoire (Chypre, 1878) ; parfois fixée à une somme globale indiquée, avec plus ou moins de vérité, comme la contre-valeur de "biens immeubles de diverses natures" (Bosnie-Herzégovine, 1909) ; parfois, encore, fixée à un chiffre destiné à représenter les sommes qui étaient affectées au service de la dette publique sur les recettes des provinces cédées (Tripolitaine, 1912).

La préoccupation de ne point abandonner les gages constitués au bénéfice de porteurs étrangers sur les revenus des territoires cédés n'a jamais abouti jusqu'ici au maintien de ces gages, mais plus simplement à la détermination d'une somme globale destinée à compenser les créanciers de leur perte. Et c'est ici où les deux systèmes en présence se rejoignent.

Pratiquement, les deux modes de calcul basés, l'un sur la spécialisation des gages, l'autre sur la proportion des recettes générales effectuées dans les territoires cédés, se trouvent, à la faveur d'une coïncidence d'ailleurs toute fortuite, aboutir dans ce cas particulier à des résultats analogues au point qu'il pourrait paraître indifférent d'adopter un système ou l'autre.

Le syndicat des porteurs allemands, qui est entré dans le détail de ces calculs, en se plaçant dans l'hypothèse de la cession aux alliés des quatre bach-mudiriets d'Europe (Constantinople exclu), estime que d'après son système l'annuité serait de £ T. 240,000, tandis que dans le système de la commission elle atteindrait £ T. 1,238,000.

Sans qu'on puisse se porter garant d'une concordance aussi exacte, il paraît suffisamment démontré aux yeux même des Allemands que le système de la commission sauvegarde aussi complètement que possible tous les intérêts en cause. Une telle constatation jointe aux raisons exposées ci-dessus permet d'apprécier l'avantage qu'il y aurait vis-à-vis des États balkaniques à se placer exclusivement sur ce terrain. Le système de la commission est, *primâ facie*, équitable, et cette qualité le recommande aussi bien aux Puissances protectrices des intérêts étrangers constitués dans les territoires cédés qu'aux États balkaniques eux-mêmes, tandis que la valeur de l'autre système dépend essentiellement des résultats du calcul minutieux qu'il suppose ; la raison qui le ferait accepter aux uns le rendrait suspect aux autres. L'un invite à la discussion, l'autre l'écarte, car la proportion sur laquelle il se base n'est pas susceptible de plus ou de moins.

Ce n'est pas à dire, d'ailleurs, que le mode de calcul adopté doive être inscrit dans le traité de paix : il n'est indiqué ici que comme étant la base de négociation la meilleure ; mais la détermination de la contribution des États alliés étant très facile à

faire d'après ce système, on pourrait estimer préférable de ne faire figurer dans le traité de paix que le montant même de l'annuité convertible en capital.

Le système de calcul de la commission, basé sur la proportion des impôts payés, serait d'ailleurs celui qui servirait sans doute aux alliés pour déterminer ultérieurement entre eux les parts respectives qui leur incomberaient de ce chef.

[11274] No. 160.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 18 of 5th March : Draft articles.

French, Austrian, and German representatives have made a communication using text given in my despatch No. 8 of 18th February.

Shall I communicate text given in your telegram, which is slightly different ? If so, please tell me the French word to be employed for "shareholders" at the end of the first paragraph of article 1.

[11275] No. 161.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 10, 1913.*

ACCORDING to Albanian sources an Albanian recently escaped from Scutari stated that there was food for another month ; that the inhabitants were taking an active part in the defence of the town, and have barricaded and loopholed the houses in order to protect themselves as far as possible from pillage should the Montenegrins get into the place.

[11263] No. 162.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 10, 1913.*

AGENT of the Khedivial Steam-ship Company informs me that the company's steamer "Towfikieh," which ran ashore in a snow-storm near Heraklitza, in the Sea of Marmora, was fired on by Bulgarian troops, and that the captain was detained on shore twenty-four hours before the vessel, since refloated, was allowed to proceed.

The agent requests that representations may be made at Sophia.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[11270] No. 163.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 10, 1913.*

DURING last few days inner circle of the Committee which directs the Cabinet would seem, after report from Djavid Bey from Vienna and Berlin, to have taken up the attitude of refusing to make peace and continuing the war unless the allies, while accepting to take over share of the Public Debt, desist from demand of war indemnity. Judging, however, by the frame of mind of the people and army, who are sick of the war, Turkey is really unable to prosecute an offensive campaign, and her attitude in this respect contains a certain element of bluff. Cabinet seems determined, however, about the non-payment of war indemnity, unless perhaps under guise of a compromise in share of Public Debt to be assumed by the Balkan allies and Albania.

There is a strong popular undercurrent against the Committee Cabinet, but the

present idea would seem to be not to take any action until after it makes peace. This strengthens the anti-peace party in the Committee, who are taking measures such as arrest and dismissal of their opponents in the army in order to strengthen their hold and perpetuate their term of power.

Fall of Adrianople might considerably influence internal situation.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[11221] No. 164.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, March 10, 1913.*

FOLLOWING sent 10th March to St. Petersburgh:—

"Troops, especially artillery, are being moved westward, especially to Volhynia. About 3rd March twenty-two artillery brigades were passing Konotop and Bakmatch. Officers' wives at frontier towns have residences in the interior assigned in case of war.

"In Poland, 1909 class of cavalry have been released. News collected during the last three weeks."

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[11271] No. 165.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 81. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 10, 1913.*

ADRIANOPLE.

A meeting of the Ministerial Council is now being held at the Palace under the presidency of the King. The leading generals now in the capital have also been summoned to attend.

It has been already decided in principle to make a concentrated bombardment and assault on Adrianople, and details will be arranged to-day.

After three fine days, however, the weather has again changed, and snow is now falling. The assault will presumably have to be postponed until the weather conditions are more favourable.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[11272] No. 166.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 10, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

Your telegram No. 62 of 4th March.

My French and my Italian and German colleagues are still without instructions similar to those in your telegram above mentioned. The German Minister has even been instructed to take no action either regarding mediation or capital where the mediation should take place.

The Austrian Minister has been instructed to ascertain, in the event of joint action by his colleagues, which capital would suit Bulgaria.

The Russian Minister states that he has received repeated instructions to ask whether Bulgaria will accept mediation, and if so to suggest St. Petersburgh for the meetings. I gather that he is acting on these instructions independently.

In these circumstances I have taken no action, especially as Bulgaria is generally supposed to be willing to accept mediation, and to approve of St. Petersburgh for the negotiations.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[11273] No. 167.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 10, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 85 of to-day.

Prime Minister wishes me to inform you that the Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest has been approached by the Roumanian Government as to whether his Government would agree to St. Petersburgh as the capital at which mediation negotiations could be conducted. His Excellency has replied in the affirmative, and he thinks it unnecessary, therefore, that any collective step should be taken by the Powers in the matter. He also understands that mediation of the Powers is included in the word "decision."

(Confidential.)

Prime Minister told me that his Government had just decided to send M. Danef to St. Petersburgh if the Roumanian Government sent Prince Ghika or any other delegate besides their Minister in that capital.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[11259] No. 168.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 10, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning the substance of your telegram No. 93 of 7th March. His Excellency is of the opinion that unnecessary importance is attached to Djakova question, and he has made to me the following suggestion with regard to it: He thinks that the Ambassadors in London might now declare as definitely traced the northern and the north-eastern frontiers of Albania, including Scutari, in that State. The district of Djakova would be left undecided, and would eventually be settled by a local commission. Meanwhile Servia would be left in possession of the town.

The essential point for the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is that the siege of Scutari should cease, and that Montenegro should be warned off that town. It is also essential, in his opinion, that Servia should withdraw her troops from the Adriatic as soon as the Powers accept the northern frontier of Albania as traced by the Ambassadors with the undecided gap of Djakova.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to me very anxious about the attitude of Servia, as she was showing a desire to force on the new military operations in Northern Albania, which looked like an intention to defy the will of the Powers. He said that Austria-Hungary had behaved loyally to Europe in not interfering during the course of the war, although its results touched her more closely than any other Power. He therefore hoped you would use your influence to bring about a prompt settlement with regard to the Scutari question and the withdrawal of the Servians from the Adriatic.

Count Mensdorff has been instructed to speak to you in the above sense.

[11280] No. 169.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 10, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador informs me that he saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and finally settled with him the text of two communiqués (which will be published probably on Wednesday). The first relates to demobilisation, and the second gives expression to the friendly and pacific sentiments towards neighbouring States. The Russian Ambassador is very satisfied with the text of the communiqués.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[11424] No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

AT Berlin and Vienna I am constantly met by the argument that even if Austria had given way about Djakova there would still be trouble about Scutari. I have always replied that if once a line was agreed upon Russia would necessarily be a party to whatever pressure was necessary to make the line respected, and that even if Scutari was taken after a line had been agreed to it would make no difference.

But I have not been able to convince German or Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that this is the view taken in St. Petersburgh.

It would be of the greatest value if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would make it quite clear that if the question of Djakova is settled he would join in preventing Montenegro from going to Scutari and in securing the recall of Servian troops from territories agreed to be Albanian.

If this was assured, and it was made clear that in the event of Djakova not being given to Albania the Albanians of the district would be given commercial advantages there, I understand that Austria would agree to refer question of Djakova to an international commission.

Contention of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is that he continually receives trustworthy news that Servians act in such a way in territories occupied by them, not only against Mahommedans, but also against Slav Catholics, that he could not defend cession of a town like Djakova, inhabited exclusively by Albanian Catholics and Mahommedans, without being able to count upon sense of justice of an international commission.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was originally opposed altogether to any such commission, and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was disposed to favour it; he was indeed at one time prepared, if need be, to propose something of the kind through Russian Ambassador here.

I understand that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is now opposed to an international commission for Djakova, but it seems to me very difficult to refuse one, if only to say what guarantees are necessary for the Albanian population at Djakova, if the town is given to Servia. I am sorry to say that British consular reports go some way to confirm allegations of outrages in territories occupied by Servians.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of whole substance of this telegram and ask his view, which I should like to have as soon as possible. I feel that things are moving towards a settlement, and that no time should be lost in attaining one before some unfavourable turn or incident takes place. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is becoming very anxious about increased Servian military activity in Northern Albania.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 118; Berlin, No. 123; Vienna, No. 101; and Rome, No. 95.)

[11424] No. 171.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

MY telegram No. 208 of to-day to St. Petersburgh.
You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[10958] No. 172.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

COULD you, if you have not already done so, obtain in a discreet manner information of any kind which would tend to confirm the rumour conveyed in Sir F. Elliot's telegram No. 24, Secret, of the 7th March, relative to the action which it is alleged that Austria-Hungary and Germany are taking with regard to Roumania and Bulgaria?

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 100).

[11424] No. 173.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

MY telegram No. 208 of to-day to St. Petersburgh repeated for your information only.

[11607] No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

THE Austrian Ambassador came to see me to-day, and spoke to me in accordance with the accompanying *pro-memoria*,† which he left with me to save me the trouble of recording what he said.

I told him that I had received a reply from M. Sazonof which was favourable to adding some words to the proposed communication to Montenegro and Servia, though I rather thought that he wished to have some alteration in the words which I had suggested. I understood that instructions were being sent to Count Benckendorff, and when I heard what these were I should be able to make a draft. I pointed out to Count Mensdorff that the suggestion which he had made went beyond the original proposal in suggesting that not only should the Powers tell Servia and Montenegro that they must evacuate the territory when the Powers announced their decision, but in stating in addition a decision on parts before a decision had been come to on the whole. I hoped, however, that we might do this, at least as regards Scutari, which was the point of most importance. I did not inform him of the contents of Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 80; but I was of course relying on it in what I said to Count Mensdorff.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11608] No. 175.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

THE Austrian Ambassador communicated to me to-day the accompanying statement respecting Servian outrages.

I said that we had received some very unpleasant reports, but that it was difficult to be sure how far they were authentic. Such as did appear to have foundation had been brought to the notice of the Servian Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 175.

Note communicated by Count Mensdorff.

LES détails suivants ont été connus sur les atrocités commises par les Serbes dans le district de Ghilan et signalées à Sir Edward Grey par une communication antérieure :—

Le nombre des hommes massacrés est précisé pour le village Ljubishte à 104; pour le village Julekar à 24. A Ljubishte le chef de la famille Bakiya, la vieille grand'mère dans la famille de Metushi et deux enfants de la famille Emin ont été brûlés vifs.

A Julekar on a éventré une femme enceinte et arraché le fœtus du ventre.

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 102) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 96). † No. 157.

La misère et la famine est si grande dans le village Ljubishte que les femmes musulmanes dont les maris ou pères ont été massacrés, pour ne pas mourir de faim, se vendent elles-mêmes aux musulmans survivants pour 400 piastres (80 fr.) comme esclaves.

Les atrocités suivantes n'ont été connues que maintenant :—

Le 27 février des soldats serbes occupaient le village Shashare, habité par à peu près 100 familles catholiques de nationalité slave ; ils éloignaient tous les hommes et garçons du village et violaient toutes les femmes et jeunes filles.

Le 27 février des soldats serbes violaient les femmes de dix maisons du village Letnitza, également habité de catholiques slaves. Parmi les femmes violées sont les deux belles-sœurs d'un domestique du consul de France à Useub.

Dans le village Presta un musulman nouvellement marié avait donné son revolver à sa jeune femme avec l'instruction de le venger si les Serbes le tuaient. Lorsque les soldats pénétrèrent dans le village et tuèrent l'homme, la jeune femme abattit cinq soldats. Tout le village, comprenant quatre-vingt-dix maisons, a été alors incendié par les soldats.

Dans le village Sefer une vieille femme, la mère d'un personnage connu, le nommé Kosun se trouvant comme prisonnier à Belgrade, a été brûlée vive avec sa servante, Kolmarini, une catholique du village Vernavokolo.

D'autres massacres ont eu lieu dans les villages Trstenik, 60 tués ; Senica, 30 tués ; Vrban, 20 tués ; et dans vingt-neuf autres villages du Karadag, où 280 fermes appartenant aux Albanais musulmans ont été incendiées.

Une série d'autres atrocités est encore exposée dans les rapports des consulats situés dans le territoire occupé.

[11609] No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

COUNT MENSDORFF, referring to-day to what had passed between Sir Edward Goschen and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that if an assurance could be given by Russia that she would formally bind herself to prevent Montenegro from retaining Scutari, and to secure the recall of Servian troops from territory agreed to be Albanian, and if Russia would agree that, should Djakova not be given to Albania, commercial advantages would be allowed in the neighbouring territory, it would be of the greatest value if Count Berchtold could know that this was so. Would Russia give this assurance if Austria, without giving up Djakova, agreed that the question of Djakova should be referred to an international commission? Count Berchtold could not give up Djakova because he continually received from trustworthy sources news that the Servians acted in such a barbarous way in the territory occupied by them, not only against Mahommedans, but also against Slav Catholics ; that he could not defend before his conscience and public opinion the cession of a town inhabited exclusively by Albanian Catholics and Mahommedans until he was able to count upon the sense of justice of an international commission.

I replied that Sir Edward Goschen had, on my instructions, told the German Minister for Foreign Affairs that I presumed that Russia would agree to whatever was necessary to prevent Montenegro from holding Scutari if once Russia had agreed to a delimitation of the Albanian frontier so that it included Scutari in Albania. All the Powers when they had agreed to a line were bound to see that Servia and Montenegro respected the line : to do otherwise would be to tear up the agreement. If Austria gave up Djakova, and Russia then agreed to a line that gave Scutari to Albania, and subsequently made difficulties about the exclusion of Montenegro from Scutari, I could not countenance such a proceeding. But after what Count Mensdorff had said, I should have no difficulty in asking M. Sazonof to make the position clear.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11298] No. 177.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March* 7, 1913.

AS reported in my telegram No. 46 of the 5th instant, I recently had some conversation with M. Pasitch and M. Stefanovitch on the subject of Scutari.

I asked M. Pasitch what would be the attitude of Servia in the event of the other Turkish peace proposals being found acceptable and Scutari still holding out. I presumed the line the Porte would now take would be to disinterest themselves entirely as regards Albania. Would Servia insist on Scutari being given to Montenegro as a condition of peace, and in the event of this leading to no result, would she assist Montenegro to effect its capture?

M. Pasitch said that, as an ally, Servia was bound to give assistance to Montenegro, and he hoped Scutari would fall as this would be the simplest solution. He did not think Austria would take any steps to forcibly eject the Montenegrins once they were in occupation. However, should Scutari not fall and become the only stumbling block to peace, and should it become evident that the Powers were determined to secure Scutari to Albania, the Servian Government would recommend the King of Montenegro not to insist on its possession. Should he refuse to listen to this recommendation the other allies would have to discuss what steps should be taken

M. Stefanovitch, whom I saw immediately afterwards, was much less guarded and distinctly anti-Montenegrin in tone. He asked whether I had seen the report of the wreck of a Greek transport on its way to Durazzo with Servian troops on board, and said that though only one man had been drowned, a number of horses, some ammunition, and other war material had been lost. He complained of the sacrifices in men and money that Servia was making to send assistance to Montenegro, and could not see of what possible benefit this would be to Servia. If Austria was bent on Scutari remaining Albanian, which she appeared to be, the capture of Scutari by Montenegro would merely entail additional complications. There was certainly an understanding on the subject now between Austria and Russia, and by supporting Montenegro Servia would only find herself in conflict with the Great Powers and incur their enmity. He thought a communication made by the Powers here and at Cettinjé to the effect that, irrespective of its capture or otherwise, Scutari would remain Albanian might be appropriate.

As there was some divergence between the statements made to me by M. Pasitch and M. Stefanovitch, I asked the latter whether he had been expressing his personal views or those of the Servian Government. He said what he had told me was based on the views held by various members of the Government, and I might take it that Servia had no intention of seeking fresh trouble for the sake of King Nicholas of Montenegro.

I have little doubt that M. Pasitch's true sentiments are those expressed to me by M. Stefanovitch, but he probably thought best not to give vent to them officially.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[11299] No. 178.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March* 7, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub reporting a conversation with an Ottoman-Albanian army doctor concerning Albanian feeling against Servia.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 178.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Uskub, February* 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday an Ottoman army doctor, an Albanian, Kol Agassi (Adjutant-Major) Zeïnel Abidyn, called on me. He informed me that, having suffered from typhoid during the Tripoli campaign, he had been at Prishtina to recruit, had been there during the Servian conquest, and was now on his way to Belgrade.

He expressed some fear that he might be made a prisoner of war there, but knew that this was contrary to the Geneva Convention. I quote this as showing how little confidence he had in the Servians.

I of course took the opportunity of enquiring about Albanian feeling. He assured me that it was very bitter against the Servians, and that the Albanians were prepared to resist indefinitely. Questioned as to what he thought that the new Albania should be, he included Nish, on the ground that it had once been Pelasgian, an argument to my mind at least as futile as the oft-quoted empire of Stefan Dushan.

He stated that Moslems were being forced to use the sign of the cross. He also quoted a rumour current that the mufti had been forcibly baptised, but had said subsequently "They have put me into a bath, but I am still a Moslem for all that." He could not guarantee the truth of this, but it is interesting that such a rumour should be current.

Though determined in the future to follow the fortunes of Albania and not Turkey ("I am an Albanian; God himself cannot make me a Turk"), he seemed in some doubt what to do when he got away from Belgrade. It seemed to me that, if his pretensions were sincere, there was no doubt that his patriotic duty called him to Aylona, but I declined to express to him any opinion of what his future movements should be.

One of my objects in reporting this interview is to draw your attention to the existence of this class of somewhat gas-bag Albanian, with his mixture of French, ethnology, and indecision. Nearly all Albanians of the higher class, officers, bairakdars, &c., whom I have met fall into two categories—there are the Hassan Beys, cultured, fluent, and inefficient in a crisis; or there are the Riza Beys, men not wanting in resource and decision, but utterly lacking in any culture or mental perspective. Alone of those who I have met (who, in justice be it said, are few in number) Hayreddin Bey, late Mutessarif of Ipek, seems to me to unite the qualities necessary for a statesman and administrator in the new state. It is for this reason that I insist on the need for foreign control till a new generation with a better tradition has been formed.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

[11300]

No. 179.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March* 7, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub on the subject of reported massacres by Servian komitajis in the district of Gilan.

As stated in my telegram No. 43 of the 3rd instant, Mr. Peckham, who came up to Belgrade for a couple of days, reported that as yet he had been unable to obtain any reliable evidence upon the subject, but that he is investigating, and believes he may obtain information pointing definitely to the perpetration of outrages by Servian soldiers.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 179.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Sir, *Uskub, February* 28, 1913.

YESTERDAY, in answer to a telegram (No. 1 of the 24th February) from the Foreign Office, I had the honour to address to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a telegram in the following sense:—

"Recently about sixty Albanian Mahommedans have been put to death at the village of Lyubishta, in the district of Gilan. This was done, it appears, at least in part, by Servian regulars. Massacres have also taken place in other villages in the neighbourhood, including those of Terpes and Julekar. It is locally supposed that the Servians wish to adjust the population to conform with their claim to have a majority in the district.

"The above in answer to your telegram No. 1."

The above information is based on various accounts which, while conflicting on details, agree in the main points of the story. At Lyubishta it appears that an Albanian had murdered a Serb, and in consequence a number of the villagers were sent for on the 25th February to come to Gilan. As soon as they were out of the village they were shot down, either by soldiers only or by a mixed body of soldiers and komitajis, and the village was burned. The number of killed is variously reported as from sixty to eighty.

At Julekar (Gelekar?) twenty-four were massacred about the same date, and a pregnant woman was ripped up. This was done by soldiers in the presence of officers. At Terpes from ten to twelve were massacred, and others (numbers unknown) at Kabashi, and also, I am informed, at other villages.

I note one discrepancy. These massacres are said to have taken place on the 25th February, whereas the Foreign Office telegram is dated the 24th February. Two explanations are possible: either my dates are incorrect or, more probable, other massacres had already taken place in the district some days earlier.

A rumour has been current here that the Powers intend to assign to Albania all districts where the Albanians have a 75 per cent. majority, and it is supposed that these massacres are taking place for statistical purposes.

Yesterday I was called on by the Catholic curé of Uskub (the Archbishop, though taking his title from Uskub, resides at Prisrend), accompanied by the curé of Ferisovich.

Besides giving me one account of the foregoing, they supplied me with a mass of information about earlier anti-Albanian action, a digest of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

Admitting the truth of all these statements—and both priests are not only Catholics but Albanians, and have therefore a double motive for exaggeration to the detriment of the Orthodox Serb—this list is quite evidently a piece of special pleading. For instance, the bare statement that 1,200 Albanians were killed at Ferisovich is a half-truth; I have already, in my despatch No. 7 of the 11th November, 1912, given the full account. Similarly, I have little doubt that many of the villages burned had provoked reprisals, and, indeed, something of the sort is admitted in the report from the Dibra district. But, if it be true, I can imagine no justification for the deliberate throwing of Albanian wounded into the Vardar. On this subject I hope later to come by more information. There is no doubt that immediately after the Servian occupation a number of corpses were found in the Vardar; at the time I believed that they had floated down from higher up, and reflected that it was unreasonable to expect an immediate pacification of all the countryside of a country virtually in a state of civil war, but facts which I have recently heard of tend directly to implicate the Servian military authorities at Uskub. A statement which I heard at the time, that "the Albanian wounded are healing with remarkable rapidity," takes, in the light of this story, a new and sinister significance.

I have up to now made no accusations against the Servians of massacre as opposed to provoked reprisals, and I do not believe that any massacres have taken place among the non-Albanian Moslems. But, apart from the recent Gilan affairs, I am beginning to suspect that much of the Albanian population is being murdered in cold blood. A *primâ facie* case seems to me to have been made out for the affair of throwing the wounded into the Vardar. General Yankovich has, I believe, an exceedingly bad reputation, and a remark I heard some time ago from a Servian throws light on the mental attitude of the Serb to the Albanian. This gentleman, a person of some

education, who spoke fluent French, arranged the first steps of the ladder of life, as: first, man; second, gorilla; third, Albanian. A peasant would probably put the Albanian lower down, along with the insect pests.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 179.

Memorandum on Massacres of Albanians.

Statements of Catholic Curé of Uskub.

[Vice-consul's comments in square brackets]

Uskub district.—Immediately after the Servian occupation of Uskub some Catholic nursing sisters went to the military hospital to dress wounds. The first day there were 132 wounded Albanians, the next 80, the next 30, the next 20. The services of the sisters were soon dispensed with. The men removed from hospital were taken and thrown into the Vardar.

About the 27th October three Albanians were bayoneted near one of the Vardar bridges.

About the 6th November the priest passed along the street leading to the station at 10 P.M., and noticed much blood which had not been there at 8·30 P.M. Early next morning a dead horse was brought in a motor to account for the blood. The truth was that komitajis in the Hotel London had shot an Albanian in the street. [The proprietor of the Hotel London, where Mr. Cahen at one time stayed, avowed himself to be a chetnik, and on one occasion told Mr. Cahen that he was just back from four weeks in the Lyuma country.]

Some eighty corpses of Albanians were found at Kisela voda [close to Uskub], and many more behind the citadel.

At the beginning of the occupation soldiers entered the house of an Albanian in Uskub, violated his wife, beat him till he told where his two daughters (aged 14 and 16) were, and then violated them.

One Chicherich, a chetnik, remarked to a friend in the hearing of a priest, "We have not eaten or drunk for 48 hours, we have been so busy looking for Albanians to kill." [In Uskub town, it appears.]

In a village near Kumanovo Servian soldiers fired the houses to drive out the inhabitants who were hidden in the roofs. As the women came out they were shot; to save powder the children were bayoneted. A Servian soldier recounted this in the presence of the priest, not knowing who he was.

Kalkandelen.—On the first day of the occupation soldiers, chetniks, and local Serbs killed eighty-five Albanians in house-to-house raids.

Gostivar.—Six Albanians were killed, and the town paid a ransom of £T 200.

Dibra.—Some 120 soldiers who had gone out to loot were killed by the Albanians; to avenge this the Servians burned twenty-four villages. The number of Albanian dead is unknown.

Perisovich.—M. Gavrilovich, ex-Servian consul at Uskub, states that 1,200 Albanians were killed on the 24th October. The Servian soldiery met a Catholic, Zefi Palctonit, in the streets and ordered him to cross himself Orthodox fashion. Being somewhat drunk he was unable to do so, and was shot. An Albanian woman took her dead husband's Mauser and killed five soldiers. Even now, three, four, or five Albanians are being killed every night in Perisovich; men are enticed into houses with the promise of food and are there beaten. Soldiers and officers rob the peasants of their money as they come back from market. [The Servians made precisely the same complaint against the Albanians in September last (see my despatch No. 74 of the 17th September to Salonica).] Parties of Albanians who go out to collect fuel are surrounded by soldiers in the woods and shot down. In Perisovich and in Prisrend men are put in prison for speaking to the Catholic priest.

At Terstenik 30 Albanians were killed; at Smira, 32; at Verban, 20; at Kamenoglava, a village of 50 families, all the men were killed. In these cases the men were forced to come out to greet the Servian troops, and were then tied together and shot. Their bodies were buried shallow and subsequently eaten by dogs.

Prishtina.—On or about the 23rd October, on the admission of a Servian military doctor, some 5,000 Albanians were killed. They were tied together and mowed down by machine-gun fire. [I have heard confirmation of extensive Albanian massacres at Prishtina from the Albanian army doctor mentioned in my despatch No. 17 of the 28th February. He stated that Albanians were placed between hurdles and machine guns turned on them.]

In the village of Shala, of fifty families, all the men were killed, two of them being hung to trees by the arm till they died.

Prisrend.—Four hundred Albanians were killed in the first three days of the occupation. Their bodies were not allowed to be buried. By the New Year 2,000 had been killed in the town alone.

Nashets: with the exception of two or three houses the village has been destroyed and the men massacred. At Lutoglava the soldiers entered a house and would violate a woman, her husband killed them, and was promptly killed himself. Three families were massacred. At Gilansa four families were exterminated.

In Prisrend district thirty Catholic muhtars (head men of villages) were tied together and shot. General Yankovich forced the head men of villages to address a letter of thanks to King Peter.

Lyuma.—Four hundred Lyuma Albanians surrendered and were brought to Prisrend, where they were put to death at the rate of about fifty a-day. On the authority of a man who was with the Servians, thirty-two villages were razed, and their inhabitants—men, women, and children—shot. The Servians lost eight battalions in Lyuma.

[11459] No. 180.

Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

Imperial Russian Embassy, London,
March 10, 1913.

Dear Sir Edward,

THIS is the telegram I mentioned as giving M. Sazonoff's opinion on mediation between Turkey and the allies. I telegraphed the substance of our conversation to-day on this subject. Should you have anything to add to what you said, please let me know.

Yours sincerely,
BENCKENDORFF.

Enclosure in No. 180.

Telegram received by Count Benckendorff.

(Confidential.)

IL résulte des télégrammes de nos représentants à Sophia, Belgrade et Athènes que les Gouvernements alliés ont accueilli la démarche collective des Puissances au sujet d'une médiation avec beaucoup de réserve. M. Guéchof a déclaré à notre Ministre que la Bulgarie ne saurait admettre d'autre frontière que la ligne d'Enos-Ergene-Midia, qu'elle espérerait pouvoir obtenir directement de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement serbe accepte en principe la médiation, mais désire au préalable être informé si la Sublime Porte consente à la cession d'Andrinople, des îles de la mer Egée, de Janina et de Scutari, ainsi qu'au payement d'une contribution de guerre.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères hellénique a exprimé des doutes sur la possibilité d'accepter la médiation proposée sous sa forme actuelle, qui, selon lui, n'est pas suffisamment précise.

Nous n'avons pas encore de réponse de Cettigné, mais le Roi Nicolas a catégoriquement déclaré, malgré les conseils de la Russie, de ne pas vouloir se désister de la prise de Scutari. Le Ministre russe a, par conséquent, été chargé de prévenir Sa Majesté qu'elle assumerait en ce cas une grave responsabilité. Nous estimons que le Gouvernement monténégrin ayant ouvert les hostilités sans l'assentiment préalable de ses alliés, ceux-ci, à leur tour, ne sont pas tenus d'obtenir le consentement du Cabinet de Cettigné pour la conclusion de la paix.

A notre avis, les réponses données par les Gouvernements alliés ne sont pas de nature à mettre obstacle à ce que les Puissances procèdent à la médiation; mais elles

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démontrent qu'il serait nécessaire de transmettre aux Gouvernements alliés des propositions concrètes de la Turquie.

Par conséquent, la prochaine démarche des Puissances devrait consister dans une proposition en ce sens à adresser à la Porte. Il faudrait en même temps s'enquérir, tant auprès de la Turquie que des alliés, s'ils consentent à munir leurs représentants à Londres de pleins pouvoirs, la médiation devant, selon nous, avoir lieu en cette ville.

[12056] No. 182.

Mémorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff, March 11, 1913.

IN the conference held on the 21st February, the following agreement has been reached in the customs question in the Turkish territories occupied by the Balkan allies:

"Concernant l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, la réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Sophia, à Belgrade et à Athènes de faire une démarche collective dans ce sens."

Sir Arthur Nicolson has informed Count Mensdorff that the British representatives in the said towns have been authorised to act accordingly when their colleagues were similarly instructed.

Count Mensdorff is instructed to express to Sir Edward Grey Count Berchtold's best thanks for his kind support in this affair.

The Russian Ambassador having declared in the conference of the 27th February that, in the opinion of his Government, the question does not come into the competence

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[12056] No. 181.

Memorandum communicated by Count Trauttmansdorff, March 11, 1913.

(Translation.)

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador is instructed to convey to Sir E. Grey the warm thanks of the Austro-Hungarian Government for his kind support of the Austro-Hungarian proposal respecting the attitude to be adopted by the Powers toward the customs arrangements made by the Balkan States in the territories occupied by them.

The reason for which the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted the matter to the meeting of Ambassadors was that they anticipated that this would be the best means of reaching a prompt agreement on the question of the identical *démarche* to be made at the capitals of the Balkan States; the proposals thus agreed upon could be submitted to the Governments of the various Great Powers whose commercial interests appeared to be in greater or less degree threatened by the action of the Balkan States.

The expectations of the Austro-Hungarian Government have been to this extent fulfilled, that the meeting of Ambassadors at the sitting of the 21st ultimo recognised the soundness of Count Mensdorff's proposal, and unanimously expressed the view that it was desirable that the representatives of the Great Powers in the Balkan capitals should make a collective *démarche* in the sense of that proposal.

The executive of this resolution has, however, met with certain difficulties in view of the attitude of the Russian Government, who, at the meeting of Ambassadors on the 2nd February, took the line that the matter was outside the competence of the meeting.

Having regard to the high importance of this matter, the Austro-Hungarian Government, believing that their efforts would, as before, be supported by the other Powers, approached the Russian Government with a request that they would carry out the step suggested by the meeting of Ambassadors.

The Austro-Hungarian Government would be most grateful if the British Government, with whom the very excellent suggestion for a collective *démarche* originated, would be good enough to use their influence in this sense with the Russian Government, in order that the Balkan States may recognise that, in this question as in others, they are confronted by joint action on the part of all the Great Powers acting in full agreement; such joint action is likely to be more effective in putting an end to the injury which threatens international commerce to a continually increasing extent than are isolated representations or claims which, as experience teaches, either are not considered at all or else are met by totally inacceptable replies.

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of the Ambassadors' conference, the Austro-Hungarian Government considering, however, a collective *démarche* indispensable for the settlement of the pending question, Count Berchtold has instructed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to ask the Russian Government to give to the Russian Ministers in the said three towns similar instructions to those given to their Ministers by the other Powers.

Count Berchtold would feel very much obliged to Sir Edward Grey if he would find himself in a position to support the Austro-Hungarian *démarche* made in St. Petersburgh.

[11485] No. 183.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 33.) [By Post.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 10, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 116 of 8th March: Ottoman Debt.

M. Gout informed Mr. Carnegie this afternoon that the French Government did not propose that the international commission should meet here until peace appeared likely. He said that the French Government would be glad to have a reply to their note of 12th February (see my despatch No. 90), and that should His Majesty's Government agree to the suggestion made therein he would be ready to communicate in writing the views of the French Government, and hoped that His Majesty's Government would communicate theirs to the French Government.

M. Gout added that it was not intended that the councillors should discuss technical matters with him. He would be glad to have them as intermediaries between himself and their respective embassies, especially in cases where verbal explanations were required.

[11286] No. 184.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, March* 10, 1913.

MY telegram No. 15 of 8th March.

Result of three days' fighting at Nigrita: Greeks lost 6 killed, 2 officers, and 20 wounded, and 25 prisoners; Bulgarian losses said to have been about 100 and two guns.

Bulgarian general has made excuses and the affair is to be hushed up if possible.

Greek and Servian fraternisation continues.

[11486] No. 185.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March* 11, 1913.

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the contents of your telegram No. 208 of 10th March, but as he had only a few minutes to spare before going to report to the Emperor he said that he must have time to think it over and that he would give me an answer to-morrow. He could not, he said, do more than he had already done at Cettinjé and Belgrade, and from my private letter, which will reach Sir A. Nicolson on 12th March, you will see what a strong line he has taken.

I suggested that he should let the Germans and Austrians know what he had done, but he replied that he could not tell them everything. If pressure to be exercised has to take the form of force, it will be almost impossible to obtain his sanction, but he did not absolutely reject a suggestion which I made that the Powers might decline to recognise any accession of territory acquired by Montenegro and Servia during the war, until they had both withdrawn their forces from territory which the Powers have assigned to Albania.

[11477] No. 186.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 9th March.

Communiqué will be published at St. Petersburgh to-morrow announcing that Austria is reducing her forces on the Galician frontier, and that Russia will then disband her reservists. A separate communiqué will be published in the "Fremdenblatt" and Russian official press recording assurances of Austria's pacific intentions towards Servia.

[11482] No. 187.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, March 11, 1913.*

I WAS told this morning, by a person whose information is usually reliable, that language of a very anti-Bulgarian character has recently been used by the German Ambassador here, who has declared that Russia will for the next few years have the guidance of that country in her hands. I gather that M. de Tschirschky is offering Count Berchtold advice to the effect that it would be well to oppose a barrier to Bulgarian predominance in the Balkans by connecting Servia and Roumania with the Triple Alliance, and with this object he appears to be recommending Count Berchtold to endeavour to conciliate Servia.

In order to endeavour to obtain the information desired in your telegram No. 100 of the 10th March, I attempted to discover from my informant what views were held in Vienna in regard to the fate of Salonica. He told me that the question of its final ownership was regarded both in Austria and Germany with comparative indifference, but that sentiment here was inclined to favour Greece if anything.

In spite, however, of this inclination towards Greece, it would cause me no surprise if Bulgaria's claim to Salonica were supported by Austria and Germany, supposing that the Great Powers had to settle the fate of the town. Count Berchtold is, as I know, very anxious to give satisfaction to Roumania, and Germany supports him in this wish. Should, therefore, the cession of Salonica to Bulgaria bring about the cession by the latter State of Silistria to Roumania, I should not be astonished at Austro-German support of Bulgaria's claim to Salonica.

[11468] No. 188.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 11, 1913.*

TURCO-BULGARIAN mediation.

My telegram No. 83 of 7th March.

The Prime Minister informs me confidentially that the Greek Government insists on certain conditions being put forward by the allies previous to accepting the mediation of the Powers, with which he does not agree. One relates to the status of Greek subjects throughout the Ottoman Empire, and another to the islands. He was endeavouring to combat Greeks on the ground that such matters should be settled by the Powers after their mediation had been accepted.

His Excellency said that Montenegro had now put its case in the hands of the allies, and that he expected the Servian reply to-day. He hopes to reply to the proposal of the Powers in two or three days.

The Prime Minister corroborates my previous information that the allies will insist on indemnity as a *sine quâ non*.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[11474] No. 189.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 11, 1913.*

THE Turkish Government are in negotiation with the German Government for the purchase of two old battle-ships, sister ships to those bought from Germany three years ago, price about 120,000*l.* each. They are to be used for exercise of crews which would be otherwise idle during the extensive repairs necessary to the two battle-ships.

[11590] No. 190.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 120 of to-day to Paris.

This is sent to you for your information in case you find that any news or misrepresentation of my action is current at Constantinople. Otherwise you should say nothing to Turkish Government.

[11263] No. 191.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 136 of 10th March.

You should act as in previous case (see my telegram No. 68 of 8th March).

[11259] No. 192.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 210.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.*

VIENNA telegram No. 35 of 10th March: Albania.

You may communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs as much of the above as you may consider desirable and discreet.

[11259] No. 193.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.*

YOU should, I think, in any case inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of proposal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned in first paragraph of Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 35 of 10th March repeated to you, beginning "he thinks," and ending "possession of the town," and ask Minister for Foreign Affairs to deal with it in instructions sent to Russian Ambassador here. Russian Ambassador has not yet received the instructions contemplated in your telegram No. 80 of 9th March.

[11590] No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[a]

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.*

INFORMATION received hitherto indicates that allies will either reply unfavourably to suggested mediation of the Powers or will attach excessive conditions to their acceptance.

[a] Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 126), Sir R. Rodd (No. 97), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 103), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 212).

In this event it seems to me that Powers must either declare mediation at an end or formulate to allies what they think would be reasonable preliminaries of peace.

Views hitherto expressed by the Powers point to a general opinion that the Ægean islands should be left to the decision of the Powers, that a line should be drawn from Enos to Midia, that everything west of this line should be ceded by Turkey to the allies except Albania, which is reserved for the Powers to delimit, that the allies should not claim an indemnity. I think that, if the allies renounce an indemnity, they and Turkey should be admitted to the discussion of the allocation of the debt, which is proceeding at Paris.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ask his views. It will be very desirable that there should be no delay in instructing Ambassadors in London what course is to be adopted.

It is also worth considering whether, if Powers decide not to declare mediation at an end, but to formulate some preliminaries of peace, there is any pressure that they could put on allies to accept what they propose.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 136.)

[12134] No. 195.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1913.

AFTER the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day I made the following communication to the Servian chargé d'affaires :—

"Les Puissances considèrent que la Serbie sera tenue d'évacuer le littoral et le territoire de l'Albanie après sa délimitation par les Puissances dès que lesdites Puissances lui auront notifié leur décision."

I pointed out that this implied that the destiny of Scutari would be decided by the Powers, that the operations now in progress against Scutari could not decide this, and that, therefore, to pursue them entailed bloodshed which was so useless that it appeared to me to be criminal.

The Servian chargé d'affaires represented the operations against Scutari as part of the war against Turkey. I replied that they had ceased to have any effect upon Turkey, and were, in fact, being undertaken solely to obtain possession of the town for Montenegro.

The chargé d'affaires observed that for Servia to evacuate places now in her possession while war was still in progress and thereby to set free Turkish troops or turbulent tribes to act against Servia was not reasonable. I replied that this was a point to be borne in mind when the Powers came to a decision to notify Servia that she was to evacuate places now in her possession ; it did not apply to what I had said about Scutari. The chargé d'affaires did not contest this.

(Repeated to Berlin, No 128 ; Paris, No. 122 ; Rome, No. 99 ; Vienna, No. 105 ; and St. Petersburgh, No. 215.)

[12134] No. 196.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1913.

AFTER the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day I made the following communication to the Montenegrin delegate :—

"Les Puissances considèrent que le Monténégro sera tenu d'évacuer le littoral et le territoire de l'Albanie après sa délimitation par les Puissances dès que lesdites Puissances lui auront notifié leur décision."

I pointed out that this implied that the destiny of Scutari would be decided by the Powers, that the operations now in progress against Scutari could not decide this, and that, therefore, to pursue them entailed bloodshed which was so useless that it appeared to me to be criminal.

The Montenegrin delegate asked whether the Powers had decided that Scutari was to go to Albania. I replied that I was not authorised to make that communication

on behalf of the Powers ; and, on his saying that neither the King nor the Montenegrin Government could give up Scutari owing to the strong feeling in Montenegro, I replied that neither the King nor the Montenegrin Government nor the Montenegrin people could resist the will of the Powers, and that the advice I had given was in the true interest of Montenegro.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 121 ; Rome, No 98 ; Berlin, No. 127 ; Vienna, No. 104 ; and St. Petersburgh, No. 214.)

[11606] No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 176.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1913.

THE French Ambassador informed me yesterday that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs heard that the reply of the allies to the communication of the Powers with regard to mediation would attach to mediation conditions that were impossible. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore suggested the following collective communication to the allies :

"1. Les Puissances invitent les Gouvernements de
à s'en remettre à leur sagesse et à leur impartialité pour fixer les préliminaires de la paix.

"2. Aussitôt que ces préliminaires auront été fixés, le Gouvernement de
sera convié à la conférence internationale que les Puissances se proposent de réunir en vue d'établir l'instrument définitif de la paix.

"3. Si le Gouvernement de ne déférait pas à l'invitation des Puissances, il s'aliénerait leur sympathie et elles se verraient dans la pénible nécessité de lui refuser toute assistance ultérieure pour le soutien de son crédit et le relèvement de sa situation économique."

I answered that we must first wait for the reply of the allies. When this was received, we might either make the communication suggested by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, or the Powers might at once formulate what they considered to be reasonable conditions of peace, such, for instance, as the Enos–Midia line as the Turkish frontier ; the cession of Adrianople and of everything west of this line, except what might be decided to be Albanian ; the leaving of the islands to the decision of the Powers ; no indemnity ; with the addition of the warning suggested in the third paragraph of the communication of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. If the allies renounced an indemnity, I thought that they should be admitted to the discussions in Paris on the subject of the share of the Ottoman debt which they were to undertake.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12114] No. 198.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1913.

IN the course of my conversation of to-day with the Servian chargé d'affaires which is recorded in my telegram No. 58 to you, I observed, in reply to some remark, of the chargé d'affaires in justification of all that Servia was doing, that her recent dispatches of guns and reinforcements to the northern regions of Albania were presumably intended for use against Scutari, as regards which I had spoken to him, but that they had given rise to apprehension in Austria lest Servia should be meditating strengthening her hold with a view to a permanent occupation, perhaps even of some part of the littoral.

I added that I could not believe, after the communication which the Servian Government had made on this subject, that they could possibly depart from the terms of that communication, or intend any such occupation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9752] No. 199.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th ultimo, respecting the protection of British and foreign financial interests which may be affected by the cession of Turkish territory on the conclusion of the war, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copy of a telegram from the Russian Government to the Russian Ambassador in London, communicated by the latter on the 27th ultimo.*

In this telegram Count Benckendorff is furnished with certain arguments in favour of amended draft articles, also enclosed, which the Russian Government would substitute for those formulated by the French Government, which formed the subject of your letter above referred to.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with their Lordships' views on the enclosed documents at the earliest possible date.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[11466] No. 200.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th February last respecting the protection of British and foreign financial interests which may be affected by the cession of Turkish territory on the conclusion of the war, in which you stated that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury proposed that an amendment should be inserted in the draft articles to be included in the treaty of peace to the effect that the total sum payable by the allies should not be less than the aggregate yield of the assigned revenues in the ceded territories, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the consideration of their Lordships, a note which has been communicated by the French chargé d'affaires setting forth certain objections to the amendment proposed.†

It will be seen from this note that the French Government are opposed to the amendment on the ground that it would introduce a fresh principle in the method of calculating the liability of the allies. This principle, the nature of which is indicated in the note, had, it is contended, already been propounded by the German bondholders last year, and had been refuted by the French commission and abandoned by its originators.

The note proceeds to state various arguments against the introduction of this principle, and these arguments are more fully explained in a confidential memorandum communicated at the same time by M. de Fleuriau, copy of which is also enclosed.‡ This memorandum was drawn up at the time when the principle was first put forward by the German bondholders.

Sir E. Grey would be glad if their Lordships, after consideration of these papers, would let him know at their earliest convenience whether they find anything in them which would cause them to modify their views already expressed in your letter above mentioned. Should their Lordships adhere to their previous opinion, Sir E. Grey would be grateful if they would favour him with a full expression of their views, so that the points raised in the enclosed note may be dealt with in detail and the objections of the French Government may be met with arguments in support of the view taken by their Lordships.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

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* Part V, No. 192. † No. 158. ‡ No. 159.

[11760] No. 201.

Minutes respecting the Ottoman Debt.

M. RAFOLOVITCH asked to see me when he was here to-day and explained at great length the Russian attitude towards the amount of the Ottoman Debt to be assumed by the Allies, and the mode in which it should be computed.

I merely listened without any attempt to discuss the matter.

He said that all the formulæ hitherto put forward failed to allow for the fact that when a loan had been concluded in Turkey, always on specific assigned securities, a very large margin had been allowed, owing to the financial instability of Turkey. Thus the securities granted were greatly in excess of the actual sums required for the service of the various loans, and there was a considerable surplus. What the Russian Government considered unfair was that the amount of the Debt to be assumed by the Allies was to be calculated, not on the actual sum paid as interest and sinking fund for the Turkish Debt, but on the sum actually assigned as security, which included a large surplus, over and above what was paid as interest and sinking fund.

He said that the Russian Government were of opinion (and he said that in this matter the Russian Government was in point of fact himself) that the whole question had been rushed, and that it should be examined *de novo* by the proposed Commission in Paris, which should deal not merely with points of detail but with points of principle.

He said that the Russian Embassy would probably communicate shortly a detailed statement of the views of the Russian Government.

I said this would be interesting to the Treasury, but the view here was that the financial questions should now be dealt with by the proposed Commission in Paris.

A. P.

Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.

There is evidently some room for relaxing the proposals about the Debt without danger to the bondholders if the Allies will give up an indemnity. There seems to me *primâ facie* to be some force in what M. Rafolovitch says.

E. G.

[11505] No. 202.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Bucharest, March 8, 1913.

IT will have been noticed from the memorandum of the Roumanian Government enclosed in my despatch No. 23 of the 2nd instant, that Roumania now claims a frontier starting from a point on the Danube some little way above Silistria and reaching the Black Sea at Baltchik, and that the offers made at different times by Bulgaria during the recent negotiations would allow of a frontier starting as at present from a point on the Danube below Silistria and reaching the Black Sea near Cape Shabla, the frontier being so drawn as to give to Roumania the strategic position of Medjidia Tabia, which lies due south of Silistria. Bulgaria has also offered to dismantle the fortifications round Silistria, while recognising Roumania's right to fortify her frontier.

A compromise between Roumania's demands and Bulgaria's offers, which it would doubtless be comparatively easy for King Charles and the peace party in the Cabinet to impose upon this country, would be the following: a frontier starting, as claimed by Roumania, from a point on the Danube above Silistria, passing south of Medjidia Tabia and reaching the Black Sea, not at Baltchik, as claimed by Roumania, or even at Cape Shabla, as offered by Bulgaria, but at a point only some 5 or 6 kilom. south of the point where the present frontier touches the sea.

Notwithstanding the declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the representatives of the Great Powers on the 2nd instant, as reported in my telegram No. 54, it would, perhaps, be rash to assume that it will be possible for the Roumanian Government to impose on the country any solution which does not give Silistria to Roumania; but should it be found impossible by the mediating Powers to agree to recommend the compromise indicated above, there is an alternative which would almost

certainly have been accepted if offered a week or two ago, and which even now, if recommended by the six Powers, would offer a fair chance of enabling the King and the soberer members of the Cabinet to still the outcry which is certain to be raised if the mediating Powers rule that Roumania should forgo the acquisition of Silistria. Roumania might be given the immediate neighbourhood of Silistria, and in compensation for the rejection of her claim to the town itself she might receive a longer strip of the coast on the Black Sea than Bulgaria has offered. The mediating Powers might thus, always supposing the acquisition of the town of Silistria is ruled out, recommend a frontier starting from the Danube below Silistria, skirting the town itself as closely as possible till it reaches Medjidia Tabia, so as to give Roumania not only the latter place, but also the outskirts of Silistria, and running from Medjidia Tabia to the Black Sea at, say, Cape Kalakra.

From Sir Henry Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 70 of the 20th ultimo I understand that the Bulgarian Government think that any further concessions than those they have offered would be of vital injury to Bulgaria, and that Roumania's demands are merely a question of *amour-propre*. It would be interesting to know by what process of reasoning the Bulgarian Government have formed this opinion. *Amour-propre* has, it is true, been aroused to an undesirable degree in Roumania, but beneath it there is a very solid conviction that Roumania's safety depends on a substantial rectification of frontier. I believe it is a fact—at any rate, it is universally believed here—that irredentist aspirations in regard to the Dobrudja have been in the past sedulously fostered in Bulgaria, and it is therefore not to be wondered at that Roumanians, now that their southern neighbour is about to be strengthened by a formidable accession of territory and population, should regard a strategic frontier as of vital importance to them, and whether the possession by Roumania of Silistria is essential for such a frontier or not, it is, at any rate, difficult to see how the cession of that town could even seriously, let alone vitally, affect Bulgaria, except in the event of her attaching the Dobrudja. It is true that it might be contended that, if Baltic Baltchik were given to Roumania, Varna would be threatened, but the Bulgarian Government must have been strongly out of touch with the feeling of Roumania if they did not know that, at any time during the recent negotiations, had Silistria been offered to her she would have accepted a strip of the coast stopping far north of Baltchik.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to St. Petersburgh by post.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[11532] No. 203.

M. Madjaroff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

THE Bulgarian Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, acting on instructions from his Government, has the honour of transmitting the enclosed "Exposé sur la Question de la Part contributive des États balkaniques dans la Dette publique ottomane."

Bulgarian Legation, London,
March 11, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 203.

Exposé sur la Question de la Part contributive des États balkaniques dans la Dette publique ottomane.

LES États balkaniques alliés se sont montrés prêts, comme on le sait, à supporter une partie de la dette publique ottomane; mais quelle serait la base sur laquelle on va calculer cette dette—voilà la question dont s'occupent actuellement non seulement la conférence des Ambassadeurs, à Londres, mais tous ceux qui s'y intéressent et, en premier lieu, les créanciers de la Turquie et ceux des États balkaniques.

Dans un projet présent à la conférence des Ambassadeurs, à Londres, il est dit: —

"Chacun des États signataires du présent traité,* qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman, supportera une part

* Il s'agit du traité de paix qui va être conclu.

de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculé d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers."

Ce ne sont point des considérations dictées par des précédents qui ont déterminé les États balkaniques alliés à prendre à leur charge une partie de la dette publique ottomane, lorsque, après une guerre, certains territoires sont cédés à un pays pour être annexés à un autre, parce que de tels précédents n'existent pas.

Notre situation de vainqueurs à l'égard de la Turquie, dans la guerre actuelle, nous donne le privilège d'enlever des droits ou valeurs, et non pas d'en créer ou d'en faire des charges. Si, malgré cela, nous nous sommes montrés prêts à supporter une partie des engagements de la Turquie à l'égard de ses créanciers, c'était parce que nous avons sincèrement voulu afin de ne pas léser, à cause de la guerre et de ses conquêtes, les intérêts et les droits privés acquis de tierces personnes. La déclaration faite en ce sens par les Gouvernements des États balkaniques alliés montre, mais plus que plus, que les combattants pour la liberté et pour une vie supportable des chrétiens en Macédoine et en Thrace, n'ont nullement l'intention de tirer parti de la guerre au détriment de tierces personnes, les créanciers de la Turquie, connaissant la conduite rétrospective de celle-ci, qui a imposé aux alliés une guerre terrible et à cause de laquelle ces derniers ont exposé au risque tout leur bien-être et leur culture, sans compter leurs grands sacrifices matériels et moraux. Et les Grandes Puissances commettraient une grande injustice si, dans ces conditions, elles demandaient aux vainqueurs de payer à cette heure des valeurs, dettes contractées pour son armement, pour faire la guerre, pour supprimer des insurrections, &c., comme il est prévu dans le projet que: "Les États balkaniques alliés doivent supporter une partie de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman." Le principe de ne pas léser les droits acquis de tierces personnes sur les revenus de certains rayons des territoires à annexer ayant été admis, il est nécessaire de faire une distinction non seulement entre la dette consolidée et la dette flottante de la Turquie. Le chiffre de cette dernière dette ne peut être exactement établi dans un État comme la Turquie, mais on doit en faire aussi séparément entre les cinq catégories de dettes existantes, en rapport avec la nature des revenus concédés (garanties réelles) servant à assurer la régularité du service des autres emprunts. La dette flottante de la Turquie constituée sous forme de diverses avances, fournitures militaires non payées avant et pendant la guerre tripolitaine et la guerre actuelle, solde et appointements impayés des militaires et fonctionnaires civils, &c., a été créée exclusivement sur le crédit personnel de l'Empire ottoman, dont le remboursement et paiement n'est en rapport avec l'existence de la Turquie, en tant que État. Or, la dette flottante de la Turquie n'a aucun rapport avec telle ou telle partie de son territoire ou de ses revenus et, par conséquent, aucune partie de cette dette ne doit être imposée aux États balkaniques alliés.†

Les créanciers de la Turquie de cette catégorie n'ayant pas demandé en temps utile à être assurés par quelques garanties réelles ou spéciales, ils ne peuvent pas exiger maintenant aux vainqueurs de la Turquie de les assurer par de telles garanties en supportant certaines de ces dettes flottantes, soit en totalité, soit en partie, pour leur compte. Tout autre est cependant la question de la participation des alliés à la dette

* La dette consolidée de l'Empire ottoman au 1er mars, 1912, s'élevait à £T. 129,000,291 et comprenait comme suit:—

1. Emprunts garantis par le produit de l'Octroi et provenant de revenus hypothéqués par divers actes de 1855, 1 pour cent 1894 et 2 pour cent 1894, avec le solde à libérer s'élevant à £T. 8,827,820.

2. Emprunts soumis au régime de Mouharrem (dette unifiée) 1 pour cent et 1 pour cent avec le solde au 1er mars, année passée, de £T. 59,016,757.

3. Emprunts spécialement affectés par un décret de Mouharrem et dont le produit et le service en ont été confiés à la Dette publique ottomane (4 pour cent 1890, 5 pour cent 1896, 1 pour cent 1903, 4 pour cent 1904 Pécheries, 4 pour cent Chemin de Fer Bagdad (1re et 2e Séries, 4 pour cent 1905 Tedjhizat-Askerie, 4 pour cent 1901–1905, 4 pour cent 1905 Zaptieh, solde au 1er mars, année passée, £T. 78,775,414).

4. Emprunts pour lesquels un décret de Mouharrem a chargé certains établissements financiers (4 pour cent 1893 Tombac, 4 pour cent 1894 garanti par l'excédent de l'exploitation des Chemins de Fer orientaux, avec le solde au 1er mars, année passée, de £T. 2,819,914).

5. Emprunts hypothécaires ou autres ne faisant pas partie du régime de la Dette publique (4 pour cent Unifié Domaines, 4 pour cent 1909, Emprunts des Chemins de Fer Sivas-Panderma et Boudeda-Sanaa et 4 pour cent 1911—première tranche, avec le solde au 1er mars, année passée, £T. 24,603,656).

† La dette flottante de la Turquie s'élevait, au 1er mars, 1912, à £T. 15,000,000, et était due pour les approvisionnements militaires et pour les pays cédés la somme de £T. 11,250,000, pour des avances et des fournitures non payées. La dette totale de la Turquie s'est augmentée ces derniers temps, surtout par suite de l'emprunt de 5 millions de livres, nécessité par la guerre tripolitaine et la guerre actuelle, se montant approximativement à £T. 15,000,000 en bons du Trésor.

publique consolidée et garantie de la Turquie, ainsi qu'il a été mentionné plus haut, bien qu'il n'en existe pas d'exemple dans l'histoire. Ainsi l'Autriche-Hongrie s'annexa la Bosnie-Herzégovine et puis elle ne paya à la Turquie que le montant des vacoufs se trouvant dans ces deux provinces, mais elle ne supporta aucune partie de la dette publique ottomane. L'Italie, dernièrement, en conformité de l'article 10 du traité de paix du 18 octobre, 1912, s'engageait, en effet, à supporter une partie de la dette publique consolidée de la Turquie, mais il ne s'agissait là que des revenus perçus en Tripolitaine, revenus qui étaient déjà donnés en gage pour garantir le service de certains emprunts de la Turquie. Le calcul de cette partie de la dette publique ottomane a été fait précisément en vertu des revenus concédés, pris en moyenne pour les trois dernières années précédant la guerre, tandis que le projet que nous examinons ici prévoit que le calcul doit être fait non pas proportionnellement aux revenus concédés servant de garantie pour certains emprunts et perçus dans les territoires libérés par rapport à ceux de l'Empire ottoman, mais en proportion à la somme perçue sur les revenus des territoires à annexer (sans distinction s'ils sont affectés ou non au payement des dettes de la Turquie) par rapport aux revenus de l'Empire, en général—"le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire. . . . . La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent." Ceci n'est pas fondé, parce que la Turquie ayant perdu ses droits souverains sur les territoires conquis, elle perd par ce fait les revenus qui y sont perçus et il n'y a que les intérêts de tierces personnes dont une partie ou le tout des revenus concédés qui doivent être compensés et cela en proportion à leurs créances pour le compte des revenus donnés en gage. Les États balkaniques alliés prendront cet engagement en supportant une partie de la dette publique ottomane en proportion aux revenus concédés, mais il n'est ni juste ni fondé qu'ils participent à cette dette pour le compte des revenus non concédés, c'est-à-dire libres de tout gage, quoique perçus dans les territoires à annexer, ainsi qu'il est prévu audit projet. En raison de la grande importance que présente cette question et la possibilité de lui donner une solution juste et équitable, l'honorable M Raymond Poincaré, aujourd'hui, Président de la République française, se posait, au mois de novembre 1912, au Parlement, la question suivante :—

"Comment devra-t-on déterminer la part contributive des États balkaniques dans la dette publique ottomane ? Devra-t-on maintenir intégralement le service de la dette avec affectation des revenus concédés ? Devra-t-on calculer la contribution d'après la valeur des gages territoriaux affectés spécialement au service de tel et tel emprunt ?"

La façon proposée de calculer la part contributive dans la dette publique ottomane que les États balkaniques alliés doivent supporter n'est basée ni sur des précédents ni sur le principe admis par les alliés—assurer les droits acquis de tierces personnes, créanciers de la Turquie, ainsi qu'il a été fait jusqu'à présent—cette nouvelle façon de calculer est donc injuste d'autant plus que les impôts en Turquie sont inégalement répartis entre les diverses provinces. Ainsi, par exemple, le "beglik" (impôt sur les moutons) est perçu dans les vilayets européens à raison de 4½ à 5½ piastres par tête de mouton, tandis que dans les vilayets d'Asie il n'est perçu que 1 à 3½ piastres par tête. La même disproportion existe pour les revenus de la taxe d'exonération du service militaire, les revenus des ports, &c. En conséquence, cette façon de calculer la part contributive de la dette publique ottomane, que doivent supporter les États balkaniques alliés, comme le prévoit le projet, ne peut pas donner un résultat correspondant à la contribuabilité réelle de la population des territoires conquis.

Dans le deuxième alinéa de l'article projeté est dit que "la quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation ; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers."

Ces deux propositions, prévues au projet, ont pour but :

1. De ne pas donner la possibilité aux alliés de faire de prélèvements sur la part de la dette publique ottomane qu'ils supporteront pour le compte d'un engagement éventuel de la Turquie de leur payer une indemnité de guerre.

2. De ne pas léser les intérêts de tierces personnes, c'est-à-dire les créanciers de la Turquie, par suite de la prochaine annexion des territoires conquis, concernant les droits acquis sur certains revenus donnés en garantie.

Le bien-fondé de la demande des États balkaniques alliés pour que la Turquie leur paye une indemnité de guerre et les raisons qui les y déterminent—la Bulgarie spéciale-

ment - ont été examinés dans un des nos exposés précédents sur cette question. Quant à l'intention des Grandes Puissances de sauvegarder les intérêts légitimes de leurs ressortissants, c'est-à-dire les créanciers de la Turquie, c'est le désir aussi des États balkaniques alliés, ainsi qu'il a été déjà dit plus haut.

Se basant sur le principe de sauvegarder tant les intérêts des créanciers de la Turquie, que ceux des États balkaniques alliés dans la solution de la question sur leur participation à la dette publique ottomane et celle sur la détermination de la proportion et le mode de payement de l'indemnité de guerre, le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie, tout en ne confondant pas ces deux questions différentes, mais qui n'ont pas moins de rapport entre elles, estime que le projet que nous examinons ici pourrait, pour une large part, léser les intérêts des États balkaniques alliés, s'il était réalisé. Le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie ne pense pas insister sur la nécessité de prélever l'indemnité de guerre, qu'il voudra imposer à la Turquie, sur la part contributive qu'il aura à supporter dans la dette publique ottomane ; mais, en revanche, il espère, avec droit, que les représentants des Grandes Puissances à la Conférence de Londres voudront non seulement contribuer à la solution équitable de l'indemnité de guerre, mais elles consentiront en même temps à ce que son payement régulier, pour une période de trente à quarante ans, soit garanti par la Turquie avec ses excédents libres (nets) sur les revenus que perçoit l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane et verse annuellement une proportion de 75 pour cent au Trésor Impérial ottoman, ainsi qu'avec certains nouveaux revenus libres de tout gage qui pourront être affectés au même but. Après avoir reçu les garanties réelles pour sa créance (indemnité de guerre), dont il est question plus haut, le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie aura la possibilité de donner et de céder ces mêmes garanties réelles aux créanciers de la Turquie, représentés par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, contre la part de la dette publique ottomane qu'il supportera et qu'il s'engagera à payer à la même administration.

Aussitôt que la proportion de l'indemnité de guerre que la Turquie s'engagera à payer à la Bulgarie aura été déterminée, laquelle sera annuelle par des annuités et garantie comme il a été dit plus haut par les excédents nets de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, dans une proportion de 75 pour cent, le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie fera une déclaration irrévocable à la même administration dans le sens qu'elle peut retenir les sommes affectées au payement régulier de l'indemnité de guerre et de les prélever sur la part de la dette publique ottomane que supportera la Bulgarie jusqu'à son extinction complète. L'annuité régulier de la part contributive dans la dette publique ottomane serait ainsi non seulement réellement garantie par le fait que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane aura le droit de prélever sur les excédents nets incombant au Trésor Impérial ottoman les sommes nécessaires à l'annuité de l'indemnité de guerre reconnue à la Bulgarie, cette dernière s'engagera en même temps à verser supplémentairement le tout ou une partie de l'annuité, au cas où les excédents—ce qui n'est pas probable—dont il est question plus haut, seraient insuffisants à couvrir le tout ou une partie de l'annuité due pour la part de la Bulgarie dans la dette publique ottomane.

Il ressort de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie, sans confondre la question de l'indemnité de guerre avec celle de la part à contribuer à la dette publique ottomane, et, aussi, sans vouloir insister sur la nécessité de prélever l'indemnité de guerre sur la part contributive, vu que la proportion de celle-ci serait bien inférieure à celle de l'indemnité de guerre, tient à sauvegarder et à garantir ses intérêts par rapport au payement régulier de l'indemnité de guerre, ce qui ne lèserait en rien les intérêts des tierces personnes, c'est-à-dire les créanciers de la Turquie qui sont aussi, pour une large part, les créanciers des États balkaniques eux-mêmes—tant actuels que futurs. Par contre, le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie en exigeant de la Turquie pour garantie non seulement les excédents libres nets de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, en une proportion de 75 pour cent, incombant, dans la situation actuelle, au Trésor Impérial ottoman, mais encore quelques nouveaux revenus turcs devant être affectés au même but, ceux, par exemple, de l'impôt militaire, de l'impôt foncier, ainsi que les sommes provenant d'une augmentation éventuelle des droits de douane de 11 à 15 pour cent, &c.,* afin de garantir suffisamment le payement régulier de

* Depuis un certain temps, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman fait des démarches auprès des Grandes Puissances en vue d'obtenir leur consentement pour augmenter les droits de douane de 11 à 15 pour cent *ad valorem*. Étant donné que la taxe douanière de 3 pour cent pour 1911-12 a produit £ T. 1,151,187 pour tout l'Empire, et, en défalquant de cette somme, £ T. 199,500, pour le compte des territoires à annexer, restent £ T. 951,687 ; cette dernière somme atteindrait le chiffre considérable de £ T. 2,278,050 2, en cas d'augmentation éventuelle des droits de douane de 11 à 15 pour cent, et après l'annexion des territoires conquis, formera une autre annuité environ déposée.

l'indemnité de guerre et en s'engageant à confier et céder la perception de ces revenus toujours à la même administration, donne ainsi la possibilité à cette dernière de renforcer davantage son contrôle sur les finances de l'Empire ottoman et d'augmenter ses garanties déjà existantes.* Ainsi, par exemple, si les États balkaniques alliés prétendaient une indemnité de guerre de 1,500,000,000 de francs, payée par la Turquie, en une période de cinquanteans, aux taux de 4 pour cent d'intérêt, l'annuité en serait donc 69,825,30·75 fr., ou £ T. 3,076,904·43, tandis que l'excédent des revenus nets de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, dans la proportion de 75 pour cent, incombant au Trésor Impérial ottoman, y compris l'excédent des revenus perçus par la même administration sur les soi-disant garanties kilométriques, se monte à £ T. 2,627,649·89 (£ T. 1,476,947·41 + £ T. 1,145,702·45) pour 1911 avec tendance d'une augmentation constante. En ajoutant à cette dernière somme les revenus provenant de l'impôt de guerre, soit, environ £ T. 750,000† et £ T. 2,938,116 prévus et de l'impôt foncier pour 1912 13 que le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie insistera à ce qu'ils soient prévus au traité de paix, parce qu'ils constituent une garantie complémentaire en dehors de l'excédent des revenus de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane pour le payement régulier de l'indemnité de guerre, on obtiendra une somme considérable de £ T. 6,310,759·89. Or, en calculant cette somme par 75 pour cent (les 25 pour cent des excédents servant à l'amortissement extraordinaire de la dette publique ottomane), on aura £ T. 4,733,069·91, qui peuvent largement garantir le payement régulier d'une indemnité de guerre se montant au-dessus de £ T. 101,676,681, ou 2,308,060,658 fr., tandis qu'on le sait très bien que la part de la dette publique ottomane que les États balkaniques alliés auraient à supporter, calculée sur la base la plus défavorable pour eux, ne serait pas supérieure à 375,000,000 de francs en chiffres ronds. En procédant de la sorte, il n'y aura nullement besoin de capitaliser les revenus garantis, ni contracter de nouveaux emprunts, ni émettre de nouveaux titres, et l'on obtiendra simplement une assurance de plus pour les intérêts légitimes des créanciers de la Turquie, sans pour cela léser ceux non moins légitimes et justes des États balkaniques alliés et ceux de leurs créanciers.

Quant au reste du projet, où est envisagée la question de mettre un article correspondant dans le traité de paix touchant les compagnies pour l'exploitation des chemins de fer existantes dans les territoires à annexer, il n'y a rien à observer, vu que le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie en s'annexant les territoires conquis prend en même temps les droits et les engagements de la Turquie par rapport auxdites compagnies, pourvu que les droits de ces dernières soient légalement établis dans les rayons des territoires libérés avant la déclaration de la guerre, le 5 (18) octobre, 1912. Mais il ne reconnaîtra aucunement des traités conclus entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et de tierces personnes, dans n'importe quel but, après l'occupation des territoires libérés par les États balkaniques alliés.

Considérant tout ce qui précède et étant donné que notre proposition n'est nullement susceptible de léser les intérêts des créanciers de la Turquie, mais elle a tendance plutôt à les mieux assurer, tout comme ceux des États balkaniques alliés, le projet que nous examinons ici pourrait causer, au contraire, une grande injustice aux petits États balkaniques, si on pense et on insiste que ces derniers peuvent supporter une partie de la dette publique ottomane, sans que la Turquie paye une indemnité de guerre quelconque régulièrement garantie. Une telle solution aurait pour résultat de contribuer à enrichir et à favoriser la Turquie vaincue, qui, grâce à sa résistance de mauvaise foi, avait toujours refusé de prendre en considération les avis et les conseils des Grandes Puissances et exterminait impitoyablement nos connationaux dans ses possessions, tant avant que pendant et après la guerre. En ajoutant, d'autre part, les énormes sacrifices matériels que la guerre a imposés aux États balkaniques alliés et à leurs populations; les ruines et les dévastations survenues dans les territoires libérés à la suite de la guerre, les États alliés, privés du droit de recevoir de l'auteur de tous ces malheurs—la Turquie—une indemnité de guerre convenable, et chargés, en outre, des dettes de la Turquie, verraient leur situation matérielle compromise pour de longues années et leurs populations, ainsi que leurs créanciers (sujets des Grandes Puissances) seraient cruellement déçus, en faveur uniquement de la future Turquie d'Asie, sans que

* Le budget de l'Empire ottoman pour l'année 1328 (1912-13) prévoit les rentrées suivantes: taxe d'exonération du service militaire £ T. 1,076,340. Impôt foncier £ T. 2,938,116, y compris les taxes supplémentaires (centimes additionels sur l'impôt foncier pour les écoles et pour la guerre).

† Il est prévu pour l'exercice 1912-13, la somme de £ T. 1,076,340 provenant de revenus de l'impôt de guerre, mais considérant qu'une partie de ces revenus restera un arriéré incombant aux territoires conquis, le chiffre doit nécessairement être réduit à £ T. 750,000 au lieu de £ T. 1,076,340.

leurs créanciers puissent en bénéficier. En d'autres termes, les alliés balkaniques seraient sacrifiés, en tant que vainqueurs, et punis, au point de vue financier et économique, en faveur du vaincu.

Sophia, février 1913.

[11550] No. 204.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March* 12, 1913.

FOLLOWING from consul at Salonica:—

"Embarkation of Servian troops for Scutari.

"Embarkation proceeding slowly.

"Up to yesterday three batteries and about 5,000 men had left."

[11627] No. 205.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 12, 1913.

MY telegram No. 137 of 10th March.

Committee commandant of the capital, in a secret circular to editors of native and foreign press which they are forbidden to publish, prohibits, under penalty of suppression and expulsion of the editor, all reference to reported differences in the Cabinet or rumours of its resignation; also transfer of officers to provincial posts—latter being the opponents of the Committee.

Spy system is now more elaborate than under the old régime, and it is almost impossible to obtain reliable information, but the tension between the Grand Vizier and the inner ring of the Committee seems on the increase, while the general internal situation appears to be tightening up.

It is stated that wireless telegraphy with Adrianople has ceased working since yesterday.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[11613] No. 206.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March* 12, 1913.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that he was about to instruct the Roumanian Minister to explain to you the importance he attached to the acquisition of Silistria by Roumania as making for tranquillity in the future. So long as Silistria was left to Bulgaria, Roumania's grievance created by the Treaty of Berlin would remain, and there would be lasting resentment against Bulgaria.

I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he did not think that the cession of Silistria to Roumania would not engender lasting Bulgarian resentment. His Excellency thought that it should not do so, as Bulgaria would have questions with her other neighbours which would prevent her nursing for long any resentment against Roumania, whose friendship would be assured to Bulgaria if Roumania now obtained a satisfactory rectification of the frontier, as Roumania's further aspirations aimed not south but west.

[11629] No. 207.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, March 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 114 of 7th March.

French Government agree that it would be inadvisable to hoist flags of the Powers over Ottoman Debt establishments and will instruct their representative at Monastir accordingly.

[11630] No. 208.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March 12, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Political Director this morning a memorandum of your circular telegraphic instructions of yesterday (No. 120 of 11th March to Paris) for the information of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen on the subject this afternoon. His Excellency concurs in your views and proposals as therein set forth, and will so inform the Russian Government without consulting them, as to do so might lead to discussions and consequent delay.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that the form of pressure to adopt might perhaps consist in warning the Balkan Governments that if they do not follow the advice given, and persist in continuing the war, the Powers will withdraw their sympathy and will abstain entirely from assisting the Balkan States in re-establishing their economic situation; and a further form might be to assist Turkey in obtaining the financial means of defending itself against the pretensions of the Balkan Governments.

I have shown the French Minister for Foreign Affairs your telegrams No. 58 to Belgrade and No. 20 to Cettinjé of yesterday. His Excellency concurs in the warnings which you have given the Servian chargé d'affaires and the Montenegrin delegate.

[11624] No. 209.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram circular of 5th March.

Memorandum from the Russian Government states that the Ambassadors' meeting decided on 6th March that all communications relative to financial conditions to be inserted in future treaty of peace should be addressed to Paris. The Russian Government, having agreed to this decision, think that the draft articles in your telegram No. 36 of 5th March to Athens should first be examined by technical commission at Paris.

[11628] No. 210.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 120 of 11th March to Paris.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that, in the event of the allies putting forward excessive conditions, the Powers should formulate the preliminaries of peace, but that it would be a mistake to tell them outright that they must not claim an indemnity. He would prefer to soften the communication on this point and to combine it with the last sentence of third paragraph of your telegram with regard to their admission to discussion of allocation of the debt in the event of their renouncing indemnity.

He thought that question of pressure to be put on them would have to be discussed, but had no clear views on the subject. I suggested that they might be told that they would receive no facilities with regard to raising of loans, and he agreed that this might be possible.

[11626] No. 211.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 88. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 12, 1913.*

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 20 of 4th March.

I hear from a sure source that the Austro-Hungarian Government have advised Bulgaria to cede Silistria to Roumania, and that, if they consent, the Austro-Hungarian Government will see that they obtain Salonica.

In my opinion the Bulgarian Government are not likely to agree to the above suggestion.

I also understand that negotiations are proceeding between the two Governments respecting the Monastir-Salonica-Dedeagatch railways. No written arrangement has, however, so far been arrived at.

[11639] No. 212.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 12, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your telegram No. 120 to Paris of 11th March this afternoon, and left an *aide-mémoire* so that he may consider points at his leisure. He will send instructions to Count Mensdorff to-night on this matter.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs made the following observations as his first impression of my communication: he deprecates the idea of breaking off mediation, even if first reply to Powers of allies should be unfavourable.

With regard to three points on which the Powers are supposed to be in agreement, his Excellency observed that he had no confirmation that Russia was opposed to payment of indemnity.

With regard to what kind of pressure can be brought to bear upon the allies to bring about preliminaries of peace, he said that it seemed to him that one must put aside all idea of a naval demonstration, and that therefore at first sight the only means left to the Powers was to bring sharp financial pressure to bear on the allies. He threw out the idea that the Powers might possibly intimate to the allies that, if they did not promptly conclude peace, they would find the markets of the world closed to them for six months, or perhaps a year.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Servia and Montenegro had intimated that, even if a preliminary peace were signed, they would not necessarily cease their military operations in Albania. This, his Excellency said, would be a state of things perfectly intolerable.

[11632] No. 213.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 12, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 35 of 10th March: Djakova.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to-day to convey to you his thanks for all the efforts you are making in the cause of peace and for your support of his last proposal with regard to Djakova. He said, however, that it was to be regretted that Russia was delaying her reply, as it was a matter of vital importance that the frontier of Northern Albania should be settled by the Powers without loss of time, and especially before the fall of Scutari. His Excellency complained very much of the military measures taken by Servia to hurry its fall. Should Scutari fall, he said, the situation would become very grave.

[11633] No. 214.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 12, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me to-day that, in his opinion, it was urgent that the Roumanian-Bulgarian conflict should be brought to an end as rapidly as possible. He told me that public opinion in Roumania was getting beyond control, and that, if the Powers did not allow Silistria to go to Roumania, the present Cabinet at Bucharest would fall, and be succeeded by a Bratiano Ministry. He said that if the latter came into power he was positive that Roumania would seize Silistria by force, and probably also Shumla.

I sounded the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to whether some compensation to Bulgaria could be found for the loss of Silistria. His language became vague, and on my mentioning Salonica he replied that it might possibly do as a compensation for Silistria if the Greeks could be persuaded to abandon it. His Excellency hinted that possible compensation to Greece might be found by the Powers in the islands, or in Southern Albania.

[11634] No. 215.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram circular of 11th March.

I have communicated the substance to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said that his first impression was that the Powers should not declare mediation at an end even if, as he anticipates, the allies put forward conditions for acceptance of mediation which were not acceptable. He would, however, reflect and consult before giving definite answer. He would also reflect on the question whether any pressure could be put on the allies. He felt that the relative attitudes of the Powers would make any coercive measures almost impossible; thought measures of commercial restrictions would react more on the Powers themselves than on the allies.

[11652] No. 216.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Malta, March 12, 1913.*

CAPTAIN of British steamer "Tewfikieh" reports stranded on Sea of Marmora coast near Eregli on 2nd March, was exposed all day to bullets and shell-fire of Bulgarians, despite British flag at masthead.

This is reported with a view to the prevention of repetition of similar incidents.

[11274] No. 217.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 17 of 10th March: Ottoman Debt.

Yes: "porteurs."

[8348] No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 12, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of a letter from the Treasury containing the observations of the Lords Commissioners on the despatch from the British delegate on

e International Financial Commission,* forwarded in your despatch No. 178 of the 15th November last, submitting for consideration certain questions connected with the collection of revenues assigned to the service of the Greek Debt in the occupied territory.

As regards the first point raised by Mr. Beaumont, you will observe that, in so far as they feel competent to express an opinion, their Lordships agree with the view that the Greek bondholders cannot properly claim to benefit by any acquisition of Turkish territory by Greece.

The second question, as to the guarantees required to ensure that the new conditions shall not adversely affect the revenues at present encashed by the Financial Commission, seems to present greater difficulties. You will see that the Lords Commissioners entertain some doubts as to whether the solution suggested by Mr Beaumont would provide an adequate safeguard, and they put forward an alternative proposal.

Another suggestion which has been made to me is to abolish the system of plus-values in connection with the Greek Debt and to come to the arrangement for a fixed rate of interest acceptable to the bondholders. This course, if feasible, might have the advantage of allaying any grievance entertained by the bondholders in connection with the first point raised by Mr. Beaumont without throwing any additional burden on the Greek Government

I should be glad to receive any further observations which Mr. Beaumont may have to make on this matter in the light of the present despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12116] No. 219.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 12, 1913.*

M. SKOULOUDIS left with me to-day the accompanying paper, to explain what had happened between the Greek and Bulgarian troops in the affair of Nigrita. He observed that the date of the 15th, mentioned at the beginning of the paper, was in the old style. The date was important, because on the 11th of the old style, *i.e.*, the 24th February, according to our calendar, the Greek Government received information that Austria had decided to support Bulgaria's claim to the possession of Salonica. Four days later came the change in the attitude of the Bulgarians which had led to the conflict.

I said that a conflict between Greek and Bulgarian troops was a most regrettable incident, which would create an unfavourable opinion, apart from the question of whose fault it was. For the rest, all the discussions, either at the meetings of Ambassadors here or between the Governments of the Great Powers, had hitherto been conducted on the supposition that the Powers would leave to the allies the division of all Turkish territory ceded by the conditions on which peace was made, with the exception of Albania and the islands, with regard to which the Powers would have to make the decision. The questions of Constantinople and the Straits would also, of course, affect the Powers if they were raised. But it would be a departure from the present attitude of the Powers if Austria or Germany, or any other Powers, decided to intervene as regards Salonica I therefore found it difficult to believe that there was any proposed intervention of this sort.

I took the opportunity of observing to M. Skouloudis that I hoped the answer of the allies to the Powers on the subject of mediation would not be delayed. Some days had already passed.

M. Skouloudis had no information on this subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Part V, No. 384.

Enclosure in No. 219.

Memorandum communicated by M. Skouloudis.

LE 15 courant (o.s.), Bulgares ont commencé à réparer ligne télégraphique entre Salonique et Langada sur territoires occupés par nous et ont établi deux postes le long de cette ligne, soi-disant pour la garder. Le même jour on nous informait de Serrès que commandement général avait reçu des ordres de Sophia procéder par tous moyens occupation bourg Nigrita, chef-lieu de toute une région occupée par nous. Officiers bulgares, se faisant écho de ces instructions, se permirent même exprimer menaces contre Grecs, disant que Bulgarie revendiquerait Salonique et alentours, et que s'ils nous tolèrent à présent ce n'est que provisoirement jusqu'à conclusion paix, après quoi toutes forces bulgares se porteront contre Salonique pour nous en expulser. Le 12 février, Bulgares ont installé poste garde aux portes de Nigrita. Remontrances de nos autorités restèrent sans effet et à la suite de laborieuses négociations Bulgares promirent, sur leur foi de soldats, qu'ils retireraient leur détachement ; il n'en fut rien. Le 14 février, détachement dix-huit Bulgares tenta occuper village Monouchi, nord-est Tsayézi (golfe Orfano). Les nôtres s'y étant opposés, quelques coups de feu furent échangés sans résultat, mais détachement bulgare se réfugia autre village. Le 15 février, peloton cavalerie bulgare, avec deux officiers, tenta occuper Nigrita ; notre détachement leur ayant interdit accès, peloton se dirigea village Xylotros, où vinrent le rejoindre 150 fantassins. Le 16 février, voilier grec ayant commencé décharger cargaison à Tsayézi, corps irréguliers bulgares, commandé par Voïvode Leftéroff, fit feu sur barque battant pavillon grec et transportation à terre chargement. Notre détachement se vit obligé tirer sur Bulgares, et conflagration s'ensuivit. Le 17 février commandement général Serrès dépêcha compagnie d'infanterie avec deux canons, sous commandement Major Christof à Dimitritsi, près Nigrita, pour attaquer cette dernière. Un officier grec se rendit immédiatement à Dimitritsi pour informer Bulgares qu'ils ne pourraient pas entrer à Nigrita, et leur faire entendre que déplacements si fréquents troupes bulgares n'avaient pas de sens et allaient à l'encontre de ce qui avait été depuis longtemps convenu entre les deux états-majors. Le 20 février deux compagnies d'infanterie bulgares, avec deux canons, deux mitrailleuses et un peloton de cavalerie, tentèrent une troisième fois de s'emparer de Nigrita, ainsi que de tous villages entre ce bourg et Tsayézi. Le capitaine commandant forces grecques à Nigrita ayant refusé entrée Bulgares, artillerie de ceux-ci fit feu sur bourg. Les nôtres ripostèrent par fusillade, manquant totalement artillerie. Vraie bataille s'ensuivit, qui dura les 21 et 22 février. Le 23, combat reprit par suite canonnade nourrie des Bulgares. Le soir du même jour officier supérieur grec à la tête de troupes de renfort venant de Salonique s'apprêtait à envoyer lettre au commandant bulgare pour faire cesser inutile effusion sang, mais Bulgares ont décampé, laissant près village Xylotros quantité vivres et munitions. Cent-dix soldats furent pris et désarmés par nous. Le nombre tués et blessés n'est pas encore vérifié, mais il y en a pas mal des deux côtés.

Démarches énergiques faites à plusieurs reprises par Son Altesse Royale le Prince Nicolas auprès du Général Hessaptsief, que le Gouvernement bulgare avait détaché près état-major hellénique dans le but d'aplanir tout conflit qui pourrait surgir du contact des troupes alliés, demeurèrent sans effet. Je vous prie de mettre tout confidentiellement au courant de ces faits regrettables son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, en relevant dispositions agressives et attitude rien moins que provocante des Bulgares, à laquelle nos troupes n'ont fait que répondre par simple défense imposée par circonstances mêmes. Malgré cette série de tristes incidents survenus si mal à propos entre alliés, le Gouvernement hellénique est fermement résolu ne pas se départir de son programme politique, qui tend au maintien alliance et au rapprochement encore plus étroit États balkaniques ; attitude plus que correcte de nos autorités, tant civiles que militaires, en Macédoine, à l'égard de nos alliés, en est preuve la plus éclatante. Cependant, nous n'entendons permettre à qui que ce soit contester notre occupation. Alors que par un sentiment bien naturel de confraternité nos troupes ont cru ne pas devoir refuser hospitalité aux troupes alliés à Salonique et ailleurs, Bulgares, abusant de notre courtoisie, ont cru pouvoir en tirer parti en intervenant et nous attaquant dans territoires conquis au prix du sang de nos soldats et où nous avons Bulgares à titre d'hôtes. Pour la région Nigrita et Pravi spécialement vous pouvez faire valoir droits que nous les avons occupés exclusivement, en alléguant non seulement constitution ethnologique de ces provinces purement grecques, mais

encore le fait qu'une colonne de l'armée grecque, ayant débarqué au golfe Orfano avant prise Salonique, disputa pied à pied ces territoires aux restes de l'armée turque, qui le défendit valeureusement.

Greek Legation,
March 12, 1913.

[12112] No. 220.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 36.) *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1913.

Sir,

I ASKED the Bulgarian Minister to-day whether he had heard anything about the reply of the allies to the Powers respecting mediation.

He said that he had not yet heard anything, but he supposed that what was suggested in the press might be true: that mediation would be accepted, but that the allies would stipulate for the Rodosto-Midia line, and for an indemnity, at least in principle.

I said that I thought that the general view of the Powers would be that there was great difficulty about an indemnity, and that to impose one upon Turkey would conflict with the interests of Powers who had great financial and commercial interests in Turkey. I expected, therefore, that there would be great objection about this.

The Bulgarian Minister said that the allies were going to take over part of the Ottoman Debt, but he thought that the amount allocated to them by the French draft was excessive. They ought not to bear a share of all the various Turkish obligations, but only of the Consolidated Debt.

I said that, in my personal opinion, if the allies gave up any claim to an indemnity, they ought to be consulted about the amount of Debt to be allocated to them, before this was finally decided. As to the Rodosto-Midia line, I thought that this was out of the question. The line which had been generally contemplated was the Enos–Midia line.

The Bulgarian Minister said that, if the Rodosto-Midia line was out of the question, the Enos–Midia line would be for Bulgaria dangerously near the railway. It would also go through swamps, where no frontier could be drawn. He advocated a line from Xeros to Midia.

I said that I could not anticipate what the answer of the Powers would be till they had received the reply of the allies, and I urged very strongly that this reply should not be delayed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12113] No. 221.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 37.) *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1913.

Sir,

THE Bulgarian Minister left with me to-day the following statement and maps relevant to the mediation between Bulgaria and Roumania,* which was to take place in St. Petersburgh. In the course of conversation, he expressed some surprise that Roumania should have preferred St. Petersburgh to London.

I said that the articles and cartoons in some of the British press while M. Take Jonesco had been in London had given the impression that the atmosphere here was not favourable to Roumania, and I was not surprised that some other place than London had been chosen. Of course, the reunion of Ambassadors in London, occupied with mediation between Turkey and the allies, could hardly have carried on another mediation at the same time. But, though it was very agreeable to us that St. Petersburgh had been chosen, I had felt some surprise at Roumania having selected it, though it was not a question that I was concerned to answer.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* See No. 270.

[12590] No. 222.

Memorandum communicated by Herr von Kühlmann, March 13, 1913.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government agree that the financial questions arising from the cession of Turkish territories to the Balkan States should be referred to Paris subject to the condition that the decisions in principle reached at the Ambassadors' meetings in London should be maintained in essential, seeing that the purport of these decisions has already been communicated semi-officially to the belligerents. A further condition of the consent of the Imperial Government is the appropriate technical composition of the Paris Commission.

German Embassy, London, March 13, 1913.

[11638] No. 223.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 120 of 11th March to Paris noted on this afternoon.

This evening the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed me only that the Imperial Government agreed with all the views expressed in your telegram except that they did not see what pressure could be put upon the allies to accept what the Powers may propose.

He gave me to understand that he had telegraphed fully to the German Ambassador.

[11741] No. 224.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 12, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 84 of 11th March.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me to-day a written reply to the *aide-mémoire* which I left with him yesterday.

It is to the following effect:—

"The Imperial Ministry would be disposed to consider the question of the pressure to be applied at Cettinjé and Belgrade with regard to Scutari in close connection with the question of Djakova. More especially if Austria consents to exclude Djakova from the limits of Albania, the Imperial Government on its part would instruct its representatives in the said capitals to make the most energetic representations with the object of raising the siege of Scutari. As regards steps of a like character to be taken at Belgrade with a view to securing the evacuation of territories which will be recognised as Albanian, the Imperial Government will also make no objections, provided that Djakova be assigned to Servia, as, according to all accounts, the Servian Government would never be able to withdraw its troops from that town.

"Animated by a sincere desire of conciliation, the Imperial Ministry would suggest the following compromise as likely to facilitate the solution of the question of Djakova: the Ministry should receive from the Austrian Government an assurance that the town would in principle be assigned to Servia. International commission which will be charged to study in detail the question of delimitation should at the same time elaborate certain guarantees, especially of an economic character, with regard to that town."

His Excellency explained that he did not ask that Austria should give such an assurance direct to Russian Government, and that it would be quite sufficient were the Austrian Ambassador to give you a verbal assurance to the above effect.

On my enquiring whether he would explain clearly to the Austrian and German Governments the attitude which he was adopting on the subject of Scutari, his Excellency said that neither the Austrian nor the German Ambassador had approached him on the subject, and that he did not wish to take the initiative.

I then informed him of the views of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 35 of 10th March, and said that it was very necessary, if Austria was to yield on Djakova question, that she should be able to count on Russia insisting at Cettinjé that Scutari must remain Albanian, even should it fall.

His Excellency said that he was prepared to join in any diplomatic pressure, but could not consent to use of force by Austria. He feared that it would be very difficult to make the King Nicholas give it up if taken. On my asking what we were to do in the latter case, he said that he would not object to personal suggestion which I made yesterday as reported in my telegram No. 84 of 11th March. He even said that although he could not answer for the Russian Government he would not personally object to a naval demonstration at Antivari so long as Russia had not to take part in it.

He is sending instructions to the Russian Ambassador. He repeated that he had no objection to our informing Montenegrin Government that the Powers were virtually agreed that Scutari was to be Albanian.

[11794] No. 225.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March 13, 1913.*

SALONICA telegram No. 16 of 10th March.

The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs puts Greek losses in fighting at Nigrita at about sixty killed and wounded, no prisoners. The Bulgarian casualties about the same; 110 prisoners; no guns taken.

The Bulgarian Prime Minister has declared the determination to prevent such incidents. Mixed commission is to make provisional settlement on the basis of prior occupation.

(Repeated to Salonica.)

[11795] No. 226.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March 13, 1913.*

"HAMIDIEH" yesterday bombarded San Giovanni di Medua, where were seven Greek transports which had conveyed Servian troops. She sank two and damaged others. There were sixty Greeks wounded, but it is not known whether the Servians had disembarked. Durazzo also bombarded without much damage. Greek squadron hopes to blockade the "Hamidieh" in a neutral port.

[11796] No. 227.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 89. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 13, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

My telegram No. 87 of 11th March.

Answer of allies to proposals of the Powers has been promised for to-morrow.

Delay is due to stringent demands of the Greek Government, which the Bulgarian Government are endeavouring to moderate. General conditions are as in my above-mentioned telegram.

(Sent to Constantinople and Bucharest.)

[11804] No. 228.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 58 of 11th March.

I saw the Prime Minister this morning and repeated to him your observations to the Servian chargé d'affaires as to persisting in operations against Scutari.

He replied that Servia was bound under her treaty of alliance to send assistance to Montenegro, and, so long as Montenegro asked for reinforcements, Servian Government could not refuse if they had troops available. The matter was therefore no longer in their hands. If the Powers could persuade Montenegro to desist, Servia would willingly renounce the offensive against Scutari. Servian Government had represented futility of continuing operations in view of the attitude of the Powers, but the King of Montenegro refused to listen.

[11803] No. 229.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 58 of 11th March.

The sixth word of the French text of decision of Ambassadors in telegram sent to me reads "Montenegro," whereas I found in conversation with the Under-Secretary of State to-day that the sixth word of the communication made to the Servian chargé d'affaires reads "Serbie."

Under the circumstances, in speaking to the Prime Minister this morning I made no mention of the evacuation of the Albanian territory by Servia. But Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw subsequently, assures me that there need be no apprehension whatever as to Servia evacuating in due course according to her promise, and he enquired whether this communication was intended to be understood as fixing a more definite date for this evacuation than the somewhat indefinite statement that had been made by Servia (see my despatch No. 11).

[11805] No. 230.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 13, 1913.*

TURKISH cruiser "Hamidieh" appeared before Durazzo yesterday, and fired ten shots at the Servian encampment without doing any damage. It then left for San Giovanni di Medua, which it bombarded, damaging [? some] ships in the harbour, and causing some fifty casualties. Cruiser was last seen off Bari in the afternoon. Greek fleet has started in pursuit.

[11590] No. 231.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.*

MY circular telegram of 11th March.

Replies received from five Powers indicate general agreement as regards what would be reasonable conditions of peace between Turkey and allies. Withdrawal of sympathy and refusal of financial support to allies are only forms of pressure suggested by anyone as possible.

As soon as answer of allies is received I will summon a meeting of Ambassadors here, and if answer of allies is as anticipated, I will suggest that we should not treat it as a refusal of mediation, but should reply to it by saying that there are some of

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 124), Sir R. Rodd (No. 103), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 224), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 109).

the conditions of the allies that the Powers could not recommend Turkey to accept, but that the Powers are prepared to recommend Turkey to accept the conditions, which we would proceed to state.

We should then ask the allies whether they accept these conditions.

Question of pressure would thus not be mentioned at this stage, or at all, unless allies refused conditions formulated by the Powers.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[11652] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.*

MR. BARNHAM'S telegram of 12th March: "Tewfikieh."

You should act as in previous similar cases.

See my telegram No. 73 of 11th March.

[10002] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.*

THE Russian Ambassador spoke to M. Cambon and Sir A. Nicolson on the 25th February in regard to the telegram of which I transmit herewith a copy to your Excellency. As to points 1 and 2, Sir A. Nicolson and M. Cambon told Count Benckendorff that owing to the large territorial cessions which Turkey would have to make, and to the necessity of not crippling her financially in addition, they were sure that all the Powers would be opposed to advocating or admitting the imposition of a war indemnity.

As to point 3, M. Cambon and Sir A. Nicolson thought that it might be possible, when Adrianople was ceded, to obtain a frontier for Turkey which would afford some elbow-room and be some defence to Constantinople.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 233.

Telegram communicated by Count Benckendorff.

NOUS partageons le point de vue de Sir Edward Grey exprimé dans sa réponse à Hakki Pacha et à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Il ne s'agit pas, d'après nous, de donner à la Porte telles ou telles autres garanties, le rôle des Puissances devant se borner à celui de médiation européenne entre les deux parties, en écartant des prétentions injustifiées. Les points de l'aide-mémoire allemand nous inspirent les observations suivantes:—

1 et 2. Nous croyons la question d'une indemnité de guerre étroitement liée à la question de la répartition de la dette ottomane incombant aux territoires qui reviendront aux vainqueurs.

3. D'après l'avis du Gouvernement Impérial, la frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie devrait commencer à Enos, puis suivre la rive sud de l'Ergene pour aboutir à Midia. Par égard pour l'amour-propre turc, on pourrait proposer une formule plus générale, tout en faisant de la frontière indiquée une réserve concrète dont la Porte prendrait acte confidentiellement.

4. Ne croyons pas possible de donner de la précision à la demande faite par la Porte et de lier à la question de la paix un consentement des Puissances à la majoration des douanes, car il ne serait nullement justifié d'imposer aux Puissances des sacrifices pour un service qu'elles rendent aux deux parties.

Nous comprenons cet article comme une réserve de la Porte contre une demande éventuelle des alliés à ce que les droits de capitulation dont jouissent en Turquie les

Puissances européennes soient reconnus aussi pour les alliés. On pourrait conseiller aux alliés de ne point formuler une pareille demande et de s'en tenir aux droits dont ils jouissaient avant la guerre.

Veuillez faire part du contenu de ce télégramme à Sir Edward Grey et à M. Cambon pour un échange de vues préalable avec eux.

[12368] No. 231.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 119.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

I SHOWED Count Benckendorff to-day your Excellency's telegram No. 89. I told him what I proposed to give to Count Mensdorff this afternoon, and that I would say that, if Austria accepted the principle asked for about Djakova, I would urge that no more difficulties should be made about subsidiary points, such as the Boyana and the lake.

Count Benckendorff said that he was not sure what value there was respecting the mouth of the Boyana, but with regard to the lake his expert told him that the part of the lake which, would be dried up and would yield fertile land, as a result of the regulation of the water, was at the north end, and that there was no object in contending that the southern part should be possessed by Montenegro. Count Benckendorff would therefore give up this on his own responsibility.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12369] No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 105.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

I SAW Prince Lichnowsky this afternoon and told him how matters stood about Djakova.

He contended very strongly that it was impossible for Austria to give up Djakova. I used the same arguments with him as I used subsequently with Count Mensdorff.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11485] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 179.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 33 of the 10th instant, in which it is stated that M. Gout has said that the French Government would be glad to have a reply to their note of the 12th February, I have to point out to your Excellency that M. Gout's request is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that, as your Excellency is aware from my despatch No. 146 of the 27th February, I have already replied to the French note.

Moreover, I have just received from the French Ambassador in London a communication to the effect that the French Government do not agree with the reply of His Majesty's Government, and I have referred this communication to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury for their observations.

I transmit herewith a copy of a note addressed to the French Ambassador to-day regarding the draft articles.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 240.

[12371] No. 237.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 188.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

IN speaking to the French, Russian, Austrian, and German Ambassadors this afternoon on the subject of mediation between Turkey and the allies, I suggested that, if, as we expected, the allies put forward excessive conditions, we should not treat their reply as a refusal of the mediation of the Powers, but should reply that the Powers could not recommend to Turkey the acceptance of the conditions of the allies, but were prepared to recommend Turkey to accept that the frontier line should be from Enos to Midia, Turkey ceding to the allies everything west of this line, except Albania, which was reserved for delimitation by the Powers; and that the question of the islands should be left to the decision of the Powers. We should tell the allies that we could not recommend Turkey to pay an indemnity, but that if the allies would renounce their claim for an indemnity they should be admitted to the discussion in Paris of the allocation of the Turkish Debt, to ensure that its allocation was equitable.

Count Benckendorff told me that the Russian Government desired not to say definitely that there should be no indemnity, but merely that, if the allies renounced an indemnity, they should be admitted to the discussion on the allocation of the Turkish Debt; and that some formula should be used, laying down certain lines respecting the debt.

I deprecated, and I found that Count Benckendorff agreed in this, the discussion of any formula about the debt, either at the meetings of Ambassadors here or in our communications with the allies. I suggested that we should, if need be, say something general to the allies about our object being to secure an equitable allocation, without going into any definition.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12370] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 56.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

I GAVE Count Mensdorff to-day a copy of the written reply of M. Sazonof, as given in Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 89. I added verbally that M. Sazonof explained that he did not ask that the assurance which he suggested should be given by Austria direct to the Russian Government, and that it would be quite sufficient if an assurance such as he desired were given verbally by the Austrian Ambassador to me.

On this I pointed out that, though M. Sazonof had not raised the point, it was quite clear to me that, if Russia were to make public that she had come to an agreement about the line of the Albanian frontier, she would also have to make public that there was an assurance that Servia would not have to evacuate Djakova. Djakova was a town of only 6,000 inhabitants, but the whole difficulty of the Russian position was this: Russia was a great Slav State, and she could not allow herself to be put in the position of siding against both the Slav countries of Montenegro and Servia at the same time on the points of Scutari and Djakova; in other words, in the Slav question of the moment Russia could not agree to be placed in the position of having to take the entire anti-Slav side. If Russia could have an assurance that Servia was not to be turned out of Djakova and Dibra, she could give this assurance to Servia, and tell her that she had no reason for discontent; and Russia could then concentrate upon bringing pressure to bear on Montenegro to renounce Scutari. Russia could do this, but she could not take the anti-Slav line against both Servia and Montenegro. If Austria agreed to the principle that Servia should not be turned out of Djakova, I should express, indeed I had already expressed, the opinion to the Russian Ambassador that Russia should not make difficulties about the smaller points, such as the questions of the Boyana and the lake, which still remained open.

Count Mensdorff expressed some disappointment that the Russian reply had not gone further, and said that he could not tell what view his Government would take

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 117), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 55), and Sir E. Goschen (No. 104).

of it. He would transmit it to his Government, but meanwhile it was difficult for him to discuss it.

I said that I did not wish to ask him to discuss it this afternoon. It was a great relief to me to have been able to give a Russian reply, and I regretted very much the delay which there had been in obtaining a reply to the last Austrian suggestion about an international commission. Indeed, it had been my intention this afternoon, if the reply had not arrived, to deprecate very strongly any further delay. I was able to deprecate delay, and had done so already; but, as the Ambassador knew, I was in a difficult position with regard to pressing Russia to yield further. Before last Christmas, the prominence given in the press to the question of Servian access to the Adriatic had led Europe to suppose that on the settlement of this question depended the peace of Europe. This question, with the limelight upon it, had been settled in the Austrian sense. As soon as this was done, I had told the German and Italian Ambassadors, as Count Mensdorff knew, that I must support Russia, if she desired support, with regard to the question of Scutari. Russia had now practically given way about Scutari, on the condition that Djakova and Dibra went to Servia. I could not press Russia to yield about Djakova without appearing to press her to go on yielding all along the line. I had explained to Count Mensdorff how difficult it would be for her to yield further. He might be sure that whatever the difficulties were I had not done anything to make them worse, and in transmitting the Austrian proposals I had been careful not to say anything that might put them in an unfavourable light.

Count Mensdorff said very cordially that he was quite sure of this, and that the part which I had played was very much appreciated.

Finally, I left with him the Russian reply, saying that it was the best that could be obtained.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12367] No. 230.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 118.) *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

Sir,

I SPOKE to Count Benckendorff to-day about the latter paragraphs of your Excellency's telegram No. 89, and pointed out that, if Russia agreed to a line, she could not possibly consent to a violation of the line by Montenegro or Servia. I would not raise this point with Count Mensdorff when telling him of this telegram this afternoon, but there could be no question that the line, if agreed to, must be respected.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9752] No. 240.

Sir Edward Grey to French Ambassador.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the French Ambassador,* and has the honour to state that, seeing that few of the Governments of the Great Powers are entirely agreed as to the wording of the draft articles to be inserted in the treaty of peace respecting the Ottoman Debt, which were submitted in one form to the meeting of Ambassadors held at the Foreign Office on the 21st February, he is of opinion that the best course would be to refrain from discussing the question further at meetings of the Ambassadors, but that, if the Governments of the Powers agree, it would be preferable that it should be dealt with by the proposed International Commission in Paris, which should endeavour to draw up articles which would be acceptable to all parties.

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

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* Also to Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian Ambassadors.

[10064] No. 241.

Memorandum communicated to Russian Ambassador, March 13.

IN the memorandum communicated by his Excellency the Russian Ambassador on the 1st instant expression was given to the view that the questions raised by the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the meeting of Ambassadors on the 21st ultimo in regard to the customs difficulties (including the so-called "war contribution" tax) in the territories occupied by the Balkan allies, being of a purely legal character, should be settled by the ordinary diplomatic channel rather than by the reunion of Ambassadors, which did not appear to the Imperial Russian Government competent to deal with matters involving the interpretation of principles of international law in connection with the administration of the occupied territories.

The questions which have so far arisen seem, however, to His Majesty's Government to be amply covered by the provisions of The Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the laws and customs of war on land and by the Capitulations.

The rules as to the levying of taxes, &c., in occupied territory are laid down in articles 48 and 49 of the regulations annexed to The Hague Convention, which are as follows:—

Article 48.—"If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do it, as far as possible, in accordance with the rules in existence and the assessment in force, and will in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory on the same scale as that to which the legitimate Government was bound."

Article 49.—"If, besides the taxes referred to in the preceding article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this can only be for military necessities or the administration of such territory."

Article 48 is based on the principle that the invader conducts the administration of the occupied territory as far as possible by means of the machinery which existed and on the principles which prevailed before his advent. He should not impose new taxes, &c., because the right to do so is an attribute of sovereignty, which he does not possess in the occupied territory. If necessary he may, as a general rule, alter the mode of collecting the revenue, but His Majesty's Government think it clear that he is not justified in increasing the amount to be collected.

The Servian authorities appear, however, to justify their action in imposing extra duties on the ground that these duties are a "war contribution" and permissible under article 49. His Majesty's Government consider that it is at least doubtful whether that article was intended to apply to a case such as that under discussion; they read it as governing only direct requisitions of money, since, if the invader was entitled to raise the taxes to any figure he chose by calling the increase a "contribution," article 48 would be rendered nugatory. His Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion that the Servian contention is unjustifiable. In any case, the contribution can only be levied "for military purposes on the administration of the (occupied) territory."

In addition to The Hague Convention, these questions are further governed by the Capitulations. It is clear that the treaty rights of foreigners in connection with customs dues, &c., form part of the "rules in existence," which must as far as possible be respected under article 48. Further than this, it is, His Majesty's Government think, generally admitted that the treaty rights of foreigners are not affected by the military occupation of the territory in which they possess such rights. These can only be affected by a change of sovereignty; and even when this takes place, as in the present case, it is suggested that the preservation of such rights shall, so far as may be practicable and reasonable, be taken into consideration by the Powers. His Majesty's Government accordingly contend that the allies, while they are in occupation of Turkish territory, are not entitled to do there any act in relation to foreigners which the Turkish Government would have been prevented by the Capitulations from doing in similar circumstances.

The test of any act done by the allies in this connection would appear to be its legality if done by Turkey if she had remained in occupation of the territories in question during the war, with a possible exception in cases of urgent military necessity, which does not apply to the conditions now under consideration.

In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government felt confident that a protest on the lines of the Austro-Hungarian communication was legally justifiable, and had already authorised their representatives to join in it.

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

[11612] No. 242.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Russian Embassy, March 13, 1213.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF was good enough to communicate on the 10th instant, a statement of the views of M. Sazonof in regard to the procedure which might be followed in the approaching mediations at St. Petersburgh in the differences between Roumania and Bulgaria.

Sir E. Grey has carefully studied the proposals of M. Sazonof, and sees no objection to adapting the procedure indicated by his Excellency should the necessity arise for doing so. At the same time Sir E. Grey has no reason to think that so sharp and equal a division of opinion among the mediating Powers as that foreshadowed by M. Sazonof is likely to concur. Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished with M. Sazonof's views and wishes as to the instructions which should be sent to Sir G. Buchanan who will represent His Majesty's Government in the forthcoming discussions at St. Petersburgh.

[9752] No. 243.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 11th instant, transmitting amendments proposed by the Russian Government to the draft articles accepted by the meeting of Ambassadors on the 21st February, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, that, seeing that none of the Governments of the Great Powers are agreed as to the wording of the articles in question, he does not propose to discuss the question further at meetings of the Ambassadors here, but that, if the other Powers agree, it would seem better that it should be dealt with by the international commission in Paris, which should endeavour to draw up articles for insertion in the treaty which would be acceptable to all parties.

The Russian Government have agreed to this proposal.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11824] No. 244.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Athens, March 8, 1913.

THE Chamber met on the 5th instant for the first time since the adjournment in October. The Prime Minister made a statement, a translation of which by Mr. Atchley I have the honour to enclose.* The statement is studiously moderate, and avoids all mention of difficulties among the allies in the division of the spoils or between the allies and the Great Powers. It gave rise to no debate.

The President read the text of a telegram to be sent to the Crown Prince and to Admiral Coundouriotis, congratulating the army and navy on their gallant work.

The Minister of Finance submitted the budget, showing—

	Drachmas.
Revenue—	
Ordinary	141,162,125
Extraordinary..	60,000,000
Expenditure—	
Ordinary	149,071,532
Extraordinary..	104,000,000

* Not printed.

It will be reported on separately. I understand, however, that it is only a skeleton budget, upon the basis of which will be framed the "douziemes provisoires," or monthly votes on account.

Different Ministers introduced a number of bills, including one establishing a Naval Prize Court, one concerning the engagement of foreigners in the navy, and another concerning the invitation of foreign experts to study the question of a new arsenal.

On the 6th, after the Chamber had unanimously approved the President's proposal to send a telegram of congratulation to the Russian Duma on the occasion of the Romanoff tercentenary, M. Venizelos read the official telegrams announcing the capture of Yannina, adding that he had dispatched to the Crown Prince a warm telegram of congratulation, as well as one to the King at Salonica, and he read His Majesty's reply. The whole Chamber tumultuously applauded his words, and cheered for the Crown Prince.

The Opposition leaders, Mavromichalis, Rhallys, Theotoky, and Gounaris, in turn emphasised the achievement of the troops and the importance of the victory. They would say nothing to embarrass the Government, but they all called upon them, in varied phraseology, "to vindicate the rights of Hellenism in their entirety, and to remind everyone that the result of the war was due, for the most part, to Greece—to her efforts and to her army and navy," and, "to employ its diplomatic arm and make every effort to prevent Greek interests from being overlooked, and to compel recognition of the rights of the lands and islands inhabited by a purely Greek population, so that they, too, might enjoy true freedom, which they could only obtain by union with the mother country." The allusion is, of course, to the districts now in Bulgarian occupation where the Greeks are in overwhelming numerical preponderance.

The Chamber then adjourned to attend a *Te Deum* for the fall of Yannina.

Yesterday's sitting was taken up by the first reading, with hardly any discussion, of a large number of Government Bills.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[11827] No. 245.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 58.)

Sir,

Rome, March 10, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the introduction of the Foreign Office estimates in the Senate on the 8th instant, one or two observations put forward rather in an interrogatory than in a hostile spirit by certain senators, elicited a brief speech from the Marquis di San Giuliano.

He said he had not much to add to what he had so recently said in the Chamber of Deputies, and would confine himself to the points which had been raised by the preceding speakers.

Under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey, to whose labours in the cause of peace an appreciatory reference was made which does not appear in the newspaper reports, the conferences now taking place in London bore witness to the efforts which the Governments concerned were making to deal with the various difficulties which had presented themselves and continued to arise; he trusted that the new ones would be overcome as the old ones had been. Italy was using her best endeavours to accelerate the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Balkan allies, but it was not possible to obtain definite results with the promptitude which might be desired. He regarded it as necessary that Albania should have an extent of frontier, and should be organised in such a manner as would allow her to develop and advance. The backward social conditions prevailing there should not make us think that, under more favourable auspices, a nation which possessed moral and intellectual qualities of no mean order could not attain to the same level of progress as the other Balkan peoples. There was a complete understanding between Italy and Austria-Hungary as regarded the loyal application of the treaties which had been concluded. He dwelt on the difficulties in practical application of the formula "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" arising from the fact that ethnographical and geographical divisions did not always coincide. Military events had quite recently increased these difficulties. The European Powers in seeking a solution were displaying a large spirit of conciliation, recognising the

paramount interest of a permanent and pacific arrangement. Two serious problems demanded attention: the equilibrium in the Adriatic, and the equilibrium in the Mediterranean. Happily all the European Powers were at one in desiring that the present territorial distribution in the Mediterranean should be maintained. The relations of Italy, with France, generally, and in particular as affected by her neighbourship with Libya were cordial, and followed the spirit of existing engagements. The friendly expressions used on the previous day by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the French Chamber, when the budget estimates were under discussion, had found sympathetic echo here, and reflected the sentiments which prevailed in Italy.

As regards the equilibrium in the Adriatic, this was assured by the agreement existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary. It was a fundamental basis of Italian policy to maintain this agreement, and he believed he might declare that such was also the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government. During the war with Turkey he had had reason to appreciate the friendship of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and when the opinion of nearly the whole of Europe was adverse to Italy the Governments of the various countries had resisted that current of opinion until at last it changed to a favourable one, in view of the perseverance and moderation which this country had displayed.

I have, &c
RENNELL RODD.

[11810] No. 246.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 13, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from Salonica to-day:—

"My telegram of 11th March.

"Further dispatch of troops has been suspended owing to exploits of Turkish cruiser at San Giovanni di Medua."

[11865] No. 247.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 15 of 28th February: Scutari.

A collective representation was made this morning.

A somewhat lengthy reply has been returned this evening to the effect that the Montenegrin Government will not prevent the departure of the consuls and their countrymen if the consuls send in lists of the names to the military authorities, but, in view of grave military and political considerations, they regret to be unable to accede to the wish of the Powers that the civilian population should be allowed to leave the town.

[11934] No. 248.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 14, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram of 13th March: Balkans.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already received similar communication from the German Ambassador at London, and has instructed him to express to you his entire agreement.

[11935] No. 249.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 14, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

With reference to the proposed refusal of financial support to the allies, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs became quite excited, and said that France and Russia were continually furnishing money to the allies under various pretences, and that he knew that France had just supplied Servia with a large sum via Switzerland.

[11938] No. 250.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 12th March: Conditions of peace.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is quite in agreement with procedure proposed, which, in the circumstances, is, in his opinion, only one available.

[11958] No. 251.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 14, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador tells me that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested at Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, with reference to mediation between Roumania and Bulgaria, that Silistria should be ceded to the former, while Salonica should be promised to Bulgaria in compensation. Russian view was that future of Salonica was a question in the first instance for settlement between the allies which must remain independent of the present issue between Bulgaria and Roumania. He did not know whether this suggestion had yet been submitted to you.

[11947] No. 252.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, March 14, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is text of reply returned by allied Powers to offer of mediation made by representatives of Great Powers. Substance has been communicated to press agencies:—

"Les Etats alliés expriment leurs vifs remerciements aux Grandes Puissances et, déférant à la démarche par laquelle elles ont offert leur médiation, déclarent l'accepter aux conditions suivantes:—

"1. Comme base de la négociation pour la délimitation des territoires entre la Turquie et les alliés sera prise une ligne partant d'un point sur la mer de Marmara à l'est de Rodosto, rejoignant la mer Noire à proximité du cap Malatra au sud-est de Midia, à l'exclusion de la presqu'île de Gallipoli, qui restera à la Turquie. Tous les territoires à l'ouest de cette ligne frontière sont cédés par la Turquie aux États alliés, y compris les places assiégées Andrinople et Scutari.

"2. La Turquie devra céder iles de la mer Égée.

"3. Elle devra se désintéresser complètement de l'île de Crète.

"4. La Turquie devra consentir en principe au paiement aux alliés d'une indemnité de guerre, dont le montant sera fixé lors de la conclusion définitive de la paix, ainsi qu'au paiement d'indemnités particulières pour les dommages dont la cause est antérieure à la guerre. Les états alliés devront prendre part aux délibérations relatives aux indemnités.

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"5. Les États alliés se réservent de règler par le traité définitif de paix le traitement à accorder à leurs sujets et à leur commerce dans l'Empire ottoman, les questions de nationalité contestée aussi bien que les garanties au sujet de privilèges des églises orthodoxes et de droit public de leurs congenères sujets ottomans.

"6. Les opérations de guerre ne seront pas interrompues."

[11948] No. 253.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 70 (repeating Salonica telegram No. 15 of 8th March) and 71 (repeating Salonica telegram No. 16 of 10th March).

The Greek Minister has read to me the official account of the three days' fighting at Nigrita. It is substantially the same as that given in the "Times" of 11th March. He states that Greeks had taken over 100 prisoners and two guns, but that the exact number of dead and wounded had not yet been ascertained. His Government have addressed the strongest representations to the Bulgarian Government on this subject.

The Bulgarian representative at Constantinople has been sent to Salonica, and a thorough enquiry will be at once instituted into the whole matter. The Greek Government have insisted that the enquiry be closed, and a report drawn up within a fortnight of its commencement.

(Sent to Salonica.)

[11812] No. 254.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

GERMAN cruiser "Breslau" arrived this morning.

[11949] No. 255.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

TURKS having seized a French merchant-vessel outside the Dardanelles and detained her on the plea that consignments of potatoes and biscuits on board were destined for the enemy, French Embassy demanded her release on the ground that these articles are not contraband of war, and insist on an apology for the insult to the flag involved in Turkish ships having fired on French ship before signalling her to stop. Owing to delay in complying, the battle-ship "Léon Gambetta," with embassy chief dragoman on board, left this evening for the Dardanelles.

[11950] No. 256.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Bussorah, 12th March :—

"(Secret.)

"Sheikh Eh-el-Benaiyeh, brother of Ghadban, of the Benilam tribe, visited me yesterday in disguise and begged for British protection and assistance for all Arab tribes on both sides of the Tigris, from Gart to Gurna, in their differences with the Turkish Government. He said that if the Turkish Government refuse to make a satisfactory arrangement regarding their land contracts they will revolt. He also asked whether there was any hope of the British Government advising the Turks to give them the land contracts they demand for a period of fifteen years, adding that, if they do so, the Arabs will pay 100,000*l.* arrears out of the 162,000*l.* due.

"I replied that I could not encourage them, as we could not interfere in the internal affairs of the Turkish Government, with whom we had friendly relations, and urged him to submit the differences to the Turkish Government direct.

"He said that direct negotiations with the Turks were hopeless, and asked me to telegraph his application and solicit an answer.

"I undertook to do so with all reserve, but could not hold out hopes of favourable reply.

"He hinted that the Arabs might take Amara and Bussorah and stop river navigation by the Turks.

"Attitude of the Arabs as regards ourselves is sufficiently embarrassing, and I hope some reply may be sent (see my telegram No. 21 of last year and No. 4 of this year. The three parties who have approached me are powerful and represent different and independent points of view. It would detract from our local interests to alienate them in view of their possible future action.

"(Addressed to Constantinople; repeated to Bushire for the information of the Government of India.)"

[11951] No. 257.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 145 of to-day.

I have instructed His Majesty's consul at Bussorah as follows:—

"Your telegram No. 12, Secret.

"You should discreetly inform the sheikh in reply that, the matter being an internal one, it is impossible for us to interfere, especially at a moment when the Ottoman Government is preoccupied with reasons of peace and war in the Balkans."

[11952] No. 258.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 85 of 11th March.

I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day how he explained the line taken by the Austrian press with regard to the statement published in Russian press respecting Austria's pacific intentions towards Servia.

His Excellency told me that he had submitted the text before publication of the statement to the Austrian Ambassador, who had expressed his entire concurrence, adding that he was ready to countersign it. Ambassador, who was leaving for Moscow that evening, put it in his pocket and omitted telegraphing it to Vienna. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had refrained from announcing the fact that the text had been concerted with the Austrian Ambassador out of regard for the latter's position.

[11953] No. 259.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 14, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day contents of your telegram No. 224 of 13th March, and his Excellency authorised me to express to you his approval of the course which you proposed to adopt. He had, he said, just impressed on the Bulgarian Minister the necessity of his Government renouncing the idea of the war indemnity.

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[11741] No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 226.) *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 89 of 12th March.

I have informed Austrian Ambassador of written reply of Russian Government, and also that a verbal reply to me would be sufficient.

An agreement, however, about Albanian frontier, to be of any use, must be made known, and this would, I assume, entail the Austrian assurance about Djakova being made known also.

I have urged Austrian Ambassador strongly to accept proposal of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs about Djakova; he could not discuss it, but referred it to Vienna.

With regard to latter half of your telegram, beginning "On my enquiring," I have of course said nothing to Austrian Ambassador. It seems unnecessary at this stage to discuss particular steps that may be required to make a frontier respected which has not yet been agreed.

But once a frontier has been agreed, I cannot contemplate that any of the Powers who are parties to the agreement would allow it to be violated by Montenegro or Servia without taking part in, or at least acquiescing in, whatever measures might in the last resort be necessary to make the frontier respected.

[12444] No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 12.) *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*
Sir,

THE Roumanian Minister told me to-day that he was instructed to impress upon me how essential to future good relations between Bulgaria and Roumania it was that Silistria should be ceded to Roumania. It was true that Bulgaria felt strongly about Silistria just now, but when peace had been made she would find so much occupation and interest and advantage in the large new territory that she had acquired, that she would be reconciled to the loss of Silistria. On the other hand, unless Roumania got Silistria she could never be on good terms with Bulgaria.

I said that the Roumanian Minister must not think that I was receiving him unsympathetically if I informed him that the argument which he had now addressed to me was parallel with that which Dr. Danef had continually used to me here. Dr. Danef had urged that, if Bulgaria was obliged to make concessions, such as that of Silistria, she would never forgive Roumania, and there would be constant trouble till Bulgaria had had her *revanche*. I said that I was quite prepared to receive whatever the Roumanian Minister wished to put before me, but as the mediation was to take place in St. Petersburgh I could not discuss it separately here.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12441] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 80.) *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*
Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador spoke to me to-day with great anxiety and immense disappointment of the last Russian proposal about Djakova. He said that he had been given to understand, though not from me, that the concession of either Dibra or Djakova would settle the matter. He had also understood that the suggestion of a commission *ad hoc* for Djakova was a Russian suggestion. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on this supposition, had done his utmost in Vienna to get Austria, who had done so only most reluctantly, to agree to refer the question of Djakova to a commission. Now the Russians came forward with a refusal to allow the commission to decide the principle of ownership. The Italian Ambassador admitted that he had not received this impression of the Russian view of a commission *ad hoc* from me.

I told him that M. Sazonof had always been perfectly firm in his language to me about both Djakova and Dibra. He had been favourable to the idea of a commission to settle the question of the whole boundary when I proposed the idea, and Austria had been very opposed to it; but he had never committed himself respecting a commission *ad hoc* for the district of Djakova alone.

The Italian Ambassador implored me to get the question settled on these lines.

I spoke to him about the settlement of the question as to the Adriatic littoral and about Scutari, and reviewed the diplomatic history of these questions as I had to Count Mensdorff yesterday. I told him that, after all that had passed, I could not in decency put pressure on Russia about Djakova, and, if the Austrian reply was unfavourable, I could not do any more.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12443] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 81.) *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*
Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador said that his Government felt that the Ottoman Jews in the territory transferred to the allies ought not to receive less favourable treatment from the allies than they had been having under Turkey. The Italian Government, therefore, thought that the allies should be asked for guarantees, and they wished to know whether I would support such a request.

I said that I should be delighted to see this question put on a satisfactory footing after being raised at the proper time. I thought that we could hardly mix it with the question of mediation between Turkey and the allies at this moment, but it was one of the things that I should be very glad to support after the preliminaries of peace were arranged. I reminded the Ambassador, who had spoken of the Treaty of Berlin, that ever since this treaty was arranged there had been a question as to the treatment of Jews in Roumania. I found that he was quite aware of this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12440] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 57.) *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*
Sir,

COUNT MENSDORFF informed me to-day that the Austrian Government had received through the Servian Minister in Vienna, and I think through their Minister in Belgrade also, the same sort of information that we had received about the Servian attitude respecting Scutari, as explained in Sir Ralph Paget's telegram, No 53, of the 13th instant. The Servians had, in effect, given the Austrians to understand that, if the Powers would only intimate that Scutari was to go to Albania, the decision would be accepted as far as the Servians were concerned. This made it all the more urgent that the Powers should make a statement as to Scutari.

I said that everything depended upon Djakova. I again went over the ground as to the impossibility of Russia putting herself in a position of hostility to both Montenegro and Servia at the same time. But, if the Austrian Government could accept the last Russian proposal about Djakova, I thought that a collective intimation ought to be made, in both Belgrade and Cettinjé, to the effect that the Powers had advanced so far in their agreement about the Albanian frontier that they were in a position to say that Scutari was to go to Albania. In fact, I said that, if Count Mensdorff could inform me that the Austrian Government accepted the last Russian proposal about Djakova, I would take upon myself to say, in both Belgrade and Cettinjé, that the Powers had virtually agreed that Scutari was to go to Albania; and I would ask the meeting of Ambassadors to have this confirmed immediately, and turned into a collective *démarche*.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[12442] No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 58.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF read to me to-day a telegram from Count Berchtold, in which the latter agreed substantially with the views which I had put forward about the conditions of mediation between Turkey and the allies, except on the question of an indemnity. Count Berchtold suggested that the question of an indemnity might be left to the Powers, who might fix the amount of it.

I said that I hoped that the Powers would not recommend an indemnity, and I observed that this question was very closely connected with the question of the Turkish Debt.

Count Mensdorff thereupon said that there were some points about the Debt which he wished to bring up at the reunion of Ambassadors here, in order to establish the main principle.

On this, I said that I thought it was not worth while laying down the main lines of the settlement of the Debt until we had settled the question of the indemnity. We ought to keep the settlement of the Debt as a means of inducing the allies to forgo the indemnity.

Count Mensdorff admitted that the line now taken by Count Berchtold about an indemnity was unexpected.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12445] No. 266.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 189.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*

THE French Ambassador spoke to me to-day about the Albanian frontier question, Scutari, and the Near Eastern situation generally.

I told him what had passed with the Italian Ambassador this afternoon. I said that, if the Austrian reply was unfavourable, I should then say to Austria that, after the settlement of the question of the Adriatic littoral and the conditional settlement of the question of Scutari, I could not do any more with Russia; and I should say to Russia that it had been a very difficult matter to get Austria to give way about Dibra, that the concession of referring Djakova to a commission had been obtained, but that this had exhausted everything that I could do in Vienna, and I must leave the question as it stood as a result of these arrangements.

M. Cambon agreed that this would be the situation, and he did not suggest that I could do anything more.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12134] No. 267.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires gave Sir A. Nicolson on the 13th March the reply of his Government to the communication which I made to him on the 11th instant.

Servia was sending assistance to the Montenegrins who were before Scutari because she was obliged to do so by the terms of her alliance with Montenegro, should the latter apply for such assistance. If she had not responded to the Montenegrin appeal she would have violated the terms of the alliance. Servia was not interested in the future of Scutari—that was a question between Montenegro and the Powers. Servia would abstain from sending assistance (1) if Montenegro said that she did not want any, or (2) if Montenegro declared that she placed the question of the future of Scutari in the hands of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11984] No. 268.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 189.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report the departure for Europe of Malid Zia Boy and Reshid Safvet Bey, who was attached to the Ottoman Peace Commission in London, on a mission to enlist sympathy, mainly that of France, in favour of Turkey in connection with the "défense nationale" movement recently inaugurated here by the Committee of Union and Progress. During the last four years I have occasionally alluded to the similarity of the Committee's doctrines and methods to those which brought about the Revolution and Republic in France. Since the *coup d'État* of the 23rd January the apparent idea has been to make Turkey imitate the French Commune of 1870. Adrianople is Alsace-Lorraine, and, if the Committee continues to grip the country, it would not be surprising after the cession of Adrianople to see some allegorical memorial set up in Constantinople in mourning for, and to keep fresh the memory of, its loss. A Committee organ has recently alluded to such a possibility. In this order of ideas Hakki Pasha is M. Thiers.

The object of the mission is to endeavour to picture to the French mind the parallel between Turkey's present position and that of France after 1870, and thus turn French opinion into channels favourable to Turkey and unfavourable to the Balkan States.

Halid Zia Bey was Ottoman commissioner to the Tobacco Régie under the old régime. He is a poet and littérateur, and was made chief secretary to the present Sultan after the deposition of Abdul Hamid.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[12039] No. 269.

Vice-Consul Conemenos to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 1.)
Excellence, *Prévésa, le 10 mars, 1913.*

J'AI l'honneur de confirmer humblement mes télégrammes respectifs des 6 et 7 mars, 1913, dont le texte comme il suit :—

1. "Although not yet officially known, all people celebrate here to-day surrender of Janina."

2. "Surrender of Janina officially confirmed."

et aussi de rapporter humblement à votre Excellence que les susdits télégrammes ont été, malheureusement, tardifs quant à leur expédition de ma part. Le premier cas, j'ai perdu mon temps à préparer de pareils télégrammes codés, pas acceptés au bureau télégraphique de Prévésa—cause: prohibition supérieure pour l'acceptation de télégrammes de la sorte, de laquelle prohibition je n'avais pas eu due connaissance; et le second cas, l'arrivée de la nouvelle officielle m'a été assez tard communiquée.

Le Vali de Janina (Gouverneur général), Général Essad Pacha, après une forte attaque de la part des Grecs pendant la nuit du 5 au 6, a été obligé, vers le matin du 6 mars, 1913, de se décider à la reddition de Janina, et cela, selon mes informations, sans conditions, avec environ 33,000 hommes, entre officiers, sous-officiers et soldats.

Il paraît que le Général Ali Riza Pacha et Zeki Pacha, de Monastir, avec environ 5,000 hommes, probablement faisant partie des 33,000 sus-mentionnés, s'enfuirent envers Paramythia, mais les Grecs, ayant été à leur poursuite, parvinrent à en faire jusqu'ici environ 2,000 soldats prisonniers.

Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier et les autres Princes et Princesses de la Famille Royale de Grèce—ceux qui se trouvaient en ce pays—ainsi que les différents attachés militaires, dont la plupart se rendirent de Prévésa à Philippias, le 5 mars, 1913, de bon matin, selon invitation à cela depuis la veille dudit jour, entrèrent à Janina, occupé déjà, le 7 mars, 1913, y ayant été reçus, je suis informé, avec enthousiasme extraordinaire.

Il est presque généralement cru ici qu'à part la probabilité de quelque légère résistance à Delvino et à Argyrocastro, le reste de la Basse-Albanie sera dorénavant soumis paisiblement à l'occupation grecque. Santi-Quaranta ont été de nouveau

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occupés du moins depuis le 19 mars, 1913, par les Grecs. On parle aussi de troupes grecques débarquées à Valona, lesquelles troupes seraient de la 1e division, mais cela sous toute réserve.

J'ai, &c.,
CÉSAR CONÉMÉNOS.

[12113] No. 270.

M. Madjaroff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

THE Bulgarian Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, acting on instructions from his Government, has the honour of transmitting a copy of the mémoire dealing with the Roumano-Bulgarian conflict.

Bulgarian Legation, London,
March 11, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 270.

Mémoire.

I.

LA frontière bulgaro-roumaine de la Dobroudja a été déterminée dans ses grandes lignes par l'article 46 du Traité de Berlin, qui modifia à cet égard les dispositions du Traité de San-Stefano. Tandis que ce dernier traité ne donnait à la Principauté de Roumanie que l'ancien sandjak de Toultcha, au Congrès de Berlin on augmenta ce territoire et on fixa les deux points terminus de la ligne-frontière ainsi : "à l'est de Silistrie" sur le Danube et "au sud de Mangalia," sur la mer Noire. Le principal motif de cette augmentation territoriale fut la nécessité pour la principauté de relier la nouvelle province à son territoire moyennant un pont qui, d'après les assertions des représentants roumains, ne pouvait être établi que sur un point près de Silistrie.

Le congrès chargea la commission européenne pour la délimitation de la Bulgarie de fixer sur les lieux le tracé de la frontière susmentionnée. Cette commission eut deux sessions consécutives : la première du 23 octobre au 23 décembre, 1878, et la seconde du 20 avril au 23 septembre, 1879. Dans sa première réunion la commission indiqua le point "à l'est de Silistrie" à 800 mètres d' "Itch Tchenguel tabiassi" et celui "au sud de Mangalia" à 1,200 mètres au sud du moulin d' "Ilanlik," c'est-à-dire, à 7½ kilom. de la ville. Le délégué russe trouvant que cette détermination de la frontière est contraire au Traité de Berlin, refusa de signer la décision de la commission. La seconde session de la même commission ne donna pas un meilleur résultat.

Une nouvelle commission européenne, technique celle-ci, formée en vertu d'un accord intervenu entre les Puissances signataires du Traité de Berlin, fut chargée d'indiquer le point où pouvait être établi le pont sur le Danube. La majorité de la commission se prononça en faveur d'un emplacement du pont près de Silistrie, mais aucune décision ne fut prise.

En 1880 le Gouvernement austro-hongrois prit l'initiative pour amener un accord entre les Grandes Puissances en ce qui concerne la fixation de la frontière et proposa une modification du tracé près de Silistrie, afin de conserver à cette ville au moins quelques terrains avoisinants dont ses habitants avaient besoin (voir le croquis, Annexe No. 1). Les Grandes Puissances acceptèrent successivement la proposition de l'Autriche-Hongrie, qui avait été déjà admise en principe aussi par les Gouvernements de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie* et devint ainsi définitive.

En 1886 la Roumanie et la Bulgarie constituèrent une commission mixte qui, du 19 mai au 27 septembre, fixa la ligne-frontière et posa des bornes, principales et intermédiaires, sur le terrain même. Des revisions et des réparations ont été faites depuis, en commun, de différentes bornes, notamment en 1891 et en 1895.

* Dans sa réponse, vu le grand sacrifice fait par la Bulgarie, le Gouvernement bulgare sollicitait l'intervention des Puissances, afin que la Roumanie s'engageât à construire le pont près de Silistrie et cela dans le délai de trois ans (voir Pilesco, "Histoire d'une Frontière," p. 83). Quant à la Roumanie, elle déclara qu'elle ne pourra pas construire le pont près de Silistrie, parce que le terrain ne s'y prêtait pas (voir Pilesco, *op. cit.*, p. 92). Le pont étant plus tard construit à Tchernavoda, le district de Silistrie a été privé de cet avantage.

Plus tard, en septembre 1902, une autre commission mixte fit une description générale de la frontière et, dans le but de faciliter le contrôle exercé par les postes des deux États, ouvrit une zone et des sentiers pour les patrouilles. Les protocoles de cette commission furent approuvés par les deux Gouvernements en 1906.

Depuis cette époque la frontière commune a toujours été, comme auparavant, respectée par les deux États et aucun conflit de nature territoriale n'a eu lieu.

II.

Lorsque éclata la guerre entre la Turquie et les États alliés balkaniques, la Bulgarie notifia cet événement au Gouvernement roumain. Le Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Roumanie, M. Majoresco, prit acte de cette notification et protesta devant le Ministre plénipotentiaire bulgare à Bucarest contre les bruits, répandus par certains journaux, que le Gouvernement roumain procéderait à une mobilisation et demanderait une compensation en échange de sa neutralité (voir Annexe No. 2). C'est le 12 novembre que M. Majoresco souleva, dans une conversation avec le Ministre plénipotentiaire bulgare à Bucarest, la question d'une rectification de la frontière de Dobroudja, tout en expliquant qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une compensation, car, disait-il, demander une compensation, alors que la Roumanie n'a rien fait pour la mériter, serait offensant pour elle. Il a déclaré aussi que la question de la rectification ne sera pas traitée pendant la guerre (voir Annexe No. 3).

Après l'armistice, M. Danef, allant à Londres, où devaient commencer les négociations pour la paix, passa par Bucarest, où, le 9 décembre, il eut l'occasion de se mettre au courant, jusqu'à un certain point, des dispositions du Gouvernement roumain à l'égard de la Bulgarie.

C'est précisément lors des négociations pour la paix que M. Majoresco proposa au Ministre plénipotentiaire bulgare à Bucarest de commencer des pourparlers entre les deux États sur une base plus large que la compensation ou la rectification, et il demanda ce que la Bulgarie donnerait à son pays, afin de pouvoir conclure une convention, car autrement la Roumanie se verrait obligée de recourir à d'autres mesures plus efficaces pour la sauvegarde de ses intérêts (voir Annexe No. 4). C'est alors que les deux Gouvernements ont décidé de commencer à Londres des négociations pour arriver à une entente entre eux. Les délégués respectifs, M. Danef pour la Bulgarie et M. Misu pour la Roumanie, après plusieurs entrevues et conversations, auxquelles prit part aussi, au commencement, M. Take Jonesco, Ministre de l'Intérieur de Roumanie ont constaté leurs déclarations réciproques dans un protocole signé le 29 janvier (voir Annexe No. 5). La Roumanie demanda par son délégué une rectification de frontière qui puisse présenter une garantie et une sécurité à l'avenir pour la sincérité des sentiments réciproques d'amitié entre les deux pays. Cette rectification devait, d'après le délégué roumain, consister dans l'établissement d'une nouvelle ligne-frontière entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie partant d'un point à déterminer à l'ouest de Toutrakan et aboutissant à Baltchik sur la mer Noire, cette ville y comprise. Le délégué bulgare se déclara surpris de constater qu'après les pourparlers avec M. Jonesco, desquels il ressortissait que les villes de Silistrie et de Baltchik ne seront pas comprises dans la rectification de la frontière, le délégué de la Roumanie a demandé à la date du 25 janvier une cession territoriale englobant ces deux villes, et à la date du 27 du même mois une nouvelle ligne de frontière à l'ouest de la ville de Toutrakan et englobant un territoire deux fois plus considérable. Et le même délégué estima que cette dernière demande ayant pour objet une véritable cession de territoire, est de nature à porter un coup fatal aux relations amicales des deux royaumes, et ne peut être prise en considération. Mais voulant faire preuve de ses bonnes dispositions à l'égard de la Roumanie, la Bulgarie consentit une rectification de frontière comme il suit :—

1. La Bulgarie est prête à démanteler les forts autour de Silistrie.
2. Elle consent à rectifier la frontière en cédant à la Roumanie les deux angles (*a b c* et *d e f*) faisant pointe dans la Dobroudja roumaine, ainsi qu'un triangle (*g h i*) ayant pour base sur la côte de la mer Noire une ligne longue de 5 à 6 kilom. à partir de la frontière actuelle (voir croquis, Annexe No. 6).*

* Dans les deux angles et le triangle il y avait, en 1910, 7,142 habitants, dont quarante seulement étaient d'origine roumaine.

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Le Gouvernement bulgare croyait que cette concession donnerait une entière satisfaction à la Roumanie, même au point de vue stratégique, puisqu'elle faisait disparaître toute pointe dans le territoire roumain et assurait au port de Mangalia une indépendance plus grande. Il trouve encore maintenant que les grands sacrifices faits par cette concession ne doivent point être augmentés, si l'on tient au but d'aboutir à un accord de nature à conserver l'amitié et le bon voisinage ayant existé si heureusement dans le passé entre ces deux pays, liés par tant d'intérêts communs.

Après la rupture des négociations pour la paix à Londres, les négociations entre les deux pays continuèrent à Sophia. Le Ministre plénipotentiaire de Roumanie, M. Ghika, en qualité de délégué de son pays, formula, le 12 février dernier, la demande roumaine en ce sens que la ligne-frontière doit être changée de manière à laisser les villes de Silistrie, Kavarna et Baltchik à la Roumanie et la ville de Dobritch à la Bulgarie. Le 15 février le Gouvernement bulgare répondit à cette proposition, par ses délégués, MM. Danef et Sarafof, en augmentant les concessions déjà faites. Il promit la cession du fort Medjidié et une augmentation de la ligne sur la mer Noire formant la base du triangle susmentionné. Ces nouvelles concessions furent faites avec la réserve expresse que la Roumanie s'en contenterait et conclurait aussi promptement que possible avec la Bulgarie un arrangement à l'amiable et directement, faute de quoi elles devaient être considérées comme nulles et non avenues. Le Gouvernement bulgare n'a reçu aucune réponse à sa proposition.

L'exposé qui précède détermine le but que la Roumanie a poursuivi en présentant sa demande de rectification de la frontière et le moyen qu'elle a considéré comme nécessaire pour la réalisation de ce but. Il s'agissait d'établir, ou plutôt de maintenir, l'amitié entre les deux pays et même de la rendre encore plus sûre et stable. A cet effet, la Roumanie demanda une rectification de la frontière, afin de pouvoir mieux garantir sa sécurité.

III.

La frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans la Dobroudja a été, comme on l'a vu, déterminée par le Traité de Berlin d'une manière générale et, puis, tracée sur les lieux mêmes par la commission européenne et modifiée par la proposition de Vienne, acceptée par les Grandes Puissances. Cette détermination de la frontière bulgaro-roumaine est obligatoire pour la Roumanie, comme pour la Bulgarie. En reconnaissant l'indépendance de la Principauté de Roumanie, les États signataires du Traité de Berlin y ont posé une condition, concernant notamment la frontière bulgaro-roumaine. La Roumanie, ayant accepté la reconnaissance des Grandes Puissances de son indépendance par le Traité de Berlin, a accepté par là même la condition posée par ces Puissances, laquelle est devenue ainsi une obligation internationale pour elle. C'est bien le sens de la doctrine de la reconnaissance *sub conditione* ou *sub modo* dans le droit international. Or, telle est la reconnaissance des États signataires du Traité de Berlin à l'égard de la Roumanie.

En 1886, la Roumanie a reconnu la délimitation de la frontière de Dobroudja vis-à-vis de la Bulgarie par la convention conclue entre elle et ce dernier pays, une convention qui a été confirmée ensuite en 1902.

La frontière actuelle est donc obligatoire pour la Roumanie au point de vue international et, spécialement, dans les rapports de ce pays avec la Bulgarie. La prétention roumaine pour la rectification de la frontière, surtout dans la forme d'une cession de territoire, ne repose, par conséquent, sur aucune base juridique.

Le principal motif sur lequel la Roumanie appuie sa prétention est que la frontière actuelle n'est pas stratégique. Il est vrai qu'au Congrès de Berlin le Prince Hohenlohe a déclaré qu'à côté de Silistrie il ne s'agit pas d'une ligne stratégique, puisque le point doit être l'emplacement où un pont pourrait être établi sur le Danube.* Il s'ensuit que la Roumanie, d'après cette déclaration, n'a pas le droit d'exiger une frontière stratégique, dans les environs de ladite ville. Mais en fait la frontière a été ensuite ainsi tracée sur les lieux que la Roumanie a reçu, d'une part, Arabe-tapia à côté de Silistrie et, d'autre part, une partie de la côte de la mer Noire, suffisante pour la protection du port de Mangalia. Si l'on compare l'Arabe-tapia (hauteur 129 mètres) et la Medjidié-tapia (hauteur 133 mètres), qui est restée en Bulgarie, on peut dire qu'il y a entre les deux pays une parfaite égalité. On peut même rappeler que c'est l'Arabe-tapia qui a joué dans l'histoire militaire un rôle relativement prépondérant.

Quoiqu'il en soit, la situation actuelle de la frontière n'a jamais été un obstacle au bon voisinage entre les deux pays qui ont, pendant tant d'années déjà, entretenu les

* Protocole du 8 juillet, 1878.

Annexe No. 1.


DANUBE
ILES HOPO
SILISTRIE
Point terminus
Iteh Tchenghel Tabiassi
Route de Ostrov
Route de Roustchouk
Route de Varna
Route de Choumla
Médjidié Tabiassi
Légende.
Tracé de la Commission de Délimitation de 1878 et de la Commission Technique de 1879
Tracé du Cabinet de Vienne (1880) et frontière actuelle.
Prairies
Pâturages
Jardins
Vignes
Conduite d'eau potable
" " " en proget
Sources
Echelle de 0m10 pour 3 kilomètres

meilleurs rapports possibles. Cela prouve que la Bulgarie a toujours considéré la Roumanie comme un État ami et a respecté ses droits sur la Dobroudja, bien que ce pays ait, pendant les siècles passés, fait partie de la Bulgarie ou du vilayet du Danube, essentiellement bulgare.

Il est presque inutile de parler de la population des territoires demandés par la Roumanie. Il n'y a pas là d'éléments roumains. La ville de Silistrie avait en 1910, sur une population totale de 11,646 habitants, 250 Roumains seulement. D'ailleurs, cette ville a toujours été bulgare depuis la fondation de l'État bulgare par le Roi Asparouch au septième siècle jusqu'à la chute du Royaume bulgare. C'est alors qu'elle fut prise par le voïvode Mircea, mais qui ne la garda que quelques années. Depuis lors, elle a fait partie de l'Empire ottoman, vilayet du Danube, comme il a été dit plus haut.

La population du territoire réclamé par la Roumanie dans sa dernière demande formulée à Sophia, monte à plus de 100,000 habitants dont à peine un millier d'origine roumaine.*

Contenant des terres très fertiles, ce territoire a attiré beaucoup de capitaux bulgares. Nombre d'établissements agricoles, se servant d'instruments perfectionnés pour la culture de la terre, ont concentré une grande population bulgare, de telle sorte que ce pays est devenu une des contrées les mieux cultivées et les plus productives du royaume. Le Gouvernement bulgare a, de son côté, fait de grosses dépenses pour l'amélioration de la culture et des communications locales, afin de rendre l'export des produits plus facile et plus rapide.

IV.

Aucun arrangement direct n'ayant pu être conclu entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie, le Gouvernement bulgare a été heureux d'accepter les bons offices des Grandes Puissances et de s'en remettre pour la solution du différend bulgaro-roumain à leur décision. Confiante dans les sentiments d'équité et dans la haute sagesse politique des Grandes Puissances, la Bulgarie espère que cette décision fera disparaître dans l'avenir tout désaccord entre elle et la Roumanie et ne laissera aucune trace d'amertume dans l'âme du pays qui sera appelé à subir des sacrifices dans le seul but de conserver l'amitié séculaire entre deux peuples voisins.

Sophia, le 18 *février* (3 *mars*), 1913.

Annex No. 2.

Extrait de la Dépêche chiffrée du Ministre de Bulgarie à Bucarest adressée au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Sophia, en date du 10 (23) *octobre*, 1912.

(Traduction.)

Le Gouvernement roumain a pris acte de la notification qui lui a été faite de la déclaration de la guerre. Il n'y aura pas de réponse. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères déclare qu'une neutralité de fait vaut mieux qu'une déclaration de neutralité formelle. Il proteste catégoriquement, en les démentant, contre les faux bruits répandus par les journaux anglais au sujet d'une mobilisation roumaine et de prétentions, de la part de la Roumanie, pour une compensation à cause de sa neutralité. . . . .

Annex No. 3.

Extrait d'un Rapport du Ministre de Bulgarie à Bucarest adressé au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Sophia en date du 31 *octobre* (*novembre* 12), 1912.

(Traduction.)

M. Majoresco m'a chargé de vous faire part de ce qui suit :

Maintenant, quand la Bulgarie fait verser du sang et sacrifie des milliers de vies humaines pour atteindre ses idéals, je considère que le moment n'est pas encore venu pour que nous vous fassions des propositions et que nous vous présentions notre petite note. Je crois que ce moment viendra bientôt et alors, sans violer les susceptibilités réciproques, nous, les deux pays, nous ne manquerons pas l'occasion de démontrer que nous sommes de bons amis et d'excellents voisins. Cependant, il y a une chose dont je

* Dans les districts de Silistrie, Dobritch et Baltchik, qui sont limitrophes de la Dobroudja, il y a eu, en 1910, 200,581 hommes, dont 1,696, seulement d'origine roumaine, c'est-à-dire 0·85 pour cent.

dois vous prévenir dès maintenant, c'est que le mot et le principe "compensation" ne sera pas la base de notre petite note, laquelle compensation n'ayant été en rien méritée de nous, serait même offensante pour nous. Mais notre prétention pour une rectification devra être satisfaite par une frontière constante et stratégique. Je crois devoir le répéter sincèrement: seulement dans le but de ramener au calme les esprits chez nous et dans l'intérêt de nos excellentes relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage.

A la fin de notre conversation M. Majoresco m'a de nouveau répété que le moment n'étant pas opportun, il abstient pour l'instant à faire une proposition quelconque. . . . .

Annex No. 4.

Extrait de la Dépêche chiffrée du Ministre de Bulgarie à Bucarest adressée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Sophia en date du 12 (25) *décembre*, 1912.

(Traduction.)

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères insiste pour que nos négociations soient immédiatement commencées d'une manière officielle sur une base plus large et plus acceptable, en laissant de côté la question d'une compensation et d'une rectification stratégique. . . . .

Dans le cas où la Bulgarie ne sentirait pas le besoin de traiter ou ne voudrait pas le faire actuellement, pour établir une entente avec la Roumanie sur les questions ci-dessus et d'autres, celle-ci se verra obligée de recourir à d'autres mesures efficaces pour la défense de ses intérêts, comme il est dit dans le Discours du Trône.

Annex No. 5.

Extrait du Protocole signée à Londres le 16 (29) *janvier*, 1913, *par les Délégués de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie, MM. Danef et Misu.*

2. Le soussigné délégué de la Roumanie déclare en outre que, pour que les relations d'amitié existant entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie deviennent encore plus étroites à l'avenir, ainsi que la Roumanie le désire vivement, il est indispensable qu'une rectification de frontière soit accordée à la Roumanie par la Bulgarie d'une étendue qui puisse présenter une garantie et une sécurité à l'avenir pour la sincérité des sentiments réciproques d'amitié entre les deux pays.

Le soussigné délégué de la Roumanie propose donc que la nouvelle ligne-frontière entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie parte d'un point à déterminer à l'ouest de Toutrakan (Tourtoukaïn) et aboutisse à Baltchik sur la mer Noire, cette ville y comprise.

Le soussigné délégué de la Bulgarie estime, en ce qui concerne la demande de la Roumanie pour la rectification de la frontière dans le but d'obtenir "une garantie et une sécurité à l'avenir," que ce but sera mieux atteint par le maintien intact de l'amitié réciproque entre les deux pays et non point par une rectification de la frontière dont la modification, surtout dans les circonstances actuelles, pourra, il est à craindre, altérer la cordialité existante de leurs rapports. Mais, voulant faire preuve de ses bonnes dispositions à l'égard de la Roumanie qui insiste absolument sur une rectification de frontière du côté de la Dobroudja, la Bulgarie a consenti à une rectification de la frontière bulgaro-roumaine comme il est indiqué plus bas.

Le délégué de la Bulgarie est pourtant surpris de constater qu'après les pourparlers avec M. Take Jonesco, Ministre de l'Intérieur de la Roumanie—desquels il ressortissait que les villes de Silistrie et de Baltchik ne seront pas comprises dans la rectification de la frontière—le délégué de la Roumanie demande à la date du 12 (25) janvier courant une session territoriale englobant ces deux villes, et à la date du 14 (27) du même mois une nouvelle ligne de frontière partant à l'ouest de la ville de Toutrakan et englobant un territoire deux fois plus considérable. En conséquence, le délégué de la Bulgarie estime que cette dernière demande—véritable cession de territoire, de nature à porter un coup fatal aux relations amicales entre les deux royaumes, ne peut être prise en considération. Elle est infirmée dans sa base par le point de vue auquel la Roumanie elle-même s'est placée lors des pourparlers précédents.

Aussi désireux de préserver les rapports amicaux entre les deux pays de toute atteinte, le délégué de la Bulgarie est d'avis que la seule rectification de la frontière admissible et répondant le mieux aux intérêts durables et bien compris des deux royaumes est celle proposée par la Bulgarie, à savoir:

(1.) La Bulgarie est prête à démanteler les forts autour de Silistrie. Par cette mesure la Roumanie, qui conservera le droit de fortifier la frontière sud de la Dobroudja, se trouvera dans une situation de sécurité absolue désirée par elle.

(2.) La Bulgarie consent à rectifier la frontière, en cédant à la Roumanie les deux triangles au milieu de la ligne de la frontière qui s'enfoncent dans la Dobroudja roumaine, ainsi qu'un autre triangle ayant pour base la côte de la mer Noire une ligne longue de 5 à 6 kilom. à partir de la frontière actuelle. Cette cession permettra à la Roumanie de mieux utiliser son port de Mangalia, ce qui augmentera davantage sa sécurité.

[12006] No. 271.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 103.)

Sir; *Berlin, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, a translation of the reply of the Imperial Foreign Office to a communication which I addressed to them on receipt of your despatch No. 85 of the 27th ultimo in regard to the interference of the allied Balkan States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories. In this communication the Imperial Foreign Office, whilst expressing their disagreement with the view taken by the Servian Government, state that a reply has not yet been received from the Servian Government to their representations, but that should such reply be similar to that returned to His Majesty's Government, they will be prepared to join in the proposed identic representations.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 271.

Note communicated to Sir E. Goschen by German Foreign Office.

(Translation.)

THE Secretary of State of the Foreign Office has the honour to inform the British Ambassador in reply to his memorandum of the 1st instant, that the answer returned by the Servian Cabinet on the 5th ultimo to the representations of the British Minister at Belgrade in regard to the interference with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt is, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, based upon incorrect assumptions.

The view put forward by the Servian Government that the "Dette publique ottomane" represents a purely Turkish administration cannot be recognised as correct. The "Dette" may in form have the position of a Turkish authority, but actually it is an international organisation, as the history of its institution and the composition of the Council of Administration shows.

As regards the duties encashed by the "dette," they belong not to the Turkish Government, but to the foreign creditors to whom the revenues are assigned, and who have appointed their delegates on the Council of Administration for the purpose of ensuring their proper collection and disposal. The only exception is the revenues which constitute an excess over the amounts required for the service of the loans, and according to agreement go to the Turkish Government. The assessment and separation of this excess revenue is, however, a matter for the "Dette," and cannot be left to the Servian authorities.

A reply to the representations made by the Imperial Minister has not yet been received from the Servian Government. Should it, as is to be anticipated, also contain a refusal, the Imperial Government will be ready to join in the identic protest of the Powers at Belgrade proposed by Sir Edward Grey.

Berlin, March 11, 1913.

Annexe No. 6.



Echelle 1: 500,000.

[12020] No. 272.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Vienna, March 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the following communiqué was published in yesterday's issue of the semi-official "Fremdenblatt":—

"The exchange of letters which took place recently between His Majesty the Emperor-King Francis Joseph and the Emperor Nicholas has given fresh proof of the fact that the events in the Balkan Peninsula have in no way impaired the feelings of friendship which unite the two Monarchs and that the maintenance of peace has all along been the object of their endeavour.

"The two Governments have come to the conclusion that certain purely defensive measures, which have been taken in the frontier provinces of both Empires, no longer appear called for under the circumstances.

"It has consequently been decided to reduce the Austro-Hungarian effectives in Galicia to their normal footing, and the dismissal of Russian reservists of the class which should have been liberated last autumn will likewise be ordered."

The St. Petersburgh Telegraph Agency is quoted further as follows:—"As a supplement to the identic communiqué of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments the St. Petersburgh Telegraph Agency is authorised to state that, as has been shown by the discussions with the Vienna Cabinet, the Austro-Hungarian Government cherishes no aggressive designs against its southern neighbour."

The "Fremdenblatt," in a leading article on the subject of the communiqué, pays a tribute to the two Monarchs whose exchange of views has rendered possible a diminution of the present military measures, and adds that the demobilisation has not only dynastic but also political importance and gives ground for hopes of a favourable issue of the present crisis. The "Fremdenblatt" refers to its article of the 13th ultimo (reported in my despatch No. 34 of the 14th February) in which it laid stress on the importance of giving the Balkans to the Balkan peoples and granting them absolute independence. The Dual Monarchy, says the "Fremdenblatt," by the constant application of this programme, has in the last few months given practical proof of the sincerity of its policy, which is not one of conquest. The demobilisation on the frontiers may be accepted as a sign that this policy has received the recognition it deserves in St. Petersburgh, and that Russia realises the possibility of doing away with the sources of difference between the two Empires. "The crisis is not yet over," concludes the "Fremdenblatt," "but we will hope that to-day marks a stage forward on the road to its solution."

Referring to the supplementary paragraph published by the St. Petersburgh Telegraphic Agency, the "Fremdenblatt" says (in a later communication issued to-day) that the inclusion of this paragraph, which was not in the communiqué as agreed upon by the two Cabinets, was considered unnecessary by the Austro-Hungarian Government, because the attitude of the Monarchy towards her southern neighbour had already been made evident before the pourparlers which have taken place on the present occasion. On the 5th November, Count Berchtold had already declared before the delegations that "the Monarchy is ready to create a basis for a permanent friendly understanding with the Balkan States."

The above statement, which appears in all the Vienna journals of to-day, is a semi-official communiqué issued by the "correspondence-bureau." Some surprise is expressed that the additional paragraph should have been issued in St. Petersburgh. The "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" says it was not agreed upon and was done without the consent of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The "Reichspost" criticises this incident with much acerbity, remarking that bad service has thus been rendered in St. Petersburgh to the cause of a peaceful understanding. Not that the contents of the extra paragraph are incorrect; it is perfectly true, as has already been often shown, that the Monarchy has no hostile intentions against Servia. But it had been agreed that no such declaration should appear in the official communiqué. Its independent publication appears therefore somewhat unstraightforward and in any case unfortunate. The "Reichspost" goes on to say that Austria-Hungary has shown great reasonableness and conciliation all

through the crisis, but she cannot tolerate the present state of affairs any longer, for Servia continues to move troops to Durazzo and against Scutari.

The "Neue Freie Presse" welcomes the publication of the communiqué in the warmest terms, as implying the removal of conditions which, in their effect on public opinion on both sides of the frontier, have been a perpetual source of tension and of danger to peace. This happy event will, it declares, be received with joy in every part of the Dual Monarchy and far beyond its borders; and in the general satisfaction the fact may well be allowed to be forgotten that (if the same sequence were followed in disarmament as in armament) the first movement towards the reduction of troops should have been made not by Austria but by Russia. The statement in the Russian communiqué as to Austria-Hungary's friendly intentions towards Servia shows, the "Neue Freie Presse" remarks, the danger which had to be passed before an agreement could be reached. It describes this statement as a sop to the Pan-Slav agitators in Russia whose attempts to hinder the disarmament have now been signally frustrated.

The "Neue Freie Presse" also welcomes the communiqué as proving that the question of Scutari has been settled, and thus that the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict has been set aside—a fact which deprives the present situation in the Balkans of all its peril so far as the peace of Europe is concerned.

The other papers speak in much the same sense, with the exception of the socialist "Arbeiter-Zeitung," which demands why demobilisation is not to take place on the southern as well as on the Galician frontier. The "Reichspost" warns its readers against excessive optimism; the situation is by no means completely clear, and Austria-Hungary must still make every effort to prevent the new conditions in the Balkans from being aimed against her.

The "Zeit" complains that the communiqué has been made to elicit encomiastic criticisms its wording, which refers only to friendship between the two rulers and not between the two nations. The article of the "Zeit" is written in a tone of hostility and suspicion towards Russia which contrasts strongly with the views expressed in the "Tagblatt." The latter journal speaks in friendly terms of the prospect of an improvement in Austro-Russian relations, and emphatically disclaims any aggressive intentions in the Balkans on the part of the Dual Monarchy.

I have, &c.

CAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[11955] No. 273.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 14, 1913.*

REPLY of Servian Government to offer of mediation of the Powers has just been handed to me by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Following is a translation:—

"The Servian Government has the honour to express its sincere thanks to the Great Powers for step taken by them in offering mediation, and declares its acceptance of such under the following conditions:—

"1. As a basis of negotiations for delimitation of Turkey will be taken a line starting from a point on the Sea of Marmora to the east of Rodosto and ending on the Black Sea near Cape Mulatra, south-east of Midia, excluding peninsula of Gallipoli, which remains to Turkey. All territory to the west of this line shall be ceded by Turkey to the allied States, including the besieged towns of Adrianople and Scutari.

"2. Turkey shall cede the islands of the Ægean Sea.

"3. Turkey shall disinterest herself entirely with regard to Crete.

"4. Turkey shall consent, in principle, to payment to the allies of a war indemnity, the amount of which shall be fixed on the conclusion of peace, likewise to payment of private indemnities 'pour les dommages dont la cause est antérieure à la guerre.' The allied States shall take part in the deliberations concerning the indemnities.

"5. The allied States reserve to themselves the right to settle in final treaty of peace the treatment to be accorded to their subjects and commerce in Ottoman Empire, questions of contested nationality, as well as guarantees regarding privileges of the Orthodox Churches and rights of their co-nationals who are Ottoman subjects.

"6. Hostilities will not be suspended.

"Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs called my attention to the fact that Servia is only interested in regard to the conditions 4 and 5. He also observed that the Prime Minister had endeavoured to persuade Bulgaria to name a town farther west for frontier."

[12025] No. 274.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 11th March.

The Russian Minister has spoken strongly to the King, telling him that if he persists in his declared intention of making further attacks on Scutari he will act in opposition to the express advice of Russia. So far the warning seems to have been without effect; preparations are being continued, and Servian reinforcements and guns are arriving. It is declared here that cruiser "Hamidieh" destroyed the cargo of food supplies at San Giovanni di Medua, but nothing else.

I will endeavour to ascertain anything I can with regard to addresses to the King enclosed in your despatch No. 6. I venture to think that [group undecypherable] Montenegrin Government cannot be accepted with entire confidence. In any case the situation has changed since last November. So far as I can learn, none of the tribes are now in touch with Montenegro except those on the frontier. It is even suggested that these two would be hostile, were they not exposed to pillage on the part of Montenegrin troops in their country.

The war has become a struggle for the possession of Scutari between the Slavs and Albania. The Turks are no longer in question. In the present temper of Montenegrins their success would be disastrous to the existing Albanian population, which the Montenegrins now admit to be fighting against them.

[11956] No. 275.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, March 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 28th February: Mediation.

Montenegrin Government have returned a reply in the same terms as their allies.

I am sending text by post, but will not telegraph it unless you instruct me to do so, as I presume you have it already.

[12162] No. 276.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 226 of 14th March.

As the Minister for Foreign Affairs left St. Petersburgh yesterday, I shall not see him for a couple of days.

As regards the last paragraph, I am not at all certain how far the Russian Government are prepared to go should coercive measures eventually be necessary. They will never acquiesce in separate military action by Austria, but might possibly be induced to sanction some collective step like a naval demonstration. My object in sounding the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject was to impress on him the necessity of his acquiescing in whatever measures may be necessary to make our frontier respected.

[12163] No. 277.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 15, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has written to me saying that, Roumania and Bulgaria having accepted the proposed mediation, and having informed the Powers of their desire that it should take place at St. Petersburgh, he would like to know whether I am authorised to take part in it.

As M. Delcassé only arrives about 21st March, the first meeting will probably be held on 24th March.

Italian Ambassador asked me a few days ago what I thought was likely to be the outcome of our meetings, and told me in confidence that he believed the Austrian and German Ambassadors would be instructed to support Roumania's claim to Silistria, that he would probably have to join them, and that then we should be equally divided. I replied that so far I had received no instructions, but that I personally should much regret were the question to be treated as one that must necessarily divide us into two opposing groups. Our object ought to be to arrive at a fair and equable decision, and as we had to act more or less in a judicial capacity we should approach the question in an impartial spirit. Otherwise smaller States would abstain in future from appealing to the mediation of the Powers were it known that the decision of the latter in the present case had been prompted by purely interested motives. His Excellency said that he entirely shared my views, though he evidently doubted whether he would be free to act up to them.

In speaking to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday I suggested that he should, in opening the discussion, say something in the above sense. He seemed, however, to fear that Germany had made up her mind to support Roumania and that nothing would prevent her doing so.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Germany's present idea was that in the event of a deadlock a sur-arbiter should be chosen, and that, if our votes are equally divided between the representatives of the two foreign Powers, one of two candidates should be chosen by lot. I remarked that whoever was thus selected would be sure to vote with the group by which he was chosen, and that, in that case, we might as well draw lots at once as to whether Silistria was to be ceded to Roumania or not. He agreed with me that we ought to do our utmost to find some compromise that would obviate the necessity of our having to choose a sur-arbiter.

Austria and Germany are very likely to object to the Spanish Ambassador, while I gather from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Emperor is averse to letting the United States of America have a deciding voice in an important European question. Among the representatives of the minor States there is none here who inspires me with confidence.

I should be grateful of instructions as to the attitude which you wish me to adopt.

[12165] No. 278.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 15, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

My telegram No. 90 of 14th March.

Present policy of the allies is to do the utmost to secure admission in principle of [group undecypherable] indemnity. If successful in this, they propose to suggest 40,000,000*l.* as basis of negotiations. The Greek Minister argues that Greece has a better right to indemnity than the other allies, because she paid 4,000,000*l.* to Turkey after the war of 1897.

(Very Confidential.)

The Russian Minister told the Prime Minister that he was personally in favour of indemnity, but that he was not speaking for the Russian Government.

The Bulgarian Government are doing their utmost to persuade both Russian and Austrian Governments to support them on the indemnity question.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[12166] No. 279.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 15, 1913.*

THE King is sending General Dimitrief, the victor of Lule Burgas, on a special mission to St. Petersburgh with an autograph letter to the Emperor of Russia.

The general was educated in Russia, and is a *persona grata* at the Russian Court.

[12425] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 15, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has given me reply to last communication about Djakova and Albanian frontier. Reply was verbal, but is quite definite that Austria cannot go further in way of conciliation than to accept an international commission to decide to whom Djakova should belong. Only if this commission had decided against Djakova being Albanian would the commission have to secure economic and other guarantees for protection of non-Servian population. I fear that on this point reply of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is final, and that concession of Dibra and assent to an international commission for Djakova are the last concessions that can be obtained from Vienna.

Austrian Ambassador also gave me to understand that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs considered that further meetings of reunion would be of no use unless the north and north-east frontiers of Albania could be settled at them without the carrying out of a decision arrived at being made dependent upon the attitude of Balkan States. This no doubt means that refusal of any Balkan State to evacuate or renounce a place assigned to Albania must be no reason for not giving effect to any decision come to at the reunion.

A decision after last reply of Austrian Government can of course only be arrived at exclusively of the question of Djakova, the settlement of which would be reserved for a commission.

I told Austrian Ambassador that the reply of Austrian Government brought me very near to the point of saying that there was no more I could do in the matter, but that this was a decision too serious for me to take without consideration, and that meanwhile I should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of purport of Austrian reply.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ask him to give very serious consideration to the situation, and let me know as soon as possible whether he would be prepared to come to a decision about the north and north-east frontiers of Albania, exclusive of Djakova, and leaving the whole decision as regards Djakova to a commission.

What I fear is that the fall of Scutari will precipitate separate action on the part of Austria, and create a serious, if not critical, situation unless an agreement about the frontier is speedily come to.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 128.)

[13876] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 15, 1913.*

A QUESTION is being asked in House of Commons on Tuesday, 18th March, as to whether His Majesty's Government are aware of the recent attempts of partisans of ex-Shah to secure his recall to Persia, and what steps are being taken by His Majesty's Government to counteract these machinations.

I propose to reply that my attention has been drawn to the reports on the subject and that I have been in communication with the Russian Government, who equally with His Majesty's Government would strongly deprecate any attempt of the ex-Shah to return to Persia.

Ascertain from Minister for Foreign Affairs if he has any objection to proposed reply, and let me have answer as soon as possible.

[11935] No. 282.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 51 of 14th March.

I have no information confirming what Minister for Foreign Affairs says. I believe Turks also have obtained some money recently from a French source, but in any case the doubt whether refusal of financial support would or could be certainly enforced makes me doubtful whether the allies would be much influenced by the threat. You can say this to Minister for Foreign Affairs if he returns to the subject.

[11865] No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 13th March.

You should warn Montenegrin Government that a very painful impression will be created here if the civil population of Scutari is subjected to any ill-treatment at the hands of the besieging forces.

[12365] No. 284.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.**

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 15, 1913.*

THE following resolution, which was adopted at meeting of Ambassadors to-day, is sent for your confidential information, but you should take no action on it until you receive further instructions :—

"La réunion est d'avis que les bases de négociation devraient être les suivantes :

"1. Frontière ottomane en Europe : Enos, Ergene, Midia. Tous les territoires à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux Etats alliés à l'exception de l'Albanie, dont le régime et la délimitation sont réservés aux Puissances.

"2. Le règlement de la question des îles de la mer Égée est laissé à la décision des Puissances.

"3. La Turquie devra se désintéresser complètement de l'île de Crète.

"4. Les Puissances ne peuvent se montrer favorables à une demande d'indemnité, mais elles admettent les alliés à prendre part aux discussions de la commission internationale de Paris pour un règlement équitable de leur participation à la dette ottomane et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués. La Turquie sera invitée à prendre part aux délibérations de cette commission.

"Si ces conditions sont approuvées par les Gouvernements, la réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de les communiquer aux belligérants et d'examiner s'il ne convient pas de réclamer d'eux une cessation des hostilités.

"La réunion pense comme M. Jonnart et Sir E. Grey que, dans le cas d'un refus des alliés d'admettre les vues des Puissances, il y aurait lieu de leur déclarer, comme on

* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 45), Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 77), Sir R. Paget (No. 61) and Count de Salis (No. 23).

l'a fait dans la première note collective à la Turquie, qu'ils ne pourraient compter sur le concours des Puissances pour le règlement des questions financières ou autres dont la solution s'imposera après la conclusion de la paix."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 126; Rome, No. 105; Berlin, No. 133; Vienna, No. 110; and St. Petersburgh, No. 228, "for your information only.")

[12366] No. 285.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

FOLLOWING resolution was adopted at meeting of Ambassadors to-day:

"La réunion est d'avis qu'il convient de prendre acte avec satisfaction de l'acceptation de la médiation des Puissances par les alliés, en leur faisant observer qu'avant d'ouvrir une discussion sur les conditions de la paix il appartient aux Puissances de formuler leurs vues sur les bases de négociation qui devraient être adoptées."

When all your colleagues are similarly instructed, you can join in making above reply to Government to which you are accredited.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 106; Berlin, No. 135; Vienna, No. 112; Paris, No. 127; and St. Petersburgh, No. 229, "for information"; and to Constantinople, No. 142, "for your information only.")

[12425] No. 286.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

MY telegram No. 230 of to-day's date to St. Petersburgh.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[12737] No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 191.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

I ASKED M. Cambon to come to see me this afternoon. I informed him that the Austrian reply to the last Russian proposal was very unfavourable. It was, in effect, that Austria could not consider the proposal of a commission with regard to the question of Djakova except on the basis that the commission was to be free to decide the ownership of Djakova. Count Berchtold added that he thought a continuance of the reunions of Ambassadors would be useless unless an agreement could be come to about the Albanian frontier, which would not be dependent upon the attitude of a Balkan State.

I told M. Cambon what I had said to Count Mensdorff. I observed that the situation was very serious, and I asked M. Cambon to inform the French Government, that they might take it into consideration.

He agreed that the situation was very serious, and he promised to inform his Government. He said that, if the reunion was broken up, the responsibility would rest on Austria.

I replied that it would no doubt be the case that the reunions would be discontinued because Austria was not willing to go on with them, but there would follow a bitter dispute between Austria and Russia as to which was responsible for the break-up of the reunions. Russia would say that they were broken up because Austria had imposed conditions on their continuance. Austria would say that she had been obliged to bring matters to a head because of the delays, for which Russia was responsible, of some weeks after Christmas and some days recently, delays which were dragging things on to

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 62), Sir F. Elliot (No. 46) and Count de Salis (No. 24).

the prejudice of Austria; the suspicion in the Austrian mind being that things were being deliberately delayed in order to confront Austria with the *fait accompli* of the fall of Scutari.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12738] No. 288.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 122.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day of the reply given to me by Count Mensdorff, as I had just told M. Cambon. I said that I would telegraph to St. Petersburgh. I spoke to him as I had to M. Cambon and Count Mensdorff respecting the seriousness of the situation, and the prospect of my being unable to do any more.

Count Benckendorff thought that it would have been easier to agree to a commission about Djakova if the suggestion had not been accompanied by the menace of the break-up of the reunion of Ambassadors.

I said that the Austrian communication was a verbal one, and I did not wish to convey it in the form of a menace, if this might prejudice the question of the commission.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12736] No. 289.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

COUNT MENSDORFF asked to see me, at short notice, before the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, and gave me verbally the Austrian reply to the last Russian proposal about Albania.

The Austrian reply was that the last Russian proposal appeared "indiscutable" to Count Berchtold. The intention of M. Sazonof to give "en principe" Djakova to Servia and to reduce the activity of the International Commission to the economic question could not be considered, all the more so as the news received during the last few days about Servian-Montenegrin atrocities against Mahommedan and Catholic Albanians had strengthened Count Berchtold's conviction that Austria could not go further in the way of conciliation than to accept the International Commission, suggested by me, to be sent to Djakova. The mission of this commission would be to decide to whom Djakova should belong; only in case this commission had decided against Djakova being Albanian, the commission would have to secure not only economic guarantees, but also guarantees for an effective and lasting protection of the religious rights and liberties of the urban and rural non-Servian population. Concerning the argument of M. Sazonof making his participation in a *démarche* at Cettinjé and Belgrade dependent on Austria's assent to the abandonment of Djakova to Servia, because Servia could never recall her troops from that town, Count Berchtold could only look upon this argument as a recognition of the right of a Balkan State to resist a decision taken by the Ambassadors' reunion in London, a principle which Austria could not admit. In Vienna the impression seemed to gain ground that, up to now, the deliberations of the reunion had had only a theoretical result. At the first occasion, when one ought to pass from theory to practice, obstacles were met with. The argument of M. Sazonof about Servian resistance raised serious doubts about how the decisions of the reunion could be carried into effect at all. It would appear aimless to continue theoretical deliberations as long as these doubts were not dispelled by a unanimous decision of the reunion of Ambassadors, imposing upon Montenegro and Servia the obligation to evacuate the territories already allotted to Albania, and to stop the war operations in the said territories. At present Austria would therefore consider further meetings of the reunion useless, as long as I was not in a position to invite the Austrian Ambassador to attend a reunion in which the north and north-east frontiers of Albania—exclusively of the question of Djakova, the settlement of which would be reserved—could be settled, without the carrying into effect of this decision

being made dependent upon the attitude of Balkan States interested in the matter. Should this be impossible, and, much against the Austrian wish, I decided to make a pause in the deliberations of the Ambassadors, Austria would have to reserve the liberty of her decision concerning events which might occur during that time.

I said that this brought me very near to the point of saying that I could not do any more, that no settlement could be come to, and that the meetings of Ambassadors must be discontinued. In that case, I should have to make a statement in Parliament of what my part had been, and of why I could do no more. But the situation was too serious for me to come to any decision without reflection. I proposed, therefore, to take Sunday (to-morrow) to consider the matter. This afternoon I would merely inform the Russian and French Ambassadors of the purport of what Count Mensdorff had told me, and telegraph it to St. Petersburgh.

Count Mensdorff begged me not to come to any decision such as I had indicated without first telling him. He was most anxious to do anything in his power to soften matters. He impressed upon me that the instructions which he had received, and which were brusque in tone, were not intended to represent the form of a communication to be made to me.

I observed that Count Berchtold's impression that Russia was establishing the principle that giving effect to a decision of the Powers should be made dependent upon the attitude of one of the Balkan States interested appeared to me to be due to a misunderstanding. The principle that Balkan States must defer to the wishes of the Powers was not disputed by Russia. She had agreed to its application in the case of the Adriatic littoral, and it would be applied in the case of Scutari if Servia was left in possession of Djakova. I therefore did not construe the Russian proposal as meaning more than that Russia was unable to concur in pressing Servia to evacuate Djakova as well as in pressing Servia to evacuate the littoral, and Montenegro to renounce Scutari. For these reasons it was not a principle that was in dispute, but the application of a principle to the particular case of Djakova. I asked Count Mensdorff to point out this to Count Berchtold, as the inherent difficulties of the subject ought not to be made worse by a misunderstanding on a point of form.

Count Mensdorff said that he would do this.

With regard to the statement that I had suggested an international commission with regard to the question of Djakova, I said that my recollection was that I was the first to suggest an international commission to consider the question of the whole Albanian frontier. Austria had been decidedly opposed to this suggestion. Russia had been favourable to it, if it became necessary. Subsequently, when only the question of Djakova remained to be settled and everything depended upon it, Count Mensdorff had told me that he thought it possible that, if a commission were limited to just this small district, Austria might accept the commission. But M. Sazonof had never committed himself as favourable to anything except the original idea of a commission for the whole frontier.

Count Mensdorff agreed in my recollection of the history of the proposal.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8408] No. 290.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to your Confidential letter of the 11th December last, regarding the possible effects of the present war on British trade with European Turkey and the Balkan kingdoms in view of the partition of Turkish territory among the latter, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the consideration of the Board of Trade, copy of a memorandum received from the German Embassy, stating the conditions, formulated with a view to safeguarding foreign trade, on which, in the opinion of the German Government, the Powers should insist before recognising any annexation of territory.*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with any observations which the Board may have to make on the enclosed memorandum.

* Part V, No. 355.

Sir E. Grey would further be grateful if the Board could suggest some general formula which all the Powers would accept, and which they could propose to the Balkan States as a preliminary to the recognition of their acquisitions.

I am to add that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the conditions to be attached to such recognition should not be too onerous or of such a nature as to hamper the economic freedom of the Balkan States.

On receipt of the views which the Board may put forward, Sir E. Grey proposes consulting the French and Russian Governments before coming to a final decision in the matter and before replying to the enclosed memorandum.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10207] No. 291.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my letter of to-day, transmitting proposals made by the German Government as to conditions to be stipulated by the Powers, previous to recognition of the acquisitions of Turkish territory by the Balkan States, for safeguarding foreign trade, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Board of Trade, copy of a communication from the Italian Embassy, relative to duties on cotton goods imported into the conquered territories.*

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[12293] No. 292.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 8, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to the 7th instant.

On the 3rd Santi Quaranta was bombarded by the ironclad "Psara" and some destroyers, and troops were landed on that and the following day. There was some resistance to the disembarkation and some prisoners were taken. The number of troops landed is not stated.

Servian troops have been conveyed from Salonica to Durazzo with some trepidation, on account of the ignorance of the whereabouts of the "Hamidieh," which appears, however, to be keeping at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. One small steamer with 180 Servians on board ran aground near Chalcis.

No statement has been made as to the losses during the final attack on Jannina, except that they are relatively slight.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 292.

Diary of the War for period March 1 to 7, 1913.

Philippiada, 3rd March.—Our troops descending from Metsovo drove back the enemy and are advancing towards the Arta River. According to information from Lieutenant-Colonel Malamou on the 28th ultimo, 800 Turks with five guns attacked the irregular corps under Krommydas and Kolivos, who held the Jannina-Philiates line, near the village of Soulopoulo. In this engagement our men repulsed the enemy with truly admirable dash, before which the Turks were compelled to retire in disorder. The Turks left over 100 dead, amongst them being their commander. The next day 500 Turks with two or three guns attempted to dislodge our troops from Lykostani.

* No. 33.

Our troops in the monastery, however, although few, not only maintained their position, but inflicted severe loss on the enemy.

Emin Aga, 5th March, 11·30 A.M.—On Tuesday (4th March) a general attack on the forts of Jannina commenced. The principal attack I ordered to be made on the western front of the fortress, i.e., against the lines of Manoliassa, Hagios Nikolaos, and Sadovitsa. With this object I concentrated on my left very strong forces, of which I formed a division of the army composed of three phalanxes (*sic*) under Major-General Moschopoulos. Our infantry fired from its positions on the enemy's trenches, inducing him to place his infantry in the fighting line and to bring all his batteries into action. Our artillery brought a very heavy fire to bear on the enemy and inflicted severe loss. It was continued all night.

For to-day I ordered the general attack. The right and centre were to execute a crushing attack in order to occupy the enemy while the left was to carry out a surprise attack. The movement and concentration of all the phalanxes on the left was carried out with admirable accuracy and order unobserved by the enemy. He was completely surprised. At 7 A.M. Tsouka was occupied by a surprise attack, and four guns and eighty prisoners were taken by the left phalanx. The left phalanx of the second division of the army took the heights of Manoliassa at about 10 A.M., capturing six guns and a whole battalion with their arms. The central phalanx, in co-operation with the left phalanx, captured Hagios Nikolaos, where the 1st and 11th regiments took ten guns and a quantity of ammunition. From 11 A.M. numerous parties of the enemy commenced descending from the slopes of Manoliassa and Hagios Nikolaos as far as Kosmira in disorder towards the plain; at about 1·30 attempts of the enemy to rally stragglers at Rapsista became evident. Our mountain batteries, however, scattered them with shells. From 2 o'clock the enemy were in flight towards Jannina pursued by artillery fire. This retreat continued until the evening. A little before dark the artillery observation post noted that the enemy in flight had come into conflict with other Turkish troops which had perhaps been sent to stop them. During the same time the mixed brigade of Metsovo occupied Drisko and Kondovraki, having in successive engagements since the day before yesterday driven back the enemy from Khrysovitsa, Dresteniko, and Linpi-Demati. The right of the sixth division also advanced a little, and the detachments of the other divisions remained firing, in the positions they had occupied, according to orders. Throughout the day the artillery harassed the enemy by a very heavy fire. On the occupation of Tsouka and Hagios Nikolaos the third phalanx advanced and captured the Durutti heights, and darkness found our left on the Durutti–Rapsista–Vodevista plain line to the north of Manoliassa. Thus my troops were victorious to-day all along the line. The attack and pursuit will continue to-morrow until the complete destruction of the enemy. When the whole operations are concluded I will forward a more detailed report.

CONSTANTINE.

Emin Aga, 6th March, 6 A.M.—The Greek army have captured the whole of the west front of Jannina, and the Bizani-Kastritsa lines of entrenchment having been surrounded. Essad Pasha has this moment informed me that his army surrenders as prisoners of war. I will telegraph details later regarding the great victory of our brave army.

CONSTANTINE.

Emin Aga, 6th March, 8 A.M.—To-day at 2·30 A.M. Essad Pasha sent to inform the Crown Prince that he desired to surrender. About two hours later a motor-car arrived at Emin Aga with Reouf Pasha and Tahat Bey, accompanied by the protosyngelos of the cathedral of Jannina. The representatives of the defeated general admitted straightforwardly that since yesterday's attack the situation of the Turkish army was hopeless, and that Essad Pasha wished to surrender. From this moment the Turkish army are prisoners of war. Each division will raise a white flag and will surrender to our troops. This great news when spread among the troops about dawn served as a most joyful reveille for the army, resting after its labours of yesterday. The men woke each other with the cry "Christ is risen!" cheering the Crown Prince and celebrating with the decorum of victors the triumph of the Greek arms.

Emin Aga, 6th March, 9 A.M.—Three squadrons of cavalry under Major-General Soutzo have entered Jannina. Bizani is covered with white flags.

Emin Aga, 6th March, 9·30 A.M.—At 4·40 the Crown Prince's delegates for the signature of the protocol of surrender returned from Jannina. The fortress and garrison surrender unconditionally. The protocol contains the following four clauses:

(1.) The fortress of Jannina surrenders to the Greek army. (2.) The troops now in the fortress are surrendered as prisoners of war. (3.) The whole of the war material, arms, colours, and horses belonging to the army are to be given up to the Greek army in their present condition. (4.) All the officers and men, wounded and sick, are subject to the laws of war.

According to the information of the delegates sent this morning by Essad Pasha to head-quarters at Emin Aga the garrison consists of 33,000 men. Lieutenant Staikos reports from Jannina, where he was sent by the commander-in-chief, that yesterday evening a strong body of troops in complete disorder left for Lykostomo. Essad Pasha justified himself by saying that he could not prevent their departure as they were under the orders of the commander-in-chief, Ali Riza Pasha, and he himself had no authority over them. The Crown Prince is now taking the necessary steps in view of the new situation.

Jannina, 7th March, 8 P.M.—The reception of the Crown Prince took place at 12 o'clock to-day. 15,000 people under the influence of emotion and unrestrained enthusiasm followed him. It was an apotheosis. On the entry of the troops, and especially of the cavalry yesterday, the people embraced the soldiers and kissed the hands of the officers.

The inhabitants tore their fezes to pieces and strewed the square with them. The Greek population is joyfully entertaining our glorious army. The inhabitants cheered for M. Venizelos.

Besides the prisoners, 6,000 sick and wounded were surrendered yesterday. Fugitive Turkish soldiers, without arms, have been directing their steps towards Albania since the night before last. During their passage through the town they looted a few insignificant shops. Since yesterday evening complete order and quiet prevails.

[12269] No. 293.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 55 of the 6th instant, I yesterday left with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a copy of the three draft articles therein enumerated, and expressed the hope that the Servian Government will agree to their insertion in the treaty of peace with Turkey.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[12213] No. 294.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 8, 1913.*

I HAVE received from the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as have the other heads of missions in this capital, copy of a memorandum, with enclosures, respecting the frontier dispute between this country and Roumania.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to whom application was made for further copies to be forwarded to you, state that twenty such copies have been supplied to the Bulgarian Minister in London, who has been instructed to bring the document to your notice.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[12214] No. 285.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 8, 1913.*

ON receipt of your despatch No. 25 of the 4th February I took an early opportunity of speaking to the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as therein

instructed, respecting the damage reported by His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica to have been inflicted by the allied troops in the districts in their military occupation, notably in that of Ghevgheli, and left with M. Gueshof a précis of the information contained in Mr. Lamb's despatch to Sir R. Paget of the 11th January, paragraphs 2 to 7.

I have now the honour to enclose copy of a memorandum received in reply from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which you will see that it is stated that the military governors in the occupied districts had received previous instructions to protect agricultural property as far as possible; that any damage committed had been the unavoidable consequence of military operations, and that none had been done wantonly by Bulgarian soldiery; and finally, that in the particular district of Ghevgheli there are very few Bulgarian troops, and no Bulgarian civil or military authorities.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 295.

Memorandum communicated to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

EN se référant au mémorandum de la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 11 janvier dernier, le Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance qu'il n'a pas manqué d'attirer l'attention de qui de ressort sur les faits exposés dans le mémorandum ci-dessus.

En réponse, le Département Royal de l'Agriculture vient de faire savoir à ce Ministère que les ordres nécessaires ont été, à temps, donnés aux gouverneurs militaires du vilayet d'Andrinople et de la Macédoine en vue de faire sauvegarder les biens champêtres, et que les quelques dégâts qui ont été causés dans ledit vilayet n'ont été faits, comme il a été constaté sur les lieux par les fonctionnaires du département chargés de procéder à une enquête dans les nouveaux territoires, que par suite d'une nécessité impérieuse et dans l'intérêt des opérations militaires, et ne sont pas du tout dus à des instincts destructifs des soldats bulgares, lesquels sont à même d'apprécier mieux que tout autre la valeur des ensemencements, mûriers, vignes, &c., étant dans leur plus grande partie des agriculteurs.

Quant aux incidents de Ghévgheli, ledit département affirme de la manière la plus catégorique, en base des rapports de ses fonctionnaires qui viennent de rentrer, que rien de pareil ne pourrait être attribué aux soldats bulgares; aucune plainte n'a été jusqu'à présent adressée à qui que ce soit contre la conduite des soldats bulgares, qui n'y sont que très peu nombreux, l'arrondissement de Ghévgheli ne possédant d'autorités civiles et militaires bulgares.

Sophia, le 21 février (6 *mars*), 1913.

[12294] No. 296.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Athens, March 9, 1913.*

BY your circular telegram of the 28th February (No. 113 to Constantinople) His Majesty's representatives at the capitals of the belligerent States were authorised, when their colleagues were similarly instructed, to approach the Governments to which they are accredited with a view to induce them, on grounds of humanity, to allow the civil population to withdraw from the three besieged towns, Scutari, Adrianople, and Yannina.

Although the proposal emanated from the Russian Government, it was not until the 6th instant that their representative here received his instructions, while none have been sent from Paris at all. The fall of Yannina renders any representation to the Greek Government superfluous, to the relief of my colleagues and myself, who were all prepared for a refusal owing to the advantage which, as the Russian proposal itself admits, compliance with it would confer upon the enemy from a military point of view.

On the day of the surrender of Yannina I asked M. Coromilas whether he knew what the condition of the inhabitants was. He replied that he had not heard of

distress or scarcity there, but that at any rate the revictualling of the town by Prevesa and Santi Quaranta would be easy.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[12216] No. 297.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 32. Secret.)
Sir, *Sophia, March 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No 24, Secret, of the 25th ultimo, respecting the secret negotiations proceeding between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments as to the boundaries of their future possessions in the territories to be acquired from Turkey as the result of the present war, I now have the honour to enclose a French translation of a despatch from the Servian President of the Council to the Servian representative in this capital.

This despatch, which is dated the 9th (22nd) February, contains a full statement of the Servian case. It was read to M. Gueshof by the Servian representative on the 28th February, and copy of it was sent to him officially on the 1st instant. No reply to this communication has yet been received by the Servian Minister, although I understand that it is receiving the serious attention both of His Majesty the King and of the Bulgarian Ministers. The President of the Council telegraphed last week to the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade, instructing him to leave for Sophia without delay in order to give his opinion as to the details of the reply which it may be considered advisable to return. M. Toshef, who arrived here a few days ago, informed a member of my staff that the present condition of affairs was highly unsatisfactory, and that every effort must be made to conclude the war. In my opinion, M. Toshef's remarks refer more pertinently to the state of the relations now existing between Bulgaria and Servia than to the negotiations now proceeding between Turkey and the allies through the intermediary of the Great Powers.

You will note that in the Servian despatch four reasons are given as justifying the present Servian demand for a larger share of territory than that agreed on at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of alliance:—

1. Bulgaria did not, in fact, furnish the 100,000 men in support of the Servian operations on the Vardar, as stipulated in the military convention;

3. Servia did, on the other hand, support the Bulgarian operations in Thrace, at the request of the Bulgarian Government, with 50,000 men, siege guns and ammunition, all of which was not stipulated in the military convention;

And as regards the operation of territory—

2. Servia is being obliged to give up the vilayet of Scutari and Durazzo, in deference to Austria; while

4. Bulgaria is in a fair way to gain Adrianople, an acquisition not contemplated at the time of concluding the alliance.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a sketch showing the small portion of territory required by Servia from her ally.* It includes the towns of Krüprülü, Perlepé, and Monastir.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 297.

Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Servian Minister, Sophia.

(Secret.)
(Traduction.)
M. le Ministre, *Belgrade, le 9* (22) *février*, 1913.

LE Président du Conseil a été agréablement touché par la reconnaissance du Gouvernement bulgare, mais il a été désagréablement surpris que M. Guéchof parle

* Not reproduced.

de nouveau d'une compensation pécuniaire pour les services militaires que la Serbie rend à la Bulgarie pour le siège d'Andrinople. M. Pasitch considère que les armées et les armes font partie de l'honneur nationale et qu'on ne les rend pas pour de l'argent.

Jusqu'à présent la Serbie a évité de parler de la compensation qui lui est due : nous avons voulu réserver la conversation sur ce point pour plus tard, quand on procéderait au partage des territoires entre les alliés; mais, puisque la Bulgarie soulève déjà la question de la nature de la compensation, le Gouvernement serbe considère de son devoir de faire savoir au Gouvernement bulgare ce que la Serbie se propose de demander.

Votre Excellence est donc chargée de faire une démarche auprès de Gouvernement bulgare pour que la ligne de délimitation de la Macédoine prévue dans le traité serbo-bulgare soit rectifié en faveur de la Serbie. J'estime que l'objection que cette ligne ne pourrait pas être rectifiée pourrait provenir de quelqu'un qui ou bien ne connaît pas les détails du traité, ou qui n'a pas comparé ce qui a été prévu par le traité avec ce qui a été réalisé par la guerre : si la Serbie s'était tenue strictement au traité pendant la guerre, il n'y a pas de doute que les alliés n'auraient jamais pu obtenir les résultats aussi brillants que ceux que nous avons obtenus en consentant à nous écarter de certaines dispositions du traité. Le traité d'alliance a été fait d'après des suppositions. Les faits ont démontré que ces suppositions n'étaient pas exactes et que le traité devait se modifier et s'adapter aux circonstances réelles. Cette réalité a imposé à la Serbie des charges plus lourdes et des sacrifices plus grands que ceux qu'elle n'était obligée de supporter d'après le traité. Si à présent le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie vient avec cette demande, ce n'est pas que le sentiment de solidarité, d'amitié, de fraternité est devenu plus faible qu'il était au moment de la conclusion du traité. Le Gouvernement fait cette démarche uniquement poussé par le sentiment d'équité, et par le désir de fortifier davantage l'alliance serbo-bulgare par le partage juste du territoire acquis.

Cette demande serbe se trouve fondée sur les quatre faits suivants, faits étroitement liés avec l'exécution même du traité, et tellement réels et positifs qu'ils justifieraient pleinement les demandes serbes, même en dehors de tout traité :—

1. D'après le traité et la convention militaire, qui ont été confirmés par les signatures des Souverains, la Serbie était obligée de mobiliser en cas de guerre au moins 150,000 hommes et la Bulgarie au moins 200,000 hommes. Pour le cas d'une guerre comme la guerre actuelle, la Serbie s'obligeait à envoyer au champ de guerre du Vardar 100,000 hommes, et la Bulgarie s'obligeait à envoyer au même champ une force égale, c'est-à-dire à aider la Serbie avec 100,000 hommes. En réalité, les choses se sont passées tout à fait autrement. Avant le commencement de la guerre la Serbie a mobilisé 310,000 hommes, et au cours de la guerre encore 50,000—en tout 360,000 hommes tandis que la Bulgarie a employé presque toutes ses forces au champ de guerre de la Maritza. Donc, la Bulgarie a employé en Thrace les 100,000 hommes qu'elle devait envoyer au Vardar, et, par conséquent, n'a pas rempli une obligation prévue par le traité en faveur de la Serbie. Cependant, la Serbie a trouvé le moyen de seconder en mobilisant une armée deux fois plus grande que celle qu'elle n'était obligée de mobiliser d'après le traité. En mobilisant une armée aussi forte, la Serbie rendait également un service à la Bulgarie, par le fait que la Bulgarie pouvait employer les 100,000 sur son théâtre de guerre en Thrace. Aussi la Serbie seule a supporté tous les sacrifices en Macédoine, comme le prouvent les grandes batailles de Koumanovo, de Kuprulu, Perlépé, Bakano Gumno et Monastir.

Pendant l'élaboration du traité d'alliance la force militaire de la Serbie était supposée beaucoup plus inférieure et celle de la Bulgarie beaucoup plus supérieure qu'elles n'étaient en réalité. Par conséquent, la délimitation serbo-bulgare en Macédoine a été faite aussi sur la base de ces suppositions imaginaires de la force militaire des deux pays—suppositions qui sont aussi entrées dans le traité, et que les événements ont montré inexactes.

En réalité, la Serbie seule a fait la guerre en Macédoine et a réussi à anéantir complètement l'armée turque sur ce champ de guerre, pendant que la Bulgarie faisait la guerre en Thrace, seule d'abord, et ensuite aidée par la Serbie. Par conséquent, la Serbie a le droit à un territoire plus grand qu'il n'a été prévu par l'entente.

2. Pendant la négociation du traité d'alliance on a prévu deux catégories de territoire : territoire incontestablement serbe, au nord et à l'ouest du Char-dagh, et territoire incontestablement bulgare, à l'est du Rhodope et de la rivière Strouma. La Macédoine formait le territoire contestable. D'après l'esprit du traité même, si la

Serbie parvient à conquérir ce territoire incontestablement serbe, c'est-à-dire le vilayet de Scutari avec Durazzo, la Bulgarie est engagée vis-à-vis de la Serbie aussi à défendre ce territoire. Pourtant, lorsque les troupes serbes avaient occupé ce territoire des difficultés très graves avaient surgi, en premier lieu pour la Serbie, et, en second lieu, pour la Bulgarie, comme alliée de la Serbie. L'Autriche-Hongrie menaçait la Serbie d'une guerre. Dans un cas pareil la Bulgarie eût été obligée, d'après le traité, d'envoyer au secours de la Serbie 200,000 soldats, contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. Donc, la Serbie et la Bulgarie se trouvaient à la veille d'une guerre avec l'Autriche-Hongrie au moment où leurs troupes alliées se trouvaient encore en face de l'armée turque. Sur les conseils des Grandes Puissances amies, la Serbie a considéré de son devoir d'éviter ce conflit, afin d'épargner les ressources des deux États. Comme on le sait, les Ambassadeurs à Londres ont privé la Serbie des fruits de ses victoires dans ces territoires. Il est donc juste que cette perte de territoire soit partagée entre la Serbie et la Bulgarie, de sorte que la Serbie soit maintenant recompensée par un plus grand territoire en Macédoine.

3. D'après le traité, comme nous l'avons vu, la Bulgarie était obligée d'envoyer 100,000 hommes au secours de la Serbie sur le théâtre du Vardar. C'est justement le contraire qui a eu lieu. Le Gouvernement bulgare, dès le commencement de la guerre, a prié le Gouvernement serbe d'envoyer des troupes serbes en Thrace. Le 11 (24) octobre, 1912, même, un délégué spécial, M. Téodoref, Ministre des Finances, a été envoyé à Nisch pour supplier M. Pasitch que la Serbie envoie le plus tôt possible deux ou trois divisions pour le siège d'Andrinople, parce que les troupes bulgares n'étaient pas suffisantes. La Serbie, sans hésitation, a envoyé plus de 50,000 soldats, qui se trouvent aujourd'hui sous les murs d'Andrinople. Outre cela, le 27 janvier (9 février), 1913, le Gouvernement bulgare s'est adressé avec une nouvelle demande au Gouvernement serbe, en le priant d'envoyer aussi ses canons de forteresse pour le siège d'Andrinople. Le Gouvernement serbe a fait cet aussi tout de suite. En vue de ces faits, il est évident que la Serbie a fait plus que ce que le traité ne lui obligeait de faire; elle doit, par conséquent, également, recevoir plus que ne lui accorde la partie correspondante bulgare.

4. Pendant les négociations serbo-bulgares, lorsqu'on a parlé des territoires turcs qui pourraient éventuellement revenir aux alliés, on a affirmé catégoriquement du côté officiel bulgare qu'Andrinople avec son territoire appartient à la sphère de Constantinople et des Détroits, et que, par conséquent, les Bulgares n'y ont aucune prétention. Cependant, au cours de la guerre un changement s'est produit sous ce rapport, et Andrinople avec son territoire est entré dans la sphère du territoire bulgare. La Serbie n'a pu que se réjouir de ce changement, qui s'est produit en faveur de son allié, et qui donne à la Serbie encore une quatrième raison pour demander l'augmentation de son territoire en Macédoine. Voilà déjà plus de trois mois que la Serbie, après avoir terminé sa tâche militaire en Macédoine, maintient toute son armée sur le pied de guerre et pèse par conséquent tout ce poids en faveur de la Bulgarie, afin que la Bulgarie obtienne ce point si important pour elle, c'est-à-dire Andrinople, auquel elle n'avait point de prétention au moment où l'alliance serbo-bulgare se faisait.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe espère que le Gouvernement Royal bulgare saura rendre justice à l'accomplissement sincère et loyal de tous les devoirs que la Serbie a exécutés comme alliée de la Bulgarie pendant cette guerre, et que le Gouvernement bulgare par conséquent s'empressera de donner au Gouvernement serbe une réponse amicale et fraternelle, d'autant plus que la Serbie ne demande pas un pouce de territoire en Macédoine qui ne fût arrosé par le sang de ses fils ou qui fût occupé par les troupes bulgares.

Le désir sincère de la Serbie est de s'arranger directement et sans intermédiaire, afin d'éviter le recours à l'arbitrage qui est prévu et auquel la Serbie a le droit.

PASITCH.

[12218] No. 208.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.,

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 8, 1913.*

THE Sobranjé reopened on the 28th February for the second half of the ordinary yearly session.

The first question of importance to be brought up was the vote of an extraordinary credit of 2,000,000*l.* required for the army.

M. Malinof, the chief of the Democratic party, took the opportunity of making an attack on the Government, which was listened to with comparatively little interest, except by his own immediate party, who rewarded their chief with mild applause on the conclusion of his discourse.

The principal points he made were that the Government did not possess the right to accept any proposals regarding mediation without consulting the Sobranjé, as such mediation would probably lead to a cession of territory, which would only be legal when approved by the Grand Sobranjé. As regards any special rights to be accorded to the Koutzo-Vlachs, he considered that stipulations should be inserted in any arrangement that might be come to for according similar rights to the Bulgarian subjects who might thus come under Roumanian dominion. M. Malinof also demanded certain explanations regarding the present attitude of the allies to one another, regarding which disquieting rumours have already begun to circulate.

M. Tontchef, the leader of the Young Liberals, supported these views, and requested that the protocol of the Roumano-Bulgarian negotiations signed in London should be communicated to the deputies for their information.

The Minister of Finance, who replied on behalf of the Government, promised to show the protocol to the heads of the various parties. This action has been subsequently taken, and it is understood that the chiefs of all the parties in the Sobranjé have been put *au courant* with the state of negotiations with Turkey, Servia, and Roumania.

His Excellency then proceeded to sum up the present financial situation, stating that the Government had disposed of 4,000,000*l.* of Treasury bonds, of which 1,600,000*l.* are placed in France and 1,080,000*l.* in Russia; 1,000,000*l.* were issued previously to the war for various constructive works. The product of these Treasury bonds and the economies effected by the Treasury have rendered the task of the Government comparatively easy.

The interest on these bonds varies from 5½ to 6 per cent., a rate which the Minister contended, amid applause, was one that few States in similar circumstances could hope to obtain.

At the time of writing, the sum of 1,000,000*l.* above mentioned has not yet been voted, but no difficulty of any kind is anticipated in passing this or any other similar measure.

On the 8th instant the Minister of War stated, in reply to a question, that they were anxious to allow the return home of the men of the territorial army in order to supply the want of agricultural labour, but that the military situation made this impossible.

A more important question was addressed to the Minister of Finance respecting the expulsion of the officials of the Bulgarian Bank from Monastir. His Excellency replied that he was awaiting further information, and meanwhile was asking his colleague of Foreign Affairs to make representations to the Servian Government on the subject.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[12271] No. 299.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March 10, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 41 of the 28th ultimo I reported that certain statements which had appeared in the "Temps" concerning the respective claims of Servia and Bulgaria in Macedonia, and which were attributed to M. Toshef, my Bulgarian colleague, had caused some ill-feeling against him in Belgrade.

According to a Sophia telegram which appeared in the "Bulletin de la Presse" yesterday, the Bulgarian Government organ "Mir," referring to certain attacks made upon M. Toshef in the Servian press, has now stated that it is authorised formally to declare that all rumours of displeasure on the part of the Bulgarian Government with their representative at Belgrade are baseless, that M. Toshef is highly esteemed, and enjoys the complete confidence of his Government.

M. Stefanovitch remarked to me a few days ago that although M. Toshef had been blamed for the statements in the "Temps," he was sure he would not have spoken as he did except at the instigation of his Government. It appeared a great pity that the Bulgarian Government could not have avoided all reference to this

uncomfortable question of the delimitation as had been done by the Servian Government.

The statements in the "Mir," the inference from which is that the Bulgarian Government entirely associate themselves with the views expressed by M. Toshef to the "Temps" will not tend to improve the feeling against Bulgaria, which is becoming increasingly bitter

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[12272] No. 300.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of despatches which have been addressed to me by His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 300.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 13. Confidential.)
Sir, *Uskub, February 20, 1913.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of the 28th January, I have the honour to report that I recently had the opportunity of discussing the position of the Kossovo Bulgars with a resident of Uskub occupying a position of trust. This gentleman, who does not wish his name mentioned, confirmed my belief in the existence of the widespread discontent of the local Bulgars at Serb rule. He expressed the opinion that they would all join the Uniate Church in order to avoid being Serbised. (I was at first inclined to regard this as a case of "nothing like leather," as my informant was himself a Uniate Bulgar, but I have since heard the same opinion expressed in other quarters. "We will call ourselves anything," so the Bulgars are reported to be saying, "even gypsies, rather than Serbs.")

He appeared under the impression that Austria's Latin protectorate would be continued, but even if it is not, the Uniate Church offers a means for the Bulgars to keep themselves to themselves, and, while not severing their connection with Bulgaria, to appeal for moral support to the neighbouring Catholic Power.

I asked how the Exarchist priests would view the movement. "They will have no choice but to join, it will be so general."

He also stated that there would be considerable resistance locally to the process of forcible Serbisation which was going on. I remarked that the success of such resistance would depend on the attitude of Sophia. "They must help us; if they do not, there will be a revolution in Bulgaria; the Macedonians there will never allow the Government to leave us to our fate."

(With regard to the efficiency of local resistance, I am told that, in contrast to the Albanians, the Kossovo Bulgars are well armed. "Where there was one rifle buried before the war there are three now.")

This gentleman subsequently sent me extracts from a register which he had kept of all the misdoings of the Servians during the occupation. I have the honour to enclose a partly condensed copy, with a running comment of my own.

These complaints seem to me to fall roughly into three classes:—

1. Cases of loot, &c., probably due, at least, as much to greed and lack of discipline as to intolerance.

2. Cases of high-handed action on the part of subordinate Servian officials, which their seniors would not, or could not, rectify.

3. Cases where the superior authorities were directly responsible.

I have deemed it useless to make enquiry into the objective truth of these allegations; true or false, they are believed by the Bulgar population, which fact seems to me to constitute their political importance.

I must confess that I entertain a certain amount of doubt at the average peasant taking to heart so seriously the difference between Exarchate and Patriarchate as to

revolt against a Government which will, on the one hand, secure him from Moslem vexation, and will, on the other, put down with a firm hand any insubordination, instead of leaving its subject races to fight their quarrels out among themselves, as the Turks did. A non-Bulgar recently assured me that the feeling of discontent was not confined to the urban population, nor, in the villages, to priests, schoolmasters, and other professional agitators, but was absolutely general. But an unbiassed opinion is not to be had in Kossovo these days.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

P.S. *February* 24, 1913.—Since writing the above, I have had occasion to interview a local Bulgar merchant on matters of business, and took the opportunity of enquiring as to his opinion of the Servians. Like my original informant, he was certain that Sophia could not leave the Uskub Bulgars to their fate, many persons in high place in Sophia being Macedonians. I was much struck by the exceeding bitterness which he displayed against the Servians, the more so as I have no reason to suppose that he is or was a professional agitator.

W. D. P.

Enclosure 2 in No. 99.

Memorandum on Woes of Bulgars.

[Part condensed: copy in French; condensation in English; Vice-Consul's comments in square brackets.]

LE Colonel Blagof Barlovatz, de Belgrade, étant avec ses soldats dans le village Brezda, a exigé du maire, Dimo Gherghief, de lui procurer une femme.

Le Colonel Blagoï Mihailovitch, étant venu à Brezda avec cinquante à soixante soldats, a dit au maître d'école Petko Marcof qu'il fallait exterminer tous les Bulgares qui ont pris part dans l'organisation bulgare. La même personne a été menacée de mort si elle osait ouvrir l'école.

Les soldats serbes ont déchiré toutes les cartes illustrées portant en bulgare "Gloire bulgare" à Traitché Andreef, qui les vendait.

[I have seen copies of the picture in question, which resembles in style the Servian war pictures. It is a picture of a Turco-Bulgarian battle, but not, apparently, of any particular battle.]

Les journaux bulgares sont supprimés, sous les plus rigoureuses peines, depuis trois mois.

[See my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 12th December, 1912.]

Les soldats serbes de retour à pied de Monastir par Vélès ont fait de tels pillages et saccages dans les villages par où ils sont passés que ceux des Turcs et des hordes albanaises ne sont que des ombres.

The villages of Brezuitza and Chrechevo have been looted. Lists of objects looted given.

[These are all food and forage, no evidence is given to show that the villagers were looted because they were Bulgars rather than because the soldiers wanted the stuff.]

Three Bulgarian schoolmistresses have been dismissed.

In the compilation of the census all Bulgars are to be entered as Serbs. Comme secrétaires et contrôleurs de ces listes sont nommés tous Serbes anciens tchetniks qui exercent la terreur. The mukhtar of Brazdo was ordered to correct the word "Bulgar" in his lists into "Serb."

[Similar complaints in Enclosure No. 2 of my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of the 18th January, but a different village.]

The name-board of the Bulgarian school in Uskub has been taken down, and it is forbidden to sell or show Bulgarian flags.

[I have myself noticed that the name-board has been removed, and that certain shops in the bazaar which used to display both the Servian and Bulgarian flags now display the Servian alone.]

The Servian troops quartered in Bulgar houses in Uskub are undisciplined, and loot; the non-commissioned officers themselves say that this is the only pay that they get.

[I have no reason to suppose that the Servian looter confines his attentions to Bulgar houses.]

Dans les villages surtout ces vols et spoliations sont continuels; l'armée serbe n'a

pas laissé aux villageois ni foin, ni paille, ni canards, ni poules, ni beurre, ni cochons, &c. Les villageois ne savent plus où s'adresser. S'ils se présentent aux chefs militaires à se plaindre ils sont reçus et renvoyés avec mille blasphèmes et injures des plus atroces, en leur affirmant que l'armée serbe n'est pas capable de faire pareilles choses. A d'autres villageois il a été répondu qu'ils ne doivent pas se plaindre des objets volés par l'armée qui les a délivrés des Turcs. Parfois quand quelqu'un veut se plaindre des abus des soldats serbes on lui ordonne de faire une plainte écrite en serbe. Ces plaintes sont faites ordinairement par des anciens professeurs ou employés serbes qui, à part qu'ils prennent énormément cher pour ces écrits, les composent d'une manière telle que les traces du délit disparaissent et les preuves restent très faibles.

Le 15 décembre passé le Métropolitain serbe de Vélès, Mgr. Barnabas, a fait appeler les épitropes bulgares de l'église Saint-Pantélimon et leur a déclaré qu'il dirait la messe le 16 du même mois dans ladite église, en les prévenant qu'ils ont été Serbes et ce n'est que sous la poussée des Turcs qu'ils ont été obligés de se dire Bulgares et reconnaître l'Exarque bulgare comme chef spirituel, qui a agi toujours sous les ordres du Gouvernement turc. Les Véleschois donc étant délivrés par les Serbes doivent à présent renier l'Exarchat et reconnaître l'Église serbe et Barnabas comme chef. Après quelque temps une commission de quatre membres avec le prêtre Dimitri se présente devant l'évêque et au nom du peuple bulgare lui déclare qu'elle ne lui permet pas de faire les saints offices dans l'église bulgare sans l'autorisation de leur chef spirituel, en lui affirmant encore que les Véleschcis sont des Bulgares et resteront tels. Malgré tout cela, l'évêque serbe avec trois autres prêtres serbes a officié dans l'église bulgare. Personne des habitants n'a assisté à l'office.

[This is probably the same affair as that reported in my No. 2, Confidential, of the 23rd January.]

Le prêtre serbe Thomas Bourkovitch, natif d'Uscub, arrivé de Belgrade, en la présence de plusieurs Bulgares, s'est adressé de cette manière devant un groupe de serbomanes: "Encore ne chasse-t-on pas d'ici ce Bougarosher Néophyte et n'avez vous pas pris des Bulgares l'église la Sainte-Vierge?"

["Bougarosher" is, I am informed, a Servian contemptuous augmentative for Bulgar. Neophyte is the Exarchist Metropolitan of Uskub.]

Dans les villes Kratovo Saint-Nicolé, Vélès, Tetovo, Gostivar, &c., il est défendu de prononcer non seulement le mot "bulgare" mais aussi de dire quelque chose de bien de la Bulgarie, de son armée et de la future frontière entre Serbes et Bulgares.

Des habitants de Kratovo, témoins oculaires, communiquent que vers la fin du mois de décembre passé le maître d'école bulgare Takime Apostolof, natif du village Tanischmantzi, a été arrêté parce qu'on a trouvé sur lui une lettre à lui adressée par le Dntcho voïvode, dans laquelle lettre, entre autres choses, il lui écrivait que Kratovo resterait en territoire bulgare. Ce maître d'école était un ancien adversaire de la propagande serbe. Après l'arrestation il a été conduit dans le village Stratzin, où il a été battu et torturé et de là il a été, soi-disant, amené dans la prison de Kounanovo, où on ne trouve nulle trace de lui. On dit que le même sort est arrivé aussi à Traïco Krilatitchki, ancien travailleur de l'organisation bulgare, qui s'était dernièrement retiré dans son village natif.

Dans le village Pogomila, dépendance de Vélès, le voïvode serbe Yanko a tué l'enfant Dimo Andof, du village Oresché, parce qu'il s'est permis de dire que dans les journaux serbes on écrit que Vélès resterait en territoire bulgare. Son cadavre est resté non enterré plusieurs jours dans la rue.

A Tetovo les Serbes ont pris par force quelques-uns des magasins bulgares appartenant à l'église Saint-Cyrille et Saint-Méthode. Ils ont aussi voulu de prendre aussi l'église même et la dénommer Saint-Sava. Dans le monastère Saint-Athanas, au village Leschok [Leshka], près Tetovo, l'armée serbe a pris quartier et disposent des biens du monastère comme de ses propres biens.

The Bulgars curse the day of their deliverance from the Turks. Bulgar women dare not go about the streets freely, fearing lewd proposals from the military. Celui qui écrit ces pages a vu des soldats serbes bousculer des femmes dans la rue, qui leur ont crié à la face qu'au temps des Turcs elles étaient beaucoup plus respectées et que les Serbes n'avaient aucune éducation et moralité.

L'évêque serbe de Vélès, Barnabas, pendant son séjour au village Saint-Nicolé, près Ichtip, a appelé devant lui les prêtres bulgares et leur a intimé l'ordre, sous peine d'arrestation, de commémorer son nom pendant les offices. Le prêtre président de la communauté bulgare a refusé de recevoir d'autres ordres que de son propre chef. Cependant le métropolite bulgare d'Uscub a lancé à ses subordonnés une circulaire dans laquelle il leur ordonne de ne rien changer dans leurs offices sans son autorisation.

[For the importance of prayer for the ecclesiastical authorities see "Turkey in Europe," p. 257.]

A Bulgarian professor got into difficulties at Kalkandelen for not having his *permis de voyage* in order.

[It does not appear from this account who was in the wrong here, but the Servians seem to have taken the opportunity to make themselves very unpleasant.]

References to the Epiphany ceremonies [my telegram No. 8 of the 17th January] and to the case of Athanas Lutfief [my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of the 29th January, Enclosure No. 1].

Le 14 janvier passé la musique bulgare était sortie, comme d'habitude dans pareil jour (premier jour de l'an), à jouer des morceaux par les rues. Quand elle est arrivée devant l'hôpital russe, elle a été invitée par les infirmiers russes de leur jouer quelques morceaux, quand un officier serbe vient et leur intime l'ordre de cesser et il chasse les musiciens. Quelques jeunes gens membres de cette société ont été battus.

Vous connaissez aussi la perquisition et la prise des archives ainsi que l'arrestation des employés de la métropole bulgare de Vélès. Sous le prétexte que la chambre qui sert de chancellerie à la communauté de l'église bulgare d'ici est nécessaire à un officier serbe pour dormir, les portes en ont été cassées. Les archives sont sens dessus dessous et feuilletés. Personne ne peut approcher de cette chambre. On peut citer mille pareils faits.

A Perlépé le crieur public a crié que celui qui se dira bulgare sera fusillé.

Vous connaissez l'histoire du prêtre Pop Angelko.

[For Pop Angelko see my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of the 28th January.]

Vassil Gavof, du quartier Tophane d'Uscub, le 23 décembre, a été battu dans le carracol par l'ancien tchetnik serbe Velian, commissaire de ce carracol, parce qu'il a signé un acte par son nom terminant en "of." ["Of," of course, being the Bulgar equivalent of the Serb "ovitch." I am also informed that an official at the municipality here states that he has orders from the mayor to refuse all petitions signed with a Bulgar name.]

Enclosure 3 in No. 300.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 14.)

Uskub, February 21, 1913.

Sir,

ON the assumption that Uskub will be annexed to Servia, I have the honour to request sanction to change the official name of this vice-consulate as soon as His Majesty's Government have recognised Servian sovereignty here.

"Uskub" is a Turkish corruption of the Greek "Skopia" and the Servian "Skoplye," and, apart from the fact that a Servian would no more call this place Uskub than an Italian would call Livorno Leghorn, the continued use of the Turkish name would be distasteful to a people anxious to efface all traces of Turkish domination.

I would suggest "Skoplyé" as the English orthography least liable to be mispronounced; it is also, with the exception of the accent, the orthography already used by the post office for the Latin character on some of the post marks. The accent is, in my opinion, necessary to prevent the average Englishman pronouncing the name to rhyme with "die."

Should the change be sanctioned, I have the honour to request that I may be supplied with a new pair of seals, ink, and wax, engraved with the new name.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 4 in No. 300.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 15.)

Uskub, February 22, 1913.

Sir,

AMONG the ethnic problems of Kossovo province which have been affected by the war there is one which I have so far barely touched—that of the Bosniac Moslem *émigrés*.

(My predecessor reported on the subject in his No. 6 of the 14th January, 1911.)

About 5,000 of the Bosniac *émigrés* are now refugees in Uskub, where practically none of them wish to stay. About 1,000 expressed their wish to go to Anatolia, either from fanaticism or, as in some cases they candidly admitted, from a desire to see a little more of the world, and the remainder to return to Bosnia. The Austrian consulate originally insisted on an application to return being made and the leave of the Serajevo Government being given. Latterly, however, owing to the efforts of the Austrian consul-general in Salonica and of Mr. Cahen, delegate of the Macedonian Relief Fund here, this has been relaxed, and at present about fifty souls per diem are being sent from here to Trieste viâ Salonica, without waiting for leave. Many of them are, I believe, to be settled in the Herzegovina.

It is to be expected that some of those who originally expressed a wish to go to Anatolia may reconsider their decision, as no steps have yet been taken to send them away; and a desire to get away from the discomforts of refugee life here may well overcome their sentimental attachment to the Crescent.

I note the following points as possessing some political importance:—

1. The bulk of the refugees state that they were evicted from their settlements by Bulgar "chetniks." I am not sure how far they distinguish Bulgar from Serb, as the local Mahommedan tends to call all Slavonic-speaking Christian peasants in Macedonia "Bulgar." But many of them come from the parts of Roumelia in Bulgarian occupation.

2. The repatriation is going on with the knowledge and approval of the headquarter staff and of the Belgrade Government, who show no desire to keep here this mass of Yugo-Slav Moslems as a possible leaven for the Bulgar districts that they propose to annex. But Servian opinion is not unanimous on this point. Recently a Belgrade business man tried to persuade some families who were leaving that they ought to stay; he was probably inspired by an article on the subject in the "Politika," of Belgrade, in which Mr. Cahen figured as an "Austrian agent."

3. In the process of segregation of races—or, rather, of religions—which is going on the Moslem population of Anatolia tends to be recruited by the more fanatical and lawless Moslems from the lost vilayets. This will affect the ethnic balance of Anatolia, where, according to my limited experience, the Bosniac *émigré* is rather rapidly digested in the Turkish population.

At Salonica, I understand, "hojas" and other agitators have persuaded the mass of the Bosniac *émigrés* to elect for Anatolia. A similar propagandism seems to have been tried here, as I have heard complaints that the would-be Anatolians were favoured at the expense of the would-be Bosnians in the distribution of relief. I do not think that this propaganda will make much headway here.

4. The Bosniacs will probably take back to Bosnia a bad impression of the Servians.* Two or three have made to Mr. Cahen comparisons between the Austrian and the Servian army officer unfavourable to the latter. Recently the Servian police subjected several grown men among them to corporal punishment, to their considerable indignation. And the Servian Government has done little for them, municipal relief having been scanty and irregular; and though it is now transporting them free to Gumenjé the credit of this will probably go to Mr. Cahen, who is locally reputed to be the Bosnian consul.

5. Though the original delay in acceding to their requests for repatriation and the subsequent general permission to return are probably due to Austrian red tape and to the energy of the Austrian consul-general in Salonica respectively, still the effect is to enhance the value of the boon of being permitted to return to Bosnia. I imagine that the policy of the Serajevo Government is to conciliate the Moslem in the hope of finding in him an obstacle to Servian propaganda.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 5 in No. 300.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 16.)

Uskub, February 22, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith certain suggestions for consulates in countries in which, like Turkey, public order is not assured. I do not wish for a

* See also my despatch No 6 of February 3, 1913.

moment to criticise His Majesty's Government for anything left undone in the past, but wish them and my colleagues to profit by my somewhat unpleasantly acquired experience.

It is, in my opinion, essential that the flagstaff of a consulate should clear the roof so that the flag may be visible on all sides. Thanks to the exertions of my predecessor, I have an excellent flagstaff, but my Austrian and Russian colleagues suffered some inconvenience and anxiety owing to the shortness of theirs. I would also add that, increditable as it may seem in Whitehall, in a country like Turkey a tall flagstaff adds appreciably to the prestige of a consulate.

It is also desirable that a consul should have a store of national flags which he can distribute to his subjects to fly on their houses and shops in a crisis. This is particularly important in the case of the Union flag, which cannot be put together in a few minutes like the French or Russian. A few pounds spent in this way may save hundreds of pounds worth of British property from being looted.

I venture to express my opinion that it is hardly fair to expect a consular officer to live in a place liable to riot, anarchy, and massacre without an adequate number of cavasses. The allowance for this vice-consulate is two, a number which I have sometimes found inconveniently small in times of tranquillity. On the 26th October, owing to the illness of one of my cavasses—wounds and sickness are a source of wastage, which should in my opinion be provided against—I had only one to leave in charge of a house filled with some 250 refugees, and had my colleagues not been better provided with cavasses the consuls would have had to drive through the streets of a town in a complete state of anarchy with no armed escort. It is idle to suggest that temporary cavasses should be taken on during a crisis, for: (1) crises have a way of arriving with bewildering suddenness in Turkey; (2) the mere fact that a consul takes extraordinary measures is commented on and increases public agitation; (3) it is impossible to have the same confidence in a stranger as a man known and trusted, whose family has perhaps supplied British consulates with cavasses for generations. I was forced to take on a temporary cavass, owing to the illness of one of my regular men, and did not find him by any means so satisfactory as a man deliberately chosen in times of peace would have proved, and have recently had to dismiss him for dishonesty.

I have already, in my despatch No. 77 of the 24th September, 1912, to His Majesty's consulate-general at Salonica, had the honour to request a supply of rifles for this vice-consulate. What I have seen in the last four months confirms me in my view that an up-country consulate should certainly be armed. It is possible that I owe my life to the fact that I went about the streets armed during the crisis here. As it happens, owing to the headlong flight of the Turks, I had only to get out into the streets to arm myself with rifles thrown away by fugitives; had the evacuation of Uskub taken place in better order, this would have been impossible. I believe that His Majesty's consulate-general at Constantinople is armed, if so, *à fortiori*, a post where it is impossible to land bluejackets should have an adequate supply of men and arms for at least a temporary defence.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[12219] No. 301.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 12, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 25 of the 25th ultimo, in which I had the honour to review some of the principal events of the previous fortnight, I have the honour to report that since that date the Bulgarian military operations before Adrianople and in the neighbourhood of Constantinople appear to have been at a standstill, owing in part to the severity of the weather and to the consequent sufferings of the troops. After the capture of Janina by the Greeks on the 5th instant, of which they received the news with mingled feelings, the Bulgarian Government had reason to desire still more anxiously a corresponding success which should improve their position in the impending peace negotiations, relatively to their allies as well as to the common adversary, and on the 10th instant a meeting was held of the Ministerial Council, attended by the principal generals now in the capital, for the purpose of arranging for

a concentrated bombardment and general assault on the fortress of Adrianople. Since then, however, there has been a fresh heavy fall of snow, so that active operations are likely to be further postponed.

The peace negotiations meanwhile are in a fair way to be initiated. In accordance with your telegraphic instructions received on the 1st instant, I had the honour to inform the Prime Minister, in conjunction with my colleagues, that the Ottoman Government had accepted the mediation of the Powers, and enquired whether the Bulgarian Government were prepared to act in a similar way. His Excellency promised to return a written reply after consultation with the other allies. Although we informed M. Gueshof that the Turkish Government had, so far as we knew, made no conditions prior to accepting mediation, I have reason to believe that the allies are likely to put forward very large demands, so that there is little immediate prospect of an agreement.

The relations of Bulgaria with the other allies are less than friendly. The Greek and Servian elements in the occupied territories appear to be making common cause against the Bulgarian, and several encounters between Greek and Bulgarian forces are reported from the neighbourhood of Salonica.

The dispute over the Roumanian demand for territorial compensation seems to be in the way of peaceful settlement—at least, for the time being. The Bulgarian Government having declared itself ready to submit the matter to the "decision" of the Great Powers, while Roumania was willing to agree to their "mediation" only—although with a secret assurance that the result would be accepted—the latter formula has been adopted, and St. Petersburgh selected by the parties as the place where the mediation is to be exercised. There was considerable divergence between the instructions received by my several colleagues in this matter, for while the Russian Minister had repeated instructions to suggest mediation and to propose St. Petersburgh is the place where it should be effected, the Austrian representative was told to act only if similar steps were taken by his colleagues, while the German Minister was instructed to take no action in the matter at all. Without these discrepancies being reconciled, however, the question was settled directly between the Bulgarian and Roumanian Governments, so that nothing now seems to stand in the way of the mediation taking place at an early date. The Roumanian Government have sent the Roumanian Minister at Sophia to assist their Minister at St. Petersburgh on this occasion, and I learn that in all probability the Bulgarian Government will now on their side dispatch M. Danef as their delegate to advise their representative in that capital.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[12222] No. 302.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I did not fail to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 58 of the 28th ultimo respecting the release of the foreign residents in Adrianople, and my colleagues representing the Great Powers carried out their identic instructions at the same time. Scutari lying beyond the Bulgarian sphere of operations, and Janina having already fallen, no mention was made of those places.

M. Gueshof did not hold out any hope that his Government would be able to act in the desired sense.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[12223] No. 303.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on receipt of your telegram No. 65 of the 5th instant, respecting the assumption by the allied Governments of shares of the Ottoman Public Debt, and of other liabilities of the Ottoman Government, proportionate to the territories which may be ceded to them, I personally handed to the Prime

Minister on the the 10th instant a *note verbale* of the draft articles contained in the above-mentioned telegram.

I expressed at the same time the hope that the Bulgarian Government would agree to their insertion in the treaty of peace with Turkey. The Prime Minister replied that he would read the articles and give the matter his personal attention.

At a meeting held on the 9th instant at the German Legation—as my German colleague is the doyen of the representatives of the Great Powers—this matter came up for discussion. It transpired that my French, German, and Austrian colleagues had already carried out instructions which they had received in the month of February, by leaving at different dates with M. Gueshof *notes verbales* which accorded with the instructions you sent to me, save for the omission by them of the words from "toutefois" to the end of article 1 in your telegram, and of the last line of article 3, from "procès-verbaux" to "traité." My Russian colleague had, he stated, just received instructions similar to those of my French, German, and Austrian colleagues, which he purposed carrying out, and my Italian colleague was without any instructions.

In view of the fact that the Great Powers wish for the insertion of these articles in the treaty of peace, it would be advisable that my colleagues should, if possible, receive immediate instructions from their respective Governments to make the additions contained in the memorandum addressed by you to Count Mensdorff under date of the 20th February (see Part V, No. 381).

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[12655] No. 304.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 190.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 133 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith extract from the "Gazette Financière," giving an account, which I understand to be substantially accurate, of the transaction by which the Government has obtained in cash a sum of something approaching £T. 300,000 from the Anatolian Railway Company.*

The transaction is an ingenious one to disguise what is really nothing but an advance against Treasury bonds. In its essence it is as follows:—

The Anatolian Railway Company holds in its possession two sums belonging to the Ottoman Government and amounting together to £T. 277,000, while, on the other hand, the Government owes the Company £T. 280,000 on account of military transport. Ordinary business prudence would suggest that the one sum should be set off against the other, but the Company now agrees to accept 6 per cent. Treasury bonds in payment of the debt for transport and to release the £T. 277,000 belonging to the Government.

This £T. 277,000 is made up as follows:—

(1.) £T. 69,000, the Government's share in the surplus receipts of the Anatolian Railway;

(2.) £T. 208,000, refund, in respect of the uncompleted sections of the Bagdad Railway, of part of the annuity of the Bagdad Railway Loan Series II and III in accordance with article 35 § 3 of the Contract of Concession of 1903.

Both these sums fell due at the end of the current financial year, *i.e.*, the 1st (14th) instant.

I have not yet been able to obtain a copy of the contract, but I am assured that the enclosed extract accurately represents its substance. It would seem unlikely that if any concession or promise of a concession has been granted to the Railway Company in consideration of this accommodation any mention of it would have occurred in the contract.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

[12193] No. 305.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 196.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting the expulsion of Greek notables from Rhodes.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 305.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Smyrna, March 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report the receipt of despatches from the British vice-consul at Rhodes, in which Mr. Biliotti states that, in consequence of political agitation in favour of the annexation of Rhodes and the islands of the Sporades to Greece, General Ameglio has found it necessary to expel the Greek mayor and his son, a priest, a schoolmaster, and two merchants, and to issue a proclamation prohibiting the holding of political meetings and the hoisting of the Greek flag or those of other nationalities.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[12273] No. 306.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March 12, 1913.*

HAVING heard that my Austrian colleague had recently made some remarks to the Servian Government deprecating the dispatch of Servian reinforcements to assist the Montenegrins in the capture of Scutari, I yesterday enquired of the secretary-general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether this had been the case.

M. Stefanovitch told me that M. d'Ugron had indeed spoken, but altogether unofficially, and the answer he had received was that the action of the Servian Government was in no way dictated by aggressiveness or by a desire to increase complications but was merely in conformity with the obligations of an ally. Reinforcements had been sent to Bulgaria; consequently the Servian Government felt also compelled to send reinforcements, if available, to the Montenegrins who were moreover far closer to them from the point of view of blood ties.

In view of certain circumstances, however, it is becoming doubtful whether this explanation, which was also given to me by M. Stefanovitch, some time ago, can be accepted as altogether satisfactory.

As I have already reported in my despatches Nos. 38 and 45 of the 28th February and the 7th March respectively, it is impossible to say that the assistance sent by Servia to Montenegro is being sent with eagerness or alacrity. Servia has no special benefit to expect for herself from doing so, very much the contrary in fact, and there is a feeling in political circles that besides the expense and sacrifice of troops entailed, Servia will, if she supports Montenegro in a defiant attitude, herself incur the displeasure of the Powers. Such being the case, surely the difficulty of finding the necessary troops and material and the disinclination in the first instance of General Putnik, the Servian chief of the staff, to part with them would have been sufficient to excuse the Servian Government *vis-à-vis* of Montenegro. If then not withstanding these circumstances the Servian Government are still sending forces to King Nicholas's aid the conclusion is that there must be some other motive and the most likely appears to be that Servia is acting under Panslav influences from Russia, and that although, as I have stated in my telegram No. 49 of the 7th instant, the Russian Government have warned the Servian Government not to persist about Scutari and that they can afford Montenegro nothing more than diplomatic support, King Nicholas has succeeded in enlisting other sympathies in Russia and in causing pressure to be brought privately at Belgrade. Such pressure the Servian

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Government, who of course rely principally on Panslav support, in their struggle against Austria, could not afford to disregard.

M. de Hartwig recently in speaking to me concerning Scutari said he could not see how this question was going to be solved. King Nicholas had declared that under no circumstances would he desist until Scutari fell, and, once in possession, public opinion in Russia would never tolerate his being ejected.

I suggested that if Russia entirely cut off pecuniary supplies King Nicholas might be forced to listen to reason. M. de Hartwig thought he would then only throw himself into the arms of Austria which would be very damaging to Russian prestige and would likewise never be tolerated by Russia.

I also recently asked my Austrian colleague how he thought the question of Scutari could be dealt with if it fell into Montenegrin hands. His reply was that there were some 30,000 Albanians under arms who would be able to make it very uncomfortable for the Montenegrins.

You will observe from a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson, military attaché to this legation, that the feeling in the army in favour of supporting Montenegro is far more pronounced than that which is manifested in Government circles, but this is scarcely surprising as the Servian military have long ago lost all sense of true proportion and are wont to talk of fighting Austria single handed.

His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reports that up to the present three batteries and about 5,000 men have been embarked for Scutari.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 306.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Belgrade, March* 12, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that I was informed yesterday the 11th instant by Colonel Stefanovitch, staff officer to the Minister of War, that the Servian reinforcements now being sent to Scutari consist of one infantry division and some fortress artillery.

The infantry division is not one of the regular divisions but is made up of units taken from different centres in Servia and the conquered territory. One regiment of fortress artillery has already been sent to Adrianople, leaving about ten guns, howitzers and mortars at the disposal of the Servian head-quarters staff; all of which are being sent to Scutari.

The total strength of these reinforcements is about 18,000 of all arms; and at least fifteen days will elapse before the whole of the troops reach their destination.

Colonel Stefanovitch stated that hitherto the action taken by the Montenegrin army against Scutari had been most feeble, and that without Servian assistance the fortress would never be taken, as the Montenegrin forces were inadequate for complete investment and the Turkish positions were exceedingly strong.

On my asking whether the Servian nation was sufficiently interested in the capture of Scutari to justify such sacrifices in both men and material, he replied that Servia was bound to assist her allies, especially the Montenegrins who were of the same race. I remarked that it was generally understood that Scutari would be included in the new Albania. At this he demurred and gave me to understand that any such arrangement would be viewed with great disfavour by the Servian army, his reasons being that Austrian influence would soon become paramount in northern Albania, and that the possession of Scutari as a base of operations would be a serious menace to both Servia and Montenegro.

I then asked what would happen if the Great Powers insisted on the inclusion of Scutari in the new Albania; of this he seemed sceptical, and inclined to the belief that a *fait accompli* might make the Great Powers change their views, since Austria alone was interested in this matter, the part being played by Italy, he described as "comic."

His personal view appears to be that the only solution of the question is a war between Servia and Austria, in which war Servia would be able to count on no ally except Montenegro, and that possibly she might have to reckon on a hostile attitude on the part of Bulgaria.

Colonel Stefanovitch is by no means a boastful man, he speaks calmly and deliberately, is not unduly elated by the recent successes of the Servian army, and in

fact he seemed depressed by the prospect in front of his country. He repeatedly said "It is fate," and that 1913 would be the decisive year for Servia.

How far Colonel Stefanovitch reflects responsible military opinion I am unable to say; he now occupies an important position at the War Office, and is an agreeable man to work with, I have never suspected him of violent opinions.

During the next few days while at Uskub I will endeavour to ascertain the views held by the Servian army head-quarter staff on the question of Scutari and will submit a further report.

I have, &c.
C. B. THOMSON, *Military Attaché.*

[12235] No. 307.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 104.) *Berlin, March* 13, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the following semi-official Berlin telegram was published by the "Kölnische Zeitung" on the 11th instant:—

"The speech in which Mr. Asquith dealt at length in the House of Commons with the situation created by the Balkan war is a declaration which has made a favourable impression in Germany. In saying that the Ambassadors' conference in London has already achieved tangible results—an assertion which has also been made by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs—Mr. Asquith is of the same opinion as ourselves, and we are glad to see that the fact is also so unequivocally recognised in that quarter. We fully subscribe to the observations of the British Prime Minister in regard to the *détente* between the two European groups of Powers, and we naturally find ourselves in agreement with what he said as to the cordial co-operation of England and Germany in the Eastern question. It is also clear from Mr. Asquith's utterances that it is now generally recognised that a practical Anglo-German co-operation is possible without prejudicially affecting the relations and obligations of the two States to the other Great Powers. We also welcome the statement made by Mr. Asquith, in reply to the question whether England had bound herself in certain circumstances to dispatch an armed force to the continent, which was to the effect that it was not true."

The "Kolnische Zeitung" also printed a telegram from Berlin yesterday in which Mr. Asquith's statement was coupled with the announcement of the Austro-Russian agreement in regard to demobilisation as representing a favourable symptom for the peaceful development of the situation.

Mr. Asquith's speech appears to have been received in Germany with general satisfaction. Professor Schiemann writes particularly warmly of it in the "Kreuz-Zeitung," mentioning especially the tribute paid to you, Sir, with which he says, he would desire to associate himself, and which is in complete accordance with the views of leading men in Germany.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[12195] No. 308.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 198.) *Constantinople, March* 13, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, which appears to me particularly illustrative of the attitude of the Asiatic provinces towards the Committee of Union and Progress.

Similar accounts have reached me from His Majesty's consular officers at Bussorah, Jerusalem and Erzeroum.

From the latter place, Mr. Monahan reports the impending bankruptcy of all classes in Erzeroum owing to the rise in prices and the stoppage of all Government payments whether contracts or salaries. He sees little likelihood of any response being made in his consular district to the Government issue of Treasury bonds, and comments on the

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lack of enthusiasm and general apathy which greeted the news of the *coup d'Etat* of the 23rd January.

From Jerusalem the news is even more pessimistic, and Mr. McGregor has reported to me a conversation which he had had with the Kaimakam of Beersheba in which a most gloomy account is given of the condition of the Beersheba district. Trouble, it appears, is seriously to be apprehended among the semi-nomadic Bedouin races who form its population, and the leading sheikh has openly threatened a rising "similar to that of the Yemen." The local officials are powerless to make their authority felt owing to the deliberate opposition of the Committee who will only allow Government support to be extended to their own nominees.

At Bussorah also considerable nervousness would seem to exist regarding the attitude of the Arabs towards the present régime, and a telegram from Talaat Bey urging the formation of committees of national defence, subscriptions and the enrolment of volunteers, &c., was only responded to in the most formal and perfunctory manner, from fear, it appears, of bringing this effervescence among the local Arabs to a head.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 308.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Van, February* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the manner in which the return of the Young Turks to power has been received in Van.

The proclamation of the Committee of Union and Progress placarded in the city announcing the *coup d'État*, stated that Kiamil Pasha's cabinet had been responsible for the defeat in Roumelia and now wished further to cede Adrianople, the key of the capital. The Turkish people being at last awakened had forced Kiamil Pasha to resign. The sole object of the new cabinet was to save the country. It concluded with an exhortation to every Ottoman to make sacrifices to save the fatherland. The population of Van received this news in silent discontent. The Turkish officials, who never forget their personal interests, are very guarded in their opinions. It is generally considered that the continuance of the Unionists in power will depend on the result of the renewed military operations, and therefore those with anything to lose or gain await patiently this result before proclaiming themselves partisans of either party.

The news of the continuation of the war caused an outburst of patriotic feeling among the army officers, though the commandant and the chief staff officer are both hostile to the Committee.

The only section of the population of Van which welcomes the return of the Unionists is the Taschnakist party.

The Taschnakists are now busy arming the Armenian population of the vilayet. They tell the villagers that the Turks will revenge themselves for the loss of their European provinces by a general massacre of the Christian inhabitants and that they must therefore put themselves in a position to defend their homes and families. The majority of the arms supplied are ten-shot automatic Mauser pistols. The price these pistols now fetch is 12*l.*, so that the Taschnakist trade of smuggling them in from Russia and obliging the villagers to buy them must prove a lucrative business.

The following story related to me by a gendarmerie officer is illustrative of the brutality of the Taschnakist agents' method:—

An agent arrived in a certain village and informed a villager that he must buy a Mauser pistol. The villager replied that he had no money, whereupon the agent retorted "You must sell your oxen." The wretched villager then proceeded to explain that the sowing season would soon arrive and asked how a Mauser pistol would enable him to plough his fields. For reply the agent proceeded to destroy the poor man's oxen with his pistol and then departed.

I have, &c.
J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[12196] No. 309.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 199.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles, reporting information received regarding the siege of Adrianople.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 309.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No 17.)
Sir, *Dardanelles, March* 8, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have had a visit from Mr. Donohoe, of the "Daily Chronicle," who has just arrived from the Bulgarian head-quarters at Demotika. He gave me the following details of the progress of operations at Adrianople; though late, they may be of interest as coming from an authoritative source:—

On the 11th and 12th February at 3 A.M. 15,000 Turks made a sortie on the south-east of Adrianople, past the Turkish cemetery. The weather was extremely cold, from 5 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit. They met the 11th Bulgarian division under General Vazof, and after four hours' severe fighting were beaten back, leaving between 3,000 and 4,000 killed and wounded. These latter were all found frozen stiff. Two regiments of Turkish infantry were surrounded and captured. As it was impossible to bury the dead, because of the frost-bound earth, they were cremated.

On the nights of the 14th and 15th February 10,000 Turks crossed the Tundscha and Maritza, which are both frozen over, and passed by the silk factory to the north of Karagatch. To the west of the railway line they met the 18th division under General Kirkof. In this engagement the Bulgarian artillery took part. The fighting lasted three hours, and the Turks fell back, losing 2,000 men. The temperature was below zero (Fahrenheit), and the wounded were again all found dead of exposure.

The Bulgarian soldiery, having heard that Shukri Pasha was contemplating a massacre of all the Christians in Adrianople, clamoured to be led to a general assault of the town. A council of war was held on the 20th February, and the Bulgarian staff decided not to carry out the project, as it would cost them 40,000 men to storm the two principal forts, Hadirlik on the north-west and Kaik on the north-east. It is at this latter point that the Bulgars have made the most headway. Both these forts are protected by barbed wire entanglements, "fougasses," and "trous de loup." The Bulgarians have hand-grenades, wire-cutters, and shields to protect them from rifle fire; in fact, all the paraphernalia the Japanese used in the storming of Port Arthur.

As Demotika is full of wounded, the general staff has taken up its head-quarters at Sufulu. The officers greatly deplore their lack of cavalry, asserting that the Turks could never have reformed at Lule-Bourgas, Churlu, and Chatalja if their retreat had been harassed by well-mounted troops. They admit losing on an average 100 men a night among their outposts from exposure. The sentinels have to be relieved every hour. There is also a great mortality from dysentery and pneumonia. Their total losses during the siege amounted to about 10,000 men, chiefly through disease and exposure.

Mr. Donohoe also tells me that there is now every reason to believe that Jannina has fallen, as on the 6th instant great rejoicings took place in Salonica, the King rode through the streets, escorted by processions and a band, and all the soldiers were firing off their rifles in the air.

All telegraphic communication from here to Salonica and Constantinople is interrupted because of the recent storm.

A Turk, who arrived here yesterday from Bulair, tells me that the Bulgarians are having great difficulties with their commissariat. Most of their provisions arrive at Dedeagatch and are taken over the Maritza on a ponton bridge of mahones. The Bulgarians are at Kavak, and the Turks one and a half hours' journey to the south, at Ibrahim Chiftlik, two hours' north of Bulair. A Russian Tartar officer, who had

deserted from the Bulgarians, told my informant that the latter were in great straits as a consequence of the recent heavy fall of snow, which has cut them off from Dedeagatch. The Turk soldiers are "mukemel," and well provided with all necessities of life.

I have, &c.
M. G. HARRIS.

[12198] No. 310

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 201.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the course of military operations since the resumption of hostilities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 310.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the past month very little has been effected towards the relief of Adrianople, which was presumably the first object of the Turkish armies when hostilities recommenced. Since the abortive landing at Sharkeui and the fighting in the region of Hexamili, reported in my No. 9 of the 14th February, no military operations of any importance have taken place, and the positions of the belligerent armies remain as indicated in that despatch. This is due to the severe wintry weather, accompanied by heavy snowfalls, which have rendered all movement practically impossible.

It will be remembered that early in February a considerable force was transported from Constantinople and other ports towards Gallipoli, with the object of combining with an advance by land from that place towards Adrianople. This force comprised the Xth Army Corps, which had some time previously been collected at various ports on the Marmora in readiness for the operation, and three redif divisions, being the IInd Reserve Army Corps, taken from the army in the Chatalja lines. The expedition having failed in its immediate object, all the transports were collected off Gallipoli on the 12th February. On the 19th about two divisions were transported to the Asiatic side of the Straits and disembarked at Chanak. One of them was re-embarked almost immediately, and returned to Constantinople on the 20th February, though only the cavalry and artillery were disembarked, the infantry going on to San Stefano. At the same time it became apparent that the bulk, if not the whole, of the expeditionary force was returning, though for some time it was impossible to say where they were landing, or if the various divisions were returning to the stations from which they had been embarked.

It is now clear that at least four out of the six divisions have returned, and the two Army Corps which composed the expeditionary force now appear to be distributed as follows:—

Xth Army Corps—
31st division at San Stefano.
32nd division, probably at Bulair.
Kharput division at Tuzla (Gulf of Ismid).

A division encamped in the country towards the Black Sea to the north of Constantinople is said to belong to the Xth Army Corps, but I have not yet been able to ascertain which this division is. It may even be the 32nd.

IInd Reserve Army Corps—
Samsun division at Ismid.
Amasia division at San Stefano.
Yozgat division has not returned. Is probably the one left at the Dardanelles.

The movements of the transports at the time they were returning (the 26th to the 28th February), and the landing of the mounted troops in Constantinople, gave rise to many sinister rumours among a public which is always greedy of sensation and prone to look beyond the obvious for an explanation. It was stated that the incoming troops were specially selected for their fidelity to the committee party, and were those on whom Enver Bey could rely for the purpose of overawing the capital. In the present uncertain state of internal politics it would be rash to say that there was nothing in such rumours, but the simple fact that the same troops returned as went away would seem to dispose of them, or at least to rob the move of all political significance. The expedition having failed, the troops returned, minus the division or two by which it was considered necessary to reinforce Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, and the present distribution is perfectly compatible with the idea that the commander-in-chief now intends to use all available troops for an advance, as soon as the weather permits, with his main army from the Chatalja lines. The disembarking of the cavalry and artillery in Constantinople itself was quite natural, as the accommodation and food for mounted troops would present difficulties in the villages and camps where the infantry are quartered, and there would be no object in keeping horses and guns out there while movement is impossible.

As regards the army at Chatalja, it is the intention to form a fourth Nizam Army Corps, if it has not been formed already. With the Xth Army Corps also available, there will thus be five Nizam Army Corps, say 150,000 men, with which it is intended to take the offensive as soon as the weather permits, leaving the remains of what were formerly the three reserve Army Corps to guard the lines and the approaches to Constantinople.

There are various indications that an advance is being prepared; for instance, the doubling of the bridge, by means of pontoons, over the lagoon at Buyuk Chekmeje, and I am convinced that the sentiment of the army will resist any attempt to make peace until the chances of war have once more been tried. At the same time I think that the state of the roads and transport difficulties will delay the commencement of the movement for some time yet, and will render the advance of the army, when it does begin, a very slow affair.

We have practically no news of the troops at Bulair, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and at Dardanelles. Fakhri Pasha is still commanding at Gallipoli, and has four or five divisions there and in the lines of Bulair. Mehmed Ali Pasha is at Maidos, commanding an Army Corps, which may or may not include the division on the Asiatic side of the Straits.

The steady flow of reinforcements to all parts of the army continues. During the past two months 53,000 and 5,500 horses have been forwarded by rail from Constantinople to Hademkeui, and it is likely that among the more recent arrivals are the troops returned from Tripoli and the Yemen.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[12250] No. 311.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Bucharest, March 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché to this legation, reporting on military preparations which Bulgaria is making in the quadrilateral, and also on military preparations in Roumania.

Colonel Lyon is sending a copy of his despatch to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 311.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, March* 13, 1913.

THERE have recently been rumours regarding military preparations by Bulgaria in the quadrilateral.

A French engineer who has just travelled through the country gives the following information:—

At Rustchuk there is only a small garrison. At Shumla there are 15,000 infantry, and two regiments (18 batteries) of 7·5 cm. Q.F. artillery. At Varna there are 20,000 infantry, some batteries of 7·5 cm. Q.F. artillery, and some 12 cm. howitzer batteries. At Silistria there is only a small garrison, composed largely of men who have been found unfit for service at the front.

The men forming the garrisons of Shumla and Varna are young men, presumably of next year's class. They are not drawn from the regular army operating in Turkey, but they have experienced non-commissioned officers. The older men of the Opolchenia (militia), who in the early part of the war did garrison duty in Bulgaria, have been sent south, and are probably being used in the investing lines at Adrianople.

It is probable that there are 50,000 men in the quadrilateral, and they are armed with new rifles that have recently been procured from Russia.

It is therefore clear that the Bulgarians have taken steps to prevent the Roumanians from occupying Shumla and Varna by a *coup de main*, and from establishing themselves in a favourable position in Bulgarian territory, from which it might be difficult to dislodge them.

Reports from Adrianople speak of the severity of the weather there, and of losses from frostbite. It seems probable that the intense cold and snow have prevented the Bulgarians from pushing the attack on the fortress.

As regards Roumania, the military preparations are continuing, and the position of the army becomes daily more favourable. Nearly 3,000 horses have been received from Russia, and have been distributed amongst the different regiments of artillery in order to be broken in. The 49 machine guns ordered for the reserve battalions have been also received, as well as four mountain batteries ordered in March 1912.

Details of the orders given during the last few months for arms, ammunition, and equipment, show how unprepared the Roumanian army was to go to war in October last. The most serious shortage was in small-arm ammunition. The troops at that time had only 150 rounds per rifle, the reserve ammunition to complete 1,000 rounds per rifle having been purchased in its elements and not made up. During the past five months this ammunition has been made up at the rate of 1,000,000 rounds per diem, but the reserve is not yet completed.

I have, &c.

F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[12205] No. 312.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Vienna, March* 14, 1913.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 32 of the 20th ultimo I enquired of the Austro-Hungarian Government, as instructed, what view they took of the action of the Bulgarian authorities in closing the Austrian and French post-offices at Cavalla, as reported by the British vice-consul at that place, and I was promised a written reply, which has now reached me.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, through their representative in Sophia, had made a strong protest to the Bulgarian Government against the closing in the month of January of the Austrian post-offices in Cavalla and Dedeagatsch by the Bulgarian military authorities. The French Minister in Sophia had joined in this protest on account of the similar proceedings of the Bulgarians towards the French post-offices in those two towns. The Bulgarian Government replied to this *démarche* by saying that the military authorities regretted that they were not in a position to go back upon the measure, which had been taken solely on grounds of military security, and further, that this measure must be maintained

giving to Roumania the outskirts of the town and Medjidia Taba, and reaching the Black Sea at Cape Shabla.

in force under all circumstances until the conclusion of the present war in the interests of national defence.

The Ministry adds that the Austro-Hungarian Government have taken note of this reply of the Bulgarian Government, and think it best for the present to abstain from taking further steps in the matter.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[12275] No. 313.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March* 14, 1913.

IN a recent conversation which I had with him, M. Stefanovitch, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, expressed considerable annoyance at the doings of the Bulgarians. He said that, apart from the unnecessarily disagreeable attitude taken by the Bulgarian Government regarding the prospective Serbo-Bulgarian frontier and the ultimate possession of certain places now occupied by Servian troops, the Servian authorities in the newly acquired territories were experiencing constant trouble owing to Bulgarian propaganda, and there seemed, indeed, to be no limit to Bulgarian greed. The Servian Government were anxious to have no quarrel and to maintain the Balkan alliance, but if the Bulgarians did not somewhat alter their tone this would become very difficult. The Greeks were likewise full of complaints against the Bulgarians.

I endeavoured to draw from M. Stefanovitch whether the rapprochement which has lately taken place between the Servians and the Greeks had begun to take a more definite shape, but he rather evaded the subject, and his replies were too vague to enable me to form any conclusion.

Respecting Veles, Prilep, and Monastir, he said Servia would not approach Bulgaria on the subject till after the conclusion of peace. If it were found impossible to arrive at any understanding, the Serbo-Bulgarian differences would be submitted to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia.

I did not gather that any such stringent pressure on Bulgaria was contemplated as that described by M. Spalaikoviteh, and reported in Sir H. Bax Ironside's despatch No. 15, Secret, of the 9th February last.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

[12251] No. 314.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, March* 14, 1913.

THE knowledge that the meetings of the Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh for the purpose of mediating in the difference between this country and Bulgaria are likely to begin next week has produced a distinct lull in the agitation for mobilisation, though that the Cabinet still feels it necessary to emphasise publicly the non-binding character of the mediation cannot but inspire one with misgivings as to the Cabinet's chances of being able to impose on the country the solution eventually recommended by the Powers, should that solution be altogether unfavourable to Roumania; and in this connection I should mention that, at an audience accorded by King Charles to the French Minister last week, M. Blondel found His Majesty hardly so confident on this point as M. Maioresco had shown himself by his declaration reported in my telegram No. 54 of the 2nd instant. On the other hand, M. Schébéko, the Russian Minister, who has just returned from a shooting excursion where the most bellicose member of the Cabinet, M. Philippesco, was one of the party, tells me that he found M. Philippesco more moderate than heretofore in his tone, and M. Schébéko, though himself personally in favour of giving the town of Silistria to Roumania, thinks that the Cabinet would have little real difficulty in imposing on the country a frontier

I enclose, as of possible interest, a communiqué published in a Government organ, the "Politique," of this morning.*

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[12240] No. 315.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 109.)
Sir, *Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 90 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that Djavid Bey accorded a further interview to a representative of the "Berliner Tageblatt" yesterday, when, after discussing the reply of the Balkan allies to the communication from the Powers in regard to mediation, he stated that he was well satisfied with the financial results of his visit to Berlin, and that he had succeeded in renewing £ T. 3,000,000 Treasury bills which fell due yesterday. He added that the Turkish Government were better supplied with funds for carrying on the war than they were a month ago, and that they had at present 40,000,000 fr. at their disposal in cash, which would be sufficient for a further three months' fighting. He hoped also meanwhile to obtain money from other sources.

Djavid Bey is leaving Berlin on the 17th instant for London, whence he proposes to proceed to Paris on a purely financial mission.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[12380] No. 316.

Memorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff, March 17, 1913.

THE Austro-Hungarian consul at Prisrend has telegraphed to Count Berchtold, that he learns by a letter received from the Catholic vicar of Djakova, that Father Aloisius Pali from Ipek, a Franciscan friar, who had been arrested by Montenegrins and escorted to Djakova, has been found tied and murdered on the road from Ipek to Djakova. The consul adds, there is a great panic among the Catholic population of the district, especially among the priests, whom the Servians and Montenegrins suspect of political machinations against the Slav occupation.

Count Berchtold has instructed the Austro-Hungarian representative at Cettinjé to bring the fact of Father A. Pali having been murdered by Montenegrins to the knowledge of His Majesty King Nicholas, and to ask on behalf of the Catholic protecting Power, that an enquiry be made immediately.

The Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affairs at Cettinjé has been instructed to add, that the news of the murder of the Albanian priest will undoubtedly cause great excitement in the public opinion of Austria-Hungary, and that the Austro-Hungarian Government will have to reserve to themselves to claim satisfaction for the arrest as well as for the murder of Father A. Pali.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade has been instructed to make a similar communication to the Servian Government.

Austro-Hungarian Embassy, London, March 15, 1913.

[12468] No. 317.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 94. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, March 17, 1913.*

THE real object of the visit to St. Petersburgh which the President of the Sobranjé is making is to make known to the Russian Government the situation described in my despatches Nos. 15 and 32, Secret. He may also act as adviser to Bulgarian representative in the matter of the Roumanian frontier question, in accordance with ostensible purpose of his journey.

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* Not printed.

[12467] No. 318.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 95. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 17, 1913.*

JUST before Nigrita incident, reported in my telegram No. 91 of 14th March, the Bulgarian Government approached the Greek Government officially with a request for the presence of Greek fleet in the Gulf of Saros.

They have now promised the Greek Government that they will do their utmost to arrange Nigrita incident in a friendly spirit, and to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

[12468] No. 319.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 17, 1913.*

SINCE receipt of your despatch No. 33 I have received despatches from the vice-consul at Philippopoli reporting on journey through parts of Macedonia. He gives most deplorable account of forcible conversions of Moslems, and describes a very unsatisfactory state of things generally.

Shall I include selections from these reports in my representations to the Bulgarian Government?

I venture to suggest also that the facts reported both by the consul general at Salonica and by the vice-consul at Philippopoli be brought to the notice of Bulgarian Minister in London after the receipt of copies of Philippopoli despatches, which follow by messenger.

[12176] No. 320.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair. Constantinople, March 17, 1913.*

GERMAN war-ship "Goeben" has left Constantinople.

[12423] No. 321.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 17, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 181 of 3rd March.

Safvet Lutfi Bey was arrested yesterday. He had taken refuge in the house of Austrian subject, and I am informed by the Austrian Ambassador that he has an Austrian passport, being of Bosnian origin, and I understand that the Austrian Embassy will probably ask for his release on condition that he leaves the country.

[12414] No. 322.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 144 of 14th March: Seizure of French merchant-vessel.

The Grand Vizier called on the French Ambassador yesterday to make his excuses for the incident. He at first offered that conditions should be purchase of cargo, but, on refusal of the French Ambassador, gave orders for the release of the ship, and undertook that company should be paid for demurrage, &c.

[12456] No. 323.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 17, 1913.*

YESTERDAY it was announced officially that Samos was occupied 15th March.

[12465] No. 324.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Athens, March 17, 1913.*

ARGYROCASTRO occupied yesterday.

[12605] No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 234. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I THINK Minister for Foreign Affairs should be prepared for an Austrian ultimatum to Montenegro, or some decided action of that nature by Austria, if Scutari falls. If, when that crisis arises, Russia does not intend to give armed support to Montenegro, it would be very desirable that Russia should have made this known beforehand, and not appear to take her decision under pressure of Austrian action.

I cannot urge concessions upon Russia; she must decide how far her interests require her to go as regards Scutari. But if she does not mean to make it a *casus belli* it seems obvious that there should be no delay in coming to a settlement about the Albanian frontier, or finding some method that will relieve Russia beforehand from being expected to give support to Montenegro in claiming Scutari, and will save her from any reproach of having intended to give that support and withheld it when the critical time came.

This is a matter too delicate for me to make a suggestion to Minister for Foreign Affairs, for Russia's dignity is her own affair, and I do not suppose that under any circumstances a war about the Albanian frontier would be regarded as a British interest involving action on our part; it is therefore not our business to discuss contingencies beyond the reach of diplomacy, but you might, as coming from yourself, ask Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation whether he has reviewed the situation that I foresee.

[11950] No. 326.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 145 and 146, both of 14th March.

In view of the opinion expressed by Mr. Crow in the last paragraph of his telegram of 12th March, and of the uncertainty of the political situation, I propose to speak unofficially to Hakki Pasha on the subject of the land contracts.

In these circumstances Mr. Crow should be instructed to give the sheikhs a sympathetic reply, and say that, as I cannot of course intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, I cannot do more than mention the wishes of the sheikhs to the Porte unofficially.

I should be glad to know how the reply is received.

[12117] No. 327.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 186.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

THE French Ambassador showed to Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th instant a telegram from the French Ambassador at Vienna reporting an increasing uneasiness at that capital in regard to the dispatch of Servian reinforcements to Scutari and the talk of the necessity of a "military demonstration" on the part of Austria-Hungary *vis-à-vis* to Servia. M. Cambon asked if His Majesty's Government had received similar information.

Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that His Majesty's Government knew that the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs was not at ease in regard to the Servian reinforcements, but that they had not heard anything as to a military demonstration.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12118] No. 328.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 187.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

THE French Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th instant that, in regard to the mediation of the Powers between Roumania and Bulgaria, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees in principle to M. Sazonof's procedure in case of an equal division of opinion between the mediating Powers, but considers that the "sur-arbitre" should not be selected from among the representatives of the Powers at St. Petersburgh, but should be the head of a State—preferably the King of Spain, or, failing him, either the Queen of Holland or the King of the Belgians.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon the substance of my telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12820] No. 329.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 192.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I TOLD the French Ambassador to-day of the idea that was afoot that the Triple Alliance would propose that Bulgaria should give up Silistria in return for support against Greece in obtaining Salonica. I said that it would be a very new departure for the Powers to intervene in the partition of territory west of the Enos-Media line other than Albania.

The Ambassador said that Sir Arthur Nicolson had mentioned the report to him some time ago, and had assumed that it could not be true.

I said that the report seemed to be gaining force.

I also told M. Cambon that I feared Russia and Austria might weaken about the indemnity. Each was inclined to court Bulgaria, and each would be afraid that, if it opposed an indemnity, the other would gain favour with Bulgaria by supporting an indemnity.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12821] No. 330.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 193.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the French Ambassador to-day about the reunions of Ambassadors as I had just spoken to the Austrian Ambassador.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12892] No. 331.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 194.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I SAW the French Ambassador to-day, and pointed out to him how desirable it would be that, before Scutari actually fell, Russia should either come to an agreement about the Albanian frontier or make a statement that she would not support Montenegro in resisting the will of the Powers about Scutari if she did not mean to give Montenegro support. She had already told the King of Montenegro privately that she would not support him; but if Scutari fell and Austria sent Montenegro an ultimatum, and Russia had not prepared the way by some announcement beforehand, it would look as if she were yielding to Austrian pressure.

M. Cambon said that it was a matter of *amour-propre*, and that Russia could not well take any step till the question of Djakova was settled.

I said that it would be a much greater blow than anything else to Russian *amour-propre* if Austria sent an ultimatum to Montenegro and Russia did not then give Montenegro support, after allowing expectations to exist that she intended to support Montenegro. It was to the interest of neither France nor ourselves to see Russia drift into this position.

M. Cambon asked whether I had said anything to Sir George Buchanan about this.

I replied that I had not done so. I felt that it was a difficult matter for me to make suggestions to the Russian Government; but I thought that M. Jonnart ought to have present to his mind the considerations which I had explained.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12891] No. 332.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador came to see me to-day, but he had not yet heard anything further from Vienna. I myself had not yet received any reply from Sir George Buchanan, to whom I had telegraphed the purport of the Austrian reply on Saturday, the 15th, as M. Sazonof had been away for the Saturday and Sunday.

I said that it seemed to me a great pity that Austria could not have accepted the last Russian proposal about Djakova, making it a condition of her acceptance that Russia should immediately agree to a collective announcement that Scutari was to go to Albania, and that Montenegro must accept the decision of the Powers. I thought that would have been a natural and fair condition for Austria to make. All I could do now was to wait for the Russian reply; I could not do any more in the matter of Djakova. I supposed that Count Berchtold felt, with regard to the reunions of Ambassadors, that the fall of Scutari would be a *fait accompli* that would prejudice the position of Austria, and that he did not wish to be hampered, when this happened, by being engaged in discussions here, if they were not likely to lead to any result. I observed that the use of the reunions had been to facilitate an exchange of views between the Powers. This had been very marked last week, as without the reunions, acting as a clearing-house and machinery for exchanging views, the Powers would never have been able to formulate as early as last Saturday, the 15th, the conditions of peace which they thought would be reasonable. It would have taken at least a week

longer to get anything formulated and considered by the Powers. In this way the reunions had facilitated agreement between the Powers, and have saved much time.

The Ambassador cordially agreed.

I said that I had no desire to prolong the reunions a moment longer when they ceased to be useful. If, therefore, we could not proceed with the question of the Albanian frontier, I should consult the other Governments as to the question of its being worth while to keep the reunions in existence for the purpose of mediation between Turkey and the allies. If the reunions were discontinued, I should of course have to make a public statement here in Parliament, to say what had been accomplished, and to explain why we were unable to make further progress, and what the point of deadlock was.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13351] No. 333.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador gave me to-day the accompanying statement of a further outrage by Montenegrins:—

"Further news received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna from the Austro-Hungarian consul at Prisren states that Father A. Pali had been arrested on Wednesday, the 5th March, and brought bound to the konak at Djakova, where he is said to have been scourged on Tuesday. The Vicar of Djakova called at the konak in order to enquire into the cause of Father Pali's arrest; he was advised to abstain from any enquiries, as otherwise he might be treated in the same way as Father A. Pali.

"On Friday, Father Pali, still bound, was transported with other prisoners towards Ipek under a Montenegrin military escort. On the way he was stripped, handed over to a komitaji, who killed him.

"Father Clement Miraj of Djakova, who tried to bring the corpse to Ipek, was prevented by the Montenegrin authorities from doing so, and had to return at once to Ipek. It is feared that now he also is in serious peril."

I said that we had brought to the notice of the Governments of the allies concerned such information as we had received from our own sources, and had urged that such things should be stopped.

Count Mensdorff observed that these outrages made it very difficult to agree to further concessions to Servia.

I asked him whether he had told Count Benckendorff about them, and whether the Austrian Government had brought them to the notice of the Russian Government.

Count Mensdorff said that he had told Count Benckendorff, but he did not know whether his Government had informed the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12822] No. 334.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No 108.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day whether Germany was entirely opposed to an indemnity for the allies.

He replied: "Absolutely."

I observed that the indemnity was a point on which I foresaw difficulty. He himself would have seen that the Russian Ambassador made some difficulty about opposing it at the last reunion of Ambassadors, and I feared that Austria was weakening in her opposition to an indemnity.

The Ambassador said that Germany was absolutely opposed to it, and he thought that it was not possible that Austria was not strongly opposed also.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13350] No. 335.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 111.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the German Ambassador to-day, as I had to the Austrian Ambassador this afternoon, about Djakova and the reunions of Ambassadors. As I knew that he thought that Austria ought not to give way about Djakova, I pointed out the difficulty of the Russian position. Russia had joined in administering to Servia a disagreeable pill about the Adriatic littoral; she had now conditionally agreed to administer another pill to Montenegro about Scutari, and she could not, on the top of that, put herself in the position of having to administer yet another pill to Servia about Djakova.

The Ambassador said that he thought we had reached the point when Djakova was the only outstanding difficulty.

I replied that this was so, but till Djakova was settled Scutari could not be settled.

The Ambassador said that it had been expected that Russia would accept my proposal for a commission about Djakova.

I pointed out that I had proposed that there might be a commission, in the last resort, to consider the question of the whole frontier of Albania. Russia had been favourable to this. Austria had been quite opposed to it. Later on, the Austrians had said that they might possibly accept a commission for Djakova alone. Russia had never been committed to accept a commission for Djakova alone.

The Ambassador made to me, verbally, the following statement:—

"The continuous siege of Scutari by Montenegro, the armed support by Servia, and the Servian reinforcements constantly sent to Albania represents not only a gross contempt of the discussions of the Great Powers, but they evoke a state of affairs in Albania which are untenable. The most cruel consequences of war are put upon a country, the future of which should be safeguarded by the Powers, and instead of being protected by Europe, Albania is the scene of devastations and cruelties committed on property and life of the inhabitants.

"Such a state of affairs is degrading the Powers that have taken in hand the fate of Albania. It is, from a human and from a political point of view, absolutely necessary that the Powers should stop the course taken by Servia and Montenegro.

"Sir Edward Grey has instructed the British representatives at Cettinjé and Belgrade to protest against the continuation of the siege of Scutari. It seems, however, advisable that the Powers, represented at the conference at London, should come to a unanimous resolution not to allow any longer the useless warfare in Albania, and to bring this resolution earnestly to the notice of the Montenegrin and Servian Governments by a collective note through their respective representatives at Cettinjé and Belgrade.

"As Turkey will have to give up Albania under any circumstances, the Montenegro-Servian fights in this country do not mean warfare on the common Turkish foe, but nothing else than a plundering expedition in a district of which the Powers are resolved to dispose. Energetic steps taken by the Powers or giving their assent that such steps should be taken by one or several of the Powers could not be considered as a breach of neutrality but merely as a measure guarding their dignity."

I repeated that everything depended upon a settlement of the question of Djakova.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11532] No. 336.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a communication received from the Bulgarian Minister,* enclosing an exposé setting forth the views of the Bulgarian Government on the question of the share which the Balkan States must bear in the Ottoman Debt in respect of Turkish territory occupied by them.

It has been suggested that this question shall be discussed and dealt with by the International Commission, which is to meet in Paris for that purpose.

Meanwhile I should be glad if your Excellency would consult Sir A. Block on the enclosed memorandum, and let me have, as soon as possible, any detailed observations which he may furnish on this document.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12819] No. 337.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador to-day expressed the hope to me that the Powers would not allow the allies to prolong indefinitely the negotiations for mediation by proposing and discussing various conditions.

I said that the reunion of Ambassadors had agreed that the Powers could not discuss with the allies the conditions which the latter had put forward, but that it must be for the Powers to propose conditions, and that they should do this simultaneously to Turkey and the allies, asking each party to accept them. This was the shortest procedure, and we had not lost any time, for the answer of the allies was received only late on Friday evening, the 14th. The reunion next morning had come to the agreement of which I had told the Ambassador, and this had been telegraphed to the Governments of the respective Ambassadors on Saturday afternoon. All the Powers were tired of the war, and wished an end to be made of it; but it was very difficult for six Powers to agree to exercise pressure.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12823] No. 338.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the Italian Ambassador to-day, as I had to other Ambassadors this afternoon, about the Austrian reply respecting Djakova, and about the reunions of Ambassadors.

He expressed most cordial appreciation of the value of the reunions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13896] No. 339.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador gave me to-day, privately, the accompanying memorandum as to what was proposed about the southern frontier of Albania:—

"La frontière partirait de la rive méridionale du lac d'Okhrida entre le couvent de Saint-Naoum, qui resterait hors de l'Albanie, et le bourg de Starova, et suivrait d'abord

* See No. 203.

les hauteurs entre le lac de Malik (ou lac de Soviani) d'un côté, et le lac de Presba de l'autre côté, puis la crête des collines formant le partage d'eau entre les bassins du Dévol et de la Bistritza (Haliacmon), en laissant le district de Kortcha (Koritza) à l'Albanie. Elle se dirigerait ensuite passant à l'ouest de Kastoria, Lapsista et Grévéna, lesquelles villes resteraient hors de l'Albanie vers le sud sur le village de Kipourio au sud-ouest de Grévéna et suivrait puis les crêtes qui forment la ligne de séparation entre les bassins : au nord, de la Voïoussa et de ses tributaires ; au sud, du Salamvrias, de l'Arta et de leurs tributaires jusqu'à la source du Kalamas dans le voisinage du Han Kalabaki, laissant au sud la ville de Janina ainsi que Metzovo, qui resteront acquis à la Grèce.

"La frontière suivrait puis le thalweg du Kalamas jusqu'au point le plus rapproché à Aidonat (Paramythia), d'où, laissant ce district et celui de Murgheliteke (Margariti) à l'Albanie, elle passerait par la crête des montagnes au sud au village de Glykys et suivrait le thalweg de la rivière Glykys jusqu'à son embouchure dans la mer Ionienne sur la rade de Phanari (ou Porto di Spianza)."

Metzovo was to be left to Greece, not because she was in occupation of it, but because investigation had proved that there was a Greek majority there. The same condition applied to Janina. On the other hand, Koritza must certainly be included in Albania. Even Mr. Bourchier, who was very friendly to the Greeks, agreed entirely with this. The Koutzo-Vlachs must be included in Albania, and when this question was being settled it would be opportune to admit the Roumanian Minister to the reunion of Ambassadors and hear what he had to say.

The Ambassador also showed me—but this was very private—that it was possible that some further territory might be conceded to Greece by moving the boundary up to the mouth of the Kalamas River. This, however, was for my information only.

I said that I myself was not in charge of the Greek case. I supposed that Russia would take it up.

The Ambassador said that Russia was indifferent.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12592] No. 310.

Lord Cromer to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(*Received March* 18.)

My dear Tyrrell, 30, *Wimpole Street, London, March* 10, 1913.

I THINK Sir Edward Grey should see this letter from Miss Edith Durham, with whose name you are without doubt familiar. I fear there can be no doubt of the authenticity of the reports about the atrocities committed by the Christians against the Turks. It is impossible not to be struck by the contrast between the indignation excited when Turks massacre Christians with the calmness and apathy displayed in the contrary case of Christians massacring Turks.

Very sincerely yours,
CROMER.

Enclosure in No. 310.

Miss Durham to Lord Cromer.

Sir, *Podgoritza, Montenegro.*

I HAVE, somewhat belated, received the "Weekly Times," in which I see that there has been a question in the House of Lords about the conduct of the Balkan allies towards the Moslems, and that you spoke on the subject. I, therefore, though a stranger, venture to write to you.

I have some twelve years' acquaintance (on and off) with the Balkans, and was here during the preparations for the war, which should have begun in the spring or early summer. But no one was ready.

In August I was on the border, at Andrijentza, when, by night, the Serbs of Kosovo vilayet came, 100 or 150 at a time, to receive arms and cartridges. I therefore heard, before war began, the ideas of the Serbs of Kosovo and of the Montenegrins.

They told me most explicitly and distinctly that they intended to repay the Turks atrocity for atrocity. I remonstrated severely and said it would lose them European sympathy. A schoolmaster from Plava then said: "Last summer (*i.e.*, 1911) the

Albanian malissori revolted. They killed no women, they mutilated no corpses. They fought quite fairly. They hoped that Europe would help them. What did Europe do? Hurled them back to the Turks (who had outraged their women and burnt their houses) with no guarantee at all. This proves to us that Europe likes atrocities. She shall have them. I swear to you that this war that will begin now will be the bloodiest ever known! We will take head for head, outrage for outrage! We will burn and annihilate!" I protested and quoted Europe, vainly. They replied that they cared not at all for European opinion. Europe had damned them into a Turkish hell and they would take vengeance.

I returned from Andrijentza to Podgoritza just as war broke out. I was, indeed, told the day on which to be there and see the first shots fired. In course of conversation with one of the schoolmasters here—one Kovachevich, a man who is so-called "intelligenza" and speaks French and German—he said: "Now you'll see Turkish noses! We shall cut off noses enough!" I expressed disgust. He was astonished. I said "You will ruin your cause if you are as bad as the Turks." He replied: "It is our custom—and they are Turks."

After Tuzi was taken I was the first foreigner to enter the town. I was doing Red Cross and went straight to the Turkish hospital. There were eight nizams there whose nose (the cartilage) and upper lip had been cut off. Nose collecting in the '76–77 war was a recognised custom.

But I had hoped that Montenegro had grown out of it. As I have a long acquaintance with Montenegro I did not publish this fact, as I hoped it was an isolated one.

Since then (this was the 15th October) I have reason to believe that very many unnecessary and bloody slaughters have been carried out both by Montenegrins and Serbs, and feel compelled to speak.

I did six weeks' work with enteric patients, and asked them (I speak Serb) pretty often: "How many noses did you cut off?" These men had been in the army that went to Kosovo vilayet, where no correspondent or foreigner was allowed. They all were proud of their noses. Some boasted as many as ten; one old man (just 76) had only got two, but said if I'd cure him he'd get more!

They described spiking a live man on a bayonet, and then cutting off the nose and lip and bidding him go home and show his friends how pretty he was! They vowed they had not left a nose on a corpse! I cannot doubt these tales as they were told quite straightforwardly, and the men roared with laughter if I said it was a dirty trick.

They said they took off the noses to the Commandant for reward. I am told women carried noses in their pockets!

The Montenegrin authorities here protested, when accused of nose-cutting, that this was done only by the Albanian malissori. This I beg to believe is false! (1.) During the malissori insurrections of 1911 not a single case occurred. I was in Scutari and its environs for the whole year and not a case was reported by the Turks. It is not a malissori custom, but a purely Montenegrin one. (2.) There were no malissori with the Montenegrin army in Kosovo vilayet.

I note that in the House of Lords debate it is stated that both Serb and Bulgar Governments deny "atrocities." I submit to you that these people do not consider wholesale massacre as "an atrocity"!

Some Serbs came here, and at the dinner table mentioned the Ljuma tribe (Albanians, Moslem, near Prizren). I said that when I was there I was hospitably received. A burst of laughter followed: "Go there now, and look for your friends; you won't find one! We have killed them all." I asked why, and was told: "They killed one of our telegraphists and sixteen men who were with him, and we sent back a battalion and exterminated them! Not a man survives." I have been repeatedly assured that there will be no Moslem problem "because not enough will survive to make one."

Recently the Montenegrin Secretary of Bijelspolzi, who was with Yanko Vukotich's army in Kosovo vilayet told me with great glee that "we entirely destroyed the Rugova tribe." I asked him what he meant and he said explicitly that having overpowered the tribe, "We put every man to the sword. I assure you, I swear to you, not one remains!" I expressed horror, and he said, "But we have done well. They were savage beasts and there is an end of them." I would impress on you, my Lord, also the fact that Montenegro protests to Europe that she cannot exist unless she obtains possession of the fertile plains near the lake and the coast. A large proportion of this land is the private property of Moslem Albanians (some, too, of Catholic Albanians) and Montenegro can only "expand upon it" by either killing or expelling the owners. Montenegro

now desires only to exterminate the Albanian people, both Moslem and Catholic. I would ask—in the name of humanity—that you would do all in your power to protect them.

With apologies for intruding upon you,

I am, &c.
M. EDITH DURHAM.

[12492] No. 341.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No 6.)

Sir, *Salonica, March 11, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram, No. 8 of the 4th January last, to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, repeated to myself on the same day, I have the honour to report that I am now informed that the Greek authorities have removed the sequester placed by them upon the revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[12553] No. 342.

Memorandum communicated by Count Trauttmansdorff, March 18, 1913.

LE Comte Berchtold tient les vues suivantes :—

Il est peu probable que la réponse des alliés aux Grandes Puissances sera un refus, mais ils formuleront probablement des prétentions exagérées. D'après l'opinion du Comte Berchtold, les Puissances ne devront pas, dans ce cas, déclarer que la médiation est terminée, mais indiquer aux alliés les points de leurs prétentions qui sont considérés comme inacceptables. Comme critérium devrait servir la probabilité d'obtenir le consentement de la Turquie. Ensuite, les alliés devraient être invités à remplacer leur réponse par une nouvelle communication dans laquelle serait tenu compte des opinions des Grandes Puissances.

Le Comte Berchtold pense qu'une pression plus forte sur les alliés n'est pas possible, vu que les Grandes Puissances n'y ont pas eu recours vis-à-vis de la Turquie.

Si les alliés posent la demande pour une indemnité de guerre, il y aurait lieu de faire la réserve que le montant d'une telle indemnité sera fixé d'accord avec les Grandes Puissances. Ce procédé permettrait de restreindre des demandes exagérées de la part des alliés et de sauvegarder de cette façon les intérêts importants des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie. Les représentants des alliés pourraient être admis à la discussion sur la répartition de la dette publique ottomane à Paris, même si les alliés recevaient une indemnité de guerre, pourvu que la Turquie y soit également admise et que tous n'auraient qu'un vote consultatif.

Mais dans ce cas on devra préalablement constater et reconnaître que les stipulations établies dans la réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres relativement aux questions financières constituent le minimum de garanties pour la protection des intérêts des créanciers et des concessionnaires en Turquie.

Dans le cas où les Puissances décideront de formuler elles-mêmes les conditions d'une paix préliminaire, elles devront sauvegarder leurs droits découlant des Capitulations turques dans les territoires cédés aux alliés contre toute dépossession qui pourrait être faite sans accord entre les intéressés, et devront stipuler que l'abolition ou la restriction desdits droits ne pourra être décidée qu'après avoir obtenu de la Puissance intéressée une renonciation formelle.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 14 mars, 1913.

[12589] No. 343.

Memorandum by Austro-Hungarian Embassy.—(Received March 18.)

(Translation.)

THE Austro-Hungarian Embassy have had the honour of receiving the Foreign Office memorandum of the 13th instant relative to the "projet d'articles" respecting the Turkish State Debt and Railway Administration.

The embassy have been instructed to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government concur in the definitive settlement of the above-mentioned questions being worked out by the commission in Paris. The Austro-Hungarian Government, however, attach to this concurrence the condition that the agreement on the subject already reached at the Ambassadors' meetings in London should be maintained in essential.

Austro-Hungarian Embassy, London, March 14, 1913.

[12477] No. 344.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 140.)

Sir, *Paris, March 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to the first paragraph of your despatch No. 179 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that in order to clear up the misunderstanding which evidently exists between His Majesty's Government and the French Government in regard to the Ottoman Debt, Mr. Carnegie saw M. Gout this afternoon and asked him what further reply to the French note of the 12th February he wanted beyond that communicated to M. Cambon on the 20th February. M. Gout replied that he had meant to refer more particularly to the proposal in the note that the "conversations" between himself and the councillors of the different Embassies in regard to the execution and application of the two first articles should be resumed. There had, however, been so many misunderstandings, M. Gout continued, that M. Jonnart intended to address a note to the Governments concerned in the course of this week proposing that the international commission referred to in article 3 should meet in Paris after Easter. M. Gout added that some of the Governments appeared to think that an international commission had already met here, which of course was not the case.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[12490] No. 345.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 17, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day the contents of your telegram No. 230 of 15th March and urged him to agree to the course suggested. I impressed on him how very strongly you had put Russian views in Berlin and Vienna, and pointed out the danger of Scutari falling before agreement between the Powers had been reached.

He gratefully acknowledged all you have done, but said he could not accept international commission without knowing how it was to be composed and what was to be its mandate. If each of the six Powers were represented, they would probably be split up, like the Ambassadors, into two equally divided groups. He suggested that Servia might be represented, to make a seventh, but I pointed out that Austria would never agree to this. On my remarking that the commission would probably be composed of consuls acquainted with the country, he said it was useless to send out pedantic experts to count heads of the inhabitants to see if they were Servian or Albanian, as we already knew that the Albanians were in the majority. Result would be that the British delegate would give his vote against the Russian, and this would produce a deplorable impression. This was a political question. Russia was ready to yield on the question of Scutari if Djakova was Servian,

and from a recent conversation with the Austrian Ambassador he gathered that the Austrian Government in proposing a commission were only seeking an expedient to save their face and were quite prepared for its pronouncing in favour of Servia. He said he must question the Austrian Ambassador again on the subject, and asked whether he might repeat to him all that you had instructed me to say. I replied that he could inform him of the communication which the Austrian Ambassador in London had made to you. I pressed him to let me have an answer as soon as possible, but he said that he might first [group omitted: *I* have] to telegraph to Vienna to ascertain what the proposed commission really meant. From a remark which he made, I think that he might agree to accept definite arrangement about the north and north-eastern frontiers by which Scutari would be included in Albania, leaving the question of Djakova in suspense instead of referring it for decision to commission. Austria, however, might not accept this.

(Very Confidential.)

Austrian Ambassador, whom I saw immediately after for a few minutes, told me that his personal impression was that his Government looked on the proposed commission as a way out of the difficulty. They had, he said, been on the point of yielding a few days ago, but had at the last moment drawn back from fear of public opinion. They would not in the least mind were a majority to be secured on the commission in favour of Djakova being given to Servia, and he even suggested that we might get a promise from the German Government to instruct their delegate to vote with those of the Triple *Entente*. I remarked that it would be ridiculous to send out a commission if its decision was a foregone conclusion, and that the simplest course would be for the German Ambassador to vote in the above sense at the meeting of the Ambassadors. His Excellency replied that it would be easier for a technical delegate to adopt such a course than for an Ambassador.

[12620] No. 346.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 99. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March 18, 1913.*

ALBANIA. (See Foreign Office telegram No. 234, Most Confidential, of the 17th March.)

M. Sazonof said yesterday, in the course of a conversation on the subject of the possible fall of Scutari, that King Nicholas would not be justified in claiming it for Montenegro, seeing that it was the Servian reinforcements who would be entirely responsible for its fall. As a possible contingency, his Excellency spoke once more of a naval demonstration. I repeated to him your views on the subject (see your telegram No. 226 of the 14th instant, last two paragraphs), but M. Sazonof said that in his opinion we ought, on the contrary, to take into consideration the measures which might eventually be necessary to bring pressure on King Nicholas. He stated emphatically that Russia could never give her consent to Austria taking any independent military action.

In accordance with your instructions, I will take first opportunity of sounding his Excellency. I cannot, however, see him to-day, as he has gone to Tsarskoe Selo to make his report to the Emperor.

Apparently M. Sazonof's attitude is at present as follows: in order to induce Servia and Montenegro to accept decision of the Powers, he would be ready to join in diplomatic pressure exerted collectively; he would not, it seems, object to collective action in some form, such as a naval demonstration, but he would not consent to any isolated military action being taken by Austria. He has no wish to give Scutari to Montenegro, and is by no means well disposed towards King Nicholas, but he may not agree to any definite and final statement that Scutari shall be included in Albania being made by the Ambassadors so long as Austria declines to leave Djakova to Servia If, however, it were declared that the question of Djakova should be left for future settlement, instead of being adjudicated by an international commission, it is possible that he might be induced to agree as regards Scutari. The best method of guarding against an Austrian ultimatum and the consequences which it would almost inevitably entail would, in my opinion, be for the Powers to consult together at once as to what collective coercive measure to which Russia might agree could be taken in the event of King Nicholas refusing to yield to diplomatic pressure.

[12634] No. 347.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 18, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, after reading me a telegram from Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburgh foreshadowing the British attitude in the mediation discussions as hostile, urged again the considerations set forth in my immediately preceding telegram of 12th March. To whichever country Silistria was given, the other country would have a grievance. Europe had to decide which of the two countries it was to be, and wisdom dictated, in the interests of future tranquillity, that it should be Bulgaria. Encumbered as the latter would be with problems of administration in her new territory and with questions with her other neighbours, in which questions she would need a friend in Roumania, her resentment at the loss of Silistria, a town which was not necessary to Bulgaria's security, would soon pass, whereas Roumania would never be content without that town, which she needed on economic grounds for the construction of a bridge, and on strategical grounds because Roumanians felt that they were not safe without it from Bulgarian attack.

[12622] No. 348.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 97. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 18, 1913.*

JUST before the departure of Danef for St. Petersburgh a telegram was received from the Bulgarian Minister there to the effect that the proposed visit was not considered desirable just now.

Two reasons were given for this postponement: First, that as General Dimitrief had already left for St. Petersburgh (see my telegram No. 93 of 15th March), a further mission was not considered necessary; secondly, that as the Roumanian Government had not sent a special plenipotentiary respecting Roumanian-Bulgarian mediation, the Prince Ghika's being unofficial, it was preferable that the Bulgarian Government should not send one either.

The action of the Russian Government in this matter is considered here as foreshadowing their decision to vote for Silistria being handed over to Roumania, and it is therefore viewed very unfavourably. Meanwhile a further effort is being made to alter this decision.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[12552] No. 349.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 18, 1913.*

MY German colleague informs me that he has received a telegram from Berlin stating that I have been instructed to protest against continuation of the siege of Scutari, and directing him to support my protest. I replied that I have as yet had no such instructions, but I acquainted him with the substance of your telegram No. 58 of 11th March, and told him of my interview with the Prime Minister and Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (see my telegram No. 53 of 13th March).

[12619] No. 350.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 47 of 25th February: Customs in occupied territory.

The Russian Minister has as yet no instructions. My French colleague, who is doyen, and has also no instructions but would be willing to act, points out that it

appears to him futile, if a combined representation is desirable, that it should be undertaken if one of the Powers does not join. We have most of us, at one time or another, protested individually regarding the five points mentioned in your telegram above mentioned, though I only spoke unofficially on the subject of war contribution. Meanwhile, the latter continues to be levied, and is apparently effectually choking importation. In the circumstances, I should be glad of instructions.

[12566] No. 351.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 18, 1913.*

MILITARY attaché left Salonica for Scutari yesterday. Please inform Director of Military Operations, War Office.

[12468] No. 352.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 96 of 17th March: Forced conversion of Moslems.

You may include any portion of reports that you think advisable, and should emphasise the very disagreeable and unfortunate impression that such things make, especially upon public opinion that has sympathised with Bulgaria.

[12163] No. 353.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 238.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 94 of 15th March.

You are authorised to take part on behalf of His Majesty's Government in mediation between Bulgaria and Roumania.

Instructions will be sent later.

[12490] No. 354.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 239.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 96 of 17th March.

I have informed Austrian Ambassador that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would not accept international commission without knowing how it was to be composed and what was to be its mandate. I added that Russia was ready to yield in the question of Scutari if Djakova was Servian.

I said that you had pressed Minister for Foreign Affairs to give an answer as soon as possible, but he said he might first have to telegraph to Vienna to ascertain what the proposed communication really meant. I added that I understood this was being done through the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, and I was very glad that St. Petersburgh and Vienna were in direct communication about it, and that Austrian Ambassador here would probably receive the next information from Vienna.

Meanwhile, to prevent the fall of Scutari creating too much excitement and precipitating a crisis, I would suggest that the reunion to-morrow might recommend a collective *démarche* at Cettinjé and Belgrade, repeating that Albania has been reserved for delimitation by the Powers; that until that delimitation has taken place no action by Servia or Montenegro in Albania can be regarded as having acquired rights; that, for instance, if Scutari falls, the destiny of Scutari will be decided by the Powers, and [illegible] Montenegrin occupation.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 113.)

[12552] No. 355.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 57 of 18th March.

German and other Embassies here were told of my telegram No. 58 of 14th March to you. I have not contemplated further separate instructions. It was fortunate that you did lay stress upon Scutari, as reported in your telegram No. 52 of 13th March. Scutari is for the moment more important than anything else.

[13000] No. 356.

[illegible]

(No. [illegible])
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

M. CAMBON came to see me this morning, and suggested a collective [illegible] with regard to Scutari.

I wrote down the following version, to which he agreed:

"A collective *démarche* should be made at Belgrade and Cettinjé, repeating that Albania has been reserved for delimitation by the Powers; that until that delimitation has taken place no action by Servia or Montenegro in Albania can be regarded as having acquired rights; and that, for instance, if Scutari falls, the destiny of Scutari will be decided by the Powers, and not by the Montenegrin occupation."

M. Cambon promised to ask M. Jonnart to recommend this to M. Sazonof.

I said that I would telegraph it to St. Petersburgh, and would speak to Count Mensdorff about it this afternoon.

M. Cambon told me that he heard that Germany was likely to make a separate representation in Cettinjé and Belgrade, urging the Governments there not to prosecute the operations against Scutari. He thought that separate action by the Powers was very much to be deprecated.

I agreed that the collective *démarche* would be much better, though, in a way, I had taken separate action in what I had said to the Servian and Montenegrin representatives the other day, when communicating to them the resolution of the reunion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13001] No. 357.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. [illegible])
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF gave me to-day the following communication, which, he said, he was instructed to propose at the reunion to-morrow:—

"Le Comte Berchtold est d'avis que la rédaction du point 1, dont les premiers mots [illegible] l'œuvre de la paix.

[illegible]

"'La question d'une indemnité de guerre sera traitée par la commission internationale de Paris en connexité avec la question d'un règlement équitable de la participation des alliés à la dette ottomane et aux charges financières des territoires [illegible] part aux délibérations de cette commission.'"

I asked Count Mensdorff whether he had shown this to the German Ambassador. He replied that he had not done so, as Germany was entirely opposed to an indemnity.

[illegible]

I said that we also were opposed to an indemnity. The situation was that Austria, Germany, and Italy had all received from Turkey some consideration that had enabled them to agree to the proposed increase of 4 per cent. in the Turkish customs dues. We ourselves hoped to come to some arrangement with Turkey about the Persian Gulf and the end of the Bagdad railway, which would be some *quid pro quo* to us; but, even if this was secured, I should be reproached for having agreed so easily to an increase of 4 per cent. when British trade amounted to about 60 per cent. of the trade affected. My main argument in reply to this would be that the increased revenue to be derived from the 4 per cent. increase of dues was essential to Turkey for the improvement of custom-houses, the development of means of communication, the establishment of order, and the general development of the country left to her. All this would result in a large increase of trade, and, as we had so large a share of the existing trade, we should presumably get a large share of the increased trade. I would explain that, in this way, our agreement to the 4 per cent. increase would in a sense be an investment. But if the increased revenue was to go, not to develop Turkish territory, but to pay an indemnity to the allies, who were going to increase the duties on British trade in Macedonia and the other territory acquired by them beyond what the Turkish dues had previously been there, my defence would be made impossible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

13002. No. 358.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the Austrian Ambassador to-day as reported in my telegram No. 239 to Sir George Buchanan. I said that I hoped progress would now be made towards a settlement by direct communication between St. Petersburgh and Vienna; the more there was of this the better. The Ambassador would, I assumed, receive his next information about the Russian views from Vienna. While this communication was taking place we could, of course, not make any progress in the reunions towards a settlement; but I thought that we might improve matters by coming to some such resolution as the following, which I wrote down for him as a sketch:

"A collective *démarche* should be made at Belgrade and Cettinjé, repeating that Albania has been reserved for delimitation by the Powers; that until that delimitation has taken place no action by Servia or Montenegro in Albania can be regarded as having acquired rights; and that, for instance, if Scutari falls, the destiny of Scutari will be decided by the Powers, and not by the Montenegrin occupation."

Count Mensdorff seemed pleased with this idea.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

12893 No. 359.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

M. DE ETTER informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Russian Government agree to the proposals passed at the last meeting of Ambassadors in regard to mediation between Turkey and the allies, and have sent the necessary instructions to their representatives.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12894 No. 360.

Mr. [illegible] to Sir E. Grey.

THE following is a translation from the Russian of a telegram sent yesterday by M. Sazonof to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna:

"Russia has no objection to the commission in regard to Djakova [illegible] to know the basis on which the commission will work. Ethnographical considerations must be avoided, and [illegible] think it [illegible] that the commission should be required to establish the undeniable fact of the geographical and economic connection between Djakova and Servia, and that this should be the guiding principle of the commission.

"If the Austro-Hungarian Government consent to express confidentially to Sir E. Grey their concurrence with the above, Count Benckendorff will receive instructions to agree to submit the question of Djakova to an international commission."

Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.

[12695] No. 361.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 4. Commercial.)
Sir, *Salonica, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, two copies of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Legation at Belgrade on the subject of the hindrances placed by the Servian authorities in the way of trade between this place and the territories in their occupation.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 361.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Salonica, March 12, 1913.*

THE Servian authorities are showing inexhaustible ingenuity in the invention of new methods of hampering and eventually destroying the trade of Salonica with the interior.

As I had the honour of informing you by telegraph on the 7th instant, six representatives of Salonica business firms who were returning here by rail with money collected from customers in the Uskub district, were arrested at the station of Ghevgheli on the evening of the 6th and, after being made to spend the night in that place, were sent back to Uskub under military guard, being made to perform the journey standing in a goods truck under circumstances of considerable indignity. On arrival at Uskub they were informed that their offence consisted in the attempt to export Servian small coin from the occupied districts. They were made to change all the Servian silver and nickel coins which they had with them into paper, and were then allowed to resume their interrupted journey to Salonica, where they arrived after a loss of three days.

Mr. Peckham informs me that the authorities at Uskub have declared that only the export of Servian silver and nickel money is prohibited, while that of Turkish money and even of Servian banknotes is free. The merchants, however, assert that they had received no previous notification of any prohibition at all, and that, moreover one of their number, M. Samuel Saporta, of the firm of Florentin, Saporta and Beraha, was carrying with him nothing but Turkish money, a fact which did not prevent him from being subjected to the same humiliating treatment as the rest. Another member of the party who, though himself an Italian subject, happened to be the bearer of several hundred pounds belonging to the British firm of Errera and Co., had no more than 400 dinars of Servian money.

The conduct of the Servians in this matter seems all the more unjustifiable in that at Monastir exactly the opposite rule is enforced, the exportation of Turkish silver being prohibited whilst no objection seems to be raised against the removal of Servian money, if any one desires to take it. As, however, the Servians have decreed that the dinar shall be equivalent to 5 piastres, whereas its value is barely four and a-half, it is obvious that anyone removing Servian silver or paper money into another jurisdiction loses something over 11 per cent. on exchange.

The Servian refusal to provide goods-trucks at Ghumendje for merchandise dispatched from Salonica is still maintained. A few merchants have partially succeeded in getting round this obstacle (and incidentally demonstrating the futility of the Servian pretext that military necessities absorb all their available rolling-stock) by railing their goods only as far as Karasouli, one station short of Ghumendje, carting them from there to Ghevgheli and thence dispatching them over the Servian rails to Uskub, after a slight application of "palm-oil" to the station officials.

The Servian object is, undoubtedly, to compel the retail trader in the occupied districts to resort to Nisch or Belgrade for his stock of goods, and in this, in spite of the far higher prices there ruling, they are already to a considerable extent succeeding. This seems to the Salonica importer not only loss of present and future custom but also enhanced difficulty in collecting outstanding debts, since the customer presenting himself in a new market is obliged to pay cash, and finds himself compelled to devote to that purpose the funds which might, otherwise, have been available to meet claims in Salonica.

The only thing that can be said in palliation of the Servians' conduct in these respects is that the measures enforced by the Bulgarians are even more thoroughly prohibitive. Not only is it impossible to send any merchandise whatever from here to the districts in Bulgarian occupation, but no one who does not enjoy powerful protection is allowed to enter them for purposes of business. The last Bulgarian measure has been to entirely close the port of Cavalla to foreign trade, a step for which there does not appear to be the slightest shadow of justification from any point of view whatever.

The Greeks, on the other hand, are making serious endeavours to gain the sympathies of the commercial community, hoping no doubt thereby to secure political support in the coming struggle between the allies.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[12658] No. 362.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 207.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles reporting the movements of the Turkish fleet and the boarding of the French steamer "Henri Fraissinet."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 362.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Dardanelles, March 10, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Mejidieh," "Berki Satvet," and two destroyers went out on Saturday, the 8th instant, and returned to their moorings at 5 P.M.

Early on Sunday morning the same two boats, accompanied this time by four destroyers, steamed out in the direction of Imbros, and found the steam-ship "Henri Fraissinet" escorted by two Greek destroyers. A few shots were exchanged, and the Greeks withdrew. The Turks boarded the "Fraissinet" and found 900 tons of potatoes, 700 tons of galettes, and other provisions on board, destined for Dedeagatch. The boat is now lying off Nagara Point.

It seems incredible that the captain of the "Fraissinet" should have chosen a course which would lead him so near the mouth of the Dardanelles. He could have shaped his course for Dedeagatch, to the west of Imbros, and this deviation, while putting him outside the range of the Turkish scouts, would hardly have lengthened his journey by an hour. This would also apply if he intended landing his goods at some point in the Gulf of Xeros near the Bulgarian lines.

I have, &c.
M. G. HARRIS.

[12661] No. 363.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 207.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the massacres of Moslems in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 363.

Acting Vice-Consul Moryan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7. Confidential.)
Sir, *Cavalla, March 6, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that twelve Bulgarian officers and officials and some 130 komitajis and others are under arrest in Serres, charged with perpetrating or conniving at massacres of Moslems in various parts of Macedonia. They will be tried by a court-martial, instituted at Serres for that purpose. Among the persons arrested are Tchakof, a komitaji chief who was prefect of Cavalla at the time when murders of Moslems took place here, and Captain Yurdanof, head of the regular Bulgarian troops in Cavalla during the same period. The former is charged with being directly concerned in the murders of Moslems here, and the latter with conniving at the murders, or at least with making no effort to prevent them.

It yet remains to be seen whether the trial of these persons will actually take place, and what sentence will be passed on them.

In this connection, and in view of the fact that the murders of Moslems in Macedonia are attracting much attention in various quarters, I venture to give below the minimum number of Moslems killed in different parts of the Cavalla district during the early part of November last. There may have been a greater number of killed than that indicated by my figures, but there was certainly not less.

In Cavalla town at least seventy Moslems were killed. I saw myself the corpses of that number. They were killed by irregulars, and had all been killed slowly with the bayonet. Many were mutilated.

At least forty-three were killed in the same way at Sarishaban, a village east of Cavalla.

At least thirty-eight in Pravishta, west of Cavalla, twenty-four in Doxat, between Cavalla and Drama, and fifteen in Drama.

There is no doubt that numbers were killed in Chatalja, east of Drama, and Kirlikova, west of Drama, but the numbers are uncertain.

All the above were killed in the most brutal fashion, either by Bulgarian irregulars or by the native Christian population; the latter, both Bulgarian and Greek, helping the former by supplying them with lists of Moslems to be killed or by directly taking part in the killing. All the persons killed as mentioned above were males.

Whatever may be said of the sufferings of Christians in other parts of Macedonia during many years, provoking natural reprisals now, it must be mentioned that in the Cavalla district Christian and Moslem seemed to have always lived happily together, and that the former has been less oppressed by the latter than in other parts. In consequence, the killing of Moslems in this district is much less to be condoned than elsewhere. In any case, whatever the charges alleged against the unfortunate Moslems, nothing can excuse the brutal fashion in which they were killed.

As mentioned above, the responsibility for these massacres lies on the Bulgarian irregulars and on the native Christian population. The Bulgarian regular army officers can hardly be excused from responsibility, for they were present in many towns and villages when massacres took place, as at Cavalla, and were cognisant of what was going on, both directly and indirectly, through the representations of the consuls and other persons.

A number of non-combatant Christians were killed by Moslems in the Struma valley, in Raslug, Nevrocop, &c. The Bulgarian army advancing down the Struma valley towards Serres found every Christian village on their route burnt and their inhabitants killed and dispersed by the Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Moslems) of the region. Two villages only, and those were Pomak villages, were found standing.

Just before the Bulgarian force, advancing down the Gerejik defile towards Drama, reached that town the Turkish troops in Drama wantonly destroyed the village of Plevna on the pretext that a number of komitajis were concealed there. About 150 Christian families perished in that village.

The only cases in which Bulgarian troops took part in the killing of Moslem civilians were those dictated by strict military necessity. Thus at Serres, after the entry of the Bulgarian troops and the surrender of the town, the troops were fired on by some of the townspeople and two Bulgarian soldiers were killed, according to Bulgarian accounts. As a punishment, at least 432 Moslems were shot down by the regulars.

Again, in the Raslog region the Bulgarian troops found themselves in presence of a general rising of the Pomak population, men, women, and even children using arms against them. In the ensuing fighting many of the latter were killed.

A small revolt of Pomaks took place in the Pomak villages west of Nevrocop some three weeks ago. This was put down by the efforts of some 200 soldiers dispatched from Serres for that purpose.

No further massacres have taken place in these parts since last November. Last week, however, a Moslem was killed near Pravishta by regular soldiers of the 21st regiment; the motive is unknown.

A number of forcible conversions of Pomaks to Christianity has been effected in the Nevrocop region. The zeal of the Christians on behalf of the Pomaks is due to the fact that the latter are of Christian and Bulgarian stock, their ancestors having at one time or another embraced Islam.

In some cases where Pomaks had committed offences against the regular Bulgarian troops involving the death penalty, they were offered their choice between that penalty and embracing Christianity, and in most cases preferred the latter.

The Bulgarian Government will create a good impression in all quarters if it metes out a severe punishment to those whom it has now imprisoned and has decided to try by court-martial for participation in the massacres of non-combatant Moslems.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[12662] No. 361.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 208.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160 of the 20th of this month, I have the honour to transmit herewith a further despatch, with its enclosures, which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica relative to Serbo-Bulgarian relations in Macedonia.

In a subsequent note which I have received from Mr. Lamb, an account is given of an incident which occured at Salonica on the night of the 6th of March when the Greeks were celebrating the fall of Janina. The Servian officers in the town, it appears openly fraternised with their Greek allies and crossed swords pledging the anti-Bulgarian *entente*.

Mr. Lamb considers this incident as prophetic of the imminence of future troubles in the Balkans.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 361.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17. Confidential.)
Sir, *Salonica, March* 7, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 14 and 15 of the 17th and 21st ultimo, I have the honour to enclose herewith some extracts from a letter written by a particularly well-informed correspondent resident in the district at present occupied by the Serbs. The writer fully confirms what Mr. Greig and myself have written concerning the relations existing between the latter and the Bulgarian population of the occupied territories, and he draws the same conclusion. His observations on the administrative principles adopted by the Serbs show how difficult it is in such matters to break away from tradition. The Serbs are simply applying the system which they have inherited through the Young Turks from Abdul Hamid, and Macedonia is once more exemplifying the truth of the adage "plus ça change et plus c'est la même chose."

Several recent incidents have shown that there is no improvement in the state of feeling between the Bulgarians and the Greeks. The most serious of these is one that occurred near Tchai-aghzi in the Gulf of Orfano, where the troops of both nationalities are in close proximity. It seems that the Bulgarian soldiers attempted to prevent the landing of some Greeks from a sailing-vessel which had approached the shore; the Greek soldiers hurried to their defence and shots were exchanged, by which one soldier was slightly wounded. The arrival of officers on both sides prevented the encounter from developing into anything more serious, but I understand that the Greeks contemplate using it as a pretext for increasing their force in that neighbourhood, which belongs to the circumscription of Serres and is consequently claimed by the Bulgarians as theirs.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 361.

Extracts from Letter written by Resident in Territory at present occupied by the Serbs.

FEELING is running high between Serbs and Bulgars in all these regions. The former, taking advantage of the weakness of the latter (owing to the absence of the majority of the able-bodied males, &c.) have been endeavouring to surreptitiously insert the thin end of the wedge. To this end they have countenanced the presence of a band of Serb komitajis, whom they have allowed to flog the Bulgars most savagely. One Bulgar has already died from the results of their beating, and several others are still laid up, including one wealthy notable. Several Bulgarian priests also have been roughly handled, and it was not until a komitaji had plundered a church of £T. 60 in cash that the military authorities began to see that they were going too far.

The ostensible object of this policy was the collection of concealed arms, but the real one was undoubtedly to strike at the roots of the Bulgarian organisation.

Trouble is certainly brewing, for it appears that the Serbs are having secret dealings with certain of the Tikvesh Beys who are now in Salonica, and you know what sort of gentry they are, do you not? The old traditional subterfuges are being resorted to once more, the Serbs endeavouring to secure the support of the Turkish element with a view to strengthening their own position.

In the Radovishta district five Bulgars have been killed by Turks, and rumour has it that several Mussulman bands have been formed and are on the prowl, having been seen in several places. This means that somebody encourages them, for otherwise the Turkish villages would not harbour them, being well aware of the attendant risks.

Over 200 of our (Bulgarian) komitajis have gone towards Adrianople as volunteers and the district is well rid of them.

Unless a belt of land from Uskub to Salonica is made autonomous, I am afraid that the allies will soon be flying at each other's throats.

[12684] No. 365.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Vienna, March 16, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have received from the military attaché at His Majesty's Embassy, reporting on the effect of the demobilisation measures taken by Austria-Hungary.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 365.

Major Sir T. Cuninghame to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Vienna, March 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of your Excellency that as a result of the agreement reached between the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Russia a proportion of the reservists and Erzatz reservists lately called up for service with the colours have been dismissed.

The following details are available:—

(1.) Galicia. Instructions have been issued to corps commanders of the 1st, 11th and 10th corps to allow all infantry reservists and Erzatz reservists of the year 1908 to return home. Also as many Cav reservists of that year as can in the opinion of the corps commanders be spared with due regard to the interests of the Monarchy and of the service. The cavalry squadrons on the Galician border are at this moment about 200 strong. Reservists of other arms are not mentioned but presumably they will be treated the same as infantry. It is calculated that this means about 25,000 to 30,000 men are released. The year gangs still serving are 1912 (recruits) 1911, 1910, (all the foregoing are service years) and 1909. The original establishment of infantry companies was ninety-three, the high water mark during the present crisis is believed to be 200. It is decided that in Galicia for the future the establishment shall be 150 per company, so as to be equal to the Russian units. The normal recruit contingent will not suffice to provide men for this purpose. At the present moment it is considered that an attempt to ask Parliament to consent to an increase in the recruit contingent would not have much success owing to the opposition of the Hungarians, consequently it proposed to find the necessary men by calling out a series of reservists for annual training, until the matter can be put upon a permanent basis. For this purpose Erzatz reservists have already been summoned earlier in the year than is usually the case.

(2.) The 15th and 16th corps. It is understood that the reservists of the 15th and 16th corps will not be dismissed, but according to the newspapers all men belonging to other districts, will be allowed a short furlough.

(3.) Elsewhere it is understood that normal establishments will be returned to, and during the last few days small batches of men from many corps have been returning home. According to the newspapers in Hungary reservists and Erzatz reservists of the common army and Honved of the year 1910 are allowed to go home. The inference is that the men of former years have already been dismissed.

I have, &c.
T. M. CUNINGHAME,
Major, Military Attaché.

[12837] No. 366.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March 19, 1913.*

NO further details respecting the assassination of the King of Greece. It is doubtful whether the murderer had an accomplice or not. Official version is that he is a noted anarchist from Volo. Popular rumour ascribes the crime to Bulgarian instigation, but every effort is being made to contradict that.

The Queen, who was here yesterday, left for Salonica this morning with Princes George and Andrew and their Princesses. King Constantine is expected here to-night or to-morrow morning.

(Confidential.)

Russian consul-general at Salonica telegraphed to Russian Minister that assassin is a Turk and that several Turks were killed by populace. Officially it is stated that complete order was preserved.

(Sent to Salonica; not repeated to the King.)

[12848] No. 367.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 19, 1913.*

PORTE has addressed to embassies of protecting Powers formal protest against occupation of Samos by Greece, pointing out that, as the island is under guarantee of Powers, no change can be made in its political status without their consent and that of Turkish Government.

They ask that steps may be taken to re-establish strict observance of *status quo*.

Note by post.

[12849] No. 368.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 19, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 149 of 17th March.

Lutfi has been allowed to leave the country on representations from Austrian Embassy.

[12847] No. 369.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 19, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Austrian Ambassador has just told him that, while insisting on Djakova question being referred to international commission, his Government are ready to leave composition of commission entirely in your hands. His Excellency has accepted this proposal.

[12843] No. 370.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 239 of 18th March to St. Petersburgh.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this afternoon that he regretted very much reluctance of Russia to accept his proposal for settling the question of Djakova. He said that he had been as conciliatory as possible in the matter, and he gave me to understand that he would be willing to leave in your hands composition and the settlement of duties of the international commission. Nevertheless, he thinks still that the commission should settle whether Djakova should be Albanian or Servian, and, in the latter case, should draw up regulations for safeguarding the Albanians who live in the Djakova district ceded to Servia.

[12804] No. 371.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, March 19, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of yesterday.

It is declared that the King's assassin is a Salonica Greek, but it is possible that this may be a *mot d'ordre* to obviate danger of reprisals. Many believe that the deed was the work of Bulgarians who are desirous of provoking disturbances, or Albanians in revenge for the fall of Janina.

[12827] No. 372.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, March 19, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

There is no longer any doubt that the assassin was a Greek named Alexander Schoinas, and that he was insane.

[12620] No. 373.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has informed me of what has passed between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

Austrian Ambassador here informs me that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' views about a commission for Djakova are as already stated, but that he would be willing to meet Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in so far as to leave the composition of the commission to me.

I could not of course take responsibility for appointment of any but an impartial commission, and should have to discuss its composition and terms of reference with Russian and Austrian Ministers for Foreign for Foreign Affairs, as it would be only on a basis agreed between the two Governments that I would act.

Meanwhile, as in any case composition of commission and terms of reference, which appear to be the only point to be settled between Austria and Russia, will require time for careful consideration, could not Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs go so far as to agree to an announcement that the Powers are agreed that Scutari must be Albanian, the question of Djakova, which is only outstanding point, being declared to be left over for future settlement (see last paragraph of your telegram No. 99 of 18th March), and Servia meanwhile not to be disturbed in her occupation of the town?

If this communication is agreed to it should, I suppose, be accompanied by an intimation that the siege of Scutari should be raised by Montenegro.

[12366] No. 374.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

FRENCH Minister at Cettinjé has reported that you and Italian and Russian representatives had already been instructed to press upon Montenegro acceptance of four conditions named in my telegram to you No. 23 of 15th March.

I have explained to French Ambassador that the instruction to you to take action

if your colleagues were similarly instructed applied only to the resolution given in my telegram to you No. 24 of 15th March.

You should clear up misunderstanding with your French colleague.

I am sending you in a separate telegram to-day further instructions for action respecting the four conditions, consequent upon a further resolution at the meeting with Ambassadors.

[13283] No. 375.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day of the communications that had taken place between St. Petersburgh and Vienna through the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh. According to these, M. Sazonof had said that everything was conditional upon the settlement of the question of Djakova. M. Sazonof wanted a commission that would deal with geographical and economic conditions, and not make the settlement of the question depend upon ethnographical considerations. M. Sazonof had stated that everything that had been agreed to in the reunions of Ambassadors was conditional upon the settlement of Djakova. Count Berchtold also considered that everything hitherto conceded by Austria would be *non avenu* if no agreement was arrived at—*i.e.*, that Ipek and Prizrend, for instance, would be claimed for Albania.

Count Mensdorff then told me that Count Berchtold must insist that the object of the commission should be to decide to whom Djakova should belong. Should the commission decide against Djakova being Albanian, the commission would have to secure not only economic guarantees, but also guarantees for an effective and lasting protection of the religious and national rights and liberties of the urban and rural non-Servian population. If these conditions were made the basis of the instructions given to the commission Count Berchtold would be willing to meet M. Sazonof, in so far that he would leave the composition of the commission to me. Count Mensdorff was to ask me whether, "provided Count Sazonof consented," I would undertake to name the members of the commission.

I replied that I could not be responsible for anything but the appointment of an impartial commission. If Austria and Russia liked to arrange between them that a commission should be composed so as to give a particular decision about Djakova, I should, of course, have no objection. But if the appointment of the commission was referred to me, with the object stated by Count Berchtold, I could not lay myself open to the reproach of having appointed a biassed commission in order to secure that it should decide in favour of giving Djakova to Servia. I would therefore tell M. Sazonof that, if I appointed a commission, it must be an impartial one. I was quite prepared to discuss its composition and terms of reference with Count Berchtold and M. Sazonof, and accept any terms of reference to which they agreed, but any commission for which I was responsible must be impartial in giving a decision according to the terms of reference. I would communicate with M. Sazonof to see whether, as the composition and terms of reference of the commission required careful consideration, some explicit statement could not be made at once to the effect that the Powers had decided that Scutari was to go to Albania, and that the question of Djakova, the only point left undecided, was under discussion. It should also be announced that meanwhile Servia would not be disturbed in her occupation of the town.

Count Mensdorff said that, if this were done, the siege of Scutari ought to be raised.

I agreed that this was so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13284] No. 376.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

AT the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day, in the course of the discussion that resulted from the resolutions, recorded in telegrams of to-day, about the conditions of peace between Turkey and the allies, and about the destiny of Scutari being left to the Powers, the Austrian Ambassador proposed the following resolution respecting an indemnity :—

"La question d'une indemnité de guerre sera traitée par la commission internationale de Paris en connexité avec la question d'un règlement équitable de la participation des alliés à la dette ottomane et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués. Les alliés ainsi que la Turquie seront invités de prendre part aux délibérations de cette commission."

This resolution might take the place of point 4 in the conditions of peace which we had drawn up.

The German Ambassador at once took objection to anything that would admit the principle of an indemnity. I agreed in this objection : and it was ascertained that all the others felt that the Austrian proposal was open to the objection that it admitted the principle of an indemnity, and would give rise to discussion that would cause a most unfortunate delay in formulating any conditions of peace.

Count Mensdorff therefore did not press the proposal, and said that he would report to Count Berchtold that the other members of the reunion were all opposed to it.

We then received from the Italian Ambassador the following proposal for the southern frontier of Albania :

"La frontière partirait de la rive méridionale du lac d'Okhrida entre le couvent de Saint Naoum, qui resterait hors de l'Albanie et le bourg de Stanova, et suivrait d'abord les hauteurs entre le lac de Malik, ou Lac de Scrchani d'un côté et le lac de Presba de l'autre côté, puis la crête des collines formant le partage d'eaux entre les bassins du Dévol et de la Bistritza (Haliacmon), en laissant le district de Kortcha (Koritza) à l'Albanie. Elle se dirigerait ensuite passant à l'ouest de Kastoria, Lapsista et Grévéna, lesquelles villes resteraient hors de l'Albanie vers le sud sur le village de Kipourio au sud-ouest de Grévéna et suivrait puis les crêtes qui forment la ligne de séparation entre les bassins : au nord, de la Voyoussa et de ses tributaires ; au sud, du Salamvrias, de l'Arta et de leurs tributaires jusqu'à la source du Kalamas dans le voisinage du Han Kalabaki, laissant au sud la ville de Janina ainsi que Metzovo, qui resteront acquis à la Grèce. La frontière suivrait puis le thalweg du Kalamas jusqu'au point le plus rapproché à Aidonat Paramythia, d'où, laissant ce district et celui de Margha hitche à Margaritti à l'Albanie, elle passerait par la crête des montagnes au sud au village de Glykys et suivrait le thalweg de la rivière Glykys jusqu'à son embouchure dans la mer Ionienne sur la rade de Phanari (ou Porto di Spinnza)."

We said that this must be taken into consideration, but we could not express any opinion upon it this afternoon.

It was agreed that the next meeting should be on Tuesday, the 25th instant, at 1 o'clock, and that the Roumanian Minister should be invited to attend it, in order to inform us of the views of his Government respecting the Koutzo-Vlachs inhabiting that part of territory that would now come under discussion as being on the Albanian frontier or part of the south of Albania.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 201), Sir E. Goschen (No. 110), Sir R. Rodd (No. 85), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 125).

[10813] No. 377.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rose-Troubridge.

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence relative to the closing of the French and Austro-Hungarian post-offices at Cavalla and Dedeagatch by the Bulgarian authorities,* and I have to request you to join your French colleague in making representations to the Bulgarian Government on the subject in accordance with the wish expressed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12856] No. 378.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Athens, March 14, 1913.*

I HAD the honour to receive on the 1st March your telegram No. 29 of the 28th ultimo, instructing me, when my colleagues were similarly authorised, to inform the Greek Government that the Turkish Government accepted the mediation of the Great Powers with the object of obtaining peace, and to ask them whether they would be disposed to accept it in the same terms.

It was not until the 8th March that all the six representatives had received their instructions, when, after meeting to compare notes, we called successively upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made him the communication in the terms of your telegram, only the French Minister adding the explanatory statement, which was conveyed by his instructions, that the Turkish acceptance of mediation was a new departure, and made no reference to previous proposals.

It was not until this morning that the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that he was ready to reply to our communication. It was agreed that it would be most convenient that he should receive us altogether, although the reply should be held to have been delivered to each of us separately. Accordingly, we met at the Ministry at 7 o'clock, M. Coromilas, premising that his communication was verbal and separate for each of us, read it to us and handed us each a copy of it. I told him I had just read it word for word in the "Estia" in a telegram purporting to come from London. He declared that the indiscretion had not been committed at Athens.

As it was, I supposed there would be no objection to telegraphing the text *ad hoc*, to which he agreed, and I believe my colleagues have done so as well as myself. I felt some compunction about sending so long a telegram, the contents of which were already known, but as M. Coromilas had told me some days previously that the whole burden of drafting the communication and sending it for approval to the Balkan capitals had fallen upon him, since the Bulgarian and Servian Legations had no French cypher, I thought it necessary to furnish you with the authentic text. I have now the honour to enclose a copy of it for the sake of accuracy.

None of us being empowered to discuss the communication, only a short and desultory conversation followed the reading of it. In the course of it, M. Coromilas insisted on the necessity of a war indemnity, and said that the strongest refutation of the arguments against it had been furnished by David Bey, the late Turkish Minister of Finance, who had declared that Turkey would be perfectly solvent, indeed more so than before, after the loss of her European provinces.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

* Sir G. Lowther, Nos. 97, February 7, and Part V, Nos. 350 and 378; and Nos. 6, 136, and 312.

Enclosure in No. 378.

Reply of Greek Government to Representatives of Powers.

LES États alliés expriment leurs vifs remerciements aux Grandes Puissances et, déférant à la démarche par laquelle elles ont offert leur médiation, déclarent l'accepter aux conditions suivantes :—

1. Comme base de la négociation pour la délimitation de territoires entre la Turquie et les alliés sera prise une ligne partant d'un point sur la mer de Marmara à l'est de Rodosto, rejoignant la mer Noire à proximité du cap Malatra au sud-est de Midia, à l'exclusion de la presqu'île de Gallipoli, qui restera à la Turquie. Tous les territoires à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux États alliés, y compris les places assiégées Andrinople et Scutari.

2. La Turquie devra céder les îles de la mer Égée.

3. Elle devra se désintéresser complètement de l'île de Crète.

4. La Turquie devra consentir en principe au payement aux alliés d'une indemnité de guerre, dont le montant sera fixé lors de la conclusion définitive de la paix, ainsi qu'au payement d'indemnités particulières pour les dommages dont la cause est antérieure à la guerre. Les États alliés devront prendre part aux délibérations relatives aux indemnités.

5. Les États alliés se réservent de régler par le traité définitif de paix le traitement à accorder à leurs sujets et à leur commerce dans l'Empire ottoman, les questions de nationalités contestées, aussi bien que les garanties au sujet des privilèges des églises orthodoxes et du droit public de leurs congénères sujets ottomans.

6. Les opérations de guerre ne seront pas interrompues.

Athènes, le 1er (14) *février*, 1913.

[12877]

No. 379.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 6. Commercial.)

Sir, *Salonica, March* 14, 1913.

I AM informed that engineers are already engaged on the preliminary surveys for the short line of railway necessary to connect the existing line from Larissa to the Greek frontier with the general European system at present terminating at Salonica, which would certainly be one of the first public works of importance to be undertaken as soon as Greek rule came to be established here.

The joining up of these lines has long been a prominent item in the Greek programme, though the Turks, with their customary shortsightedness, would only discuss their so-called "strategic" alternative tracé viâ the Indje-Kara valley and Elassona.

The distance from Papapoulia on the Thessalian frontier to Ghida, the third station on the Salonica Monastir line, where the connecting branch would probably strike the latter, is about 90 kilos., or 58 miles, and involves no technical works of importance excepting one bridge over the Indje-Kara, shortly before reaching Ghida, and another smaller one over the Mavroneri near Katerina, and the work could easily be completed in a year or eighteen months.

The work of construction will probably be conceded to the French Batignolles Company, which built the Larissa line, but I understand that the Greek Government will be disposed to accept competition.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[12883]

No. 380.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Uskub, March* 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of a Foreign Office despatch of the 21st February, containing a communication from the Russian Ambassador on the subject of the organisation of Servian administration and of Albanian confidence in the Servian Government.

It is correct that the Servians have appointed prefects, sub prefects, and mayors in those parts of this vilayet which they occupy, and have also established law courts. Their grouping of centres for administrative purposes strikes me as more intelligent than that of the Turks. Kalkandelen (Tetovo), for instance, is no longer subordinate to Prisrend, an arrangement which existed in Turkish days, and which, owing to difficulties of communication, was an inconvenience to Moslem and Christian alike. And a great deal of work is being done on roads, though, owing to lack of money, this is rather in the nature of relief work, and the wages paid are, I believe, exceedingly low.

But if the Servian Government has gained Albanian confidence by appointing prefects and judges, and doling out piastres and loaves for road work, the whole of my information about Albanian feeling, which tallies with my knowledge of the Albanian character, is entirely at fault. I believe that the true Albanian feeling on the subject is expressed in my despatch No. 11 of the 18th February to Belgrade:

"Recently an Albanian of my acquaintance remarked to me: 'If only it was summer there would be a hundred bands out in Kossovo.'

"'And when the snow melts?' I asked.

"'Then a rifle will be worth £ T. 50.'"

This man was by no means one of the wilder Albanians; he was a respectable Uskub tradesman, whose business had probably prospered rather than lost by the war.

With regard to the "justice" and "impartiality" of the Servian administration, I would refer you to my despatch No. 11 of the 18th February to Belgrade (treatment of Catholics and crypto-Catholics), and to every despatch I have written on the Servian treatment of Bulgars, and I would add that I hear that it is virtually impossible for any business man at Prishtina or Mitrovitza to get a railway truck for the carriage of goods unless he is a Serb.

M. Oudintzof, the Russian vice-consul at Mitrovitza, who has been in charge of the Russian consulate-general here for the last three months, is a man of about twenty-five, who has, I believe, less than a year's experience of the consular service. He is on terms of greater intimacy with the Servians than any of his colleagues. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that he is the only consul here with a competent knowledge of Servian, and, on the other, to a natural Servian partiality for the representative of Russia, a partiality which has sometimes struck me as being carried so far as to amount to something rather like discourtesy to the rest of the consular corps. It is, therefore, only natural that his views should reflect those of the Servians, and those views, or, at least, the expression of them, is optimistic. It is also quite possible that Albanians have expressed to the Servians their confidence in their Government, applying the Oriental proverb, "Kiss the hand that you cannot cut off." I believe that the remark of the Dyakova Albanian at the Trieste Congress that "with the spring we will make Kossovo a Servian graveyard" reflects much more accurately the will, if not the power, of the Albanians.

The dragoman of the Russian consulate is an Ottoman Serb, is therefore naturally biassed, and is the last person to enjoy Albanian confidence. My own dragoman, on the contrary, is an Armenian, and, as such, less likely to be a partisan in local quarrels. Such leanings as he has are in favour of the Albanians, a fact of which I duly take account.

And my knowledge of Turkish enables me to collect opinions and discuss the situation independently of my dragoman. I have already given (my despatch No. 8 of the 16th November, 1912, to Belgrade) my reasons for believing that Albanian expressions of confidence in the British consul are more than mere politeness. I would only add that so thoroughly is the Russian consulate regarded locally as pro-Serb that even the Bulgars, though Slavs themselves, give me more of their confidence than they do to M. Oudintzof.

If, within less than six months from Kumanovo, under an administration of which I have said that, "however well the higher commands may have succeeded in matters of strategy, they have failed signally in the not less important qualities required for the pacification and conciliation of a conquered country" (my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 12th December, 1912, to Belgrade), and in a time of massacres and rumours of massacres, the Albanians have confidence in the Servian Government, they are false to the impressions of, I believe, every English traveller who has studied the Albanian question on the spot, and to the traditions of twelve centuries.

I am sending copy of this to His Majesty's Legation at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[12862] No. 381.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50 of the 10th instant, enclosing copy of statements handed to me by the Austrian Minister with regard to outrages alleged to have been perpetrated by Servian soldiery or komitajis, I have the honour to transmit herewith extracts from a private letter which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham.

Mr. Louis Cahen, who has been working at Uskub for some four months on the Macedonian Relief Fund, and who brought me the above letter, is anxious I should enter a protest here concerning the massacres which are said to be taking place, and concerning which he says reports are daily arriving at Uskub. He also suggests an international commission of enquiry.

I have informed him that I already protested some time ago, but the reports are denied by the Servian authorities, who merely put them down to malice, and that, unless I can be furnished with unimpeachable evidence concerning the facts complained of, it is difficult to make any effective representations.

From the point of view of eliciting the truth, I do not think that an international commission would be found of much value, as, in the first place, the Servians would do their best to prevent its hearing any witnesses able to incriminate them; and, secondly, any witnesses that the commission might succeed in securing independently would probably be afraid to give evidence for fear of the consequences. On the other hand, however, there is no doubt that an international commission would be useful in this respect, namely, that its presence in the country would check the perpetration of further outrages.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 381.

Extracts from Vice-Consul Peckham's Private Letter, dated Uskub, March 13, 1913.

I HAVE been making enquiries about that Albanian who was thrown into the Vardar, and find that there were two of them. One has got a scare that the Servians know of his existence, and has fled the country; I am trying to find out where he has gone to. The other is living here in the utmost seclusion, also in fear of the Servians. I am trying to get in touch with him. If I do find him, I shall probably have some difficulty in getting him to talk, and think I am much more likely to be able to do so if I can offer to get him out of the country. This I could do by entering his name as a cavass (if need-be, an assumed name), and taking him down to Salonica with me, if I go, as I should rather like to, for a few days at Easter. . . . . .

My dragoman has seen a man who, he says, is quite trustworthy, who had talked with the Albanian No. 1, but there was no mention of No. 2. This strikes me as a little inconsistent, but not necessarily destroying the truth of the story, as neither of them would be likely to want to admit the existence of the other, from fear of the Servians.

According to No. 1's story, they were wounded at Kumanovo, taken to an improvised hospital in the Servian school here, and on the Monday (28th October) were taken out and thrown into the Vardar.

No. 2, from the details I have gathered at second or third hands, adds that their hands were tied, that he bit his bonds off and then freed No. 1, and that they swam some way down before landing.

I have not sifted this information yet, but propose to do so as soon as possible.

. . . . . .

Mr. Cahen, who brings this up, has somewhat modified his views of the Servians since he originally came out here; he is now about as anti-Servian as he was pro-Servian when he arrived. I think his opinions need a little moderating; he is inclined to believe all the stories told him without too much considering probabilities or consistencies. Thus, when he came here, he was sure that Prchalka had fired on the Servian troops from his own consulate, and now he is inclined to believe all the massacres of the Albanians which the Catholics recount here.

[12863] No. 382.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 57)
Sir, *Belgrade, March 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 12th instant in which I made observations on the feeling in Servia with regard to Scutari, I have the honour to enclose herewith extracts from an interesting private letter written from Uskub which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson, military attaché to this legation.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 382.

Extracts from Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson's Private Letter, dated Uskub, March 13, 1913.

I DINED at the officers mess this evening and had talks with several of them. They seem set upon taking Scutari, as a feat of arms, and say it will increase the pride of their soldiers, but at the same time I am glad to say they are quite prepared to be deprived of their conquest by seeing Scutari given to the new Albania.

Colonel Ilitch who has been attaché at Vienna and Constantinople and is quite one of the most intelligent Servians I have met, says that they want to increase the hatred felt by Servians of all classes for Austria; by pointing out that they will be in a position to give an outward and visible sign of Austrian [illegible] and oppression, and enable preparations for a national war in a few years time to be made. It seems rather far-fetched reasoning, and the game is scarcely worth the candle; I told him I thought there was quite sufficient hatred of Austria in Servia already, but he denies this, and says Servia will never be contented until alone and unaided she has beaten the Austrian army in the same way as the Turks. They are going to make a great parade of the manner in which they have been deserted by the Triple *Entente*, although in their hearts they recognise that this is unavoidable. They Bandidch [illegible] giving them all the jumps.

The figures given in my despatch to you as regards the strength of the force being sent are approximately correct, though I may have underestimated the artillery, which if they can get them off in time will consist of seventeen guns, &c., and not ten as stated. The head-quarter staff of the expedition has not yet left Salonica.

[12864] No. 383.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 58.)
Sir, *Belgrade, March 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a communiqué published by the Servian Government regarding the command of the Servian and Montenegrin forces before Scutari.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 383.

Communiqué published by Servian Government.

CERTAINS journaux étrangers tendancieusement annoncent que des malentendus peuvent se produire en ce qui concerne le commandement à Scutari, puisque l'armée monténégrine coopère avec l'armée serbe. Au moment de leur arrivée, toutes les troupes serbes étaient placées sous le haut commandement du Roi Nicolas. Au moment où l'attaque générale commencera, ce sera le Général Bojovitch qui prendra le commandement des opérations. Par conséquent, il y a à constater aucun malentendu dans cette question entre la Serbie et le Monténégro.

Belgrade, le 15 mars, 1913.

[12983] No. 384.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 88.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March 16*, 1913.

WITH reference to previous telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note which I have received from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the question of mediation between Roumania and Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 384.

M. Sazonof to Sir G. Buchanan.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 1er (14) *mars*, 1913.

LES Grandes Puissances ayant fait à Bucarest et à Sophia des démarches collectives pour proposer à la Roumanie et à la Bulgarie leur médiation dans le différend qui les sépare, ces deux Etats ont accepté ladite proposition et se sont adressés au Gouvernement Impérial en demandant que Saint-Pétersbourg soit choisi comme lieu de la médiation.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Excellence, je vous prie, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vouloir bien me faire savoir si vous êtes autorisé par votre Gouvernement à prendre part à la médiation en question.

Aussitôt que j'aurai reçu votre réponse, ainsi que celle de vos collègues, je ne manquerai pas de vous informer du jour et de l'heure de l'ouverture des séances de la conférence.

Veuillez, &c.
SAZONOF.

[12865] No. 385.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March 16*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham on the subject of the discontent and anti-Serb feeling in his district.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 385.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Uskub, March 12*, 1913.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 13 of the 26th February on the subject of local anti-Serb feeling, I have the honour to report that I have received from a Bulgar source a fresh list of outrages against the Macedonian Bulgars and the Exarchist Church. I have not thought it worth while troubling you with a copy of this, which recites much the same class of outrage as those I have previously given. It is stated that in various places Exarchist priests are forced to take out licences from the Patriarchist authorities before continuing their sacerdotal functions, and that prayer for the Exarchist religious authorities is forbidden.

I am of opinion that anti-Serb feeling is increasing rather than decreasing, as more and more pressure is being brought to bear on the Bulgars. I have previously stated (my despatch No. 2, Confidential, of the 23rd January) that in the Tabanka district Bulgar and Serb were living more or less harmoniously, but recent information tends to show that discontent is now manifesting itself there. And I am assured that even the Ottoman Serbs are beginning to be discontented and to sigh for autonomy under foreign control. Nor does this strike me as improbable. On the one hand, various paid Serb agitators now find their occupation gone (for instance, the Servian paper which used to be published here has been some time defunct, as the Servian Government has ceased to subsidise it); on the other, the Ottoman Serbs, who in old days sighed for the advantages of annexation and did not realise its disadvantages, now suffer all the inconveniences of military occupation, of an improvised administration, and of the continued dearness of living due to the action of the Servian customs authorities.

I am assured that every element here would prefer autonomy under a foreign control to annexation to Servia or to a re-establishment of the Turkish régime, and that they have not yet given up hope that autonomy will finally be established.

This hope is, I believe, the only thing which restrains the local Bulgars from beginning militant tactics. I fear that, as soon as the annexation of the part of the country has been definitely made, a section of them will embark on a systematic series of outrages.

The principal centre of discontent appears for the moment to be Kyopulu Veles, which has always been an important Bulgar centre, and where the Servians seem to be carrying on a particularly energetic anti-Bulgar campaign, the Exarchist Metropolitan having been expelled, and the mayor, a Bulgar whom the Servians themselves appointed after the occupation, dismissed because he refused to Serbise his name.

But my impression on this subject may be due to the greater facility of communications and consequently of transmitting news from Kyopulu, and I would not wish it to be inferred that other places, such as Kumanovo or Kalkandelen (Tetovo) were more than relatively content.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[12860] No. 386.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Rome, March 17*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note which I have received from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a communication which I addressed to him in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 61 of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the interference of the allied Balkan States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories.

You will observe that the Italian Government, on whom I strongly urged both verbally and in my written communication the importance of all the Powers acting together in questions of this nature, are disposed in principle to take part in the proposed identic protest against the action of the Servian authorities but wish, before

definitely committing themselves, to see the draft which is being prepared by the French Government.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 386.

The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir R. Rodd.

(Translation.)

Rome, March 15, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated the 3rd instant, in which your Excellency enquired whether the Royal Government would be disposed to take part in an identic protest to the Servian Government in the interests of the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories. I hasten to inform you that, in principle, the Royal Government would not be unwilling to associate themselves in the action in question. It will, however, be desirable first to be acquainted with the text of the communication to be made at Belgrade, a text which, as I understand from your Excellency, it is proposed should be drafted by the French Government.

I therefore await the communication of it and have, meanwhile, the honour, &c.

SAN GIULIANO.

[12850] No. 387.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 111.)

Paris, March 19, 1913.

Sir,

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 147 of the 27th ultimo relative to the interference of the Balkan allied States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories, I transmitted to the French Government a copy of the Servian reply to the representations of His Majesty's Government on this subject, and I at the same time enquired their views as to how far the principles quoted by the Servian Government could be held to apply in the case of interference in Turkish territory with an institution in the special position occupied by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. I further informed M. Jonnart that you were in agreement with the suggestion put forward in the concluding paragraph of his note of the 19th ultimo that a further representation should be addressed to the Servian Government, and that you would be glad if the French Government, in pursuance of their proposal, would draw up the terms of an identic protest to be made at Belgrade.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note from M. Jonnart, enclosing a draft of the instructions to be sent to the French Minister at Belgrade. M. Jonnart observes that, although the various points raised by the Servian Government are answered as fully as possible by the accompanying draft, it would, in his opinion, be advisable for the representatives of the Powers at Belgrade to concert together in drawing up the exact terms of the protest to be made to the Servian Government.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 387.

M. Jonnart to Sir F. Bertie.

Paris, le 18 *mars*, 1913.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR une lettre du 1er de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me transmettre copie de la note adressée le 5 février dernier par le Ministre serbe des Affaires Étrangères au représentant de Sa Majesté britannique à Belgrade, en réponse à une communication de Sir R. Paget tendant à assurer le libre fonctionnement de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane dans les territoires occupés par les armées serbes.

Votre Excellence m'informait en même temps du désir du Gouvernement anglais de

connaître les vues du Gouvernement français sur le point de savoir à quel degré les principes invoqués dans la note serbe pouvaient être considérés comme applicables en territoire ottoman, à l'encontre d'une institution jouissant de la situation spéciale qu'occupe l'Administration de la Dette ottomane.

En m'avisant en outre que les représentants anglais à Berlin, à Vienne et à Rome avaient reçu pour instructions de sonder les Gouvernements intéressés en vue d'une action commune, votre Excellence voulait bien ajouter que Sir E. Grey serait heureux que le Gouvernement français prît l'initiative de rédiger une protestation dont les termes seraient adoptés par les diverses Puissances en vue d'une nouvelle démarche à Belgrade.

En réponse à cette communication, et au désir qui y est exprimé, j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser sous ce pli copie des instructions qui seront adressées au Ministre de la république à Belgrade. Bien que la note ci-jointe réponde d'une façon aussi complète que possible aux points soulevés dans la réponse du Gouvernement serbe que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer, je pense qu'il serait préférable de laisser aux représentants des Puissances à Belgrade le soin de se concerter sur les termes définitifs de la protestation qui serait remise au Ministère serbe des Affaires Étrangères, sur la base de cette note, mais de façon à tenir compte des éléments d'appréciation qui auraient pu nous échapper ou qui auraient pu se faire jour récemment.

Agréez, &c.
JONNART.

Enclosure 2 in No. 387.

Draft Note from the French Minister at Belgrade to Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Fonctionnement de la Dette publique ottomane dans les territoires occupés par les Serbes.

LE Ministre de France a déjà eu plusieurs fois l'occasion d'attirer, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'attention du Gouvernement Royal sur le fait que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, agissant d'une façon indépendante et propre sur le compte des créanciers étrangers de l'Empire ottoman, et de sa seule autorité, exerçait, malgré l'état de guerre, pour assurer, dans les provinces occupées par les armées serbes, la perception des revenus qui ont été cédés d'une manière absolue et irrévocable, en vertu du Décret de Mouharrem, pour le service de la dette.

Une notification semblable a été adressée sur place par les consuls de France à Uscub et à Monastir aux commandants en chef des armées engagées dans ces villes, de leur côté, les administrations intéressées s'adressaient directement aux autorités serbes en vue d'obtenir leur concours pour assurer leur libre fonctionnement.

Enfin, des démarches analogues étaient faites par les représentants des Puissances intéressées à Belgrade comme à Sophia, à Athènes et à Cettigné.

Aux communications de la Légation de France, son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a bien voulu répondre en donnant l'assurance que le Gouvernement du Roi ne songerait en aucune façon à porter atteinte aux intérêts étrangers engagés dans la zone d'occupation serbe, et que, dans la mesure où le fonctionnement de la Dette ottomane et de la Régie contrôlée se trouverait entravé à raison de nécessités militaires inéluctables, il serait tenu compte du préjudice causé à ces deux institutions, hors du règlement général.

Le Gouvernement de la république, à qui la légation n'a pas manqué de transmettre ces assurances, est heureux d'en prendre acte, mais me charge d'insister à nouveau pour que toutes facilités soient laissées aux agences de la Dette publique pour continuer librement leurs opérations au profit des porteurs à qui les revenus administrés ont été cédés.

Les autorités serbes ont cru, en effet, pouvoir justifier l'occupation des bureaux de la Dette, la saisie des sommes qui y étaient conservées et la perception pour le compte du Trésor serbe des revenus administrés par la Dette ottomane, par une série de considérations tirées du droit de la guerre et dont il est fait application à la Dette, comme s'il agissait d'une institution purement turque chargée de la perception de deniers publics pour le compte et au profit du Trésor ottoman.

Si tel était le caractère de cette institution, et si les recettes effectuées par elle étaient destinées à alimenter, directement ou indirectement, le Trésor ottoman et à faciliter ainsi les opérations militaires de l'adversaire, les autorités serbes seraient, en effet, autorisées, conformément aux lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, à saisir entre les mains de la Dette le numéraire, les fonds et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État, à prélever les impôts d'après les règles de l'assiette en vigueur, et à employer ces fonds à l'administration des territoires occupés comme à l'entretien du corps d'occupation.

Mais tel n'est pas le cas.

L'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, qui n'est pas, en effet, une institution internationale au sens exact et juridique du mot, ne saurait être non plus assimilée à une institution purement turque dont le sort serait attaché à celui de la souveraineté ottomane elle-même.

La Dette, ainsi que cela résulte nettement des actes qui ont réglé sa constitution et son fonctionnement, notamment du Décret de Moharrem et des décrets et conventions annexes qui sont venus le compléter, est une institution privée constituée, à la suite d'une convention entre le Gouvernement ottoman et ses créanciers, au bénéfice d'un syndicat de porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans avec la sanction de la loi turque et avec l'agrément des Puissances.

Le Décret de Moharrem constitue la charte de cette institution privée, dont le régime ne saurait être modifié sans un "accord préalable entre le Gouvernement Impérial et le Conseil de la Dette" (article 9).

Ce conseil, institué "pour représenter les porteurs et pour pourvoir à leurs intérêts" (article 15), s'est vu attribuer "l'administration, la perception et l'encaissement, directement ou par le soin des porteurs" (article 16), de certains revenus des monopoles et contributions indirectes cédés d'une manière absolue et irrévocable jusqu'à l'extinction complète de la dette (article 8).

Le caractère privé de cette institution résulte avec évidence de l'exposé qui précède : c'est aux porteurs, et non au profit des Turcs, qu'opère la Dette, et les autorités de l'Empire n'exercent aucune part prépondérante à l'exercice de cette institution d'autre droits ou des droits plus étendus que ceux appartenant au Gouvernement ottoman lui-même. Si les autorités serbes ont succédé aux droits du Gouvernement ottoman, elles n'ont évidemment succédé aux droits des porteurs.

En dehors d'un droit de contrôle strictement défini (article 18), le Gouvernement ottoman n'a aucun droit, même en temps de guerre, la libre disposition des revenus perçus par la Dette ottomane. Les seules perceptions opérées pour le compte du Trésor sont les excédents non affectés, déclarés en fin d'exercice, et disponibles alors seulement ; encore ces sommes pourraient-elles être frappées d'opposition par les autorités des armées occupantes.

La Dette est, même n'est point, pour le reste, comptable de deniers publics, les sommes d'argent qu'elle perçoit étant affectées, sans distraction possible, au service des emprunts. Or, si les lois de la guerre autorisent la saisie et la perception des fonds ou valeurs portant en propre à l'État, elles assurent, d'autre part, le respect et la sauvegarde de droits privés.

La Légation de France n'entend point discuter ici les conditions de fait qui, par leur existence impérieuse ou urgente, ont pu amener les autorités militaires serbes à adopter dans tel ou tel cas particulier une attitude déterminée. Mais, tout en prenant acte des dispositions déclarées du Gouvernement serbe en ce qui touche le règlement ultérieur de ces difficultés dans un esprit favorable aux porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans, dont les droits doivent bénéficier d'une protection entière, même en temps de guerre, le Ministre de la république doit, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, attirer l'attention du Gouvernement Royal sur les considérations qui précèdent dont la force et la valeur ne sauraient lui échapper.

Jusqu'à ce qu'un nouvel ordre de choses ait été consacré tant par traité qu'en vertu d'un accord spécial avec les intéressés, les droits que la Dette ottomane exerce au nom des porteurs sur certains revenus des territoires occupés ne sauraient souffrir ni de l'occupation actuelle ni de la cession éventuelle de ces territoires.

Belgrade, le mars, 1913.

[12931]

No. 388.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, March 19, 1913.*

THE Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury have had before them the letters from your department of the 11th and the 13th instant, relative to the arrangements to be made as regards the Ottoman Debt on the conclusion of the war, and they direct me to make the following reply :—

Their Lordships note that as none of the Governments are agreed as to the wording of the articles to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace, the Secretary of State does not propose to discuss the question further at meetings of the Ambassadors in London, but to leave it to the International Commission in Paris. This course should undoubtedly facilitate a settlement.

As regards Sir L. Mallet's letter of 11th March, the observations of the French Government—to whom the substance of their Lordships' letter of 19th February does not appear to have been communicated—seem to be based on a misconception of the reasons which suggested the proviso put forward by this Board, and of the extent to which it was intended to apply.

It occurs to their Lordships that the French Government may have interpreted the amendment proposed by Secretary Sir E. Grey in the sense that the contribution of the allies might vary annually according to the yield of the assigned revenues which would be maintained in the ceded territories.

This of course was not contemplated.

My Lords approached the question on the assumption that a certain sum is to be fixed at the outset once and for all as the contribution of the allies towards the Debt, and that it will be impossible to continue to earmark towards the service of the Debt the revenues now assigned thereto in the ceded territories, and they expressed themselves as generally in favour of the principle (which has obvious advantages) advocated by the French Government for determining the amount of the contribution to be made by the allies.

But it is evident that the aggregate contribution arrived at by taking a proportion of the Ottoman Debt corresponding to the proportion borne by the general revenues of the ceded territories to the total revenue of the Turkish Empire will not necessarily coincide with, and might be very different from, the actual amount heretofore contributed in the aggregate by these territories to the service of the Debt, and if the former amount were substantially less than the latter, the creditors of the Ottoman Government would to that extent be prejudiced.

Their Lordships had before them no figures to show how the two methods would compare except those furnished in Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 91 of the 16th February, which seemed to show that the result of the first method would be substantially smaller than that of the second.

For this reason it appeared to their Lordships that a proviso should be added to the French formula, and the proviso which they intended to suggest (though their letter was not explicit on the point) was that the total contribution should not be less than the past aggregate yield of the assigned revenues in the ceded territories so far as actually required for the services of the Debt, *i.e.*, excluding the surplus (or "excédent") referred to in paragraph 3 of the French Ambassador's memorandum of the 10th March, which has been carried to the general revenue of the Ottoman Treasury.

It is now stated in the memorandum submitted by the French Ambassador that either method of arriving at the total amount of the contribution payable by the allies produces the same practical result. If this is so, the proviso becomes quite unnecessary and should be abandoned as a superfluous and disturbing complication which (as pointed out by the French Government) may stipulate "la discussion et le marchandage" on the part of the allies.

But their Lordships are not in a position to say whether or not the French statement is correct. Secretary Sir E. Gray may then see fit to ask the French Government to furnish him with the calculations on which it rests, and he may also wish to leave the question an open one for the consideration of the British delegates to the Paris Commission.

Secretary Sir E. Grey will observe that one amendment proposed by the Russian Government in No. 1 of the draft articles (Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 13th March) aims, if my Lords understand it correctly, at fixing the contribution of the allies to the

Debt with reference to the sums actually paid as interest and sinking fund, as opposed presumably to the total yield of the assigned revenues, the surplus of which (the "excédent") has gone to the Turkish Treasury. If this is so, their Lordships' views on the point (as already explained) do not differ substantially.

The further amendments proposed by the Russian Government (forwarded in Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 11th March) raise the general question of how far it is advisable to define in the Treaty of Peace the principles on which the obligations to be assumed by the allies shall be calculated.

This question, with others, will now, as their Lordships understand, be referred to the International Commission in Paris, and they do not think that they can usefully make any observations thereon. The Secretary of State will of course have observed that the Russian Government proposes that the Paris Commission should now include representatives not only of the Great Powers but also of the Balkan States.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[12933] No. 389.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)

Sir, *50, Cornhill, London, March 19, 1913.*

IN continuation of our letter of the 3rd March on the subject of certain Treasury Bills of the Ottoman Government, we beg leave to point out further that the words used in article 7 of the contract for the Treasury bills by which the revenues in question are assigned and affected to the contracting banks "pour assurer le payement du capital et des intérêts des bons" follow the form used in almost every one of the numerous loan contracts made by the Ottoman Government. The revenues are assigned to the banks for the sole purpose of paying the capital and interest of the bills, and the banks have no interest in receiving the revenues except for that purpose, and as representing the holders of the bills.

We find it necessary also to correct the statements made in the last paragraph of our letter of the 3rd March, which, on further examination, we regret to find were erroneous.

The Bagdad Railway loans have no charge whatever on any customs revenues, whether arising in the five districts named in the Treasury bill contract or elsewhere.

The first series of the Bagdad Railway loans is guaranteed by assignments of tithe revenues in various districts; and the remaining five series primarily by the surplus of revenues received by the Ottoman Public Debt under the decree of Mouharrem, excluding the proceeds of the additional 3 per cent. customs duties.

The loans are created by the Ottoman Government, and handed to the Bagdad Railway Company in payment of the kilometric guarantee of the various sections of the line; and then sold by that Company to the public.

We may mention that in the case of the loans which have a prior charge on the customs revenues of the five specified districts, viz.: the customs loan of 1902, the loan of 1901 5 and the loan of 1908, the clause assigning the revenues is similar to that in the contract for the Treasury bills.

We have, &c.
(For National Bank of Turkey),
H. BABINGTON SMITH, *President.*

[12934] No. 390.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)

Sir, *50, Cornhill, London, March 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to our letter of the 3rd March and other correspondence on the subject of Turkish Treasury bills, we have the honour to inform you that no provision was made by the Ottoman Government (with the exception of the sum of £T. 75,000 mentioned in our letter of the 18th February) for the purpose of meeting their bills to the amount of 1,500,000*l.*, which fell due on the 13th instant.

On the 7th March we received a telegram from Constantinople requesting us to communicate to such holders of the bills as we could trace an offer from the Ottoman

Government to renew the bills for twelve months with interest at 7½ per cent., the Government reserving the right to repay the bills before maturity, the interest in that case to be calculated up to the date of repayment only. We communicated this offer to such of the holders as we were able to trace, but none of them were inclined to accept it. On the 13th March we received a further telegram, dated the 12th March, giving the substance of a letter received by the National Bank of Turkey at Constantinople from the Minister of Finance. The Minister, desiring to avoid a formal protest of the bills, undertook that if the bills were not protested the Government would recognise, to the benefit of the holders, all the legal effects of a protest, viz., interest at the rate (9 per cent.) fixed by Turkish law until complete payment of the bills, and maintenance of the conditions of the contract regarding the obligation to repay the bills from the proceeds of the first financial operation, and to pay to the National Bank of Turkey the revenues assigned as security.

We enclose a copy of a statement handed to the holders of the bills at the time of presentation for the purpose of bringing this telegram to their knowledge. We believe, however, that the holders have, in most cases, performed the necessary formalities for having the bills formally noted by a notary as unpaid, and in some cases they have extended a protest.

The Ottoman Government, having failed to meet the bills at their maturity, has now to carry out the obligations defined in article 7 of the contract: that is to say, to pay to the National Bank the whole of the receipts of the customs in the districts of Salonica, Smyrna, Adrianople, Broussa, and Beirout, so soon as the receipts from those custom-houses have reached the amount (£T. 642,000 in each year) necessary to satisfy prior obligations. We beg, therefore, to renew the request which we ventured to make in our letter of the 18th February with reference to a communication to the Governments of the allied Balkan States. We beg to add that, in addition to the customs revenues of the Salonica district, we understand that the customs revenues arising in various parts of the Adrianople district are being encashed by one of the allied Balkan States.

We would ask also that the rights of the holders of the bills in question may be kept in view in any negotiations or discussions which may take place regarding the settlement of Turkish finances.

We have, &c.
(For National Bank of Turkey),
H. BABINGTON SMITH, *President.*

Enclosure in No. 390.

Statement respecting Turkish Treasury Bills, 1912, due March 13, 1913.

FOLLOWING upon the proposal made to the bill-holders on the 10th March to the effect that the Government wished to renew the bills for twelve months, retiring the old bills and giving new ones for the face value plus one year's interest at 7½ per cent., the Government reserving the right to repay under rebate before maturity, the National Bank of Turkey, London, received yesterday the following telegram from its head office in Constantinople:—

"*Stamboul, March* 12, 1913, 11 A.M.

"Government offers Jeddah customs, average yearly receipts 60,000*l.*, as additional security if first renewal proposal accepted."

It will be appreciated that time did not permit of the examination of the value of this proposal or of its being communicated to the bill-holders.

The following further telegram was received this morning:

"*Stamboul, March* 12, 1913, 6 P.M.

"Have obtained following letter from Ministre des Finances:

"'Vu non-acceptation de notre proposition renouvellement bons Trésor pour un an, avec garantie additionnelle douane Djedda, et vu impossibilité pour Gouvernement payer bons échéance 13 mars, déclarons dispensé banque contractante et porteurs ces bons recourir formalité protêt en leur reconnaissant tout effet légal de protêt, savoir, intérêt légal 9 pour cent jusqu'au remboursement complet, et maintenant

naturellement condition primitive obligation rembourser ces bons sur première opération financière et versement National Bank of Turkey recettes affectées.

"'Veuillez communiquer porteurs en les engageant de ne pas protester, bien entendu sans aucune responsabilité de notre part.'"

The above communication is made by the National Bank of Turkey without responsibility on their part.

[12991] No. 391.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March* 19, 1913.

THE Bulgarian representative informs me that he thinks it probable that the Bulgarian Government will accept conditions of peace which the Powers have now put forward to them.

[12884] No. 392.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March* 19, 1913.

THE Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he is making urgent representations to the Montenegrin Government to obtain permission for the civilian population of Scutari to evacuate the town, as the Montenegrins, contrary to rules of war, are deliberately firing on buildings of the town. He expects a negative reply, on the ground that the besieged would refuse to cease firing during evacuation of town by the civilians. In his opinion, the next step should be for the Powers to send a message under a flag of truce to the commander of Scutari to tell him that he must make arrangements for the civilian population to evacuate the town unmolested.

[12895] No. 393.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, March* 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 15th March.

On my making a communication to him yesterday, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs entered into lengthy explanations with regard to what he described as the military situation at Scutari, with which he thought that you must be acquainted. I replied (as was the case) that I could not follow his arguments, but I understood his chief point to be that the entire population was taking part in the resistance to the Montenegrins. He agreed.

I would venture to draw your attention to this admission. It seems to me that the struggle is being carried on with the greatest bitterness against Albanians; shells are being thrown indiscriminately into the town, while the British Red Cross, who can communicate freely with the men returned from the frontier, tell me of savage spirit displayed by them towards their opponents.

[12902] No. 394.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, March* 19, 1913.

MILITARY attaché telegraphs to-day from the Servian position that Servian reinforcements are arriving, but that he does not think offensive action is probable for the present.

[12846] No. 395.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March* 19, 1913.

ALBANIA.

I informed M. Sazonof to-day of your conversation with Austrian Ambassador reported in your telegram No. 239 of the 18th March. His Excellency said that he had spoken to the Austrian Ambassador here on the subject of the International Commission instead of telegraphing to Vienna. M. Sazonof maintained that all that was necessary was to discover a pretext for leaving Servia in possession of Djakova, as the whole object of the proposed commission was in order to save the *amour-propre* of Austria. Such a pretext might be furnished by the fact that Djakova gravitates eastwards and not westwards, and instructions might be given to the delegates not to take account of ethnographical considerations. He is quite indifferent to grounds on which their decision may be based, but insists on Servia receiving Djakova in return for leaving Scutari to Albania.

I told his Excellency that, in my opinion, it was essential as regards Scutari that an immediate agreement should be come to about question of Albanian frontier which would preclude all idea that Montenegro's claim to it would have Russian support. Otherwise, in the event of a crisis arising, Russia might be obliged to make her choice between exposing herself to humiliation or making the question a *casus belli*. On my reading to his Excellency the proposal you were to submit to-day to Conference of Ambassadors, he signified his acquiescence. So long as Russia was not required to fire a shot or to agree to a European mandate being given to Austria, she was prepared to adopt almost any course which might compel Montenegro to submit to the will of the Powers. In the event of failure of diplomatic pressure, the best course to adopt seemed to him the one which he had suggested to me last night, and which I reported to you in my telegram No. 100.

M. Sazonof's attitude, however, in this respect as regards Scutari is conditional on Djakova being left to Servia.

[12979] No. 396.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March* 20, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 18th March.

In view of continued difficulty in obtaining the consent of Russian Government to dispatch of mission under M. Danef, King of Bulgarians has sent one of his secretaries to St. Petersburgh with special instructions to General Dimitrief respecting the line of policy to be adopted in the pending Roumanian-Bulgarian mediation and on the whole question of Servian-Bulgarian claims in Macedonia.

[13320] No. 397.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March* 20, 1913.

HEAD-QUARTERS staff report repulse with loss of sortie made from Chatalja on 18th March by five Turkish infantry divisions with cavalry and artillery supported by guns of the fleet.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13138] No. 398.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 20, 1913.*

I AM informed confidentially that orders were given last night for an Austrian naval squadron to leave Pola for the Albanian coast. I am informed that it will limit its action for the moment to showing itself off the North Albanian ports as the result of recent incident at San Giovanni di Medua between the Montenegrins and Hungarian steamer. I have been also given a hint that the squadron has secret orders to meet Greek transports bearing 12,000 Servian troops and to turn them back.

Pray inform Admiralty.

[12996] No. 399.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 61 of 15th March, penultimate paragraph.

It appears to my Russian and French colleagues and myself that, if the Balkan States should refuse to agree to the views expressed by the Powers in the first instance, they would consider it derogatory to accept them subsequently under pressure, and this in itself might prove an additional obstacle. It might therefore be advisable that, in simultaneous official communication of the bases of negotiation decided upon by the Powers, a hint should be thrown out privately as to the consequences of refusal.

The Russian Minister is telegraphing in the same sense.

[13024] No. 400.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram addressed to Sophia, No. 78 of 15th March : Mediation.

My colleagues having received instructions, we made communication to-day.

[12999] No. 401.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 20, 1913.*

SECRETARY-GENERAL told me this morning that Austrians were dispatching ships of war to Cattaro. Episode of Montenegrins firing on an Austrian ship was an evident pretext, and the real reason was the situation of Scutari and dispatch of Servian reinforcements. He said that any unilateral intervention by Austria against Montenegro would not be favourably viewed here. If intervention became necessary it might be contemplated [*sic*] by Austria and Italy conjointly as mandatories of the Powers.

[13009] No. 402.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 20, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs being unable to see me on account of Cabinet council, I have had conversation by telephone, and, at his request, read to him paraphrase of your telegram No. 243 of 19th March.

His Excellency expressed disappointment and said that the Austrian Ambassador had assured him again yesterday that his Government did not care how the commission was composed. It was, he repeated, a mere diplomatic expedient.

I pressed him to do as you asked and to consent to declare Scutari Albanian, leaving Djakova question for future settlement. He said that he could not announce to the world that he had yielded on the former question until he obtained satisfaction with regard to the latter.

He called me up a second time to say that he proposed to telegraph to London suggesting that the two questions of Scutari and Djakova should be both referred to the same international commission. Were this to be agreed to, he would give private assurances to the Austrian Government that he would not support Montenegro's claims to Scutari.

[12997] No. 403.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 20, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 70 of 2nd March.

Disbandment of reservists will begin on 24th March and be concluded in about a week.

[12619] No. 404.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 20, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 58 of 18th March.

You should point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that absence of unanimity will greatly weaken effect of representation, and ask his Excellency to send immediate instructions to representatives at Belgrade, Sophia, and Athens to join in it.

(Repeated to Belgrade, No. 65.)

[12949] No. 405.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.†

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 20, 1913.*

THE following resolution was come to at the meeting with Ambassadors yesterday :—

"Sur la proposition de Sir E. Grey, la réunion est d'avis qu'il y a lieu de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Cettigné et à Belgrade une démarche collective en vue de déclarer que la délimitation de l'Albanie a été réservée par les Puissances ; que, jusqu'à ce que cette délimitation ait été faite, aucune action de la Serbie et du Monténégro en Albanie ne saurait être considérée comme créant des droits acquis ; que, par exemple, si Scutari vient à tomber, le sort de cette ville sera réglé par les Puissances, et non par le fait que le Monténégro l'aura occupée."

You should act upon it as soon as your colleagues receive similar instructions.

[12634] No. 406.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 18th March.

Roumanian Minister here has already urged same arguments upon me. I replied that I was ready to listen to what he had to say, but in view of coming mediation at St. Petersburgh I could not enter upon separate discussion here.

Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburgh has no business to send reports about my views of which he can know nothing.

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 248).

† Also to Count de Salis (No. 28).

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[12948] No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.[a]

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

MY telegram No. 141 of 15th March.

The following resolution has been come to at meeting with Ambassadors yesterday. (End of R.):

"La réunion est d'avis que des instructions soient envoyées aux représentants des Puissances à Constantinople, Belgrade, Athènes, Sophia et Cettigné pour leur prescrire de faire connaître collectivement aux Gouvernements auprès desquels ils sont accrédités les quatre points constituant les bases d'une négociation de paix. Les représentants des Puissances déclarent en même temps que dès l'acceptation de ces bases les hostilités devront prendre fin."

(R.) You should act upon it as soon as your colleagues receive similar instructions.

[12895] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 23 of 19th March.

To prosecute the siege of Scutari after the intimation I gave that fate of Scutari would be decided by the Powers is unreasonable; to prosecute it in the way described in your telegram is to inflict useless suffering and bloodshed in a way that will alienate all sympathy from Montenegro. You should say this to Montenegrin Government, and say that they will not gain Scutari by persisting in this course, and will forfeit all the sympathy they have had here, and which might some day have been valuable to them in the future as it has been in the past.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 252.)

[12847] No. 409.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram is for your information only.

[13358] No. 410.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 253.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

MY telegram to Cettinjé No. 29 of to-day.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[12849] No. 411.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 102 of the 19th March, 1913.

I must have it very clearly understood that, though at the request of both the Russian and Austrian Governments I undertake in principle the duty of composing the commission, it is only on terms of reference agreed to by both Governments and

[a] Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 47), Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 80), Sir R. Paget (No. 63), and Count de Salis (No. 27), *mutatis mutandis*.

defining clearly its scope and object that I can proceed with it. For for me to accept this task is a delicate matter. I am willing, however, to do so if the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will be enabled thereby to join in a public communiqué stating that the siege of Scutari should be raised, as all the Powers are in agreement that it is to go to Albania. I should inevitably be exposed to the reproach of bad faith from one side or the other were I to appoint a commission regarded by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as having for its whole object to save the *amour-propre* of Austria by discovering an excuse of handing over Djakova to Servia (see your telegram No. 101 of the 19th March) and by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs as having the duty of deciding whether that place should belong to Servia or Albania.

It is important that some agreement should be announced soon, so that any demonstration directed against Montenegro may not take the form of individual action by Austria for her own objects, but may rather be one in which other Powers, such as England and France, could engage, and it will be more difficult to come to any agreement after such separate action has been taken than before it.

The urgency for the announcement of some agreement is further accentuated by information received from His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé. The Austrians, it is reported, say that a monastery and the Austro-Hungarian orphanage have been destroyed and their consulate damaged, and foreign flags not respected, and they are dispatching warships to southern Dalmatian waters. At the same time, no effect has been produced by representations on behalf of the civil population of Scutari; the greatest bitterness is being shown against the Albanians, and shells are being thrown indiscriminately into the town.

[13797] No. 412.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that, according to news received from the Austrian consul-general at Scutari, the bombardment was directed exclusively against the town, and not against the fortifications. The intention of the besiegers was obviously to destroy the town, and particularly the Christian quarter, the consulates, and the foreign establishments. The Austrian consulate had been damaged, the Austrian orphanage and the monastery of the Stimatins had been destroyed. Foreign flags had not been respected, and seemed, on the contrary, to have been used as targets. This news had produced a deep impression on Austrian public opinion. Considering the desperate position of the population at Scutari, and the proceedings of the Montenegrins against foreign subjects and establishments (contrary to international law), it seemed imperative that Austria should put an end to the intolerable state of affairs as soon as possible. Montenegro had been told repeatedly that the future of Scutari would not depend on any military success, but on the decision of the Powers, and that the continuation of the siege meant only useless bloodshed. As Montenegro ignored all these warnings, and as the situation at Scutari was such that Austria could not, in the interest of humanity, wait any longer without doing something for the relief of the inhabitants of Scutari, the Austrian representative at Cettinjé was being sent instructions at once to invite the Montenegrin Government to permit the departure of the civilian population of Scutari, as proposed by Russia at the London reunion, and to suspend the bombardment till this was done. To give, if necessary, more weight to this communication, men-of-war were being sent to the waters of Southern Dalmatia. Besides the above considerations, these measures would appear to be justified also by the attitude of provocation assumed by Montenegro towards Austrian interests in several pending questions.

I asked the Austrian Ambassador whether this communication had been made to the Russian Government.

Count Mensdorff supposed that it had been made to them.

I urged that if it had not already been made to the Russian Government, it should be made to them at once.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[13798] No. 413.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

I TOLD Count Mensdorff to-day that M. Sazonof had accepted the Austrian proposal that I should compose a commission to deal with the question of Djakova. I would accept this proposal, but only on the understanding that the terms of reference and object of the commission were agreed between Austria and Russia, and understood in the same sense. Otherwise, if the commission decided that Djakova was to go to Servia, I should be reproached in Austria with having appointed a biassed commission; and, if it decided that Djakova was to go to Albania, I should be reproached by M. Sazonof on the ground that he had understood that the object of the commission was that Djakova should be given to Servia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13933] No. 414.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 70.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

THE Austrian Ambassador gave me to-day the following communication:—

"L'ARCHEVÊQUE catholique de Prisrend, Midia, est rentré aujourd'hui de Djakova. Par suite de la mauvaise foi des autorités monténégrines, il n'a pu empêcher la conversion de catholiques.

"Il était même forcé d'être, dans la cour du konak, le témoin impuissant de la conversion forcée de 400 catholiques, qui, pleurant et désolés, furent cernés par des soldats et amenés de force dans l'église orthodoxe.

"Six villages catholiques du district de Djakova ont déjà passé à la religion orthodoxe; les autres seize villages devront faire de même, si on ne leur porte pas assistance de suite. Les Monténégrins ont donné la parole: Orthodoxie ou la mort.

"Les musulmans sont aussi forcés d'embrasser en masse la nouvelle foi. Depuis quelques jours les persécutions contre les catholiques et les musulmans dans le district d'Ipek sont poursuivies avec énergie. On dit que vingt-cinq Albanais y sont assassinés chaque jour."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13798] No. 415.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1913.

I TOLD the Roumanian Minister to-day that the meeting of Ambassadors was approaching the question of the southern frontier of Albania; that, as he would know, a settlement of Koutzo-Vlachs existed in the south of Albania; and that the Ambassadors and I would be glad if he would come to our next meeting, on the afternoon of Tuesday the 25th instant, and give us his informationand the views of the Roumanian Government respecting this settlement of Koutzo-Vlachs. I said that I must be very precise in stating this, lest there should be any idea that the object of his coming to the meeting was to discuss questions at issue between Bulgaria and Roumania, which were referred for mediation to St. Petersburgh. Such an idea would, of course, be disturbing, and would make Bulgaria think she was being unfairly treated unless the Bulgarian Minister was also invited.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12056] No. 416.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and, with reference to his Excellency's note of the 11th instant, respecting the difficulty placed by the Russian Government in the way of carrying out a collective *démarche* at the capitals of the Balkan States with regard to the customs and fiscal régime in Turkish territory occupied by them, has the honour to inform his Excellency that the Russian Ambassador has already been informed that His Majesty's Government felt confident that a protest on the lines proposed by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador on the 21st February was legally justifiable, and had already authorised their representatives at the Balkan capitals to join in it.

Foreign Office, March 20, 1913.

[11253] No. 416°.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

HIS Majesty's Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the French Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency's memorandum of the 7th March respecting the jurisdiction of the commercial tribunal of Salonica and the eventual partition of Macedonia between Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria.

His Majesty's Government have received circulars and representations on this subject from various commercial bodies, to whom Sir E. Grey has replied that His Majesty's Government can hardly express opinions upon the matter until the political future of Salonica and of Macedonia is decided.

Sir E. Grey, however, considers that the question should not be lost sight of, since it is one of importance for the trading community.

Foreign Office, March 20, 1913.

[13013] No. 417.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March* 21, 1913.

ALBANIA.

Your telegram No. 254 of yesterday.

I discussed the situation at length with M. Sazonof to-day.

His Excellency professed at first a decided preference for his proposal which was telegraphed yesterday to London, namely, that the International Commission should discuss both the question of Scutari and that of Djakova. To insist on raising the siege of Scutari would, he maintained, be a breach of neutrality on our part, even Austria having only suggested that the bombardment should cease. The destruction of the houses of Austrian subjects was, he observed, one of the ordinary risks entailed by war. I laid stress on the danger lest public opinion in Austria might compel her to take some form of isolated military action, and I urged his Excellency to consent to a joint declaration to the effect that the siege should be raised, as the Powers had unanimously agreed to the inclusion of Scutari in Albania. M. Sazonof's reply to this was that such a demand would meet with a direct refusal.

He authorised finally my telegraphing to you giving you the choice between the Austrian proposal, that it should be left to you entirely to settle the composition of the International Commission, and that the commission should decide the question of Djakova only, and his own proposal that both questions should be submitted to the commission. He had again been informed yesterday by the Austrian Ambassador that the Austrian Government were indifferent to the composition of the commission and to its decision, and that their proposal had only been put forward as a golden bridge. He thought it might only embarrass the Austrian Government to be consulted by you as to the points to be referred to the commission, and that it was unnecessary

for the reasons he gave to do so. The matter was a different one for him: unless Austria gave way as regards Djakova, Russia could not yield on the point of Scutari. His suggestion accordingly was that you should lose no time in drawing up the reference for submission to him. If, then, its terms were such that he could count on Djakova being left to Servia, he would join in a declaration to the effect that the boundaries of Albania would include Scutari, and would associate himself in some collective diplomatic action at Cettinjé, demanding on humanitarian grounds the cessation of the bombardment of that town. The fact that Servia was to receive Djakova need not, he added, be mentioned in the terms of reference, but if, after binding himself to leave Scutari to Albania, in the end Djakova were not secured to Servia, his position here would become impossible.

[13017] No. 418.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Athens, March 21, 1913.*
TEPELEN occupied.

[13025] No. 419.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 21, 1913.*
YOUR telegram No. 63 of 20th March.
I spoke to Prime Minister again yesterday about Scutari, and said that Servian Government should really desist from aiding in siege, and should make an effort to bring Montenegro to reason. He replied that he had done his best to point out at Cettinjé futility of the present operations in view of attitude of the Powers, and he would do so again now, but the King of Montenegro appears to be mad, and merely met his representations with demands for further reinforcements.
Position of Servia is not altogether easy, for any reluctance to send troops is immediately ascribed by the King of Montenegro to hope on the part of Servian Royal Family that his dynasty may fall, and that they may profit thereby.
Servian Government are somewhat perturbed lest it should be thought that they have had any share in the incidents of forcing the crew of an Austrian steamer at San Giovanni di Medua to disembark troops, the murder of a Roman Catholic priest under Austrian protection at Djakova, and the forcible conversion of some 400 Roman Catholics to Orthodoxy. They state that Montenegrins are alone responsible, and this is confirmed by my Austrian colleague, who added that he learns from Vienna that the situation is extremely serious.

[13026] No. 420.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 21, 1913.*
YOUR telegram No. 24 of 20th March, last sentence.
I understood from the telegram which the Minister for Foreign Affairs read to me that Roumanian Ministry was reporting his impression as to the probable attitude not of yourself but of Sir G. Buchanan.

[13038] No. 421.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, March 21, 1913.*
AUSTRIA and Montenegro.
Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that his only information regarding Austrian grievances in respect of Scutari comes from Austrian sources. As regards forced

conversions at Djakova, he has received outside confirmation also from Servia, who regrets, but pleads inability to prevent.
Austrian Ambassador has just proposed that, in the event of no satisfaction being given at Cettinjé, Italy should join Austria in a naval demonstration. Minister for Foreign Affairs is most anxious to avoid such a step, apart from the apparent uselessness of a naval demonstration against a mountainous country. In any case he said that he could give no answer owing to absence from Rome of Prime Minister, and he prefers to postpone decision until actual occasion arises. Meanwhile he is anxious that Russia should co-operate in urging Montenegro to give Austria some satisfaction, as with Austrian ships already at Cattaro and excitement of public opinion he is nervous lest Government at Vienna might take some precipitate action. He considers that as Powers have generally agreed that future of Scutari is to be decided by them it would be consistent and advantageous that all the Powers should make some representation to Montenegrin Government.

[13027] No. 422.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 21, 1913.*
YOUR telegram No. 77 of 15th March.
Bases of negotiation have practically been made public here through a telegram received from Reuter's Agency in London. Circumstances are very favourable in Sophia now for the conclusion of peace. The army is short of provisions, and the soldiers are suffering much from cold and fatigue. Prime Minister and leading personages in the capital do not hide their anxiety to conclude war. My Servian and Greek colleagues are also both of opinion that their Governments will accept proposals of Great Powers without demur.
(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13028] No. 423.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 21, 1913.*
MY telegram No. 98 of 20th March.
In spite of their failure to obtain consent of Russian Government to dispatch of M. Danef, and in direct opposition to advice of Russian Minister here, Bulgarian Government have decided to send him to St. Petersburgh. He left here last night.
This action may be attributed to direct decision of King of the Bulgarians (see my telegram No. 94, Secret, of 17th March).

[13029] No. 424.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 102. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 21, 1913.*
I HEAR that quite recently Albanian notables at Vallona, Ismail Kemal Bey and others, manifested the wish to enter into friendly pourparlers with Balkan States. They took steps to communicate their wishes to Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian Governments. It has been arranged between allied Governments that Servian Government, as the one most interested in question, should negotiate with the Albanians in the name of the allies, and the Servian consul-general at Salonica, who is temporarily at Durazzo, has been instructed accordingly. Nothing is as yet known as to nature of Albanian overtures.
(Sent to Belgrade.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[13014] No. 425.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 253 of 20th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely approves instructions in your telegram No. 29 of 20th March to His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé.

[13015] No. 426.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 21, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 90 of 14th March.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether report telegraphed from Vienna as to contemplated recall of Austrian Ambassador, against whom "Novoe Vremya" published a violent attack this morning, was true. He replied that he had instructed Russian Ambassador to express to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs his earnest hope that Austrian Ambassador would be left here, as his recall at the present moment would be most unfortunate.

[13787] No. 427.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 255.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 21, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has informed me that Austrian Government will give up Djakova on understanding that there will be a promise to secure effective protection of Albanian and Catholic minorities in those territories which are going to Servia and Montenegro, and also a further understanding that the rest of the line of North and North-East Albania should be settled according to last Austrian proposal; also that the immediate cessation of hostilities in and the evacuation of those territories allotted to Albania should be demanded and secured by the six Powers in Belgrade and Cettinjé. I earnestly hope that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to this and consent to a communiqué on these lines. Servia, assured of Dibra and Djakova, will then presumably accept intimation of the Powers, and withdraw from Scutari and Montenegro can hardly persist alone.

It seems to be of greatest importance to avoid delay. If Montenegro proceeds with present indiscriminate attacks upon Scutari and a massacre occurs it will alienate all sympathy here. I hope to get Ambassadors to take note of this Austrian communication to-morrow and to recommend some communiqué to their Governments. It seems to me that now Austrians have given way about Djakova the whole question should be settled.

[13126] No. 428.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Rome, March 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I communicated this morning to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the substance of your telegram No. 103 of yesterday's date, setting forth the methods of procedure which you proposed to follow in the event that the reply of the allies on the subject of mediation by the Great Powers should prove, as was anticipated, to contain conditions which they were not prepared to submit to the Turkish Government. His Excellency had no hesitation in saying that he agreed with the course which you had proposed to take, and that under the circumstances he thought there was no other available.

He then went on to speak about the Albanian frontier and the question of Scutari, and said that he had just heard that Russia would only agree to definitely accept the inclusion of Scutari in Albania under any circumstances if Austria-Hungary would

definitely accept the exclusion of Djakova from Albania, whereas the most that it seemed possible to induce her to agree to was the proposed commission to examine into the local conditions. He said were he an Austrian Minister he would not hesitate and would at once agree to leave Djakova to Servia. The place had no importance in itself, and a settlement was imperatively important. But at the same time there was another way of looking at it. If one merely regarded the balance of concessions which Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other had agreed to make, no doubt Russia had given way on a greater number of points. But this was only a question of the details involved. When the question was regarded from a larger point of view, Austria was the big loser and Russia was the big winner, not of course on her own national account, but in so far as she was identified with the Slav interest. From this point of view it was admissible to think it equitable that Austria should obtain a greater measure in the adjustment of details, and that Russia should be content with a little less.

I have reported this conversation only because it may serve to illustrate the present attitude of mind of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[13104] No. 429.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 209.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 77 of the 31st January last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir relative to the position of the Ottoman Public Debt in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 429.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Monastir, March 4, 1913.*

IN my despatches Nos. 83 and 84 of the 9th and 16th December last, I had the honour to report to your Excellency that the service of the Ottoman Public Debt had been suspended since the Servian occupation of this district, and that my French colleague and I had jointly protested on several occasions against this interference with an administration enjoying international protection.

In my despatch No. 2 of the 24th January some account was given of the losses resulting from the suspended operations of the Public Debt and of the endeavours of M. Grenier, principal inspector of that administration, to secure the resumption of the work by means of representations addressed to the authorities in Monastir and to the head-quarters of the 1st Army then at Uskub. His action has led to no result.

M. Grenier, who is still here, has now reported to my French colleague and me the following incidents:—

1. The office of the Public Debt at Dibra was sacked when that town was occupied by Servian troops.

The losses involved are still unknown, and the news only reached Monastir on the 23rd February owing to defective postal arrangements.

2. The Servian military authorities have taken possession of the offices of the Public Debt at Ressna and Struga, seizing the registers and the keys of the safes.

At Ressna the safe contained 7,000 to 8,000 piastres' worth of stamps. The Servian authorities refused to give the local agents a receipt for the property seized.

3. At Ochrida the Servian military authorities have requested the agent of the Public Debt to surrender the register containing the list of arrears of tithes.

On the 23rd February, in a letter addressed to M. Protitch, who is appointed by the Servian Foreign Office to act as intermediary in questions between foreigners and the local authorities, my French colleague and I complained of the incidents at Dibra and Ressna and of some other measures directed against the Ottoman Public Debt.

A copy of our letter is herewith transmitted.

The incidents at Struga and Ochrida became known later. In consequence of them I telegraphed to-day in the following sense to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade:—

"The offices, registers, and keys of safe of Ottoman Public Debt at Struga and Ressna have been seized by the Servian authorities. My French colleague and I have consequently requested the Monastir authorities to give instructions for restitution of property seized, and have protested against violation of domicile involved. They state that the action complained of was taken in pursuance of instructions given by the head-quarters of the army of occupation. They assure us that they are telegraphically communicating our request and complaint to those head-quarters with a recommendation that the property should be restored.

"It might be well, in view of this high-handed treatment of a foreign administration, to place the British and French flags over the various offices of the Public Debt in this district. But as most of the agents and employés of the Public Debt are Turks, who might make unwarrantable use of such protection for their own purposes and so provoke some serious incident, I have great hesitation in suggesting that course."*

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 429.

Joint Letter addressed to M. Protitch.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Monastir, February 23, 1913.*

IN the "Monastir Gazette" of the 27th January the public is officially informed that duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* has been imposed on all imports into this district, and that some of them, including spirits and salts, are liable to certain additional charges.

The Ottoman Public Debt, as you are aware, has a monopoly of salt, and duty on alcohol and spirits is levied by its agents, and therefore the new tariff involves an infringment of its rights.

Apart from this, certain incidents of a serious nature are reported to us by M. Grenier, principal inspector of the Public Debt, who is at present in this town.

They are as follows:—

1. The Servian military authorities at Ressna, acting on instructions given by the head-quarters of the army of occupation, have recently compelled the local agent of the Public Debt to surrender the keys of his office and of his safe, which contained amongst other things stamps to the value of 7,000 to 8,000 piastres.

M. Grenier has complained of this to the prefecture, but to no effect.

This violation of domicile is aggravated by the seizure of other property, for which no receipt was vouchsafed to the employé in charge.

2. The offices of the Public Debt at Dibra were sacked when that town was occupied by the Servian troops. The losses incurred are at present unknown. News of this was only received to-day owing to defective postal arrangements.

The attitude of the Servian authorities has caused the Public Debt considerable direct and indirect loss, and it is our duty to remind you that that administration is independent of the Ottoman Treasury, that the revenues accruing to it constitute pledges assigned to the European creditors of Turkey, and that it consequently enjoys the protection of the Great Powers.

Our observations regarding the import duty on salt and spirits apply to all other steps already taken or contemplated, involving any curtailment of the privileges of the Public Debt.

We have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.
DE BERNE LAGARDE.

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* My message also contained the information that my French colleague has telegraphed simultaneously in the same sense to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[13105]

No. 430.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 210. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of a leading article in the "Tanin," from the pen of Ismail Hakki Babanzadé and written in a flippant and sarcastic vein, on the subject of the presence of the foreign ships of war in the Bosphorus.

As reported by me at the time, the "thousand ridiculous stories coming from well-known factories of lies and distortions" really came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was under Committee influence, and the object seemed to be to get the foreign ships up here with a view to internationalising the situation, and thus avoiding a war settlement direct between Turkey and the Balkan allies, or, in other words, to avoid a second Treaty of San Stephano.

Now that the Committee is in power and believes that mediation, represented by the presence of Hakki Pasha in London, will be easily convertible into European intervention, as opposed to a direct settlement, there is, perhaps, a desire in Committee circles to see the ships leave; but foreign and large sections of native opinion feel that their presence may be more necessary than heretofore until such time as peace is definitely concluded. The matter has a certain bearing on the internal situation. The Committee, under the pretence of the "national defence," has been raising subscriptions, and with the proceeds paying a body of irregulars called the "garde civile," composed of doubtful and in many cases desperate characters. This corps, retained in the capital, seems intended, not for defence of the nation, but for that of the Committee against the nation in the event of a hostile popular outbreak after the fall of Adrianople or the conclusion of peace.

In non-Committee circles it is believed that the Committee have drawn up a list of close on 300 of their political adversaries, whom they have arranged to have assassinated by the "garde civile," who would thus correspond to the "carbonari" under the Portuguese Republic, while the adversaries of the Committee seem to expect that, after the fall of Adrianople or the conclusion of peace, the main body of officers in the army will induce the latter to take revenge on the Committee for the assassination of the late General Nazim Pasha and the misfortunes of the Committee régime. They would also seem to expect that, should the Committee decide to make peace and to prepare the way, by having recourse to desperate methods, to rid itself of its prominent opponents, the presence of foreign war-ships here and their possible action in the event of disorders would constitute places of refuge or act as a restraint against the violence of the Committee. Hence, while the Committee would like to secure the departure of the ships, their opponents and the mass of the population are anxious that they should remain until matters at least become semi-normal.

The present form of Government in Turkey is difficult to understand and still more difficult to describe. The Sultan-Caliph notably has no voice in affairs, but is practically a prisoner in his palace, surrounded by Committee agents and spies, so that he is deprived of all freedom in his private movements and intercourse with other members of the Imperial family. The latter are similarly the victims of secret agents and their delations. Parliament does not exist, and all constitutional forms are ignored or over-ridden. The Cabinet, including the so-called Grand Vizier, is simply the emanation of the Occult Committee, which directs its acts and policy. No public or private meetings are allowed. The press is under a rigorous political as well as military censorship. Arbitrary arrests and imprisonments are effected by Colonel Jemal Bey, military commandant of the capital, who apparently derives his power from a higher, or perhaps lower, source than the "Grand Vizier." The whole power and resources of the country seem to be in the hands of the inner ring of the Committee, composed of heterogeneous elements, *e.g.*, hybrids from the Caucasus, Jews and Crypto-Jews from Salonica, Cretan Moslems, Koutzo-Vlachs, &c., the genuine Turk being all but totally unrepresented. This inner ring grips a portion of the army through a band of resolute officers, some of whom are well-intentioned but of limited horizon, while others are "die-hards," none too scrupulous in their methods. They, however, hold the purse-strings and dispose of appointments and promotions, and thus terrorise the body of officers, who, as a rule, find it more prudent to let matters slide.

* Not printed.

The masses of the Moslem population are apparently apathetic, but all, with the exception of those who derive their bread and butter from the existing system, are discontented with a régime in which the Sultan-Caliph has no place, but is belittled and ignored, and to which they attribute the disasters of the last four years. There has been no "revolution" of the people in Turkey, and the change of régime in 1908 was the result of a pronunciamento which handed the power over to an occult body whose principles seem akin to those which produced the revolution and the republic in France. The new force is obviously republican, and consequently destructive of that represented by the Sultan-Caliph. It fears a partial restoration of the latter, and is especially hostile to Prince Vahideddin, the younger brother and second heir to the present Sultan, who has so far kept aloof from the Committee. He has recently been accused of harbouring political refugees, his house has been surrounded by spies, and the "Grand Vizier" has, at the behest of the Committee, visited him and intimated to him the necessity of refusing to receive the visits of other than "authorised callers." His Highness has been warned by friends of intended violence, and is thinking of fleeing the country by escaping to a foreign man-of-war.

Prince Sebaheddin and Marshall Fuad Pasha, the hero of the Russo-Turkish war, are in a similar position, and the general impression on the native mind is that they are living under a reign of terror and not a constitutional régime.

Rumour has it that the conclusion of peace will be succeeded by a popular and military outburst, accompanied by bloody events in the capital, and many believe that the inside Committee is consequently decided not to make peace, and, by sending Hakki Pasha to London, is merely manœuvring to throw on the Balkan allies the odium of continuing the war. It would certainly seem that the "die-hard" Committee element in the army are opposed to an immediate peace, and are determined, if possible, to drag on the state of war until spring conditions give them an opportunity of attempting an advance and trying final and desperate conclusions with the Bulgarians. Another factor which militates against an early peace is that the Salonica and Macedonian elements in the inside Committee seem utterly regardless of the general interests of Turkey, and have focussed all their energies on securing autonomy for its Macedonian hinterland, an object that is, they think, obtainable, not by an early peace on terms approaching those of the allies, but by dragging on the hostilities in the hope of wearing the enemy down and of keeping the Bulgarian forces in Thrace, thus giving the Greeks and Serbs a more open field in Macedonia for an anti-Bulgarian internecine strife, which would form the basis for an appeal to Europe to intervene and inaugurate a special régime for the afflicted provinces.

It is a curious feature of the existing situation that the Salonican and other representatives of the European provinces which have been practically lost to the Ottoman Empire should be the arbiters of the capital and the Anatolian provinces, and should thus be able to drain the resources of the latter to further their own non-Turkish aims in provinces which their misrule has helped to lose to Turkey.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[13106] No. 431.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 22.)

(No. 211.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 17, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 208 of the 15th March, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on the encounter between the Greek and Bulgarian troops at Nigrita.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 431.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Salonica, March* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my immediately preceding despatch of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the small

encounter, which I therein reported as having taken place between Greek and Bulgarian troops at Tchai-Aghzi at the head of the gulf of Orfano, has been followed by a far more important one, which, though it has been brought to a close, and efforts are being made to hush it up as much as possible, certainly became at one moment a source of considerable anxiety to the military authorities in this place, and may even yet be followed by serious consequences.

Exact details of this affair are difficult to obtain, but it appears that a Greek detachment established at Nigrita, which is situated on the hillside about 20 miles east of Serres, overlooking the plain and commanding the road leading from that place to the sea, observed a Bulgarian convoy of unusual strength approaching along this road, the object of which, according to one version, was to establish itself alongside the Greeks at Nigrita, while, according to another it was to strengthen the post already established at Tchai-Aghzi, at the mouth of the Strouma Kara-Sou, which the Greeks, for various reasons, were already watching with considerable jealousy.

In any case the Greeks forbade the passage of this column, and the Bulgars attempted to force it, for which purpose they brought into play two mountain guns; but after a combat, which lasted three days, they were compelled to abandon the attempt.

According to information supplied to me by an officer of the Greek staff, the Bulgarians fired more than a hundred rounds from their two guns on the 6th, and resumed the cannonade at daybreak on the 7th, continuing it until the evening of the same day, by which time they appear to have exhausted their supply of ammunition. On the 8th only rifle shots were exchanged, until the Greeks, who in the meantime had received the reinforcements dispatched from here on the 6th and 7th, and who had probably grasped the significance of the silence of their adversaries' artillery, advanced in force, drove back the Bulgarians, and succeeded in capturing their guns together with a considerable number of prisoners. Their losses are said to have amounted to six men killed, two officers and about twenty men wounded, and twenty-five men taken prisoners, the latter being a detachment who had been sent to guard a bridge, and who allowed themselves to be cut off and surrounded. The losses of the Bulgars are declared to have been considerably heavier, but the details are not yet known here.

The impression created in Salonica by the news of these occurrences may be judged from the circumstance that a "thé d'honneur," which the garrison had arranged to offer on the afternoon of the 8th instant to the officers of the Servian division, which is in process of being embarked here for the Adriatic coast, and at which Prince Nicolas had consented to be present, was countermanded on the morning of that day, and orders were issued for the entire garrison to be ready to turn out at a moment's notice. On that day, however, General Hessaptchieff, who till then had professed to be entirely without information on the subject, called on the Prince and offered his excuses for the action of the Bulgarian troops, which, he declared, had been founded on a misapprehension. The victory, therefore, both from the military and the political point of view, remains for the present with the Greeks, but the latter are under no delusions as to the seriousness of the state of things hereby disclosed. Further reinforcements have been sent along the coast, and it is already announced that a considerable portion of the army of Epirus, now numbering 60,000 men, which has been released by the fall of Janina, will at once be brought back to Salonica. The Bulgarians on the other hand can hardly add very much to the strength of their forces in this part of the country as long as Adrianople holds out.

The relations between the Greeks and Servians here have become, in striking contrast to those existing between either of them and the Bulgarians, demonstratively cordial.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Britannic Majesty's Legations at Athens and Sophia.

H. H. L.

[13107] No. 432.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 212.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting on the sale of Ottoman Treasury bonds for the proposed internal loan.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 432.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Jerusalem, March* 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the efforts of the authorities to place Treasury bonds for the proposed internal loan are meeting with but scant success in this district, the total amount subscribed in Jerusalem and Bethlehem not exceeding £ T. 1,000, of which the greater portion is in the names of the various Greek and Armenian ecclesiastical institutions. As most of these monasteries hold large amounts of real property and are interested in being on correct terms with the authorities, they have felt compelled to submit to what they consider a forced contribution, seeing that the prospect of the bonds being eventually accepted in lieu of land tax is held to be illusory.

This scheme for replenishing the coffers of the Treasury has in fact merely served to demonstrate the unwillingness of the population to make any material sacrifice for the Turkish Government, which, it is openly stated on all hands, has shown its inability to make good use of the sums voluntarily contributed during the last few years for the needs of the army and navy.

I understand that no attempt has so far been made to sell bonds at Jaffa, and in some quarters doubts are expressed as to whether the scheme will ever be put into execution.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[13108] No. 433.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 213.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Official Gazette" of the 6th instant publishes an iradé sanctioning the decision of the Council of Ministers extending the operation of the budget for the year 1328 to the year 1329. (The 1st (14th) March, 1913, to the 28th February (13th March), 1914.) It is interesting to note that this has been done by iradé, not by a provisional law. The legal authority for such extension of the operation of a budget is article 102 of the Constitution and article 9 of the most recent law on "Comptabilité générale," i.e., the provisional law of the 14th (27th) February, 1912, not yet passed by Parliament. This article says, "The operation of the budget is confined to the year to which it belongs. Excepting only that if the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved owing to extraordinary circumstances without having approved the budget, the operation of the budget of the past year may be prolonged until the meeting of the next Chamber of Deputies by a decision taken by the Council of Ministers and signed by the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Finance, its effect not to last for more than one year."

Last year the budget for 1327 was continued in operation for 1328 by a provisional law countersigned by the Minister of Finance and the Grand Vizier. The law was dated some days later than the new law on "comptabilité" quoted above, but a provisional law was perhaps considered necessary because the 1327 budget was not continued in exactly the same form, but subject to certain modifications. It was confirmed by the Parliament which sat from April to July 1912, but no proper budget for 1328 was ever voted, so that the present iradé really continues the 1327 budget,

with the same modifications as were sanctioned for 1328. No other modifications are provided for, and there is no mention of the reassembly of Parliament. The iradé is countersigned by all the Ministers.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[13113] No. 434.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No 219. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that a certain amount of uneasiness has been caused in the Armenian community by the report that the present peace negotiations are to be made the occasion for renewing the guarantee of Europe of the integrity of Turkey in Asia, and especially of the North-Eastern Anatolian provinces, where Turkey undertook in 1878 to introduce reforms as provided by article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention. Armenians instance the last three and a half decades of massacres and disorder as a reason why Turkey should be induced to institute serious improvements and orderly government in those regions as a condition precedent to any such territorial guarantee if the question is mooted. It must be admitted that, though many projects of reform for those vilayets inhabited by the Armenians have been discussed since the change of régime in 1908, reports, both official and private, go to show that the conditions of life there are little, if at all, more tolerable than in the days of the Hamidian régime, and any territorial guarantee that did not give Europe or a mandatory Power the right to insist on the introduction into those regions of the elements of decent government would seem of more than doubtful expediency.

As far as Armenians are concerned, their general sense would seem to be that any new paper guarantee is scarcely likely to be more efficacious than that contained in article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. Apart from the Armenian problem, it would appear that a European guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would imply a guarantee of the maintenance of the existing Ottoman *status quo* in Egypt, Tunis, and the Aden hinterland, which Turkey still holds to be an integral part of her Empire.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[13129] No. 435.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Rome, March* 18, 1913.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 88 of the 5th instant and to your despatch No. 77 of the 14th, on the subject of the distribution of the Ottoman Debt between the allies and the Ottoman Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note from the Italian Government informing me that they have taken action at the capitals of the allies similar to that taken by His Majesty's Government as described in your above-mentioned telegram, reserving to themselves at the same time full liberty in the interpretation and application of the three articles, the inclusion of which they have recommended in the treaty of peace with Turkey.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 435.

The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir R. Rodd.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Rome, March* 17, 1913.

WITH reference to your Excellency's note of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Government has sent telegraphic instructions dated the 11th March to the Royal representatives at Athens, Sophia, Belgrade, and Cettinjé, to

communicate to their respective Governments the text of the three articles proposed by France for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace, to guarantee the creditors of Turkey and the parties to whom Turkish territory is ceded, and to declare at the same time that the Royal Government recommends that such inclusion should be effected.

This declaration is, however, to be accompanied by a warning that the Royal Government reserve to themselves full liberty of action as regards the manner of interpreting and applying these articles, in particular as regards the various categories of debts, their repartition and imposition, and the question of the tobacco régie.

I have, &c.
SAN GIULIANO.

[13190] No. 436.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 48.)

Sir, *Vienna, March 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that considerable excitement has been aroused here by an incident which is stated to have occurred in the harbour of San Giovanni di Medua.

From the accounts published in the press it appears that the steamer "Skodra," belonging to the Hungarian-Croatian Shipping Company of Fiume, was engaged in unloading her cargo at San Giovanni at the moment when the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" appeared outside the harbour. The Montenegrin authorities, alarmed for the safety of the Servian troops on board the Greek transports in the harbour, forced the captain of the "Skodra," in spite of his refusals, to land some 600 of these Servian troops by means of his own boats. In the meantime the Turkish cruiser had opened fire on the Greek transports, and had set two of them in flames. The Montenegrins thereupon again approached the captain of the "Skodra" with a demand that he should go to the assistance of the Servian troops in the burning ships, some of whom had thrown themselves into the water. The captain was, however, unable to comply with this demand, as his crew had left the "Skodra" and landed with the other Servian soldiers in order to escape the fire of the "Hamidieh."

This account of the incident has been supplied to the Press by the president of the shipping company to which the "Skodra" belongs. The Montenegrin Government has issued a *démenti* to the effect that there is no truth in the statement that any Austrian steamer was prevented by Montenegrin troops from unloading its cargo at San Giovanni, or that the lives of its sailors were threatened; but this *démenti* would not appear to cover the facts as stated above.

The semi-official "Fremdenblatt" has so far made no allusion whatever to the matter. It is, however, as I understand, only waiting for the official account of the incident.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[13081] No. 437.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—Received March 22.)

(No. 117.)

Sir, *Paris, March 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 140 of the 17th instant relative to the Ottoman Debt, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs proposing that a commission should meet in Paris in order to examine all questions affecting the rights and interests of the foreign bondholders. M. Jonnart suggests that the commission should draw up the final text of the articles which the Great Powers have already approved, and should examine their details and the conditions of their application. His Excellency considers that the commission should only be charged with work of a preparatory nature, and that it might be transformed into a plenary meeting, at which Turkey and the Balkan States would be represented, when negotiations for the conclusion of peace are begun.

I have, &c.
(For His Majesty's Ambassador),
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

Enclosure in No. 437.

Note communicated to Sir Francis Bertie by M. Jonnart.

COMME suite à sa communication du 12 février dernier relative à l'adoption par les Puissances intéressées d'un projet d'articles destiné à sauvegarder, par son insertion dans le prochain traité de paix, les intérêts et les droits des porteurs de fonds ottomans, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de prier son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique de soumettre à l'agrément de son Gouvernement la proposition suivante, qui aurait pour but de hâter l'étude de ces questions et de préparer un règlement qui soit acceptable à toutes les parties intéressées.

La conférence des Ambassadeurs à Londres s'étant dessaisie, le 6 mars dernier, de toutes les questions relatives aux règlements financiers, il y aurait un intérêt évident à réunir sans délai à Paris la commission spéciale chargée de leur examen.

Cette commission préparatoire aurait pour programme, en prenant pour point de départ de ses discussions le projet d'articles du 10 janvier, lequel a été déjà porté à la connaissance des États balkaniques, de rédiger le texte définitif d'articles qui aient l'adhésion de toutes les Grandes Puissances, d'en poursuivre l'examen de détail et d'en étudier les conditions d'application.

A cet effet, les conseillers des différentes ambassades pourraient être utilement assistés de délégués techniques, qui apporteraient leur compétence spéciale à l'examen des questions soumises à la commission. L'intention de M. Jonnart serait, à cet égard, d'adjoindre à M. Gout, Ministre plénipotentiaire, sous-directeur au département, un haut fonctionnaire du Ministère des Finances, et le délégué des porteurs français au Conseil de la Dette ottomane.

Cette commission, qui n'aurait, en l'état actuel, qu'un caractère consultatif et une mission préparatoire, ne se composerait que de représentants des Grandes Puissances. Elle ne pourrait se transformer en réunion plénière, avec le concours des représentants des États balkaniques et de la Turquie, qu'après la cessation des hostilités, ou au moment où des négociations officielles seraient ouvertes en vue de la conclusion de la paix.

C'est à cette commission internationale seulement, où seraient représentés tous les États intéressés, qu'il appartiendrait, après adoption des mesures propres à assurer la sauvegarde des porteurs de fonds ottomans, de rédiger les protocoles qui seraient annexés au traités de paix, conformément à l'article 3 du projet d'articles.

Si le Gouvernement britannique donne son adhésion à cette proposition, la commission préparatoire pourrait se réunir à Paris, au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, au cours de la première semaine du mois prochain.

Paris, le 21 mars, 1913.

[13934] No. 438.

Note communicated as a Verbal Communication by Count Mensdorff, March 22, 1913.

LE Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie à Cettigné a reçu l'ordre de faire au Roi Nicolas et au Gouvernement monténégrin la déclaration suivante :

L'archevêque et le gérant du consulat d'Autriche-Hongrie à Prizrend entreprendront prochainement ensemble un voyage à Diakova et aux environs de cette ville pour y rétablir le *statu quo* confessionnel. Nous tiendrons responsable le Gouvernement monténégrin de ce que toutes les conversions obtenues par voie de force soient annulées sans délai. L'archevêque aura à ramener au sein du catholicisme tous ceux que les Monténégrins avaient forcés à changer de confession. M. de Poezel assistera l'archevêque dans l'accomplissement de cette tâche et s'informera en même temps des divers outrages subis par les catholiques dans ces lieux. Il s'informera également d'une façon générale du sort des musulmans.

Nous attendons du Gouvernement monténégrin qu'il répondra immédiatement à notre démarche, en garantissant de donner sans retard les ordres nécessaires, afin que la tâche de Mgr. Midia et de M. de Poezel soit accomplie sans aucune difficulté.

Les décisions que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se propose de prendre et qui pourraient avoir pour le Monténégro des conséquences très graves, dépendront de la

réponse donnée à notre démarche par le Gouvernement Royal, ainsi que du résultat du voyage de l'archevêque et de M. de Peczel.

Loin d'accepter les explications fournies par le Monténégro pour excuser l'assassinat de Palitch, nous sommons le Gouvernement Royal d'ouvrir immédiatement une enquête minutieuse contre tous ceux qui ont pris part à l'emprisonnement et à l'assassinat dudit prêtre. Un représentant du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal devra assister à cette enquête.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 21 mars, 1913.

[13035] No. 439.

Note communicated as a Verbal Communication by Count Mensdorff, March 22, 1913.

LE 12 du courant le bateau de la Hungaro-Croata "Skodra" fut arrêté à son arrivée à San Giovanni di Medua par le commandant monténégrin et forcé de faire débarquer des troupes serbes qui se trouvaient à bord de bateaux grecs. A cette occasion le capitaine et d'autres personnes de l'équipage de la "Skodra" furent gravement injuriés et arrêtés sous menace d'être fusillées.

Le départ de la "Skodra" ne fut permis que le lendemain, non sans que le capitaine fût forcé de signer un compte rendu rédigé par le commandant monténégrin et contenant un récit absolument inexact dudit incident.

Ce procédé détermina le Comte Berchtold de télégraphier à notre représentant à Cettigné l'ordre suivant : -

"Je vous demande d'insister auprès du Gouvernement Royal monténégrin qu'il ouvre une enquête sévère contre le Perutchnik Raco Kusovatch et ses complices pour le fait—

"1. D'avoir menacé et insulté le commandant et les autres personnes de l'équipage de la 'Skodra';

"2. D'avoir détenu le bateau et arrêté des sujets de la Monarchie austro-hongroise;

"3. D'avoir forcé le commandant de signer une fausse déclaration."

Notre représentant aura à exiger en outre la promesse formelle que durant l'occupation provisoire de San Giovanni di Medua nos bateaux ne seront plus importunés.

Pour appuyer cette démarche d'une façon efficace notre représentant à Cettigné aura à faire observer au Roi Nicolas ainsi qu'au Gouvernement monténégrin que si la garantie demandée ne sera pas donnée immédiatement, et que si les coupables ne seront pas punis sévèrement dans peu de jours, nous regretterions d'être obligés de prendre nous-même en main le règlement de cette affaire.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 22 mars, 1913.

[13077] No. 440.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 21, 1913.*

THE Austrian chargé d'affaires has made the following communication to the King, and subsequently to the Government :—

"According to reports from consul-general at Scutari Montenegrin fire during the last bombardment was exclusively directed on the town and not on fortifications. This reckless proceeding, contrary to the law of nations, obliges the Austrian Government to put an end to the present state of things as soon as possible. Montenegrin Government are called upon in accordance with point of view adopted at meeting of Ambassadors to allow the civilian population to leave the town, and to suspend bombardment until this measure has been carried out."

Chargé d'affaires was instructed to leave no doubt as to the serious nature of the representation.

King replied that he would order that there should be no more firing into the town, but that he could not alter the decision of his Government with regard to the civilian population.

[13083] No. 441.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 26 of 19th March.

I have pointed out to the French chargé d'affaires that the nature of your instructions to me with regard to the four conditions was not correctly reported to Paris. I am very sorry.

[13317] No. 442.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 22, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from Jerusalem to-day :—

"My despatch No. 15.

"Consular agent at Gaza telegraphed 20th March that 'Hamidieh' had been there since 18th March."

[13332] No. 443.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.- (Received March 22.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 22, 1913.*

BALKAN war.

My telegram No. 99 of 20th March.

Over 400 Bulgarian soldiers have arrived here with badly frozen limbs; also some Turkish soldiers. Several hundreds of the Bulgarian troops were frozen to death in the trenches round Adrianople.

It is reported that Turks have made fresh sorties from Chatalja on 19th and 20th March, but that they were again repulsed.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13321] No. 444.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 22, 1913.*

I HAVE carried out, together with my colleagues, instructions contained in your telegrams No. 78 of 15th March and No. 80 of 20th March. Prime Minister replied that he would refer the matter to the King and the Cabinet. Bulgarian Government would also have to ask for views of their allies, and when these had been obtained his Excellency would send a written reply.

[13335] No. 445.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 63 of 20th March.

The four points constituting bases for peace negotiations were communicated to Servian Government by representatives of Powers collectively to-day. Prime Minister stated that he took note and would consult with allies.

The declaration concerning cessation of hostilities was omitted, as my French, Russian and German colleagues maintained that their instructions did not direct them to make it.

[13322] No. 446.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 22, 1913.*

FOLLOWING to-day from Monastir, No. 7:—

"General officer commanding 1st Morava division and his chief of staff left Monastir for Elbassan to-day.

"Whole of the 2nd regiment left Monastir to-day. I am informed that its destination is region north of Dibra."

[13358] No. 447.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 22, 1913.*

THE following is the text of the communication made to the reunion of Ambassadors to-day:—

"*London, March 21, 1913.*

"Count Berchtold has recently received continuous news from Scutari showing that the situation of the non-combatants is absolutely desperate. Further, that grave and serious excesses are being committed by the allies in the occupied territories against the Albanians and the Catholic population.

"In view of these facts, Count Berchtold has decided to put considerations of humanity before political considerations. His conviction, under these circumstances, has been strengthened, that the earliest settlement of the delimitation of the Albanian frontier and the evacuation of Albania is most urgently necessary. Also, that it is indispensable that provision should be made for an effective protection of the Catholic and the Albanian minorities in the territories to be ceded to Montenegro and Servia, in accordance with the views always maintained by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

"Under the understanding that an assurance for this protection should be given 'en principe' by the Powers, Count Berchtold has decided to abandon the claim that the town of Djakova should remain to Albania.

"This concession is, of course, also conditional on the following points:—

"Assurance of the other Powers that the north and north-eastern frontier of Albania be settled according to our line (including our point of view regarding the Boyana and the Lake of Scutari);

"That the immediate cessation of hostilities, and the rapid evacuation by Servia and Montenegro of the territories allotted to Albania, be *demanded and secured* by the representatives of the six Powers at Belgrade and Cettinjé."

I earnestly hope that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will approve the resolution come to at the reunion of Ambassadors this afternoon, and enable the intimation to be made at Belgrade and Cettinjé without delay.

When this has been done, there should, I think, be some communiqué to the press of the substance of the agreement come to.

I think Servia, being now assured of Djakova, should agree to withdraw at once from Scutari without regard to what Montenegro may say.

[13741] No. 448.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.**

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 22, 1913.*

AT the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day the following resolution was adopted:—

"Sir E. Grey a fait connaître à la réunion une communication de l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie du 21 mars, qui a dû être portée directement à la connaissance de toutes les Puissances.

"La réunion considère que cette communication assure l'accord au sujet de Djakova, conformément aux vues qu'elle a déjà exprimées le 6 mars. La réunion pense que cette solution implique l'extension de l'accord à toute la frontière nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, conformément aux indications précédemment données par le Comte Mensdorff, et qu'une notification à ce sujet devrait être adressée sans retard à la Serbie et au Monténégro.

"Les six Puissances pourraient déclarer en même temps qu'il est indispensable de prendre d'urgence des mesures pour assurer la protection effective des populations catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises dans les territoires cédés au Monténégro et à la Serbie.

"La question albanaise n'étant nullement affectée par la continuation de la guerre entre la Turquie et les alliés, les six Puissances pourraient donner également à leurs représentants à Cettigné et à Belgrade l'instruction d'inviter les Gouvernements auprès desquels ils sont accreditès à lever le siège de Scutari, à mettre fin aux hostilités dans les territoires abandonnés à l'Albanie et à procéder rapidement à l'évacuation de ces territoires."

You should act upon this with your colleagues as soon as they are instructed.
(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 260.)

[13741] No. 449.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.†

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 22, 1913.*

MY telegram to Belgrade No. 66 of 22nd March contains some references which perhaps you have not yet got.

It is difficult to describe the whole line of the proposed frontier in a telegram; it is practically the one described in my despatch to Sir F. Bertie No. 107 of 10th February, with the difference that now, in consequence of subsequent concessions by Austria, the towns of Djakova and Dibra are excluded from Albania.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 261.)

[13367] No. 450.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March 22, 1913.*

ALBANIA.

Please refer to your telegram No. 255 of yesterday.

I was informed by M. Sazonof that a similar communication had been made to him by Austrian Ambassador here. In M. Sazonof's opinion the communication of the decision of the Powers to the Montenegrin and Servian Governments would be sufficient, and there was nothing to be gained by the publication of a communiqué. The Russian Government were prepared to accept Count Berchtold's assurances in regard to Djakova, and his own in regard to Scutari ought in return to be accepted by the Austrian Government. I pointed out that fact of decision being published would be a proof of its irrevocable character, and, in view of the possible fall any day of Scutari, a guarantee was required by Austrian Government that that town should be included in Albania.

* Also to Count de Salis (No. 30). † Also to Count de Salis (No. 31).

In the event of a communiqué being made, M. Sazonof said that question of its wording must be carefully considered, and that he would first have to examine the text.

The first condition as to a clause in the Treaty of Peace securing the protection of minorities was unobjectionable to his Excellency; no form of international control was, however, admissible in view of Servia's position as a sovereign State.

The second condition was also acceptable to his Excellency, provided that the definition of the frontiers in the communiqué made no mention of the fact that they were those Austria had proposed.

The third condition met with strong objection on the part of M. Sazonof. Until the end of war the evacuation of Durazzo, &c., by the Servians could not be demanded, and until the fall of Scutari Servia felt bound to give Montenegro her support. His Excellency was firmly opposed to any measures of coercion, and urged the futility of employing menacing language at Cettinjé, where no attention would be paid to it. The Powers would not have more success than Russia, who had tried and failed. On my urging the danger lest Austria should take separate action in the event of the continuation of hostilities, his Excellency replied that the King of Montenegro had now given his word that the bombardment of Scutari should be stopped.

M. Sazonof eventually agreed to the publication of a communiqué stating that, in view of the irrevocable decision of the Powers that Albania should include Scutari, they had agreed to take diplomatic action collectively at Belgrade and Cettinjé for the purpose of securing the acceptance by those Governments of this decision and to remove the territories allotted to Albania from the sphere of hostilities.

I have the impression that, to prevent Austria from taking any isolated military step, his Excellency might in the last resort agree to a collective naval demonstration without the participation of Russia in order to stop the useless shedding of more blood and to impose the decision of the Powers on the two Governments.

As I had invited M. Sazonof to dinner to-night, I took the opportunity of reading to him those portions of above which deal with his views on three conditions and communiqué. His Excellency asked me to make the following alterations: to soften the original "imposing," in the fifth paragraph, into "securing," and to insert at the beginning of the sixth paragraph the words, "I have the impression," and to say "his Excellency might" instead of "his Excellency would."

[13336] No. 451.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram to Sophia No. 78 of 15th March and Constantinople No. 150 of 20th March.

Collective representation was made this morning.

Montenegrin Government will return answer after consulting allies.

[13338] No. 452.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 23, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 25 of 21st March: Scutari.

Russian, Italian, and German Ministers urged, yesterday, suspension of bombardment until civilian population have been allowed to leave.

[13359] No. 453.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram to Belgrade, No. 66, and your telegram No. 262 of 22nd March.

I read to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day resolution come to by Ambassadors yesterday.

He at first took exception to terms of its last two paragraphs, but eventually said he thought he could accept it. I pressed him to send instructions at once to Russian Ministers at Cettinjé and Belgrade, but he said he must await report from Russian Ambassador in London. He gave me to understand that he would do so as soon as this report is received.

He told me that from a conversation he had had with Servian Minister to-day he believes that Servians will now retire from Scutari when once the Powers intimate to them their decision with regard to that town.

As regards communiqué to press, his Excellency said that it should be on lines indicated in my telegram No. 111 of 22nd March, that it must contain nothing calculated to wound Servian or Montenegrin *amour-propre*, and that text must be submitted to him before publication.

[13341] No. 454.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 23, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 98 of 20th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that General Dimitrief had pressed him to support Bulgaria's claim to a frontier line starting from Rodosto or all events from a point on Gulf of Saros. General had contended that this would make an ideal national frontier. His Excellency had replied that he had had great difficulty in getting the Enos–Midia line, which had always been represented to him by the Bulgarian Government as the ideal one accepted by the Powers. One which they were now putting forward could only serve as base for aggressive operations, and he must altogether decline to support it. General had therefore declared that this refusal on his Excellency's part would be regarded as an abandonment by Russia of Bulgarian interests. He added that it might have the effect of driving Stamboulofists, who would shortly come to power, into the arms of Austria. His Excellency resented what he considered an attempt to blackmail him, and said he could not purchased Bulgaria's friendship at such a price.

[13349] No. 455.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 23, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 100 of 21st March.

From statements made yesterday to a member of this embassy by Talaat Bey it would appear that both Committee and Cabinet are anxious for peace, provided that an undisguised war indemnity and the Rodosto, as opposed to the Enos, line are not insisted on.

Bulk of army is opposed to any forward movement, and proclamation secretly circulated, and purporting to represent feelings of army, violently attacks the leaders of the Committee, such as Talaat Bey and Enver Bey, and the members of the present and last Committee Cabinets, including Hakki Pasha, now in London.

During last week Committee has been endeavouring, through agents in Greece, and by bringing pressure on Greek notables here, to induce Greece to side against Bulgaria with a view to assistance after peace.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[13345] No. 456.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 150 of 20th March.

Communication had not yet been made to Turkish Government owing to fact that French Ambassador has not yet received his instructions.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[13337] No. 457.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March 23, 1913.*

REPRESENTATIVES of Great Powers have collectively read and handed to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs paper containing: firstly, substance of resolution conveyed in your telegram No. 78 of 15th March to Sophia; secondly, four points in your telegram No. 141 of 15th March to Constantinople; thirdly, substance of last phrase in your telegram No. 150 of 20th March to Constantinople, the word "devraient" being substituted for word "devront" in accordance with text received by three of my colleagues, and with intention of resolution in your telegram No. 141.

Minister said he must consult the allies before answering.

[13339] No. 458.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 23, 1913.*

MY Austrian colleague informs me that, under instructions from his Government, he yesterday stated to Prime Minister that the situation between Austria and Montenegro had become exceedingly serious, that Austrian Government would use every effort to arrive at an amicable settlement, but that unless Montenegro adopted a less defiant tone and afforded some satisfaction regarding treatment of crew of "Skodra," the murder of Franciscan monk, and the forcible conversion of Catholics, Austria would be compelled to employ coercive measures.

Austrian Minister merely made the statement. He did not ask for a reply or even an expression of opinion. He fears that, if forcible treatment has to be applied to Montenegro, Servia will be drawn into the quarrel.

[13344] No. 459.

Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 23, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

At meeting prior to *démarche* reported in my immediately preceding telegram, French Minister stated that in his instructions just received, from which he could not depart, proposal as to frontier was worded as follows:—

"Frontière partira d'Enos, suivra le cours de la Maritza, puis le cours de l'Ergene," &c.

My Russian, German, and Italian colleagues at once agreed to adopt this text; my Austrian colleague and I felt some hesitation in doing so, but finally thought it advisable to waive the point because, firstly, further delay was undesirable, secondly, it was only a question of bases of negotiations, and thirdly, French text seemed to be natural amplification of yours. In the circumstances I venture to hope that you will approve my action.

(Confidential.)

Prime Minister informed me that Bulgarian Government attach importance to possession of both banks of the Maritza, which necessarily involves possession of Enos.

I gathered afterwards from my French colleague that the reason why he insisted on his wording is that a French company have a large contract with Ottoman Government for drainage of marshes round Enos, about which they are anxious.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13325] No. 460.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 24, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

My immediately preceding telegram of 23rd March.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs showed considerable impatience to-day in speaking to me of Montenegrin proceedings. He said that a Council of Ministers had been summoned to deliberate on the situation, and he thought pressure would be put on Montenegrin Government to permit departure of non-combatants from the town of Scutari, also to bombard only the forts and, if absolutely necessary, the town, to take particular care to avoid edifices flying foreign flags, churches, hospitals, &c. I asked what would be Servian attitude in the event of Austria being compelled to take coercive measures regarding any of various questions now at issue between her and Montenegro. He replied that there were limits to the obligations of an ally, and the Servian Government would certainly not feel it incumbent on them to join in a quarrel for which Montenegro was solely responsible. He then acknowledged to me confidentially that, though it had been impossible for the Servian Government to refuse reinforcements requested by Montenegro, it had never been their intention that these should arrive in time, and various excuses for delay had been put forward. Even now means had been found to hold up the transports on the way from Salonica somewhere on the coast of Greece.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs further hinted that as soon as the Powers had made known that the limits of Albania were definitely fixed it might be possible for Servian Government to withdraw their forces from Scutari. He hoped this would happen soon.

My French colleague has apparently no instructions whatever for a collective representation about Scutari, not even similar to those contained in your telegram No. 64 of 20th March.

[13323] No. 461.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 24, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Government received information some days ago that a monk who had been arrested by Montenegrins at Ipek had been murdered near Djakova, and gave notice here that Archbishop of Prisrend and the Austrian consul would investigate circumstances.

Montenegrin Government replied by denying right of consul to take part in enquiry, and by declaring that shooting of monk by their gendarmes was justified by his attempted flight. Austrian chargé d'affaires returned note on the ground that it denies Austrian right of protection and that explanation given is insufficient. He added that proposed mission will also enquire into circumstances in which several Albanian Catholics have been obliged to join Orthodox Church; reply of the Montenegrin Government and result of mission may lead to decisions of the greatest gravity for Montenegro.

A further incident has arisen in connection with alleged threats under which captain of Hungarian steamer at San Giovanni was compelled to render assistance during bombardment by Turkish cruiser.

As regards monk, Montenegrins, even on their own showing, seem to have a weak case, but I do not think highly coloured accounts published in Vienna press should be accepted without reserve.

[13324] No. 462.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 24, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN chargé d'affaires has been instructed to ask for cessation of all firing against either town or fortifications of Scutari until the civilian population have left. If a negative answer is returned, coercive steps will be resorted to, and efficacious measures adopted to prevent excesses by Montenegrin troops in case town be taken. Montenegro will be held responsible for lives of inhabitants.

[13298] No. 463.

Sir C. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 24, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from Beirout dated yesterday :—

"'Hamidieh' arrived 22nd March; left last night after coaling."

[13936] No. 464.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 24, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that his Government approved the resolution that had been come to about the Albanian frontier at the meeting of Ambassadors on Saturday, the 22nd instant.

He then expressed the greatest apprehension of separate action on the part of Austria, which would be most embarrassing to Italy.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14146] No. 465.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 71.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 24, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador gave me to-day the following communication as a verbal one :—

"Dans la réponse que Sa Majesté le Roi Nicolas a fait connaitre au chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie à la démarche du 19 courant, il exprime ses regrets de ce que le feu d'artillerie ait causé tant de dégâts dans la ville de Scutari; Sa Majesté est particulièrement affligée de ce que les établissements étrangers aient été aussi fortement endommagés, d'autant plus qu'il avait spécialement recommandé aux commandants de les ménager. Sa Majesté affirme d'ailleurs d'avoir, depuis ce temps, donné l'ordre de ne plus diriger le feu sur la ville elle-même, mais sur les fortifications.

"Quant à la demande de laisser sortir librement la population civile de Scutari, Sa Majesté a déclaré d'être obligée de la rejeter pour des raisons d'ordre militaire, sur lesquelles son Gouvernement doit insister.

"Le chargé d'affaires d'Autriche-Hongrie a été chargé, le 22 de ce mois, de déclarer à Sa Majesté ce qui suit :

"'Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne peut considérer la réponse du Gouvernement monténégrin comme satisfaisante. Il doit, au contraire, exiger que, jusqu'à la sortie des non-combattants, les assiégeants cessent absolument le bombardement de Scutari, et non seulement le feu dirigé sur la ville elle-même, puisqu'il ne paraît pas possible de constater sur quels points le feu de l'artillerie est concentré.

"'Veuillez donc demander au Gouvernement monténégrin une réponse claire et precise, si le Monténégro est disposé à donner suite à nos réclamations ou non. Vous

êtes chargé de déclarer en même temps que, si la réponse était négative, ou si nos demandes, une fois acceptées par le Gouvernement monténégrin, n'étaient pas réalisées dans un délai raisonnable, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal serait forcé, à son vif regret, de prendre des mesures coercitives pour faire respecter ses demandes.

"'Veuillez, en outre, faire comprendre à Sa Majesté et à son Gouvernement que nous sommes absolument décidés d'employer des mesures de force si, après une capitulation éventuelle de Scutari, l'entrée de troupes monténégrines était accompagnée de n'importe quel excès contre la sécurité personnelle de la population, dont nous rendrions le Monténégro responsable.'"

"Les instructions envoyées à notre représentant à Cettigné ont été transmises à notre Ministre à Belgrade avec la communication suivante :—

"'Vous êtes chargé de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement serbe et de déclarer en même temps que la démarche a été faite uniquement à Cettigné, parce que le Roi Nicolas est le commandant en chef de toutes les troupes devant Scutari. Nous espérons que le Roi du Monténégro donnera suite à nos réclamations et fera cesser le bombardement. Si, contrairement à notre espoir, nos demandes étaient rejetées, nous serions forcés d'employer des mesures coercitives, qui s'étendraient sur le champ entier des opérations militaires, dirigées par les troupes coalisées contre Scutari.

"'Veuillez aussi faire remarquer que, si les troupes serbes ne prenaient plus part au bombardement de Scutari, nous serions prêts d'entamer une conversation avec le Gouvernement de la Serbie pour trouver le moyen de ne pas faire subir aux troupes serbes les conséquences de la situation qui pourrait résulter de nos mesures.'"

The Ambassador then said to me that all the Powers must recognise that his Government had, up to the present day, observed the greatest reserve towards Montenegro, notwithstanding their geographical proximity and their many interests that were involved. They had calmly awaited the result of the collective *démarche* in Cettinjé proposed by Russia, and agreed to in the reunion of Ambassadors, the object of which was to enable the non-combatants to leave Scutari. The Austrian Government expected that Montenegro would take into consideration the representations made by nearly all the Powers, according to which the fate of Scutari depended exclusively on their decision; and they expected that King Nicholas would understand that the siege of Scutari involved useless bloodshed, and that he would therefore put a stop to further military operations. So far, the Montenegrin Government had not only not followed the advice of the Powers, but had clearly shown by the barbarous acts committed during the bombardment that they were taking undue advantage of the situation in an unwarrantable manner. The fact that Montenegro seemed to imagine that no one was in a position to apply forcible measures had compelled the Austrian Government to take the necessary steps. Should Montenegro, against their expectations, continue to disregard their demands, they intended at present to limit their action to such measures as were compatible with international law and a condition of peace. They trusted that the expected unanimous and vigorous diplomatic action of the Powers, simultaneous with the Austrian measures, would result in Montenegro giving way in time, and that they would be spared having to go beyond the measures contemplated at present.

I said that I could only express the hope that Austria would not feel obliged to take separate action : it would give rise to great sensitiveness in Russia, and, as I was sure Count Mensdorff knew, in Italy also.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13524] No. 466.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, March 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 22 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the full text of the reply returned by the Montenegrin Government to the representatives of the Powers on the subject of the proposed mediation between the allied Balkan States and Turkey.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

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Enclosure in No. 466.

Reply of Montenegrin Government to Representatives of Powers.

LE Gouvernement Royal de Monténégro exprime au Gouvernement Royal d'Angleterre ses vifs remerciements pour la médiation qu'il a bien voulu lui offrir en vue de hâter la conclusion de la paix entre le Monténégro et ses alliés d'une part, et la Turquie de l'autre. Il croit, cependant, nécessaire d'indiquer les conditions sous lesquelles il accepte cette médiation, à savoir :—

1. La cession aux alliés de tous les territoires de l'Empire ottoman situés à l'ouest d'une ligne allant d'un point à l'est de Rodosto sur la mer de Marmara à la baie de Malatria à l'est de Midia sur la mer Noire, à l'exception de la presqu'île de Gallipoli. Dans ces territoires sont comprises les places fortes d'Andrinople et de Scutari.

2. La cession des îles de la mer Egée.

3. Le désistement complet de tous les droits de la Turquie sur l'île de Crète.

4. L'acceptation en principe d'une indemnité de guerre, dont le montant sera déterminé à la signature du traité de paix, ainsi que du payement des dommages causés par la Turquie aux différents États alliés avant la déclaration de la guerre.

Les États alliés devront prendre part aux délibérations relatives aux indemnités.

5. Dans le traité de paix définitif devront être réglés les rapports de droit public et privé des sujets et des commerçants des États alliés en Turquie.

Dans le même traité de paix il faudra établir les principes qui régleront la question des nationalités contestées, des sujets des États alliés et régler les garanties et les privilèges de l'Église, ainsi que le droit public des consulaux des États alliés sujets ottomans.

6. Les opérations militaires ne seront pas interrompues.

[13412] No. 467.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 89.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March 18, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of the *aide-mémoire* handed to me by M. Sazonof on the 12th instant, of which I sent you a full summary in my telegram No. 89 of that day, explaining the views of the Russian Government with regard to the questions of Djakova and Scutari.

When on the 17th instant I informed his Excellency, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 230 of the 15th instant, that Austria had definitely stated that she would not go further in the way of conciliation than to accept an international commission to decide to whom Djakova should belong, his Excellency at once said that in that case Russia could not yield on the question of Scutari. I thereupon reminded him how strenuously you had urged the acceptance of the Russian view, both at Vienna and Berlin, and how impossible it was for you to do anything more. I pointed out how critical the situation would become were Scutari to fall before an agreement had been reached, and urged him to accept a settlement about the north and north-eastern frontiers of Albania, leaving the ultimate fate of Djakova to be decided by an international commission. This his Excellency said he could not do without knowing what was to be the character and composition of that commission. A long discussion followed, of which I sent you a report in my telegram No. 96 of the 17th of this month, and in which his Excellency urged that it was useless to send out experts to supply us with statistics with which we were already acquainted, and that the only object of the commission was to furnish Austria with a pretext for leaving Djakova to Servia. This, he had gathered from a recent conversation with Count Thurn, she was ready to do if only she could save her face by leaving the decision to a commission. Before, therefore, giving me an answer, he must ascertain from Vienna what the proposed commission really meant.

The view thus expressed by M. Sazonof was confirmed in great measure by the Austrian Ambassador, with whom I had a few minutes' conversation immediately afterwards. Count Thurn told me that his Government had been on the point of yielding on the question on Djakova, and had only been deterred from doing so by fear of public opinion. It was for this reason that they had proposed referring the question to a commission ; and they would not mind if we could secure a majority in favour of

Djakova being assigned to Servia by inducing the German delegate to vote with his French, British, and Russian colleagues. Whether or not Count Thurn faithfully reflects the views of his Government I am not in a position to say.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 467.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonof.

EN réponse à l'aide-mémoire en date du 26 février (11 mars), année courante, le Ministère Impérial a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique qu'il serait disposé à envisager la question de la pression à exercer à Cettigné et Belgrade dans la question de Scutari en connexion étroite avec la question de Djakova. Notamment, si l'Autriche consentait à exclure Djakova des limites de l'Albanie, le Gouvernement Impérial, à son tour, donnerait des instructions à ses représentants dans lesdites capitales de faire les représentations les plus énergiques afin de lever le siége de Scutari.

Quant aux démarches analogues auprès du Gouvernement serbe en vue de l'évacuation des territoires qui seront reconnus albanais, le Gouvernement Impérial n'y ferait non plus aucune objection, pourvu que Djakova soit attribué à la Serbie, car, d'après toutes les informations qui nous reviennent, le Cabinet de Belgrade serait placé dans l'impossibilité de faire évacuer cette ville par ses troupes.

Animé d'un sincère esprit de conciliation, le Ministère Impérial croit pouvoir suggérer le compromis suivant, qui pourrait faciliter, peut-être, la solution de la question de Djakova :—

Nous aurions dû recevoir de la part du Gouvernement austro-hongrois l'assurance que cette ville serait en principe attribuée à la Serbie. La commission internationale, qui sera chargée de s'occuper en détail de la question de délimitation, devra également élaborer certaines garanties, surtout d'ordre économique, qui seraient à établir par rapport à cette ville.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 27 février
(12 mars), 1913.

[13415] No. 468.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March 18, 1913.*

THE publication in the "Rossia" of the Russian supplement to the Austro-Russian identic communiqué, of which I had the honour to forward a translation in my despatch No. 82 of the 12th instant, has caused a somewhat heated press controversy in both countries.

The "Novoe Vremya" calls on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to explain in an official form how the Russian nation is to understand the official statement of the Vienna "Correspondenz Bureau" on the subject, which virtually repudiated the supplementary statement published at St. Petersburgh as unauthorised by the Austrian Government. How this misunderstanding arose is even now not perfectly clear, but I believe that the following is a more or less accurate account of what has happened.

In view of the fact that Austria would not consent to effect any reduction in the forces which she has concentrated near the Servian frontier, M. Sazonof considered it essential in order to tranquillise public opinion in Russia, that the communiqué announcing the dismissal of the Russian reservists and the reduction of the Austrian forces on the Galician frontier should be accompanied by some assurance to the effect that Austria did not cherish any aggressive designs towards her southern neighbour. After a week of fruitless negotiation the Austrian Ambassador on the 8th instant submitted to M. Sazonof proposals both with regard to the terms of the communiqué itself and to the language to be held by the "Fremdenblatt" on the subject. After taking the Emperor's orders M. Sazonof had a further conversation with Count Thurn on the 10th instant, in which he accepted the Austrian proposal, and at the same time

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gave him the text of what he proposed to publish two days latter in the "Rossia." Count Thurn, according to M. Sazonof, expressed his entire concurrence, and said that he was ready to countersign the draft of the statement which M. Sazonof had given him. He left for Moscow the same evening, and either through forgetfulness or inadvertence, omitted all mention of it in the telegram which he dispatched to his Government. He admitted this when questioned by M. Sazonof a few days later on the subject of the telegram published by the Vienna telegraph agency, and expressed his readiness to make all the reparation in his power. From what M. Sazonof has since told me Count Thurn at once telegraphed to Vienna to explain what had occurred, while the Russian Ambassador in giving a similar explanation of the incident to Count Berchtold, was instructed to add that M. Sazonof did not wish to do anything to injure Count Thurn's career. In telling me this his Excellency added that, had it not been for the personal regard which he has for Count Thurn, he should certainly have published the whole story. Count Berchtold thanked M. Sazonof through M. de Giers for the considerate manner in which he had acted, adding that had he acted otherwise it would have been very difficult for the Emperor not to recall Count Thurn. He at the same time published an official communiqué disclaiming all responsibility for the various statements made in the Vienna press on the subject, and giving M. Sazonof what the latter described to me as a "patente de loyauté." So far from mollifying M. Sazonof, this communiqué appears to have produced the contrary effect, as he considered that his reputation did not stand in need of a certificate of this nature. He would, he told me, have to ask for the publication of some more satisfactory explanation, though he did not explain how this could be done without sacrificing Count Thurn.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[13199] No. 469.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 54.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 18, 1913.

THE capture of Argyrocastro on the 15th instant completed the occupation by the Greeks of the territories within the line which they propose as the frontier of the future Albanian. Rumours nevertheless arose in the European press, and were repeated here, to the effect that the Greek troops were to push on to Avlona and Beirout, and that the Italian Government had protested. In consequence a communiqué was published this evening stating that the commander-in-chief had been instructed to avoid an advance in the direction of Avlona under any circumstances, and M. Coromilas, in confirming the fact to me, stated that he had so assured the Italian Minister.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[13518] No. 470.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Rome, March* 19, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Bulgarian Minister called upon me yesterday evening to present me with a copy of the Bulgarian case in the issue with Roumania. In the course of conversation, M. Rizof told me that he thought his Government would fall in with the proposals of the Powers for the preliminaries of peace. All the allies needed peace, and the war had entered into a period of stagnation from which there seemed no prospect of issue. He said that in Bulgaria itself the Government had been rather taken by surprise by the staying power of the peasantry. They were known to be thrifty, but experience had shown that they had more savings in hand than was generally known. He believed they could continue hostilities for another month without risk of a financial crisis, but two or three months more would almost inevitably bring about a minor crisis in finances. Another point of interest which he mentioned was the satisfactory attitude of the Mussulman population in Bulgaria, which M. Rizof estimated at about a sixth of the whole. He said the

Bulgarian Mussulmans had shown their gratitude for not having been compelled to join the ranks and fight against their own co-religionists by spontaneously volunteering to till the fields of the Christian peasantry who were absent at the front, and that very cordial relations had thus grown up between the two sections in the interior of the country.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[13500] No. 471.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey. (Received March 25.)

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 19, 1913.

ON the 13th instant M. Kalergi, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed an interpellation to the Government in the Chamber calling attention to questions connected with foreign policy and to the situation arising out of the war. The subject of his speech, a translation of which, taken from the "Messager d'Athènes," I have the honour to enclose,* was the one since prevalent as to the future of some of the Greek populations which had been liberated from the Turks. With regard to the islands, the Great Powers made reservations, but as the question could not be solved without the consent of Greece, M. Kalergi would recommend immediate annexation. With regard to Albania, the Greek Government had gone to the extreme limit of concession in tracing the frontier of Epirus. In Macedonia he demanded for Greece Monastir as against the Servians, and a line starting from the Nestos River, and including Cavalla, Serres, and Drama, as well as, of course, Salonica, as against the Bulgarians. M. Kalergi's speech led to no debate, but has attracted a good deal of attention.

On the 15th a debate arose out of the presentation of a memorial from representatives of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace praying for inclusion within the limits of the Hellenic kingdom. A translation of the memorial will be found in the same number of the "Messager d'Athènes." I have the honour to transmit a full translation by Mr. Atchley of the principal speeches, including those of MM. Gounaris, Rhallys, Theotoky, and M. Venizelos himself, which all deserve perusal.* The Opposition leaders voiced the general apprehension that large Greek populations are to be abandoned to alien rule. M. Venizelos, with his usual courage and frankness, replied that the facts must be faced, that there must be give-and-take between the allies, that to insist on a long sea front without a hinterland because it is inhabited by Greeks would be to weaken the kingdom, and that it was necessary to make the sacrifice against concessions in other directions which would enable the new territories to be satisfactorily rounded off. He added, however, in a further short speech yesterday, that there were limits of concession beyond which neither Government, Crown, nor country would go.

The recent events at Nigrita have naturally embittered the feeling against the Bulgarians, and in irresponsible circles talk of war with Bulgaria, either now or in the near future, is freely indulged in. It is clear, however, from M. Venizelos's language, as well as from M. Gueshof's equally admirable and almost simultaneous speech in the Sobranjé, that the responsible statesmen in both countries desire to maintain the alliance intact after the termination of the war.

Although relating to an entirely different subject, I have the honour to call your attention to an article in the same issue of the "Messager d'Athènes" on the subject of the compensation for private losses, caused before and during the war, which Greece has the right to claim from Turkey altogether irrespective of a war indemnity properly so-called. The writer estimates them at 60,000,000 fr. on the ground of losses during the Armenian massacres of 1894 and during the Turkish occupation of Thessaly in 1897, and of those caused by the seizure and detention of ships during and before the present war, and in divers other ways.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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* Not printed.

[13501] No. 472.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Athens, March 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, from the 7th to the 18th instant, on which date King Constantine left Yannina after, as I understand, handing over the command-in-chief to his former chief of the staff, General Danglis.

The operations recorded in the diary complete the occupation of Epirus up to the line claimed by the Greeks as their future frontier with Albania.

The statement in my above-mentioned despatch that troops were landed at Santi Quaranta on the 3rd instant was incorrect. News of a landing being projected and of its having been effected was purposely spread as part of the Crown Prince's scheme for drawing off the attention of the defenders of Yannina from the point which he meant to attack.

I understand that the number of prisoners taken at Yannina, officially put at 33,000 men, did not really amount to more than half that figure.

The raid of the "Hamidieh" on the 12th instant finds no place in the official record. At Durazzo she is said to have done no damage, but at San Giovanni di Medua, where she found a convoy of Greek transports landing Servian troops and stores, she sank or destroyed two ships and inflicted considerable damage on several others. It is said that there were sixty casualties, but the Servian troops appear to have been disembarked without much loss. The "Hamidieh" had been sighted by a Greek destroyer, which was, however, unable to communicate with the squadron at Corfu in time to bring them up. She has since been heard of at Alexandria, and is again at sea.

The enrolment of the naval recruits of the 1912 class has again been deferred *sine die*, and a law has been passed modifying the Law of Naval Recruitment of the 8th to 21st October, 1912, as follows:—Paragraph 1 of article 3 now reads: "The Minister of Marine may postpone for three months [in time of peace or indefinitely in time of war] the enrolment of naval recruits," the words in brackets having now been added.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 472.

Diary of the War for March 7 to 18, 1913.

Yannina, March 7, 11 P.M.—Upon learning from the officers of the Turkish staff, through the foreign consuls at Yannina, the desire of Essad Pasha to surrender the town, I appointed Major-General Soutso military governor, with orders to go with the cavalry regiment and occupy the town, which was done at about 10 A.M. yesterday. The 7th Regiment of infantry was ordered to undertake the garrisoning of the town. About noon I sent to the Turkish commander Staff-Captains Metaxas and Strategos, who signed the protocol of surrender. Complete order prevailed during the occupation.

At noon to-day I made my official entry into Yannina. At 11·30 the following troops, comprising detachments from all the divisions, were drawn up a kilometre from the town under the orders of Major-General Moschopoulos: the 1st, 8th, and 15th Infantry regiments, the 1st battalion of evzones, a section of field artillery, a company of engineers, and sections of bicyclists. The fine appearance of the men was remarkable.

At the entrance of the town I was received by the Metropolitan, with the clergy and the heads of the other religions, the consuls in full uniform, and the representatives of the various corporations. The progress through the town took place amid a real frenzy of enthusiasm on the part of all the people. After a *Te Deum* at the cathedral, and an address from the Metropolitan, which was interrupted by unrestrained cheering for the King, myself, and the army, the official reception of the religious and municipal authorities, and of the consuls took place. The entire town is decorated with flags, and is *en fête*.

Two troops of cavalry sent to the north of the town captured 2,300 of the fugitive soldiers.

The Metropolitan of Paramythia has sent, at the request of the local Mussulman notables, a document offering the surrender of Paramythia and the adjoining villages to the Greek army.

CONSTANTINE.

Yannina, March 8.

Order of the Day.

Officers, N.C.Os. and Men,

The capture of the fortress of Yannina has added one more splendid victory to your glorious achievements. After penetrating the whole of Macedonia and crushing the hostile armies, you have captured, by way of crowning these achievements, a fortress which was considered impregnable. The fortitude with which you have undergone sacrifices, privations, and hardships equals your courage. You have added new trophies to those of Macedonia. More than 100 guns and one more hostile army, with its generals and staffs, its colours, and all its ammunition, are prisoners in your hands. Your colours have been covered with fresh glory. The whole nation admires this last achievement of yours, and I, proud to lead such an army, express to you my entire satisfaction.

CONSTANTINE.

Yannina, March 9.—I have the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Ipity entered Paramythia yesterday at 1 P.M. with two battalions of infantry and one section of artillery and two troops of cavalry. Other forces will arrive via the Scala of Paramythia. The enthusiasm of the people is great. The collection of arms commenced forthwith. The occupation of Margariti is imminent.

Yannina, March 12.—After the capture of Liaskovik, it was to-day officially reported to head-quarters that Konitza was occupied by our troops without resistance. The inhabitants received the liberators with indescribable enthusiasm.

8 P.M.—Our troops occupied Premeti yesterday. The enemy's forces then left, probably for Berat. It is also confirmed that the Turkish troops at Delvinaki evacuated the town in a panic.

Paramythia, March 13.—Following upon my written proclamation in the name of the King, the Crown Prince and the Government, respecting submission and equality before the law, to the inhabitants of Tsamouria irrespective of race, religion, or language, I am glad to report the occupation and submission of the whole of Tsamouria as far as Kalamas, and thence as far as Philiates. I am occupying with detachments of troops Paramythia, Karvounaria, Margariti, Fargo, Kastri, Philiates, and Neochori, disarming the inhabitants. I have no forces at my disposal for places beyond Kalamas. The Ottoman deputy, Mehsin Dino, has come in with a number of notables, beys and agas, from Kastri, and has with all of them made complete submission.

IPITY.

Yannina, March 16.—To-day the 8th Division, with the cavalry regiment, advanced from Khan Delvinaki to the meeting of the Delvino and Argyrocastro roads. The rearguard of the enemy, being attacked near the Arinitsa, took to flight. Two battalions, comprising 30 officers and 1,570 men, were taken prisoners.

Announcement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Yesterday morning a landing party, under the protection of the battleship "Spetsai," occupied the island of Samos. The enthusiasm of the people is indescribable.

Yesterday the 8th Division, under Colonel Matthaiopoulos, advanced against Argyrocastro. On his approach, after the guns had fired a few rounds, the enemy retired in the direction of Tepelen. The Division occupied the town.

CONSTANTINE.

Yannina, March 17.—The 3rd Division occupied Kleissura yesterday.

CONSTANTINE.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Yannina, March 18.—Yesterday Santi Quaranta was occupied by the Ipity detachment. A detachment from the 8th Division occupied Delvino and captured there 22 officers, 100 cavalry, and 600 sick.

Prevesa, March 18.—In continuation of my last telegram concerning the occupation of the whole of Tsamouria from the Acheron to the Halamas by my detachments, I am happy to announce that I have, with the Metropolitan, personally visited the whole of Tsamouria, which has entirely submitted, and a systematic disarmament is being carried out by my detachments. We have prepared the whole territory with the Metropolitan of Paramythia, who has given willing assistance in encouraging the Mussulman population and in restoring order.

IPITY.

[13363] No. 473.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 222.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a *note verbale circulaire* addressed to the foreign mission by the Sublime Porte, requesting that steps should be taken to safeguard the rights of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied provinces and to secure restitution of the sums seized by the allies.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 473.

Circular Note verbale.

IL résulte d'une communication du Département Impérial des Finances que, malgré le consentement des Gouvernements coalisés à la perception par les agences de la Dette publique ottomane de leurs recettes, comme par le passé, dans les régions occupées, les autorités respectives ont mis une saisie sur lesdites recettes, sous prétexte que leurs excédents, ainsi que les surtaxes du sel et des spiritueux, reviennent directement au Trésor Impérial, et que les surtaxes en question sont affectées à l'impôt de guerre.

Or, de même que lesdites recettes constituent un gage pour les porteurs de la dette régie par le Décret de Mouharrem, les excédents en sont affectés au service de l'emprunt 4 pour cent de l'année 1904 et de celui du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

Les produits des surtaxes perçues sur le sel et les spiritueux garantissent également les emprunts contractés à l'étranger.

Dans ces conditions, l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, qui gère ces gages, doit avoir la libre disposition de la totalité de ces recettes, y compris les excédents et les surtaxes précités.

La saisie opérée par les autorités des Gouvernements belligérants ne pouvant dès lors se justifier en aucune façon, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères prie l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique de vouloir bien, dans l'intérêt des créanciers étrangers, faire les démarches nécessaires auprès de qui de droit en vue d'assurer la sauvegarde des droits de la Dette publique ottomane contre toute atteinte de la part desdites autorités, ainsi que la restitution des sommes saisies, dont le prompte encaissement s'impose en raison de l'échéance des coupons payables au mois de mars courant.

Constantinople, le 17 *mars*, 1913.

[13364] No. 474.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 223.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a *note verbale* which I have received from the Sublime Porte, embodying a formal protest against the Greek

occupation of the island of Samos on the ground that is under the protection of the Powers.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 474.

Note verbale communicated to Sir G. Lowther.

LA Sublime Porte est informée que la Grèce a procédé à l'occupation de l'île de Samos en y débarquant des troupes.

L'administration de l'île a été confiée à Sofoulis, en attendant l'arrivée des fonctionnaires qui en seront chargés par le Gouvernement hellène.

Sofoulis a déjà fait acte d'autorité en empêchant le médecin de l'office sanitaire d'exercer ses fonctions.

L'île de Samos se trouvant placée sous la garantie des Puissances protectrices, aucun changement ne serait être apporté à son statut politique sans leur consentement préalable ainsi que celui du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

La Sublime Porte se voit donc obligée de protester auprès des Puissances protectrices contre cette atteinte portée par la Grèce aux accords internationaux existants et d'insister auprès d'elles pour qu'elles veuillent bien aviser aux dispositions nécessaires en vue d'assurer le rétablissement et la stricte observation du *statu quo* de l'île.

Sublime Porte, le 18 *mars*, 1913.

[13365] No. 475.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 224.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, reporting on an inflammatory article issued by the local authorities, with a view to inviting subscriptions for the new internal loan, and reporting his own action to secure its withdrawal.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 475.

Vice-Consul Hony to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Mosul, February* 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that great efforts are being made by the authorities here to obtain subscriptions towards the new internal loan. They have evidently been subjected to great pressure from Constantinople to get money, but they are finding it very hard to do so.

Their first step was to issue a circular, a copy of which I enclose with translation. The language was so exaggerated that I felt bound to demand its withdrawal, as it could not but have a dangerous effect on the ignorant and fanatical population. My French colleague took a similar step, and the circular has now been withdrawn.

They next formed a commission of the leading men of Mosul to discuss means of procuring money. The vali informed this commission that £ T. 500,000 were required from Mosul. The commission replied unanimously that such a sum simply did not exist, they had already given some £ T. 9,000 towards the Red Crescent and war funds, and it was very doubtful whether they could raise more than £ T. 1,000 or £ T. 2,000 for the loan.

What wealth there is in Mosul is not of a kind that can easily be liquidated, it is either in lands or live stock, or is being actively employed in trade.

There is a very natural, and perhaps well-founded, fear that money subscribed to this loan will be as good as lost, and it is thought that the issue of the loan really only amounts to an issue of paper money, which is certain to depreciate.

Apart from this, bad seasons and poor trade have caused considerable distress. Prices have never been higher than they are at present, and they show signs of rising even more.

There is a feeling of resentment against the Turks, who are only following the usual policy of their Government, which regards its subjects merely from the point of view as to how much money it can squeeze out of them. The following words, attributed rightly or wrongly to the chief of the Ulema, represent fairly the general feeling:—

"We are commanded to pay tithes to the Commander of the Faithful if he protects our honour and our property. Our honour he has lost on the battlefields of Roumeli, our property is daily plundered by Arabs on this side and Kurds on that, and, therefore, any money we pay to the Sultan is haram or unlawful."

I think it safe to predict that the patience of the people is drawing to its limit, and that further attempts to get money from them may have very serious results.

I have, &c.
HENRY C. HONY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 475.

Circular issued in Mosul on the 18th February, 1913, for the purpose of encouraging subscriptions to the Internal Loan.

(Translation.)

THE Governments of Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro have made a secret agreement to seize our sacred country and to plunder our property and capture our children and our families, and suddenly declared war on us four months ago, and they have taken advantage of the weakness of our numbers to invade the greater part of our land in Roumelia and the islands, until they have reached the very gates of Stamboul. And having invaded these lands they now wish to invade Stamboul also, and the rest of our country. But our Government has striven to defend itself in every way, and our army has tried to wipe out the stain on its honour, and the people living near the seat of war have partaken in it, and everyone everywhere has subscribed towards the war fund. For the purpose of our enemies is the purpose of oppression; for in the lands they have invaded they have killed more than half the population, sparing neither young nor old nor women, and they have plundered all their possessions and goods, and they poured oil on the mosques where the people had taken refuge, and burnt them, and even now they are practising cruelties which pass belief. Our Government is striving with all its might to recover the invaded lands and to rescue their unhappy inhabitants, and thanks be to God Most High Who has recently granted us some victories.

But the war has seriously increased expenditure, and our Government has decided to issue an internal loan of 500,000,000 piastres, and the Treasury has issued bonds, the security for which is the property tax. And the value of a bond of 100 piastres is 120 piastres, or an English pound, and they are also issued for half this amount, and the capital and interest is divided into five coupons, which will be paid yearly on the 30th of Teshrin-i-sani, and coupons will be paid in cash by the finance departments of the Empire, and they will be received in lieu of cash in payment of taxes. Until the bonds arrive, certificates for the amount required will be issued by the finance department.

In every country patriotic people are hastening to buy these bonds, thereby assuring their own profit and helping the needs of the Treasury. So, noble people and patriots, we invite you to show your patriotism by buying these bonds, that we may save our sacred land from the tyranny of our enemies. As we are far from the seat of war and cannot assist in person, we must assist with our money, for if we strive not to repulse our enemies they will succeed in their aims, and the cruelties which they are doing there they will do here, and they will not be content with your money and your property, but will assail your persons and your honour.

Consider this well, people of sense!

[13552]

No. 476.

General Post Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March 25.*)

THE Secretary to the Post Office presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Postmaster-General and with reference to letter from the Post Office of the 28th February last, encloses copies of certain papers on the disposal of correspondence addressed to Cavalla.

General Post Office, March 20, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 476.

General Post Office to British Postmaster, Salonica.

Sir, *General Post Office, London, March 6, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letters dated the 27th January and the 3rd ultimo, I am directed to inform you that the Postmaster-General desires to know how far correspondence addressed to Cavalla which has reached your office during the last two or three months for onward transmission may be presumed to have been delivered to the addressees.

It is understood that correspondence reaching your office, and addressed to Cavalla, was in normal circumstances delivered through the Austrian Post Office at that place; and I am to enquire whether this correspondence was ordinarily handed over to the Austrian Post Office at Salonica for disposal, or was sent by Austrian steamship in closed mails from your office to the Austrian Post Office at Cavalla for delivery. If it is a mistake to suppose that correspondence for Cavalla was ordinarily delivered through the Austrian Post Office, you should state what the normal course was, and how and when this course was departed from.

On the 27th January you reported that correspondence for Cavalla arriving in the mails from London was being retained at your office; and in your letter of the 3rd ultimo you stated that all the delayed correspondence addressed to Cavalla was handed over to the Bulgarian Post Office at Salonica on the 1st February for transmission to the Bulgarian Post Office at Cavalla.

I am to request you to state whether the correspondence handed over to the Bulgarian Post Office on the 1st ultimo consisted only of correspondence which had accumulated at your office (if so, the dates between which the correspondence accumulated should be stated), or whether it also included correspondence which had been sent on by you and had been returned to you as undeliverable. The British vice-consul at Cavalla, writing on the 29th January, stated that "all British mail for Cavalla arrives by Austrian post, and as British postal matter has for the last month been accumulating in the Austrian mail bags, which remain on board the Austrian steamers plying between Salonica and Constantinople, and have not been delivered, the postal dispute inconveniences British subjects as much as other foreigners." You should therefore report what information, if any, has reached your office concerning the accumulation of British correspondence addressed to Cavalla on board Austrian packets.

I am also to enquire the exact circumstances in which the correspondence for Cavalla has been handed over to the Bulgarian Post Office at Salonica since the 1st ultimo. If this action was taken in consequence of a written request, you should furnish a copy of the communication in question. In any case you should state whether you consulted the British consul-general before taking action.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary),
H. L. KINGSFORD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 476.

British Postmaster, Salonica, to General Post Office.

Sir, *British Post Office, Salonica, March 11, 1913.*

IN reply to your letter of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, as no enquiries for missing correspondence have been received from Cavalla, either at

the Austrian Post Office at Salonica, or at this office, it may be presumed that all correspondence addressed to Cavalla, which has reached my office during the last two or three months for onward transmission, has been delivered to the addresses.

Correspondence reaching this office and addressed to Cavalla was ordinarily handed over to the Ottoman Post Office at Salonica for disposal, and was therefore in normal circumstances delivered through the Ottoman Post Office at that place. After the occupation of Salonica by the Greeks on the 7th November, 1912, I arranged for all correspondence addressed to Cavalla to be handed over to the Austrian Post Office at Salonica for disposal, under which arrangement it would necessarily be delivered through the Austrian Post Office at Cavalla.

I am now informed by the Austrian Postmaster at Salonica, in reply to my enquiries, that the Bulgarians first refused to allow his mails to be landed at Cavalla on the 6th January, and as these mails also contained correspondence which had been sent on by me, the correspondence handed over to the Bulgarian Post Office on the 1st ultimo consisted of correspondence which I had handed over to the Austrian Post Office at Salonica between the 6th and the 27th January, and which had been returned to them, as well as correspondence which had accumulated at my office between the 27th January and the 1st February.

I would add that as several attempts were made by the captains of the Austrian steamers to land the mails at Cavalla, on their journeys between Salonica and Constantinople, I was not informed that they had failed to do so until the latter part of January, when the Austrian Postmaster also asked me to cease sending him the correspondence for Cavalla.

I commenced handing over correspondence for Cavalla to the Bulgarian Post Office at Salonica for transmission to their office at Cavalla on being informed by my Austrian colleague that he had been instructed to do so by his head office at Constantinople, and on his pointing out to me that it would be much more expeditious for me to hand over all correspondence directly to the Bulgarian Post Office at Salonica.

The British consul-general had informed me that he was forwarding all his correspondence to Cavalla by the Bulgarian Post Office, and was satisfied with their service previous to my taking action.

I am, &c.
R. A. C. ROUTH, *Postmaster.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 476

British Postmaster, Salonica, to General Post Office.

Sir, *British Post Office, Salonica, March* 13, 1913.

WITH further reference to the question raised in your letter of the 6th instant, as to the disposal of correspondence, addressed to Cavalla, reaching this office for onward transmission, I have the honour to inform you that I have to-day called on the Bulgarian Postmaster at Salonica, and that he states that all correspondence reaching their office at Cavalla is regularly delivered to the addresses, with the exception of a few newspapers, the entry into Cavalla of which is prohibited by the military authorities. This prohibition does not include any English papers.

He further informed me that mails are dispatched daily, by train, to Cavalla, and that to avoid the handling of the correspondence at his office and any consequent delays, he is willing to accept closed mails addressed to the Bulgarian Post Office at Cavalla. I replied that I would make up closed mails for Cavalla should the amount of correspondence warrant such a course, but as he had no objection, I would continue to hand over the correspondence to him *à découvert*, when the amount was insignificant.

I should, perhaps, add that correspondence addressed to other places in the region occupied by the Bulgarians is also handed over to the Bulgarian Post Office for onward transmission.

It is reported that the port of Cavalla has been altogether closed to shipping, owing, it is believed, to the fear entertained by the Bulgarians of the Greeks landing troops at that point.

I am, &c.
R. A. C. ROUTH, *Postmaster.*

[13420]

No. 477.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 97.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, March* 21, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 92, Confidential, of the 18th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the "Novoe Vremya," under the heading "The resignation of Count Thurn de Valsassina," publishes a violent attack on the Austrian Ambassador here. The article begins by stating that the amazing story of the weakening of the precautionary measures on the Russo-Austrian frontier was now being cleared up, but did not thereby become any better. The Austrian semi-official press had declared that Austria had not given Russia any assurances regarding Servia and Montenegro, and the Austrian Government did not deny these declarations. It had thus impressed on European public opinion that the supplementary communiqué published at St. Petersburgh was untrue. Russia was made to appear as though she had left Servia and Montenegro to their fate. It appeared now, from news received from the Vienna correspondent of the "Novoe Vremya," that Count Thurn had given the Russian Government positive assurances that Austria cherished no aggressive designs against her southern neighbours. Russia had, on the strength of these assurances, dismissed her reservists. The assurances had not been included in the text of the identic declaration, but had been added in a very softened form as a footnote by the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In Vienna they had decided to be diplomatists rather than gentlemen. When Russia dismissed her reservists, Austria only dismissed one-third of hers. If Count Thurn, who represented his Sovereign and Government, had no right to give those assurances, then of what use was it to enter into conversation with him rather than with any Austrian who happened to be at St. Petersburgh? He had certainly undertaken that demobilisation would also be carried out on the Servian and Montenegrin frontiers, and if this undertaking were not fulfilled there was not another capital in Europe where the assurances of the Austrian Ambassador would be accepted. This case amounted to a great diplomatic scandal. Diplomatists, especially in Austria, were sometimes insulted by the mob, but in this case the dignity of the Austrian Ambassador had been impaired by his own Government. The Vienna correspondent of the "Novoe Vremya" stated that Count Thurn, having acted without Count Berchtold's authorisation, must resign. His personal career did not interest Russia, but it was of importance to her that the categorical assurance of an Austrian Ambassador was not to be accepted as binding.

While in other respects the account given by the "Novoe Vremya" is substantially correct, it is not true that Count Thurn undertook that demobilisation would be carried out on the Servian and Montenegrin frontiers.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[13512]

No. 478.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Vienna, March* 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the official account of the incident at San Giovanni di Medua has now been published in to-day's "Fremdenblatt." As it differs somewhat from the account given in my despatch No. 48 of yesterday's date, and contains a more detailed statement of the Montenegrin proceedings, I have the honour to transmit the following résumé of this later account, which was supplied from Fiume to the "Politische Correspondenz" as an authentic representation of the facts.

On the arrival of the "Skodra" at 6.30 on the evening of the 12th March at the temporary pier of San Giovanni di Medua, in order to unload cargo destined for the Servians and Montenegrins, the Montenegrin military commander appeared on board the steamer and demanded that it should remove and land the Servian troops on board seven Greek steamers which had arrived in the harbour from Salonica. The captain of the "Skodra," Captain Blaich, at first refused, but on the Montenegrins threatening him and his crew with revolvers he gave way and steamed up, guarded by Montenegrin troops, to one of the Greek ships.

After a few minutes the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" appeared in the distance and

began to bombard the Greek steamers, whereupon the captain of the "Skodra" steamed back to the pier and took refuge in the hills with his crew. During the bombardment, which lasted for an hour, four of the Greek steamers were destroyed and the Servian troops suffered severe losses in killed and wounded. The "Skodra" received no damage.

After this the "Hamidieh" departed; whereupon the captain of the "Skodra" returned with his crew to his steamer with the intention of leaving the harbour. The Montenegrins forbade him, however, with threats, to carry out this intention; and the Montenegrin commander Juko Kusovac attempted to force him to remove troops and ammunition from a burning Greek ship. Upon the captain refusing to do this owing to the danger to his ship, the Montenegrins took over the command of the "Skodra" and attempted, with revolvers in their hands, to force the engineers to get up steam. They failed, however, in this attempt, and finally left the ship. The repeated protests of the captain of the "Skodra" were only met with threats by the Montenegrin commander and by Major Milanovic that he would shoot him and his crew; they were declared to be prisoners and were compelled to land, while the ship was manned with Servians and Montenegrins. Not until the morning of the 14th March was the "Skodra" permitted to unload her cargo and leave the harbour.

A further account furnished by the Hungarian Telegraphic Bureau adds that Captain Blasich, before leaving San Giovanni, was compelled to sign a declaration in Servian stating that he had not been molested during his stay in the harbour.

A usually well-informed person tells me that he learns from the director of the Hungarian-Croatian Line, to which the "Skodra" belongs, that in reality the matter was not so serious, and that an application was merely made by the Montenegrins to Captain Blasich to save the Servian troops, who were in danger of drowning as a result of the wrecking of the Greek ships by the Turkish fire.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[13513] No. 479.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Vienna, March 21, 1913.*

PUBLIC attention in Vienna is for the moment centred on Montenegro and the differences which have arisen between Austria-Hungary and that kingdom. It is announced to-day in the semi-official press that the Austro-Hungarian Government have, through their representative at Cettinjé, made a *démarche* with a view to the civil population of Scutari being enabled to leave the town, proposing that the bombardment should be stopped for a fixed interval of time, and that, if necessary, a bearer of a flag of truce should be sent to the Turkish commander to endeavour to arrange for the cessation of fire on the part of the garrison. It is understood that representations have also been made at Cettinjé in regard to the proceedings of the Montenegrins near Djakova and the murder of a Catholic priest; and that a protest has also been raised against the action of the Montenegrin authorities in the question of the steamship "Skodra" at San Giovanni di Medua. (I have reported on this incident in a separate despatch.)

Commenting on this information the press says that Austria-Hungary, in making representations regarding the bombardment of Scutari, is inspired only by humanitarian feelings, and has the right as protecting Power of the Albanian Catholics to ask that an enquiry be made into the reported events at Djakova. The "Neue Freie Presse" publishes what purports to be an authentic account of the murder of the Franciscan Father Palic and devotes a long leading article to this subject, in which it says that the murder is of great political importance, for it is an example of what would happen were the Albanians of Scutari to be handed over to the Montenegrins.

It is reported that the Italian Government have made friendly representations at Cettinjé regarding the bombardment of Scutari; and the press remarks, with evident satisfaction, that it is clear that Italy and Austria-Hungary are acting in complete agreement and inspired by the same desire to put an end to the useless shedding of blood at Scutari. This agreement, says the "Neue Freie Presse," is an important guarantee for the peaceful solution of the present crisis.

The "Reichspost" calls upon Count Berchtold to show more determination, and to put an end to a state of affairs in which Montenegro is defying Austria-Hungary. The continuation of a passive policy can only lead to humiliation.

Further accounts (said to be supplied by the "Albanesische Correspondenz") of alleged massacres in Albania appear in the press. In the villages of Trstenik, Sevica, Vrban, Sjubista, and Ginlekar 238 men are said to have been massacred. Many villages of the Kara Dag are said to have been burned to the ground and the male population put to death.

This evening's papers state that the Montenegrin reply to the Austro-Hungarian representations is unsatisfactory, and that King Nicholas has declined to allow either a cessation of the bombardment of Scutari or the appointment of an Austro-Hungarian official to a commission of enquiry into the reported events at Djakova.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[13746] No. 480.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, March 25, 1913.*

BALKAN war.

Head-quarter staff report that last night, after a preparatory bombardment, Bulgarian forces made general and simultaneous assault against advanced positions in front of Adrianople. At 3·30 this morning, after severe fighting, all the forts on the east front were carried by assault. The Maslak redoubts, together with the fort of the same name, were captured by the Bulgarian troops, together with twelve guns, four machine guns, and much war material. It is further reported that the Bulgarian forces at Chatalja successfully repulsed the attacks of the Turks.

[13748] No. 481.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 25, 1913.*

REPORTS have been current in Vienna to-day that the Austro-Hungarian Government have sent an ultimatum to Montenegro. To-day being a public holiday, high officials of Ministry for Foreign Affairs are absent; but, as far as I have been able to ascertain, two representations were made by Austria-Hungary at Cettinjé on 22nd and 23rd March, to which an immediate answer has been requested, but they can hardly be said to have the character of an ultimatum.

In well-informed circles here no satisfactory reply is expected from Montenegro.

[13659] No. 482.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 25, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 30 of 24th March.

In a note which I have just received, Montenegro protest against Austrian communication as a violation of neutrality, and state that they refuse to discuss the matter with the Austrian Government.

They add that, on humanitarian grounds, and in acceptance of the unanimous advice of the Powers, they are taking necessary steps, in conjunction with military commandant at Scutari, to facilitate the departure of the civilian population of the town.

[13745] No. 483.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 25, 1913.*

FRENCH Ambassador tells me that Minister for Foreign Affairs, on being informed by Austrian Ambassador of ultimatum presented at Cettinjé, said it was

impossible to understand how Austria could have recourse to such isolated action, which was in direct contradiction with collective policy on which Powers were agreed. It was taken, too, at a moment when Russia, in accordance with her agreement, was disbanding her reservists, and after she had accepted Austria's conditions with regard to Scutari and Djakova. It could not fail to make Russia lose all confidence in Austria, and would make worst impression on Russian public opinion. Minister for Foreign Affairs has gone to report to the Emperor, so has not been able to see me.

[13752] No. 484.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, March 25, 1913*

FOLLOWING sent to St. Petersburgh, No. 10, 25th March :—

"My telegram No. 3.
"At Odessa time-expired men are being released."

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13744] No. 485.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 25, 1913.*

IT is rumoured that Turkish force at Kadikoui has sustained a severe reverse. There is demonstration of military activity in and around the capital, troops being hurried to the front at Chatalja.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade.)

[13742] No. 486.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 263.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 25, 1913.*

IT is very urgent that Minister for Foreign Affairs should authorise without delay communication recommended at meeting of Ambassadors last week to be made at Belgrade and Cettinjé. Every day increases danger of something happening, or some separate action being taken that might be avoided if once agreement of Powers was made known and intimated at Belgrade and Cettinjé. And Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is letting slip a golden opportunity in not seizing the moment, when Austria has given up Djakova, to clinch agreement. It has been a severe trial for Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to concede this point, and if Russia makes difficulties now a mood of despair will set in, which may upset everything, which may lead to some precipitate action on the part of Austria, and which will rally to Austria both Germany and Italy, who will think agreement now impossible. There will be a real feeling that Russia has put herself in the wrong and missed a fair opportunity.

It would be helpful if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would also impress upon Servians that, having got Djakova and Dibra, they should withdraw from Scutari.

You should speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[13766] No. 487.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, March 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 20 of the 15th instant I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the collective representation made by the

representatives of the Powers and of the reply of the Montenegrin Government on the subject of the civil population of Scutari.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 487.

Collective Note addressed to Montenegrin Government.

D'APRÈS des renseignements récemment parvenus aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances, les habitants de Scutari seraient réduits à la famine, les magasins destinés à approvisionner la population civile s'épuisant plus rapidement que les provisions de la garnison.

Les Gouvernements respectifs, s'inspirant des principes de l'humanité et soucieux du sort des sujets étrangers, se croient justifiés à demander au Gouvernement Royal monténégrin de permettre à la population civile tout entière de quitter Scutari.

Or, comme les États balkaniques ont entrepris la guerre pour délivrer de l'oppression leurs coreligionnaires, les Grandes Puissances estiment que le Gouvernement Royal monténégrin ne saurait qu'accéder à cette demande et ne s'opposera pas aux mesures de secours qui seraient organisées en faveur des habitants qui voudraient quitter la place assiégée.

Enclosure 2 in No. 487.

Reply of Montenegrin Government to Collective Note.

LE Gouvernement Royal, animé comme toujours de sentiments de déférence envers les Grandes Puissances, a dédié toute son attention à la demande de leurs représentants tendant à faciliter à la population civile de Scutari la sortie de la ville assiégée.

Il se permettra, cependant, de faire remarquer qu'il a prévenu, dès les premiers jours de l'investissement, une partie de la demande des Grandes Puissances, en offrant aux Consuls étrangers à Scutari toutes les facilités pour quitter la ville avec leurs ressortissants respectifs, autorisation dont le Corps consulaire n'a pas cru nécessaire ou opportun de profiter.

Le Gouvernement Royal, tout en renouvellant aux représentants des Grandes Puissances l'assurance qu'il ne s'opposera pas à la sortie des consuls et de leurs connationaux de la ville assiégée, par la base d'une liste nominative que les consuls remettront préalablement à nos autorités militaires, regrette de ne pouvoir accéder au désir exprimé par les représentants des Grandes Puissances de permettre à la population civile de quitter la ville—les considérations les plus graves d'ordre militaire et politique s'y opposent.

La guerre balkanique a été, en effet, entreprise pour la délivrance, non des coreligionnaires et des connationaux des États alliés en Turquie, mais le principe inscrit au premier chef sur le programme de leurs revendications leur prescrit précisément d'entreprendre toutes les mesures pour faire cesser le plus tôt possible un état de guerre que le Gouvernement Royal est le premier à déplorer.

Or, les autorités militaires iraient à l'encontre de ce but suprême ; elles se trouveraient privées du moyen le plus efficace pour hâter la reddition de la place forte de Scutari si elles autorisaient la population civile de quitter la ville, car cette mesure augmenterait considérablement la résistance de la place forte et provoquerait en outre la destruction complète de la propriété privée et publique de la population de Scutari.

Si, en outre, les représentants des Grandes Puissances voudraient bien se rappeler que la population civile de Scutari se trouve être, en grande partie, dans les rangs des combattants ennemis, ils comprendront aisément l'impossibilité dans laquelle se trouve ce Gouvernement Royal d'acquiescer à leur demande.

[13758] No. 488.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 225.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the present military situation.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 488.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, though the weather has now been fine for nearly a fortnight, no military operations of any importance have yet been reported from either of the theatres where the Turkish and Bulgarian troops are in contact. The state of the country after the recent rain and snow is sufficient to account for this, and I am informed by Turkish officers from the front that the roads are still not fit for wheeled traffic.

From the official reports of the last few days it appears that on the 12th instant the line of the Turkish advanced posts was somewhat behind that given in my despatch No. 9 as occupied on the 12th February, and that the Bulgarian outposts had reoccupied some of the points from which they were previously reported to have been driven. I have just seen a map marked by the head-quarter staff of the army, which shows the front of the line on the 16th instant. It runs from Ormanli through a point about a mile to the east of Akalan, to the railway; thence through Albasan to Boghados. The Bulgarian line was supposed to be Karajakeui, Kushkaya Tepe, Kabakje, Kadikeui, the last three of which have been reported on various occasions as having been taken by the Turks.

To-day's report points to an advance all along the line, talks of severe fighting, and states that the Bulgarians have been driven out of Kadikeui. I do not imagine that these are serious engagements, or that the advance in force has yet begun. The Bulgarian troops are probably only in the nature of weak rear-guards, and an aeroplane reconnaissance effected on the 16th discovered no enemy in the country between Boghados and Silivri, and as far north as the railway, except two weak detachments in the neighbourhood of Kadikeui. Also, though it is confidentially expected in Turkish circles here that an advance in force by the Chatalja army will take place immediately, I notice that a good many officers from that army are now in Constantinople on a few days' leave. Further, there is as yet no sign of a move on the part of the 10th army corps.

The aerial reconnaissance on the 16th was made by the German lieutenant Berckner, in the uninjured Mars biplane, flown by the aviator Scherf (see my despatches Nos. 12 and 13 of 4th and 5th instant). Yesterday I met Lieutenant Berckner, who told me that they had started at 5·15 P.M., and got back to San Stefano at 7 P.M. The general staff had not furnished them with a map showing the positions of the Turkish troops, and he was under the impression that these were further back (more to the east) than they really were. The consequence was that he wasted time in reconnoitring trenches, facing east, and strongly held, on the line Chakil, Arab Tepe, Shaiteros, and it was not till after his return that he became aware that he had been reconnoitring his own troops. He went on towards Silivri, but owing to the time lost in the above reconnaissance and to the approach of night was not able to reach that place. He was, however, able to ascertain that all the country west of the before mentioned line and south of the railway was free of hostile troops except at Kadikeui. The descent was effected in the dark, by the help of three benzine flares near the hangar. It has been reported by eye-witnesses that when this aeroplane was returning in the dusk over the Turkish lines, it was fired on both with shrapnel and rifle, and Turkish officers, mentioning this mistake, have attributed it to the fact that the troops were never informed that the aeroplane was going out. When I asked Lieutenant Berckner about this, he said that he did not know that anyone had fired at him, and was under the impression that the troops had been duly warned of his intended reconnaissance, though he said that if he had been fired at he would not have known

it, as the noise of the motor would drown that of any report, and they were too high to see whether rifles were pointed at them or not. As regards shrapnel, he said that certainly nothing came near enough to him to be observed.

It is considered that the Greek army, released by the fall of Yanina, may be utilised for a descent on the coast of Asia Minor, and an army of 50,000 men is to be collected in the neighbourhood of Smyrna. The Sivas Redif division and four battalions of Mustahfiz are, as previously reported, already there. It is not yet known where the other troops are to come from, but the mobilisation has been ordered of the 28th division (Erzerum). Besides this division, there remain only two Nizam and three Redif divisions now in Kurdistan. The Redif divisions have not yet been called under arms.

Some of the troops which have lately been returning from the Yemen and Tripoli, but which I find very difficult to trace, may also be available towards the formation of an army at Smyrna.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL,

Military Attaché.

[13761] No. 489.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 228.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 22, 1913.*

A CERTAIN amount of renewed attention has been attracted to the subject of the administrative machinery of the Turkish provinces by the publication in the "Official Gazette" of the 11th instant of a provisional law on the separation of provincial from Imperial finance. The new law has been promulgated under the following circumstances:—

Up to the beginning of last year the main law on the administration of the provinces was that of the 21st January, 1871, a translation of which is printed in Mr. Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," vol. I, pp. 47 following. It is hardly necessary to say that the absorption of all power by the Central Government, *i.e.*, the palace under the Hamidian régime, deprived the law of any of its practical importance, but it remained theoretically in force subject to certain modifications, up to the renewal of the constitution in 1908.

From that date onward the question of remodelling the law to suit modern conditions became one of the principal preoccupations of successive Ministries, and a considerable portion of the time of Parliament was devoted to the discussion of the various proposals submitted by the executive. Nothing in the shape of a completed law came of all this, however. At last Said Pasha's Government took the bull by the horns last April, while Hadji Adil Bey was still touring the European provinces, and only a fortnight before the opening of Parliament, and promulgated as an "urgency" measure a provisional law on the "Special Administration of the Vilayets," modifying and supplementing the general law of 1871. This law, dated the 6th April, 1912, defines the legal nature of the vilayet as a "moral person," having for its administrative organs the Governor-General (Vali), the General Assembly of the province, and the Vali's advisory council. It proceeds to enumerate the duties of the Vali, to lay down rules concerning the provincial budget, and indicate the special revenues and expenditure comprised in it, to define the functions of the General Assembly, the members of which are to be elected by the administrative units called kaza at the rate of one per 12,500 male inhabitants, and, lastly, to indicate the nature and functions of the permanent advisory council of four members chosen each year by the General Assembly of the province to assist the Vali.

This law, which gave very considerable powers to Valis acting in conjunction with the General Assemblies, was not confirmed by the Parliament which sat from April to July 1912. This fact would not impair its validity according to the constitutional theory now tacitly adopted in regard to "provisional laws"; but, as a matter of fact, no steps appear to have been taken so far to bring it into practice. The recent law, mentioned in the first paragraph of this despatch, is, however, a step in that direction. It provides that from the commencement of the new financial year, beginning on the 14th March, 1913, the revenue assigned to the vilayet by the law of the 6th April, 1912, shall be collected, as before, by the Imperial Treasury officials, pending the organisation of special financial machinery for the provinces, but shall be

placed in a separate account, and that payments for local services shall likewise be defrayed out of a special vilayet account, within the limits of the credits set apart for the several vilayets in the general (Imperial) budget for 1328 (year ending the 13th March, 1913). The budget of each vilayet is to be drawn up by its General Assembly.

This law has been hailed by the committee press as a big step forward towards administrative decentralisation, and as happily completing the provisional law of last year, which the Cabinets of Ahmed Mukhtar and Kiamil Pashas allowed to remain inoperative. Considered politically, it may be regarded as an attempt on the part of the Committee Government to refute the allegation that the committee aim at the centralisation of all power and the absorption of all other elements in the Turkish, and to take the wind out of the sails of their adversaries, who have made decentralisation a main plank in their platform. Practically considered, the laws cannot be considered to effect much improvement unless the Central Government can raise up a generation of Valis equal to supporting and ready to accept great responsibilities, and can then leave them and their General Assemblies really free from interference. Whether the effect produced, even if these conditions were fulfilled, would be good or bad, only experience can show.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[13883] No. 490.

Memorandum communicated by Austrian Ambassador, March 26, 1913.

LA frontière de l'Albanie partira de la côte Adriatique à l'embouchure de la Boïana, elle suivra le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'au village de Koritsa, situé sur la rive droite. De là elle atteint le sommet des montagnes séparant la Boïana du lac de Scutari en laissant le Tarabocho à l'Albanie. Elle traverse le lac près du village Zogay, qui reste à l'Albanie jusqu'à, la baie de Licheny Hotit, d'où elle suit la frontière entre les tribus de Gronda et Hoti, cédées au Monténégro, d'une part, et les tribus de Kastrati et Klémenti, d'autre part, laissant ces deux tribus à l'Albanie.

Elle se confond ensuite avec les limites actuelles entre la tribu monténégrine de Koutchi d'un côté et la tribu de Klémenti de l'autre côté jusqu'au district de Gussigné et Plava; elle laisse ce district au Monténégro en suivant la chaine principale et la ligne du partage des eaux entre le Lim d'un côté et le Drin de l'autre.

(a.) *Proposition austro-hongroise.*

Elle quitte cette chaine pour descendre à un point situé au sud du couvent de Détchani, qui est laissé hors de l'Albanie, et gagne le Drin blanc à l'embouchure de la rivière Bistritsa de Détchani.

(b.) *Proposition russe.*

Elle quitte cette chaine pour gagner la crête des collines au sud de la ville de Diakova, qui est laissée hors de l'Albanie.

Elle suit le cours du Drin blanc jusqu'à l'ouest de Prizrend et ensuite la frontière entre le district de Prizrend, et ensuite le district de Liouma, laissant ce dernier à l'Albanie.

De là elle suit la crête de la montagne Korab en laissant à l'Albanie le district de Dibra inférieure et hors de l'Albanie le district de Réka. Quittant cette crête un peu au nord de la ville de Dibra, qui reste hors de l'Albanie la frontière gagne le Drin noir, qu'elle remonte jusqu'au village de Loukovo, d'où en laissant Strouga hors de l'Albanie elle gagne la rive du lac d'Ochrida.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres, le 26 mars, 1913.

[13757] No. 491.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 66 of 22nd March: Joint representation about Scutari.

All my colleagues have received the necessary instructions, except, as usual, the Russian Minister.

[13756] No. 492.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 25, 1913.*

I GATHER that General Savof has recommended Ministers to endeavour to delay reply to mediation proposal of Great Powers. This is in view of successful assault on Adrianople reported in my telegram No. 106 of to-day.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13898] No. 493.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 26, 1913.*

HEAD-QUARTERS Staff announce that the defences of the east front of Adrianople carried at dawn this morning. The Turks have set fire to the barracks, arsenal, and stores. Entry of Bulgarian troops reported, but not officially.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[13892] No. 494.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 248 of 21st March.

Memorandum from the Russian Government states that the Russian Ministers at Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens have been instructed to join in making collective representations with a view to the maintenance until the conclusion of peace of the present customs régime in the territories occupied by the allies.

[13903] No. 495.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 263 of 25th March.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent necessary instructions to Russian representatives at Cettinjé and Belgrade.

He hears that it is probable that non-combatants will decline to leave Scutari, and that when three days have expired King Nicholas will recommence the bombardment.

German Ambassador has communicated a proposal from his Government that Austria and Italy should be given a mandate to impose the will of the Powers on the King. Minister for Foreign Affairs is strongly opposed to this, and is replying that, in order to give any action which it may be necessary to take an European character, it is necessary that the other Powers should also take part in it. He trusts that French and British Governments will consent to do so. He does not suppose that His Majesty's

Government would be prepared to send troops but he would like to see some British dreadnoughts in the Adriatic. He would acquiesce in any action, such as the landing of detachments, which England and France might agree to take.

His Excellency is much incensed at Austria's ultimatum. He told the Austrian Ambassador that his Government could not pursue a pacific and an aggressive policy at the same time, nor associate themselves in collective action of the Powers and then take some separate action behind their backs. In conversation with the German Ambassador, he said, that Russia was not a negligible quantity like Montenegro and if Austria thought she could treat her as such, she would find she was mistaken. He told me however that he now considers the incident as closed.

(Secret.)

His Excellency told me that he had never seen the Emperor so angry as he was yesterday.

[13904] No. 496.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 120. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March 26, 1913.*

ROUMANIA and Bulgaria.

Your telegram No. 238 of the 18th March.

M. Sazonof is endeavouring to induce Bulgarian Government to accept following arrangement:

That, in return for the payment by Roumania of a money indemnity for Silistria and the renunciation by her of all claims to an increase of territory along the coast of the Black Sea, Bulgaria should give up Silistria and two triangles on the Dobroudja frontier.

As soon as his Excellency has received a definite answer to this proposal, which he expects on Friday, the 28th, he will invite M. Delcassé and myself to meet him to discuss whole question. In the event of Bulgarian Government accepting proposed arrangement I presume that I may support it. Secrecy will, of course, have to be maintained in regard to this proposal, as, with a view to extracting concessions on the question of the littoral, it will be necessary for us first to insist on the retention of Silistria. Saturday will probably be the first day on which the Ambassadors will meet.

According to information which has reached M. Sazonof, an attempt is being made by Germany and Austria to persuade Bulgaria to consent to cession of Silistria in return for an assurance that Salonica will become Bulgarian. In his opinion, in the event of Austria raising this question at meeting of Ambassadors, we ought to refuse to discuss it. As we have no mandate to discuss Salonica I agreed in this. That Austria will do so seems, however, to me to be rather doubtful, as, from what I hear from M. Sazonof, dynastic reasons render the proposal objectionable to the German Emperor.

[13911] No. 497.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 26, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he has sent a circular despatch to the Austrian Ambassadors abroad which will be communicated to the Powers. It gives the reasons which have led Austria-Hungary to make representations at Cettinjé, explaining that this has been done owing to the urgency of the situation and to humanitarian considerations. Minister for Foreign Affairs particularly desires to make it clear that in acting as he did he had no desire to break away from the concert of the Powers.

He said to me that he had made a great concession in yielding with regard to Djakova, but he laid stress on the following—that it must be clearly understood that he gave up Djakova only on condition that Scutari is effectively handed over to Albania and it was for the Powers to find means to do this. He hoped that collective action

of the Powers at Belgrade and Cettinjé would have the desired effect, but he had some misgivings upon this point. I could get no clear statement from him as to what he proposed to do should the collective action fail.

He was very emphatic as to the urgency of putting an end to the present situation at Scutari; otherwise he feared that trouble might arise between the Powers as to the means to be employed to bring about the evacuation of territory occupied by Montenegro and Servia.

With regard to Skodra incident, his Excellency said to me that he hoped that it would be satisfactorily arranged. He did not seem to attribute any great importance to it.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to tell you that your speech yesterday in Parliament has been received with the greatest satisfaction here, and he hopes that it will have a good effect upon the Balkan States.

[13912] No. 498.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 26, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that it was absolutely necessary to give Silistria to Roumania if the Bulgarian-Roumanian difficulty was to be peacefully settled. He said that it would be deplorable if the Great Powers were to be equally divided on the question, for then it would be almost impossible to find a peaceful solution.

I sounded him again as to Salonica, and whether he thought it might be given as compensation for Silistria. In his reply, he seemed to me to be resigned to the idea that it would probably go to Greece now that it was being claimed (by what he observed was a bad argument) as having been consecrated to Greece by the blood of the King.

[13811] No. 499.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, March 26, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Constantza:—

"Turkish steam-ship sailed, cargo of ammunition and eight large cases, believed to contain armoured automobiles."

[13894] No. 500.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 26, 1913.*

A COMMITTEE organ refers to the probability that Turkey's cession of Adrianople will be conditional on dismantling of the fortress, neutralisation of Adrianople zone, extra-territoriality of mosques, tombs, &c., that the Ottoman garrison should be allowed the honours of war and removal of war material, &c., in the fortress, and that Turkey should not indemnify the allies for maintenance of prisoners of war.

These desiderata seem coincident with views of that section of the Committee which is in favour of staking the issue of war on a decisive engagement before finally agreeing to peace.

(Sent to Sophia and Athens.)

[13905] No. 501.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 26, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 25th March.

Austrian Minister was told yesterday at Ministry for Foreign Affairs that as soon as Servian Government are officially notified of decision of the Powers regarding Albanian frontier it will be possible for them to declare to Montenegro that it is futile to continue the siege, and that they propose to withdraw from further operations.

This is of course prevented by Russian Minister having no instructions.

[13906] No. 502.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 26, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Uskub:—

"I hear that Servian authorities have seized a proclamation of the Macedonian revolutionary committee of Sophia, calling on the Bulgarians of Uskub, Kyoprulu, Monastir, &c., to revolt if those districts are annexed by Servia."

I have ascertained from Under-Secretary of State that information is correct.

[13988] No. 503.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 266.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.*

THE following resolution was passed at the meeting with Ambassadors to-day:—

"Tous les Gouvernements ayant approuvé la proposition formulée le 22 mars, la réunion persiste dans l'avis qu'il importe de procéder sans délai sur les instructions des Gouvernements aux démarches collectives à Belgrade et à Cettigné.

"M. de Etter ayant déclaré que le Gouvernement russe adhérait à la suggestion austro-hongroise relative à la cessation immédiate des hostilités en Albanie et à une rapide évacuation des territoires albanais, mais qu'il faisait observer qu'il serait nécessaire de n'y procéder qu'en prenant des mesures pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité, la réunion pense que l'observation du Gouvernement russe doit être reprise en considération en effectuant l'évacuation le plus rapidement possible après la cessation des hostilités."

I hope the last sentence will remove any hesitation, if there still is any, on part of Minister for Foreign Affairs in sending instructions to Russian representatives at Belgrade and Cettinjé to make the collective representation.

Austrian Ambassador urges that Austrian step taken recently at Cettinjé ought not to be regarded as isolated action, being in the sense of what the Powers had already approved about the civil population in Scutari, but gave me to understand that to avoid difficulties Austrian Government would accept the reply of the King of Montenegro for the present, though they considered the reply evasive, and feared the King might be intending to find some pretext for not doing what was desired.

It seems to me quite clear that the best way to prevent further difficulties will be to make the collective representation at Belgrade and Cettinjé immediately. This will give Servia the occasion that she desires to withdraw from Scutari, and will make separate action by Austria much less likely. On the other hand, delay in making the collective representation will give Austria pretext, if not justification, for some new step, and may even weaken position of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, so that he may be forced to take some step against his will.

This last paragraph is entirely my own inference, as Austrian Ambassador has not hinted at anything of the kind.

You should speak to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in this sense if he has not already sent instructions to Belgradè and Cettinjé.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 137; Berlin, No. 140; Vienna, No. 120; and Rome, No. 114, for information only.)

[12223] No. 504.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 39 of the 12th instant, reporting the presentation to the Bulgarian Government of a note containing the draft articles, relating to the liability of the allies in regard to the Ottoman Public Debt, which it is proposed shall be inserted ultimately in any Treaty of Peace between the Balkan States and Turkey.

In this despatch you draw attention to the fact that these articles have been communicated by your French, German and Austrian colleagues to adopt in a form slightly different from that which you were instructed, and I accordingly have to explain that the articles which you communicated to the Bulgarian Government, and which had been accepted by the meeting of Ambassadors in London, have not been agreed to by the Governments of all the Powers. The French Government take exception to the Treasury amendment to clause 1, which is embodied in the words omitted, as your despatch shows, from the draft articles communicated by certain of your colleagues, and the Russian Government have proposed another amendment.

In view of the lack of unanimity at this stage among the Powers, I have suggested that the matter shall not be pursued further by the meeting of Ambassadors in London but shall be reserved for discussion by the international commission which, it is proposed, shall meet shortly in Paris to examine this question.

For the present, therefore, I shall refrain from approaching the other Governments again with a view to the introduction of any alteration in the draft articles as communicated by them to the Bulgarian Government, and you need take no action pending the receipt of further instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12860] No. 505.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 66 of the 17th instant, transmitting a note from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proposed joint protest to the Servian Government against interference with the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, your Excellency should inform the Marquis di San Giuliano, in connection with the second paragraph of his note, that I have requested the French Government to communicate to the Italian Government and to the Governments of the other Powers interested a copy of the draft notes in question in the text of which I have recommended a slight modification.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14806] No. 506.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.*

AT the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day, after the Roumanian Minister had made his statement about the Koutzo-Vlachs, we discussed the collective representation

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 219), Sir E. Goschen (No. 116), Sir R. Rodd (No. 89), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 195).

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to be made in Belgrade and Cettinjé about the north and north-east frontier of Albania. It appeared that all the Governments, except the Russian Government, had sent instructions to their representatives. M. de Etter stated that M. Sazonof adhered to the resolution come to at the meeting with the Ambassadors on Saturday last, the 22nd instant, but M. de Etter had not yet heard that instructions had actually been sent to the Russian representatives in Belgrade and Cettinjé. The resolution recorded in my telegram No. 266 to Sir George Buchanan was then passed.

The German Ambassador stated that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that we must be prepared for the use of coercive measures to get the King of Montenegro to accept the decision come to by the Powers. The German representative in Cettinjé had learnt that the King of Montenegro intended not to agree to it. Coercive measures might take the form of a mandate to Austria and Italy, or of some collective action.

I said that I thought the important thing was to make the collective *démarche*. It would be premature to pass any resolution about coercive measures till this *démarche* had been made, and we knew the effect of it. I hoped that, after the collective representation, Servia would withdraw from Scutari, and Montenegro would then be left alone, and would not be able to do anything. My own opinion was that, if pressure became necessary, a naval demonstration by all the Powers would be the best form. It would entail no bloodshed, and would very likely apply just the pressure necessary to make the King of Montenegro give way. But I hoped that nothing of this sort would be necessary. I emphasised the urgency of the collective representation, as all the appearances indicated that it would induce Servia to withdraw from Scutari, and once it was made it would make it apparent that it was not separate action by one Power, but collective pressure by all the Powers, that would follow if necessary.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14595] No. 507.

Minutes.

MEHMED BEY KONITZA and M. Philippe Nogga, delegates of the Albanian Provisional Government, called this morning to express the Albanian view of the present political situation.

They said that they would not put what they had to say in writing because they did not wish to advertise their grievances and aspirations, as the Servians and Montenegrins were wont to do, and also because they had already presented to the conference of Ambassadors a memorandum with enclosures on the subject.

They complained that the question of Albania was being settled without the slightest regard to the Albanians themselves, and that the boundaries of the country were being delimitated solely with a view to prevent a breach between Austria-Hungary and Russia, for which the Albanians were not responsible, and with which they had nothing to do.

With the assignment of Djakova to Servia existence became impossible for the inhabitants of northern Albania, because all that was now left to them was a rocky and unproductive country which depended on Djakova for its means of livelihood.

They feared that the same thing would happen in the south, where the plain south and west of Janniua bore the same relation to the rest of the country as that of Djakova in the north. The Greeks had occupied this region as far north as Varna, and would, of course, make an effort to keep it.

The object of the territorial rearrangements now being made was supposed to be the establishment of a durable peace, but, as a matter of fact, the way in which the Albanian question was being settled would make any kind of peace impossible. The Albanians in autonomous Albania would starve, because they would be deprived of all means of livelihood by the assignment to the allies of all the fertile part of the country, and thus would be forced to raid their neighbours; while the many Albanians who would be handed over to the Servians and Greeks (with whose tyrannous methods they were already well acquainted) would never submit to the yoke imposed on them, but would live in perpetual revolt. Both Servians and Greeks had abundantly proved that they were determined to suppress the Albanian nationality, the former by their recent atrocities in the north, the forced conversions, &c., and the latter by their ecclesiastical and educational policy, which they had long pursued in the south with the support of the Turks.

The delegates wished to make a very solemn appeal to the conference, and particularly to Sir E. Grey, because they had special confidence in British impartiality. They asked no favours, nor even full justice (for it was already too late to ask for that), but they begged for just a little justice, which was, moreover, necessary to avert further disaster.

The delegates spoke with great earnestness, but at the same time with great sobriety.

I made no comment on what they said, but merely promised to report it faithfully.

H. N.

Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.

R. P. M.
L. M.

It is very seldom that any question of foreign can be decided on the merits of one aspect of it, or, indeed, on its merits pure and simple.

E. G.

[13955] No. 508.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, March* 26, 1913.

MY telegram No. 31 of 25th March.

According to note just received from Montenegrin Government, commandant of Scutari has replied to the Crown Prince that he cannot avail himself of the offer to allow the civilian population to leave the town, since he is not authorised to do so by his Government. The King asks me to transmit this information to you at once.

I cannot help remarking that in the commandant's reply, which I saw for a moment (but not in the Montenegrin note), there are the words "in the conditions proposed by your Royal Highness." It will be difficult to ascertain exactly what was said to the commandant by the Montenegrin emissary. Austrian proposal that the latter should be accompanied by neutral delegate was rejected by the King.

[13964] No. 509.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, March* 26, 1913.

ACCORDING to confidential information, Council held at the Palace has decided not to yield to any representations of Powers, but to continue attack on Scutari.

Representation ordered in your telegram No. 66 of 22nd March to Belgrade has not yet been made, as we are waiting for Russia.

[13963] No. 510.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 26, 1913.

AS the result of fighting all along the line during the last two days, Turkish outposts appear to have withdrawn towards Chatalja line.

Divisions from San Stefano arrived last night to reinforce Turkish left, which had then evacuated Bogados.

[13908] No. 511.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, March 26, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 26th March.

Bulgarian Government are making arrangements for military attachés and limited number of newspaper correspondents to proceed to the front. As my military attaché is temporarily absent at Bucharest, I have given vice-consul at Philippopoli permission to proceed and report.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[13909] No. 512.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, March 26, 1913*

MY telegram No. 108 of 26th March.

Adrianople has surrendered. King has left for that city.

Constantinople informed.

[14062] No. 513.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 27, 1913.*

I LEARN that it is proposed to send General Mahmoud Mouktar Pasha as Ambassador to Berlin, and perhaps transfer present Ottoman Ambassador there to Vienna.

There is a question of Cabinet changes as a result of effect of fall of Adrianople.

(Sent to Berlin.)

[14063] No. 514.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 266 of 26th March.

Though instructions had already been sent to Russian Ministers at Cettinjé and Belgrade, I read to Minister for Foreign Affairs text of resolution passed at meeting of Ambassadors yesterday, as his Excellency had not yet received it.

He begged me to explain that the Russian amendment had been prompted by his anxiety lest withdrawal of Servian troops should be followed by anarchy and possible massacre of Christians by Albanians. He had no suggestion to make as to how order was eventually to be maintained, but he would strongly object to Austrian and Italian officers being employed to organise some sort of gendarmerie.

Austrian Ambassador had just told him that it was Turkish commandant at Scutari who had refused to allow non-combatants to leave the town, and had suggested that the Ambassadors at Constantinople should ask the Porte to instruct him to authorise their departure. His Excellency said that he had no objection to sending instructions in above sense to Russian Ambassador, but that if reported fall of Chatalja was confirmed there might be no Government left in Constantinople. I asked him if he still thought that a naval demonstration in Montenegrin waters would be necessary. He said that recent Bulgarian successes would probably encourage King Nicholas, and that it would therefore be well for His Majesty's Government and French Government to take the question into serious consideration.

[14053] No. 514°.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 107 of 25th March.

Adjutant-general told me recently that if Adrianople fell military authorities would oblige the Bulgarian Government to insist on Rodosto.

Now that the *élite* of the army has been released from the siege, I have reason to believe that desperate efforts will be made to force Chatalja and Bulair positions, and that the King of the Bulgarians and General Savof still regard Constantinople as their objective.

In these circumstances, decisive pronouncement by the Powers as to frontier would seem to be urgent in order to forestall the situation of increased difficulty.

[14056] No. 515.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 111 of 27th March.

I venture to submit that the Great Powers should categorically inform the allies that hostilities must cease, and should formulate conditions immediately, without waiting for evasive reply, which they are sure to receive.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14064] No. 516.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 27, 1913.*

A DIVISION of Servian troops of 6,000 men with heavy artillery has been waiting more than a week at Corinth, in Greek transports, for opportunity to proceed to Albanian coast. Servian Minister tells me that they hope to leave to-morrow, but he regards the expedition now as a matter of form.

[13955] No. 517.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

POWERS wish to get Montenegro to raise the siege of Scutari, but at present Montenegro has agreed only to give facilities for departure of civil population. Turkish commandant, it is reported, refuses to let civil population leave without authorisation of Turkish Government. You should ask Turkish Government to give this authorisation. Austrian Ambassador certainly, and perhaps some of your other colleagues, have received same instructions, but you need not wait for any who are not instructed.

[14165] No. 518.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 269.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador informs me that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs hears that collective representation has been made at Cettinjé, but that Montenegrin Council of War has decided to assault Scutari, which will probably fall with accompaniment of a massacre. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs urges that some pressure must be brought to bear, and has asked what form it should take.

I have replied that I have not yet heard that collective representation has been made, but I hope it has been made or will be made directly; that I anticipate it will be followed by withdrawal of Servia from Scutari, and that probably Montenegrins will not be able to do much when left alone. I hope, therefore, that coercive measures will not be necessary, but if they are required, my personal opinion is that joint naval demonstration would be the best form. I am asking Admiralty to send two cruisers to Corfu, or some place within easy reach in case of urgency. Meanwhile, I have expressed hope that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated or will communicate with other Governments.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 141; Paris, No. 138; Rome, No. 118; and Vienna, No. 112.)

[14357] No. 519.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

IF there is reason to apprehend that Bulgaria intends to force the Chatalja lines and reach Constantinople, I agree that we should consult as to what our attitude should be; but the question is one that concerns Russia most intimately, and I think it is for M. Sazonof to let his views be known here and at Paris.

[14355] No. 520.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

M. SKOULOUDIS came to see me to-day, and brought me very carefully prepared maps, charts, and statistics about the south of Albania.

I thanked him for his information, but explained that we were only beginning to consider the question, and that, therefore, though I was glad to have information, I could not discuss the question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14356] No. 521.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

I TOLD the Bulgarian Minister to-day that only the question of the Koutzo-Vlachs in the south of Albania had been discussed with M. Mishu at the meeting with the Ambassadors yesterday. We had been careful to touch on nothing that even remotely affected the differences between Bulgaria and Roumania.

The Bulgarian Minister asked me whether the Roumanian Minister had stated that there was a compact mass of Koutzo-Vlachs in the south of Albania, and what he had asked on their behalf.

I replied that he had stated that there was a compact mass. He had not asked for any separate political status on their behalf, but only that the Powers, when organising Albania, should stipulate for the liberty of the religion, language, schools, and churches of these Koutzo-Vlachs.

The Bulgarian Minister said that this was just what Bulgaria was prepared to give in her territory. In answer to further questions, I assured him that the meeting of Ambassadors had not discussed the question of the Koutzo-Vlachs except in relation to Albania, for the organisation of which the Powers would be responsible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14359] No. 522. **160**

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

I OBSERVED to the Bulgarian Minister to-day that, now Adrianople was taken, I hoped the Bulgarians would make peace.

He said that his Government were waiting only for the opinion of their allies in order to reply favourably to the last note of the Powers; but he added that it would help matters very much if I would take some initiative in getting the Saros–Media frontier line for Bulgaria instead of the Enos–Media line. If this could be done, Bulgaria would not trouble about Rodosto.

I said that there was not at present a question of the Powers taking an initiative; it was for the Bulgarian Government to reply to the note of the Powers. I observed, however, that Saros was very near to the Straits, and some of the Powers were naturally very sensitive about any frontier line that would be near the Straits.

The Bulgarian Minister said that matters would be facilitated if the question of an indemnity could be referred to the Commission of the Debt in Paris, and if, after discussing the whole question of an indemnity and of the debt, the Powers came to the decision that there could not be an indemnity. The decision could then be accepted by Bulgaria.

I explained to him our position with regard to the 4 per cent. increase of the Turkish customs dues, and how impossible it would be for me to defend it in the House of Commons if the revenue it produced was to go, not to secure and develop Turkish territory, but to the payment of an indemnity to the allies, who imposed heavier duties than Turkey upon British goods.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12850] No. 523.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 207.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 141 of the 19th instant, transmitting copy of a draft note drawn up by the French Government protesting against the interference on the part of the Servian authorities with the administration of the Ottoman Debt, I have to request you to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that a copy of this draft note has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade, with instructions to join with his French, German, Austrian, and Italian colleagues in examining, and if necessary revising, it before presenting it to the Servian Government.

Your Excellency should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I proposed one amendment in the text of the note, viz., that at the end of the fifth paragraph, after the words "ont été rendes," the words "d'une manière absolue et irrévocable," used in the first paragraph, should be repeated, and should explain to him that my object in making this suggestion is to emphasise the main point on which the protest depends, viz., that the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt is a thing apart, and is governed by special international provisions and considerations.

Your Excellency should at the same time suggest that a copy of the draft note should be communicated at once to the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian Governments, so that they may lose no time in sending the necessary instructions to their representatives at Belgrade.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14354] No. 524.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[a]

(No. 212.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

M. CAMBON came to see me to-day, with M. de Etter, and showed me the frontier line that the French Government thought should be given to Greece in the south of Albania.

Mr. Vansittart brought a map, and explained how indefensible this line would be on ethnographical grounds.

I said that we were evidently agreed that the Italian line would be unacceptable as it stood, but we were not agreed as to what would be reasonable. I suggested that we should try, in the first place, to get the Italians to concede to Greece the coast opposite Corfu. I was sure that Italy and Austria would not accept the line that the French Government proposed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14357] No. 525.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 213.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that there was anxiety lest the Bulgarians should now force the Chatalja lines, and King Ferdinand prosecute his intention of presenting himself before Constantinople. It would be desirable that England, France, and Russia should be in accord as to what should be done in this contingency.

I said that the question of Constantinople was one that interested Russia most intimately, and I thought that M. Sazonof should let us know what were his views.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14358] No. 526.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Turkish commandant of Scutari had replied to the Montenegrins that he could not let the civil population leave without being authorised by his Government to do so. Count Berchtold had instructed the Austrian Ambassador in Constantinople to ask the Turkish Government to give this authorisation; and he wished to know whether I would instruct the British Ambassador to make the same request, and let it be known in Cettinjé that I had done so.

I said that I would instruct the British Ambassador to make the request in Constantinople, but if the British Minister in Cettinjé, after having joined in a collective representation demanding that the Montenegrins should raise the siege altogether, then went to the Montenegrin Government and asked them to let the civil population leave, it would imply that the British Government contemplated that there would be a refusal on the part of Montenegro to raise the siege, and that there would be an assault upon Scutari. This would weaken the joint representation.

Count Mensdorff appeared to admit the force of this, and he did not press the point further.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[a] Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 133).

[12850] No. 527. 161

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 24 of the 8th ultimo respecting the interference on the part of the Servian authorities with the administration of the Ottoman Debt, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris enclosing a draft of a note which has been prepared by the French Government protesting against the action of the Servian authorities in this respect.[a]

You should at once put yourself into communication with your French, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian colleagues with a view to examine with them, and if necessary revise, the terms of the draft note, which you will then communicate, jointly with them, to the Servian Government.

The terms of this draft appear to me to be satisfactory, and, subject to the great desirability of inducing all the Powers to agree to a communication in identic terms, I am of opinion that no important change in its present wording is desirable.

I have, however, recommended to the French Government one slight amendment, viz., that at the end of the fifth paragraph, after the words "ont été cédés," the words "d'une manière absolue et irrévocable," used in the first paragraph, should be repeated.

My object in making this suggestion is to emphasise the main point of which the protest depends, viz., that the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt is a thing apart, and is governed by special international provisions and considerations.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14370] No. 528.

M. Misu to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

Légation de Roumanie, Londres,
M. le Secrétaire d'État, *le 27 mars,* 1913.

POUR faire suite aux entretiens que j'ai eus avec votre Excellence et au mémoire du Gouvernement roumain du 28 février dernier, que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous remettre personnellement, je m'empresse, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de vous présenter copie d'une circulaire du 21 mars courant du Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Roumanie au sujet du différend roumano-bulgare.

Avec, &c.
N. MISU.

Enclosure in No. 528.

Circular.

L'UN des arguments qui, dans le différend roumano-bulgare, est le plus souvent mis en avant contre la cession de la ville de Silistrie à la Roumanie, surtout après les nombreuses interviews et déclarations de certains hommes politiques bulgares, c'est que cette cession donnerait naissance à une inimitié irréductible des Bulgares contre les Roumains et rendrait impossible des rapports futurs de bon voisinage.

Nous croyons l'argument dénué de valeur.

Les nouvelles acquisitions imposent à la Bulgarie un tout autre problème politique à résoudre, son véritable problème vital. Par les deux ports de Kavalla et de Dédéagatch, la Bulgarie arrive à la mer Égée; dès lors, outillage nécessaire, amélioration des ports, construction de chemins de fer; à côté de cela, exploitation de la grande région des tabacs turcs et, avant tout, consolidation ethnique du pays conquis et des frontières du côté des Serbes, des Grecs et de l'Albanie ou de la Macédoine. Ces graves questions produiront, aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix, des préoccupations si absorbantes et d'un ordre tellement supérieur que tous les sentiments ou ressentiments provoqués au premier moment par la cession d'une petite

[a] Sir F. Bertie (No. 141), March 19, 1913.

ville comme Silistrie et de la région, relativement insignifiante, jusqu'à la mer Noire, habitée par une majorité tartare, disparaîtront nécessairement. Ajoutons à cela que les nouvelles complications à prévoir entre les alliés d'aujourd'hui obligeront la Bulgarie à tous les ménagements envers la Roumanie, le voisin aux finances florissantes et à l'armée intact.

Il faut maintenant compléter la perspective en l'envisageant du côté roumain. Si la Roumanie acquiert Silistrie avec une ligne de frontière raisonnable jusqu'à la mer Noire, et si—comme il paraît certain—les églises et les écoles macédo-roumaines obtiennent leur situation légitime, la Roumanie pourra regarder en toute tranquillité la marche ultérieure des événements dans les Balkans.

Si, au contraire, on lui refuse Silistrie, elle sera nécessairement tentée d'intervenir à chaque petite ou grande complication future dans les Balkans, à chaque difficulté entre les alliés d'aujourd'hui, et aucun Gouvernement roumain ne pourra résister à la poussée de l'opinion publique, d'autant plus difficile à maintenir dans la voie des intérêts généraux de l'Europe que la médiation actuelle des six Grandes Puissances aura préparé, à un peuple jusqu'à présent paisible et plein d'attention pour les conseils de ses aînées en civilisation, une déception plus profonde.

Il faut ajouter à cela que si les nouvelles complications à prévoir entre les alliés balkaniques pourront garder un caractère local, comme du reste leur guerre contre la Turquie a gardé ce caractère jusqu'à présent, une intervention armée de la Roumanie ferait immédiatement naître le danger d'une conflagration européenne.

Ces quelques observations suffiraient à elles seules à indiquer la vraie solution à donner au différend roumano-bulgare dans l'intérêt de l'Europe.

MAJORESCO.

Bucarest, le 8 (21) *mars*, 1913.

[14175] No. 529.

M. Misu to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

Roumanian Legation, London,
March 27, 1913.

Sir,

IN order to accomplish the desire your Excellency has been so kind to express, I hasten to send you a short notice on the views of the Roumanian Government concerning the Roumanians who would be incorporated in Albania.

I am, &c.
N. MISU.

Enclosure in No. 529.

Pro-memoriâ.

LE Gouvernement roumain voit avec satisfaction la création d'un État albanais indépendant, d'autant plus qu'il espère que, par les mesures que les Grandes Puissances garantes voudront bien prendre, l'individualité des nombreux Roumains qui y seront incorporés sera sauvegardée.

Dans ce but, les limites de la future Albanie devraient être tracées de telle manière que, non seulement cet État soit à l'abri de toutes difficultés ultérieures avec ses voisins, mais qu'aussi la population roumaine, qui est la plus compacte au sud-est de l'Albanie, soit conservée intacte dans les confins de l'État albanais.

La région comprise entre les villes de Janina, Metzovo, Grébéna et le mont Gramos est habitée par une population en majorité roumaine, qui peut être évaluée à plus de 80,000 habitants et qui est groupée dans trente-six villages et bourgades, dont les principales sont: Samarina, Avdela, Perivoli, Krania, Labanitza, Saracu, Porovala, Laïsta, Leshnitza, Breaza, Turia, Medjidié, &c.

Il y a lieu de faire remarquer que les deux versants de la Pinde, depuis le mont Gramos jusqu'à l'Agrafa, sont occupés en majorité par des Roumains. Une partie de cette population a été annexée à la Grèce après le Traité de Berlin. Les Roumains ont protesté alors contre cette annexion. Ce serait injuste de permettre de nouveau la séparation du tronc compacte des Roumains et de les annexer à d'autres États que l'Albanie. La Roumanie est d'avis que leur individualité nationale sera mieux conservée dont un État albanais indépendant, sous la garantie et le contrôle des

Grandes Puissances, dont les limites devraient être fixées d'une manière aussi indiscutable que possible pour éviter des troubles à l'avenir dans ces contrées.

Le Gouvernement roumain considère que les meilleures frontières naturelles pour l'Albanie du sud-est seraient les montagnes de Zagori (Mitchikéli et Papingo), la vallée de la rivière Inahos jusqu'à son confluent avec la rivière Arta (Arachtos) jusqu'à la source de cette rivière à Joug (Zygos), d'ici à Metzovo et, en suivant la frontière actuelle de la Grèce, jusqu'à la rivière Venetico, et de là jusqu'à son confluent avec la rivière Bistritsa (Aliacmon = Indje Sou), suivre le cours de la Bistritsa vers Darda, Gramoste, Koritsa jusqu'au lac de Prespa.

La population de ces contrées est en grande partie roumaine, musulmane (Roumains mahométans dénommés Vlahades), albanais et une minorité grecque.

Pour la sauvegarde de l'individualité nationale des Roumains de ces contrées, qui seront incorporés à l'Albanie, les Grandes Puissances voudront bien inscrire, non seulement dans le traité international qui remplacera le Traité de Berlin, mais aussi dans la constitution ou statut organique de l'Albanie, le principe que dans toutes les localités où la majorité serait roumaine la langue administrative soit roumaine, de même que dans toutes les églises et écoles roumaines.

Le nouvel État albanais devrait garantir une autonomie administrative et communale et, autant que possible, politique aux nombreux Roumains de l'Albanie, en ne mettant aucun obstacle au fonctionnement du chef religieux roumain des cantons habités par des Roumains.

L'État roumain pourra, comme par le passé, subventionner les institutions de culture roumaines de l'Albanie, sans aucune restriction de la part de l'État albanais.

Légation de Roumanie, Londres,
le 27 *mars*, 1913.

[14596] No. 530.

Note communicated by Count Mensdorff, March 28, 1913.

LE Baron de Giesl télégraphie en date du 24 courant ce qui suit :—

"Concernant l'enquête de Diakova, je reçois tout à l'heure une note du Gouvernement monténégrin qui, tout en passant sous silence la mission de l'archevêque, consent à celle du vice-consul, sous la condition que ce fonctionnaire et les délégués monténégrins procèdent ensemble à l'enquête dont il s'agit."

Le Ministre Impérial et Royal à Cettigné fait savoir dans un autre télégramme, daté du 25 courant, ce qui suit :—

"Le Gouvernement m'assure qu'il ne voit, de son côté, aucun obstacle à la mission de l'archevêque, et que l'attitude du Gouvernement monténégrin ne sera en rien altérée par suite du refus du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal d'admettre un troisième membre à la commission."

Le Comte Berchtold a répondu au Baron Giesl dans les termes suivants :

"Nous croyons comprendre que le consentement du Gouvernement monténégrin s'applique aussi à l'affaire Palitch. Vous êtes donc chargé de demander au Gouvernement du Roi qu'il prenne, conformément à sa promesse, immédiatement les mesures nécessaires afin que Mgr. Midia et le représentant austro-hongrois qui le doit accompagner puissent remplir leur tâche.

"Quant à la proposition du Gouvernement Royal qu'en dehors des délégués monténégrins des représentants d'autres Puissances prennent également part à l'enquête, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne fait aucune objection, pourvu que ces représentants soient désintéressés et dignes de confiance.

"Je vous prie d'aviser le Gouvernement Royal que l'archevêque et le vice-consul doivent se rendre à Diakova le 29 de ce mois."

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie,
Londres, le 28, *mars* 1913.

[14075] No. 531.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, March 27, 1913.*

THE news sent by the Cettinjé Press Bureau concerning the surrender of Djavid Pasha was premature. Djavid Pasha did in effect make an offer to surrender troops and arms on condition of himself and officers being permitted to keep their swords; this condition was agreed to, but Djavid Pasha changed his mind at the last moment, and is still negotiating.

[14076] No. 532

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 32 of 26th March: Scutari.

Austrian Minister has made a further representation demanding that bombardment should cease until orders have been sent to commandant from Constantinople to allow civilian population to leave the town.

[14198] No. 533.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. -(Received March 28.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March 28, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 167 of 27th March.

Private information which I received yesterday evening confirms the report that present Turkish Ambassador at Berlin will be almost immediately replaced by General Mahmoud.

[14239] No. 534.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 28, 1913.*

BULGARIAN representative asked Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day whether Bulgaria could count on German support for the Midia-Rodosto line. Secretary of State replied in the negative.

[14216] No. 535.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, March 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 269 of 27th March to St. Petersburgh.

Secretary of State says that as far as he knows collective representation has not yet been made at Cettinjé owing to Russian representative being still without instructions. He agrees with you entirely that if pressure proves necessary naval demonstration would be the best form, but he thinks that if Russia stands out another Power should do so also in order to avoid the appearance of dissension amongst the Powers. He therefore suggests that the demonstration should be carried out by four Powers: for instance, England, France, Austria-Hungary, and another Power, either Italy or Germany, he does not care which.

[14217] No. 536.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 28, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day substance of your telegram No. 269 of 27th March to St. Petersburgh. He said that he had received information two days ago that alarming anarchy seemed to prevail in the entourage of the King of Montenegro, who then seemed determined to renew operations against Scutari. He had since received more reassuring news, but the danger was not really past.

He said that he had just received information from Belgrade that Servia seemed disposed to give orders to her troops to abstain from further action against Scutari as soon as the Servian Government had been officially informed of the decision of the Powers in regard to Albanian frontiers. In his Excellency's opinion it was therefore essential that there should be no further loss of time in taking collective action at Belgrade and Cettinjé. He deeply regretted the vacillation of Russia in the matter and the delay she was apparently causing, and he hoped you would use your influence to put an end to it.

Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that Montenegro will yield to the wishes of the Powers, but he seems to me to be prepared to take determined action to enforce will of Europe upon her if she does not give way. This will apparently take the form of a naval demonstration in which he hopes that the other Powers will join, and he has already communicated his views on the subject to Paris, Rome, and St. Petersburgh. Germany, he said, would not take part, as she has no ships in the Mediterranean; Italy, he hoped, would do so, as she was working in perfect accord with Austria-Hungary. He begged me to thank you for your intention to send ships to Corfu to be ready in case of emergency. Moral effect produced by this measure on the Balkan States would, he said, be most beneficial.

[14218] No. 537.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 122 of to-day just received.

Before its arrival I had, in speaking to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sounded him as to his views with regard to division of territory amongst the allies.

On my observing that I understood that the Powers had decided to disinterest themselves in the matter, he replied that he had no particular interest in the matter beyond question of Scutari and the passes to it, which he thought regarded the Great Powers. He was opposed to the idea of the internationalisation of the town, as he foresees too many difficulties in carrying out such a scheme.

Essential point was to safeguard freedom of commerce, and to guarantee free transit of goods by rail in whatever territory railway should pass. These were questions which he said would have to be raised at the meeting of Ambassadors.

[14240] No. 538.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 28, 1913.*

I LEARN from Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he has just received information from Sophia that the Bulgarian Government do not intend to prosecute war actively if there is a likelihood of a prompt conclusion of peace.

As regards peace, his Excellency's information goes to show that the Bulgarian Government mean to be moderate in their demands.

[14205] No. 539.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 161 of 23rd March.

The French Ambassador has now received instructions, but at the last moment a hitch has occurred regarding the collective communication, the Russian Ambassador stating that in his instructions in point 1 there is no specific mention of discussion of Ergene River. He has telegraphed urgently for instructions.

[14204] No. 540.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 168 of 28th March.

Russian Ambassador has now explained to me the reasons for his proposed modification, which is the result of a demand made by M. Danef that a line should go straight from Enos to Midia, and not follow the Ergene River.

Urgently request instructions for meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow morning.

[14237] No. 541.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 28, 1913.*

I HAVE communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs contents of your telegram No. 269 of 27th March.

He quite approves what you say about collective naval demonstration, but is anxious that it should take place in Montenegrin and not in Albanian waters. He is continuing to use all his influence at Belgrade to detach Servians from Montenegrins, but fears that they may not be able to recall their troops from Scutari until after its fall.

[14214] No. 542.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 270 of 27th March.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs hears from General Dimitrief and Dr. Danef that the Bulgarians will not try to force the lines, as they have nothing to gain, and want to bring the war to an end.

His Excellency is much preoccupied about the question of Salonica. Bulgarians have told him that they will make their claim good by force if necessary, and, as then seem to be inclined to adopt the same attitude towards Servians with regard to certain territory in the occupation of the latter, he fears that Greeks and Servians may eventually combine to resist Bulgarians' pretensions.

[14199] No. 543.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 28, 1913.*

MY telegrams Nos. 111 and 112 of 27th March.

My German colleague called on me yesterday. He judges the situation in a similar light to myself, and has, I gather, telegraphed his views to his Government.

Entry into Constantinople is now openly spoken of as the objective of the Bulgarian army, and the Ministers have been petitioned not to conclude peace until the Bulgarian army is in that capital.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14215] No. 544.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 28, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 27th March.

The Servian division sailed yesterday afternoon.

[13903] No. 545.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

I AM informed both from St. Petersburgh and by Russian chargé d'affaires here that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent yesterday instructions to Belgrade and Cettinjé to make the collective representation agreed to about north and north-east frontier of Albania and about Scutari.

It is most urgent that this should be made without delay, especially at Belgrade, as Servian Government wait for it before withdrawing from Scutari. What is the reason of the delay? If it is still due to your Russian colleague it will reflect upon Russian good faith, and may have most serious consequences, and I must point this out to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 277, for information.)

[12948] No. 546.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

IF Bulgarian Government has not yet replied to collective communication of the Powers respecting conditions of peace, you should ask when reply will be received. It is not seemly that it should be longer delayed.

[14865] No. 547.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

RUSSIAN chargé d'affaires informs me that Russian Minister at Sophia has warned Bulgarian Government against pressing their action or demands to the point of raising the question of Constantinople and the Straits, and has asked me to support this. Russian Government would take decisive action against these questions being raised.

Subsequent information renders it doubtful whether this warning is now necessary, but you should consult your Russian colleague, and if he still wishes it you should say to Minister for Foreign Affairs that you hope Bulgaria will not raise this question.

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* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 49) and Sir R. Paget (No. 71), *mutatis mutandis*.

[14204] No. 548.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1913.

RUSSIAN chargé d'affaires has informed me that Daref has told Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Bulgarian Government will accept the Enos–Midia line on condition that it is straight and does not follow the course of the River Ergene. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that the Turks will accept, and asked me to support this at Constantinople.

I replied that, if the Bulgarian Government in their reply to the Powers made it clear that they would make peace on these terms, I thought, in view of present military situation, that the Turks should accept, and I should be prepared to join in giving this advice, but I did not see how Turks could be pressed till Bulgarians had replied to the Powers.

I have since received your telegram No. 170 of to-day. Collective communication at Constantinople appears to be of minor importance pending the reply from the allies. You may agree to whatever modification has the consent of your colleagues, and for the rest act in accordance with second paragraph of this telegram.

[13904] No. 549.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 271.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1913.

BULGARIA and Roumania.

I approve views in your telegram No. 120 of 26th March.

[13912] No. 550.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 46 of 26th March.

It is best not to raise the question of Salonica, and, if it is raised by others, to take the line that assumption hitherto acted upon and accepted by all the Powers has been that they will not interfere with territorial arrangements between allies except as regards Albania and Ægean islands, unless questions affecting Constantinople, the Straits, and Asia Minor are provoked by allies.

[14813] No. 551.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[*]

(No. 71.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1913.

AT the meeting of Ambassadors this afternoon I reported the request of M. Skouloudis, the Greek delegate, to be admitted to the reunion as M. Mişu, the Roumanian Minister, had.

The Italian Ambassador pointed out that, if the Greek representative was admitted to discuss the whole of the southern frontier of Albania, the Servians and others might complain that they had not been admitted to discuss the parts of the frontier which interested them, and Albanians also might ask to be heard.

[*] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 221), Sir E. Goschen (No. 117), Sir R. Rodd (No. 90), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 141).

The French Ambassador observed that the others had not yet requested to be heard, and the questions other than those connected with the south of Albania were already settled. A sense of grievance might be caused if, after the Roumanian Minister had been admitted, the Greek delegate was not heard.

I said that I thought it would be inconvenient if M. Skouloudis discussed the whole southern Albanian question with us after we had settled the other parts of Albania without hearing the Servians and others; but, on the other hand, now that M. Mişu had been allowed to put before us personally the views of his Government concerning the Koutzo-Vlachs, it would be rather hard if M. Skouloudis was not given an opportunity of replying to M. Mişu with the views of the Greek Government.

Eventually it was agreed that I should give M. Skouloudis a copy of the résumé which M. Mişu had sent and which I had communicated to the reunion, and that M. Skouloudis should be asked to reply in writing to the points raised by M. Mişu. I would then communicate this reply to the reunion.

The Austrian Ambassador informed us that his Government had instructed their representatives in Cettinjé and Belgrade not to oppose any proposal made by the Russian representatives in the sense of the resolution come to by the reunion on the 25th instant respecting the evacuation by Servia and Montenegro of territories occupied by them inside Albania.

We then discussed the Italian Ambassador's proposition about the southern frontier of Albania.

The French Ambassador and I pointed out the hardship to Greece of not getting possession of the coast exactly opposite to Corfu. I said that it was not necessary that the frontier of Albania should go in a direct line inland from the point chosen on the coast, but it would be hard for Greece not to have the coast.

The Italian Ambassador contended most emphatically against this, saying that it would mean the cession to Greece of the port just south of Capo Kephali, which was the outlet for all that hinterland of Albania, and could be made into a naval station. He said that the Italian Government would agree that Greece should have up to the line of the Kalamas, but they could not possibly go beyond this.

It was agreed to regard this discussion as a preliminary one, on which each Ambassador would make his own report to his Government.

Finally, the following resolution was adopted :—

"Le Prince Lichnowsky fait observer qu'on pourrait envisager dès maintenant l'emploi de mesures coercitives pour le cas où le Roi Nicolas refuserait de se rendre à la communication collective des Puissances, on ferait attendre trop longtemps sa réponse.

"Sir E. Grey dit que, dans le cas où l'emploi de pareilles mesures deviendrait nécessaire, il conviendrait de recourir à une démonstration navale internationale et de s'y apprêter en envoyant de bâtiments de guerre à portée des eaux monténégrines. L'Amirauté anglaise a déjà été invitée à prendre des dispositions à cet effet.

"La réunion partage l'opinion de Sir E. Grey."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14807] No. 552.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1913.

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires informed me to-day that the King of Montenegro accepted the conditions of peace proposed by the Powers, except as regards Scutari.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14808] No. 553.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 137.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that, in reply to the German Ambassador in St. Petersburgh, M. Sazonof had said that he could not agree to a mandate to Austria and Italy to coerce Montenegro. The chargé d'affaires explained to me that M. Sazonof would prefer a naval demonstration, in which England and France should take part, though Russia would not do so.

I said that I had been aware that this was M. Sazonof's view, and that was why I had already suggested an international naval demonstration as preferable to a mandate to one or two Powers only.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14809] No. 554.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 138.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that M. Sazonof thought that we must consider what should be done temporarily to preserve order, after the Servian evacuation of Albania, till a permanent organisation could be established. The Cretan precedent was not a good one, nor did M. Sazonof like the idea of an Austrian and Italian occupation. He thought that, after the siege of Scutari was raised, the Turkish troops might be used temporarily to keep order in Albania.

I said that this would be preferable to the other alternatives that he had named, provided we could be sure that the Turkish troops would not commit excesses. I thought that perhaps they might be turned into a sort of gendarmerie temporarily, and they might have attached to them, as instructors or in some other capacity, some European officers whose presence would ensure that excesses were not committed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14810] No. 555.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 139.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires informed me to-day that M. Sazonof thought that the word "protection" was rather too definite to be used in connection with the Catholic minority in Albania. What should be done was to guarantee the liberty of the religion, education, churches, &c., of the Catholics.

I said that this might be done by the giving of guarantees by the Servian Government to the Powers, and by the appointment of consuls, who would report if the guarantees were not carried out. It should be clearly understood that the subject was one on which the Powers were entitled to make representations and have their say if the guarantees were not fulfilled.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14811] No. 556.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 140.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires told me to-day that he was instructed to ask whether I would make some communication to the press, in accordance with the Russian

view that had been more or less adopted respecting the evacuation of points occupied by Montenegro and Servia in Albania.

I said that the press here was hardly aware of this particular point, and it seemed not worth while to make a special communication about it. But, if M. Sazonof liked, he could communicate to the Russian press his own view about the evacuation, and say that the Powers were agreed that it should be taken into consideration.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14812] No. 557.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 220.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.*

THE French Ambassador informed me to-day that M. Pichon, after receiving M. Sazonof's views about a naval demonstration against Montenegro, urging that England and France should take part though Russia would not do so, had replied that France certainly would not take part if Russia did not.

I said that Russia evidently did not wish to incur the odium of a naval demonstration against Montenegro, but to France and England it mattered very little whether we joined in a naval demonstration of this sort. It was not as if we were asked to quarrel with Bulgaria or some important country. If it would make things easier for M. Sazonof if we took part in the demonstration, I thought that we might very well take the risk of doing so; if we did not, the other Powers would proceed to a demonstration without us.

M. Cambon said that he would inform M. Pichon of what I had said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14292] No. 558.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Athens, March 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Beaumont on the present financial situation in Greece, with special regard to the means at the disposal of the Government for meeting expenditure caused by the war.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 558.

Memorandum by Mr. Beaumont on Greek Finances, with Special Reference to the War.

THE accounts of revenue and expenditure for the years 1910 and 1911, the latter of which has just been published, show that the total surplus realised during the two years amounted to a little over 3,500,000*l.*

The results of 1911 were particularly satisfactory, showing an increase in ordinary receipts of 375,000*l.* compared with 1910, and an increase of 150,000*l.* over the estimates presented by M. Coromilas, while ordinary expenditure is nearly 290,000*l.* lower than the estimates, in contrast to the practice, general in the past, of over-estimating revenue and under-estimating expenditure.

With regard to 1912, M. Diomedes now calculates ordinary receipts at 388,000*l.* below the figures of the original estimates, and 420,000*l.* less than the actual receipts of 1911, leaving ordinary expenditure approximately the same as in the original estimates, and 415,000*l.* more than the expenditure actually effected in 1911.

The total deficit is estimated at 4,600,000*l.*, of which 3,500,000*l.* will be met from the surplus of 1910 and 1911, so that to balance accounts the Government will apparently have to provide, over and above the advance obtained in December, a further sum of approximately 1,000,000*l.* The deficit is, of course, entirely due to expenditure on account of the war, in connection with which, in addition to 2,250,000*l.* granted to the

national defence and national fleet funds, supplementary credits for nearly 4,000,000*l.* have been voted, bringing the total war expenditure up to 6,250,000*l.*, exclusive of the ordinary expenditure of the Ministries of War and Marine.

During the first eight months receipts exceeded those of the same period of 1911 by 160,000*l.*, notwithstanding a loss from customs duties of 100,000*l.*, due to the reduction of the sugar duties and a falling off in the importation of cereals in consequence of the good harvests in Greece in 1911 and 1912. The loss under the latter head for the whole year compared with 1911 was 160,000*l.*, and 220,000*l.* compared with 1910. The 50 per cent. reduction in the sugar duties caused a considerable increase in the amount imported, representing a consumption per head of 4·6 kilogs., instead of 3·5 kilogs. in 1911, with the result that the revenue from this source, estimated at 200,000*l.*, actually produced 240,000*l.*, or only 80,000*l.* less than the maximum reached under the old duty. It may be hoped that this result will not be without effect when the question of the revision of the tariff again comes under consideration, and that it may dispose the Government to consider the advisability of lowering other duties which now act as a check on consumption and an encouragement to smuggling, particularly easy in a country with the natural configuration of Greece.

During the last four months of the year the total decrease in receipts compared with 1911 was about 440,000*l.* The revenue most affected was stamps, which, owing to the proclamation of a moratorium on the outbreak of hostilities and the complete stagnation of business, shows a reduction for the year of nearly 100,000*l.*, in spite of a substantial increase during the first eight months. The revenue from customs duties has also suffered severely.

The estimates for 1913 presented by M. Diomedes anticipate a deficit in ordinary revenue and expenditure of 316,000*l.*, and a total deficit which exceeds 2,000,000*l.*, although providing for the issue of a loan to realise 2,000,000*l.*, in anticipation of which the Government are authorised to borrow from the National Bank of Greece on current account.

The total estimated extraordinary expenditure on the war figures at 4,160,000*l.* Of this 120,000*l.* is for expenses of administration in the occupied territories, the revenue from which is estimated at only 400,000*l.*

The estimates are declared to be only provisional, and are little more than a copy of those of 1912.

A decrease of 80,000*l.* is allowed for under direct taxes, due to the effects of the war.

Under expenditure the following are the most noticeable increases :—

Public debt, 40,000*l.*

This would have been more considerable but for a reduction of 28,000*l.* on the interest and redemption of the old gold loans payable from the plus values of the assigned revenues in 1912.

Ministry of Interior—
Gendarmerie and refugees, 40,000*l.*
Post Office, 20,000*l.*

Ministry of Education—
Grant to poor communes for increasing salaries of teachers, 20,000*l.*

Ministry of Commerce—
Expenditure in new provinces, 20,000*l.*

Ministry of Marine—
New equipment and increase in personnel, 120,000*l.*

No provision is made for additional taxation, and it would appear that the Government propose to meet all expenditure connected with the war, which cannot be covered from the surplus of 1910 and 1911, by borrowing. Up to now loans for 4,200,000*l.* nominal capital only have been authorised (excluding the issue of Treasury bonds), and as the special war credits already voted exceed 10,000,000*l.*, some 3,000,000*l.* more will be required to balance the budgets of 1912 and 1913.

A remarkable feature in the situation has been the steadiness of exchange, which during the whole period of the war has remained at or near par, with even a tendency in favour of the paper drachma.

A tabular statement is annexed, summarising the actual revenue and expenditure in 1910 and 1911, and the estimated revenue and expenditure for 1912 and 1913.

March 22, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 558.

TABLE showing actual or estimated revenue and expenditure for the years 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1913.

1910.

(Provisional Account.)

	£
Revenue, ordinary	5,324,815
Revenue, extraordinary—Loans, net, after deduction of all expenses of issue	1,550,956
Total	6,875,801
Expenditure, ordinary	5,027,334
Expenditure, extraordinary—	
Refugees in Thessaly	63,271
National fleet fund	417,131
Total	5,507,736

Surplus of ordinary revenue over ordinary expenditure, 297,511*l.*

Total surplus, 1,368,065*l.*

1911.

(Provisional Account.)

	£
Revenue, ordinary	5,700,769
Revenue, extraordinary—Loans, net, after deduction of all expenses of issue	3,501,075
Total	9,201,844
Expenditure, ordinary	5,225,526
Expenditure, extraordinary—	
Refugees in Thessaly	30,111
National defence fund	190,011
Repayment of advances	1,600,000
Total	7,045,678

Surplus of ordinary revenue over ordinary expenditure, 475,243*l.*

Total surplus, 2,156,166*l.*

1912.

(Estimates as revised in March 1913.)

	£
Revenue, ordinary	5,280,000
Revenue, extraordinary—	
Temporary advance by the National Bank of Greece and a group of French banks	1,600,000
Sale of Treasury bonds	360,000
Total	7,240,000
Expenditure, ordinary—	
Reduced estimates	5,353,000
Supplementary credits voted in October 1912 and March 1913	288,343
Expenditure, extraordinary—	
Grants to national defence fund	1,140,186
Grants to national fleet fund, including 660,000*l.* for the purchase of four destroyers	1,108,000
Special war credits voted in October 1912 and March 1913	3,936,777
Total	11,826,306

Estimated deficit in ordinary revenue and expenditure, 361,343*l.*

Total estimated deficit, 4,586,306*l.*

1913.

(Estimates presented by M. Diomedes.)

	£
Revenue, ordinary	5,646,485
Revenue, extraordinary—	
Produce of loan	2,000,000
From occupied territories	400,000
Total	8,046,485

	£
Expenditure, ordinary	5,962,862
Expenditure, extraordinary—	
Ministry of War	3,200,000
Ministry of Marine	410,000
National fleet fund	400,000
Administration of occupied territories	129,000
Total ..	10,162,862

Deficit in ordinary revenue and expenditure, 316,377*l.*

Total deficit, 2,076,377*l.*

[14249] No. 559.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 237.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 24, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 160 of yesterday, I have the honour to enclose translation of a proclamation purporting to voice the feelings of a considerable portion of the army.

As will be noticed, it denounces in strong language many of the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress, including Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, Hakki Pasha, and Djavid Bey, now in Europe, and is apparently intended to inflame public opinion against them.

As the present form of Government in the capital drives all adverse criticism below the surface, it is impossible to estimate whether the document represents the feelings of the bulk of the army or only a section of the army. The latter is rumoured to be determined to avenge the *coup d'État* of the 23rd January and the assassination of General Nazim Pasha after peace, should the latter not be concluded on terms more advantageous than those which the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet was insisting on. The extreme element in the Committee is of course aware of this, and may, in consequence, hesitate to make peace, and even make another effort to retrieve the military situation, and, if possible, to relieve Adrianople, the cession of which would be the main handle against them. Another possibility is that, should the present Cabinet decide on peace on the terms suggested by Europe, the extremists may get rid of them by the same methods as were used to overthrow the last Cabinet.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 559.

Proclamation.

THE Ottoman army can no longer keep patience.

The army curses the Committee of Union and Progress—

Because, after taking its own birth from the army and entering into the active arena, instead of working to increase and extend the effectiveness and strength of the army, it ruined and destroyed the discipline and good order of the army by employing in political and civil and personal services a set of commanders and officers engaged in the pursuit of ambitious aspirations, whose number and identity are known.

The army curses both the Chamber of Deputies elected by the Committee of Union and Progress—

Because those guardians of the rights of thirty millions of Ottomans, who ought to have known the familiar saying that, Whatsoever country has possessed a powerful army, that country has lived in prosperity and happiness, *i.e.*, the deputies, out of fear of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, did not exert themselves in the smallest degree to secure the means of bringing the Ottoman army to a state of perfection to compare with the armies of the adjoining countries; and, when it was declared by the newspapers published at the time that the tortures inflicted on the deputies arrested in connection with the imaginary secret association matter (in 1910) were carried out under the direction of a soldier (Staff-Colonel Ismail Hakki Bey, formerly redif commander), tarnished the honour and prestige of the army by opposing the holding of an expeditious enquiry into the matter.

The army curses Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, formerly commander of the expeditionary army—

Because, while it is known to the inner ring with what great difficulty, owing to the fear and baseness which are innate in him, he was induced to accept the commandership-in-chief of the expeditionary army which was compelled to march on Constantinople, when he was commander of the IIIrd Army Corps in 1909, he, after entering Constantinople, affected a lordly conduct and assumed a despotic attitude which hastened the decline of the excellences of the Ottoman army.

The army curses the ex-Grand Vizier Said Pasha—

Because this ambitious old man, who was the one and only cause of the disasters which the army suffered in the last Russo-Turkish war, and who is simply the embodiment of the celebrated Halet Effendi, recently pursued, when he was placed at the head of the Union and Progress Government, the treacherous policy of turning the Ottoman dominions into a burnt-out area as a result of internal warfare, and enfeebling the Ottoman army owing to useless conflicts.

The army curses the ex-Grand Vizier Hakki Pasha

Because, owing to his being to the last degree given up to pleasure and self-indulgence, like Nevsherli Damad Ibrahim Pasha, his careless handling of the affairs of State during his Grand Vizierate brought upon the Ottomans a calamity like the Turco-Italian war, and simply opened the way a year in advance for the daily disasters which the Ottoman forces are exposed to to-day in the Balkans.

The army curses the Grand Vizier Mahmoud Shevket Pasha—

Because, though, according to the law on the revision of military ranks which he caused to be drawn up in Constantinople when he was commander of the expeditionary army, he could then retain the rank of general of division (ferik), he has now, on becoming Grand Vizier by the commission of so many crimes, acted so as to incur the responsibility of making of no account the provisions of the military laws by securing the grade of vizier and marshal and skipping the rank of first general of division (birindji ferik).

The army curses with all its strength Talat Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior—

Because, though constitutional Government is an acquired right of the whole Ottoman people, he, with a few individuals capable of being partners in his evil-doing, got the Government into his hands, did everything he liked in such fashion as to make one regret the most despotic sovereigns, and, by urging on a great number of officers to services designed to fortify his own position, committed the great crime of sowing the seeds of dissension and discord in the Ottoman army.

The army curses with all its strength Javid Bey, ex-Minister of Finance—

Because this upstart, who is devoid of all Ottoman and patriotic feeling, while being saddled with the duty of not leaving any room for abuses in regard to the manner and direction of expenditure of that huge military budget, followed a negligent line of conduct in this respect owing to his pursuing certain covetous and personal aims, and gave the opportunity for that vast mass of gold, which should have been the source of life to the Ottoman army, to melt away and vanish in hands burning with the fires of peculation and covetousness.

The army curses with all its strength Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, Minister of War

Because, though ignorant of the mentality and traditional characteristics of the Ottoman army, he, together with a few intriguers and parasites, brought the army to a state of utter confusion by the treacherous idea of introducing an organisation of a kind to destroy its ancient fundamental principles, and was the cause of disasters which produced such deplorable results as the internal wars in Albania, the Hauran, and the Yemen, besides the Turco-Italian war; and, with the director-general of commissariat, whom he himself so well chose (Brigadier-General Ismail Hakki Pasha), was guilty of the treachery of devoting the budget of the Ministry of War exclusively to purchases, in order to make some profit and advantage out of it, and refusing to spend any money on the instruction and training of the army.

The army curses with its whole strength Enver Bey, chief of the staff of the Xth Kol Ordu

Because this murderer and sketch of a soldier, who has never done any work except look after the means of securing his personal advantage, has, together with his accomplices, by the blundering military operations which they executed owing to his keeping the Xth Kol Ordu, of which he was recently appointed chief of staff, under the command of an incompetent commander like Khurshid Pasha, exposed it to defeat and dreadful slaughter, and fled to San Stefano in order to save his life and taken refuge there under the pretence of protecting Constantinople.

In fine, the army now also curses with all the strength it possesses and with its whole being the evil-doers and vile persons who have, instead of transforming into a state of efficiency the Ottoman army, which in the Russo-Turkish war of 1293 A.H. (1878 A.D.) achieved so many military successes and desperate resistances, and in the Turco-Greek expedition of 1312 A.H. (1897 A.D.) a complete victory, been the cause, in a greater or less degree, of damaging its good order and discipline.

[14532] No. 560.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 61.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which has been addressed me by His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica,* relative to the action of the Servian authorities at Uskub in prohibiting the export of Servian silver and nickel money, and otherwise hampering the trade of Salonica with the interior.

I took an opportunity to-day of speaking unofficially to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon this subject, and I pointed out to him that it appeared to me to be bad policy on the part of the Servian Government to resort to petty vexations, which would only indispose the Powers towards them, and would not be to their future advantage.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[14269] No. 561.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March 25, 1913.*

IN speaking to me the day before yesterday about the difficulties of his Government with Montenegro, my Austrian colleague said he feared that, if coercive measures had to be applied to Montenegro, Servia would also be drawn into the quarrel. I therefore took an opportunity yesterday of asking M. Stefanovitch what course the Servian Government was proposing to adopt.

The secretary-general, as will have appeared from my despatches Nos. 45 and 53 of the 7th and 11th instant, has never shown himself to be very pro-Montenegrin, and he spoke on this occasion with considerable impatience of the recent Montenegrin proceedings *vis-à-vis* of Austria.

His remarks were to the effect that there were limits to the obligations of allies. Montenegro was solely and entirely responsible for the present complications, and Servia certainly could not be expected to go to war with Austria just on account of Montenegrin bad manners and obstinacy. It was deplorable King Nicholas should refuse satisfaction to the Austrian Government for incidents for which the Montenegrin authorities were certainly to blame; whilst with regard to the principal question, Scutari, if Servia had been able to renounce Durazzo, surely Montenegro could renounce Scutari, and should understand that it is useless to defy the Great Powers.

M. Stefanovitch then told me confidentially and with evident enjoyment that, although it had been impossible to refuse Servian reinforcements, excuses had been resorted to to prevent any really effective force arriving in time. Of course the Servian Government had hoped that long before this a settlement would have been reached in the Scutari question, and the long delay was somewhat awkward, as the troops had already left Salonica, but with the connivance of the Greek Government means had been found to hold up the transports *en route*. M. Stefanovitch being M. Pasitch's son-in-law, I presume that the sentiments he expresses reflect those of the Prime Minister.

The above information coincides entirely with indications which I have received from another source.

In their dealings with Montenegro concerning reinforcements, the Servian Government have kept the dynastic question in view throughout. It is for this reason, and that they might subsequently point to their solicitude on behalf of Serbdom, that

* No. 361.

in January last they offered assistance to Montenegro and caused the offer to be widely known, having, however, with considerable discernment, chosen a moment at which they well knew King Nicholas would not accept it. When later the complete incompetence of the Montenegrin army to capture Scutari unaided forced the King to change his mind, the Servian Government, while making display of dispatching artillery and troops, at the same time availed themselves of every excuse to retard their arrival on the scene of action. That Scutari should fall does not at all enter into the Servian programme. Rather the contrary; that it should successfully resist and finally be incorporated in Albania will weaken, and possibly cause the fall of, the present dynasty in Montenegro, a contingency which opens up very inviting possibilities of aggrandisement for Servia. Moreover, now that Djakova is secured to Servia, there is no longer any strong irritation against Austria, and the country needs rest and all classes desire peace. Meanwhile, should circumstances be too strong and Scutari succumb, the Servian Government have sufficient troops on the spot to make it altogether evident that its reduction is due alone to the participation of the Servian army, and they are likely, therefore, in either way to score on this occasion at the expense of the Montenegrin dynasty.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[14270] No. 562.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March 26, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a communiqué published by the Servian Government in the "Samouprava" of the 22nd instant, giving warning that they will recognise no transactions or alterations in concessions in the territories occupied by their troops which may be come to without their participation or approval.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 562.

Extract from the "Samouprava" of March 9 (22), 1913.

THE Royal Government have been informed that negotiations are being conducted abroad with a view to the purchase of the railway lines in the territories occupied by the Servian army. Whereas the occupation of these territories gives special rights to the Servian State, it is necessary to state that the Kingdom of Servia cannot accept any transactions or changes in the questions respecting the railways, or other questions affecting concessions and such like, carried out without its participation or approval.

[14339] No. 563.

Sir H. Babington Smith to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received March 29.)

My dear Mallet, 50, *Cornhill, London, March 27, 1913.*

I HAVE been away in Scotland for a few days, which accounts for my delay in answering your letter of the 20th March about the Treasury bills.

The bills were originally sold half in London and half in Paris, and, so far as we know, they are not held anywhere else, except possibly a certain amount in Belgium. We have no means of knowing the exact amount now held in each of the two capitals.

I may mention that the Bank of Salonica have made representations to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with reference to these bills, and have asked that a communication might be made to the Governments of the allied States with reference to the assigned revenues.

Yours sincerely,
H. BABINGTON SMITH.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[14243] No. 564.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 154.) *Paris, March 28, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to the note which I addressed to his Excellency's department under the instructions conveyed to me by your telegram No. 132 of the 20th instant, informs me that the French Minister at Belgrade was instructed on the 7th instant to unite with his colleagues in supporting, by means of a joint representation, the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the customs duties, taxes, and war contributions levied by the allied Governments in the Ottoman provinces occupied by their troops. On the 15th March, however, M. Descos reported that the Russian Minister and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade had not received any instructions, and that in these circumstances it had not been possible to make the joint representation recommended by the Ambassadors' meeting in London.

M. Pichon adds that instructions similar to those given to the French Minister at Belgrade were sent on the same date to the French representatives at Athens and Sophia.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[14400] No. 565.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 29.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, March 29, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that Vice-Admiral Cecil Burney is proceeding to Corfu from Smyrna in His Majesty's ship "King Edward VII," and may be expected to arrive there on or before Monday next, the 31st instant.

2. His Majesty's ship "Dartmouth" is also under orders to proceed from Malta to Corfu. She cannot, however, leave Malta before Monday, arriving Corfu the next day. If Sir Edward Grey considers it necessary that a cruiser should be at Corfu not latter than Monday it would be possible to order one there from Piræus, provided the request is made to-day.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[14311] No. 566.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, March 28, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

German Ambassador told me confidentially that question had been discussed by Triple Alliance group of a mandate to Austria-Hungary and Italy from the Powers to deal with the situation in case of necessity. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was at first disposed to favour the idea, but is now opposed to joining in coercive measures, which I apprehend the President of the Council realises would be disapproved by public opinion.

[14242] No. 567.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 225 of 21st March.

Vice-consul at Dardanelles reports Greek transports, escorted by torpedo-boats, in Besika Bay.

Transport of Turkish troops from Europe to Asiatic side has begun, and a large force is expected shortly in Besika Bay district.

Considerable apprehension prevails among Christian inhabitants of Dardanelles, as it is said the whole Turkish population has been armed by the Government.

[14424] No. 568.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 29, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

I have carried out instructions contained in your telegram No. 83 of 28th March.

Prime Minister explains that delay is not due to Bulgarian Government. He states that Greek Government are raising the question of delimitation of frontier of Southern Albania as well as that of future status of islands. Also that Montenegrin Government, whilst accepting the other conditions, refuses cessation of hostilities prior to fall of Scutari.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14425] No. 569.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 29, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Minister undoubtedly has apprehension of forcing of Chatalja lines and Bulgarian entry into Constantinople, and has reported in this sense, but has not repeated since November last the warning referred to in your telegram No. 84 of 28th March, and he does not wish me to act.

(Confidential.)

He tells me that negotiations are proceeding between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Danef respecting frontier, and that Bulgarian Government now want direct line from Enos to Midia, giving them considerable tract south of the River Ergene. Russian Embassy in London know about this.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14426] No. 570.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 29, 1913.*

MACEDONIAN customs.

I have made collective communication with my colleagues as instructed in your telegram No. 55 of 25th February.

[14310] No. 571.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No 153 of 27th March.

Grand Vizier yesterday handed the Austrian Ambassador a cypher message to Turkish commander at Scutari instructing him to authorise civilian population to leave.

The message was sent on to Vienna.

[14418] No. 572.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 28th March.

I have just seen my Russian colleague, who now acknowledges receipt of telegram on the subject of joint representations concerning Scutari and northern frontier of Albania. He says that telegram was undecypherable before. He commenced by saying that he did not know whether he could consider a mere account of proceedings at an Ambassadors' meeting as instructions for joint representations, and asked me what form communication to Servian Government should take. I replied that I felt quite clear as to the bearing of the telegrams I had received, and read to him the draft communication which I proposed. He took exception to the word "protection" in the phrase "the effective protection of the Catholic populations, &c.," and said that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not admit that word, as being an offence to the sovereignty of the Balkan States and affording a pretext for the interference of other Powers. He was willing, however, to follow my text if I would substitute "liberty of conscience" for "protection." I said that it was imperative to make the representations at once, so I would make the substitution he desired and submit point to you subsequently.

Austro-Hungarian Minister informs me that Prime Minister, whom he saw yesterday, appears to have changed front, and now says that representations of the Powers cannot have any effect on Servia unless Montenegro also agrees to raise the siege of Scutari, as Servia is bound by the treaty of alliance to supply troops. This is undoubtedly due to outside influence, as hitherto both Prime Minister and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs have repeatedly stated that if the Powers would declare Scutari to be for Albania under all circumstances the Servian troops could be withdrawn.

[14420] No. 573.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, March 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 71 of 28th March: Conditions of peace.

Prime Minister said he hoped to give an answer day after to-morrow. Montenegrin and Greek Governments had apparently not formulated their replies till yesterday.

[14414] No. 574.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 29, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs is supporting Bulgarian claim that future Turco-Bulgarian frontier should follow a straight line drawn from Enos to Midia instead of curving line originally proposed. He is very anxious that you should also give this line your support, as he fears that it will be very difficult to induce the Bulgarian Government to be contented with less. It will also, he hopes, dispose them to be more conciliatory with regard to Roumanian frontier question.

[14450] No. 575.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Philippopoli, March 29, 1913.*

REGULAR telegraphic communication with Adrianople not having yet been established, His Majesty's consul handed me the following message yesterday, with instructions to cypher and forward from here:—

"Adrianople was taken by assault on 26th March, the Bulgarian troops capturing the eastern lines of defences by bayonet charge at 8 A.M. The town surrendered at 9·30 A.M., I understand unconditionally. The allied cavalry entered at 9·45 A.M., the infantry at 11 A.M. The arrival of the troops acclaimed by the Christian population. Order prevails in the town except for looting by civil population, which is being repressed.

"All officers and troops are regarded as prisoners of war, but at present only 15,000 are in the hands of the Bulgarians, the remainder, about 30,000, believed by the Bulgarian authorities to be hidden in the town.

"The King of Bulgaria arrived 27th March, received formal surrender of the town from Shukri Pashi, to whom he returned his sword, and left the same day.

"Telegraphic communication not yet re-established. Trains expected in sixteen days. All British colony safe."—SAMSON.

Foregoing message sent to Foreign Office, Constantinople, and Sophia.
Major Samson's despatches forwarded from here by post to-day.

[14436] No. 576.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Philippopoli, March 29, 1913.*

AFTER parting with His Majesty's consul at Adrianople yesterday I went to head-quarters in order to make arrangements for return here. Situation seemed to be developing somewhat critically. Proclamation issued to the effect that all Turkish soldiers in hiding must surrender upon pain of death, and same penalty for those harbouring them. There had been numerous unfortunate incidents, and there was disquieting appearance of worry and confusion at head-quarters, where chief of staff informed me that two Bulgarian officers and ten men had just been killed by Turks. On the other hand, Moslem houses were being pillaged, and several non-combatants were said to have been murdered and others maltreated.

In view of magnitude of Bulgarian triumph and of inevitable difficulty of making arrangements for 10-,000 troops and prisoners, it will be very creditable if no further incidents occur, but situation will require very careful handling if trouble is to be avoided.

General Ivanof, whom I saw, laid stress on the fact that situation was not properly that of a town which had "surrendered," inasmuch as Bulgarian troops had charged well within the lines, losing some 6,000 killed and wounded before the white flag was hoisted. He has taken up quarters of Koprospek [*sic*]. King and royal train 12 miles this side of Adrianople. Shukri Pasha and staff have been conveyed to Sophia.

(Sent to Foreign Office, Constantinople, and Sophia.)

[14823] No. 577.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 29, 1913.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires has suggested, on instructions from M. Sazonof that energetic collective pressure be exercised at Sophia, with a view to the immediate cessation of hostilities on the understanding that they obtain the direct Enos-Midia line.

You may join when your colleagues are instructed.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 140; Paris, No. 140; Berlin, No. 143; Vienna, No. 125; Rome, No. 123; and St. Petersburgh, No. 280.)

[14310] No. 578.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 29, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 173 of 29th March.

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed me that his Government have instructed the Austrian Minister at Cettinjé to concert with his colleagues with regard to the best way of transmitting to the Turkish commander at Scutari the orders of the Turkish Government authorising the civil population to leave.

You are authorised to join your colleagues in this consultation.

[14814] No. 579.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 222.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 29, 1913.*

I TOLD the French Ambassador to-day of the information in Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 124 of yesterday. I observed that it was good as regards Chatalja, but bad as regards Salonica. My own sympathies were with Greece about Salonica, but I was strongly of opinion that if the Bulgarians, Servians, and Greeks quarrelled about anything between the Enos-Media line and Albania, the Great Powers should all agree to draw a ring round them and not to interfere. For, if one Power sided with one country,, another Power would side with another country.

M. Cambon cordially agreed in this view.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[14815] No. 580.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 223.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 29, 1913.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that he attached the greatest military importance to the small bit of sea between Corfu and the coast. Italy did not wish Greece to have this, because Italy wished it to be available for herself some day for the use of mines and torpedo-boats.

I said that it had not occurred to me that this passage had any real strategic value, or that we had any interest in seeing Greece obtain it. I had, therefore, been supporting the Greek claim simply because I thought it hard for Greece to be denied so much. I would, however consult our Admiralty as to its strategic value. If it had any, I suppose that it might be neutralised as far as Italy was concerned by freeing Greece from her obligation of neutrality about Corfu. The country in possession of Corfu, if it had a free hand, could presumably prevent any use being made of the waters between Corfu and the coast. For this reason I had been inclined to agree to the Italian line of the Kalamas, on condition that Greece should be freed from the obligation of neutrality as regards Corfu, and that Italy should undertake to evacuate Rhodes and the other Ægean Islands that she held and give them to Greece.

M. Cambon preferred that the question of the south of Albania should be referred to a commission. The German Ambassador had told him that Germany felt no interest in this matter of the south of Albania, and did not, as a matter of fact, wish to oppose Greece owing to the connection between the Royal families.

I said that I had no objection to a commission if the others would agree to it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14419] No. 581.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 29, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 70 of 29th March.

Joint representation concerning frontiers of Albania, raising siege of Scutari, &c., was made this afternoon.

As reported in my telegram above referred to, it was necessary in order to persuade my Russian colleague to act at all to-day, to substitute for the word "protection," the words "liberty of conscience" in the draft of the communication to the Servian Government. My Austro-Hungarian colleague appeared to agree to this, but I find that subsequently he, together with German and Italian representatives, retained the word "protection."

In handing my memorandum to Prime Minister I said that I hoped that Servian Government would lose no time in recalling their troops, and reminded him of the declaration he had made some months ago to the effect that in regard to Albania, Servia would submit to the wishes of the Powers.

His Excellency's reply was not very encouraging. He said that Servia had nothing to gain by a continuation of the war. She had been waiting for peace for three months now, and it was therefore not necessary to put pressure on her to cease hostilities, but Servia was not a free agent in the question of Scutari. If Montenegro could be persuaded to listen to reason Servia would at once withdraw her troops, but it was as matters stood at present a question in which all the allies were involved, and the representations of the Powers affected all the allies. There would, therefore, have to be a general consultation before he could take any action. He said that any aggressive steps by Austria-Hungary against Montenegro would find the allies united against her.

He admitted having declared without any [? group omitted] that Servia would submit to the decisions of the Powers concerning Albania, but objected that the war was not yet at an end.

I endeavoured to impress upon him how much it would alienate English sympathies were Servia to continue to assist in useless operations against Scutari and possibly add to complications by bringing about its fall. He replied that he hoped that Montenegro would prove amenable to advice.

[14435] No. 582.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Adrianople, March 29, 1913.*

ADRIANOPLE taken by assault 26th March after thirty hours' engagement. Statement in my memorandum of 28th March that document containing surrender of town was sent to Bulgarian commander is based on Turkish information. General Ivanof assures me no such document reached him either from Shukri or Ismail Pashas. 35,000 prisoners now in the hands of the Bulgarians. Turkish losses believed 10,000. Official return of Bulgarian losses, 7,000 killed and wounded.

[14437] No. 583.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Philippopoli, March 29, 1913.*

I HAVE just returned from Adrianople. His Majesty's consul and British colony are well; French, Russian, and Austrian consuls and colonies also. Details later.

[14421] No. 584.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 30, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Monastir:—

"With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, General Putnik left for Uskub on 27th March.

"Desultory fighting is in progress a few miles south-west of Elbassan between Servian troops and a Turco-Albanian force under Javid Pasha about 10,000 strong, with five field guns and two mountain batteries.

"Another small Turkish force is at Berat. Greeks have occupied Tepeleni, but do not appear to have advanced from there across the River Viosa."

[14422] No. 585.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 30, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Uskub:—

"(Confidential.)

"I learn from a military source that orders have been given, but not yet promulgated, for demobilisation of non-commissioned officers and men of third ban."

[14427] No. 586.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, March 30, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

My telegram No. 114 of 29th March.

My Greek colleague handed reply of Greek Government to Prime Minister yesterday. He informs me that it contains certain reservations respecting islands and indemnity.

King and Ministers are all at Adrianople. Reply to Powers may be expected in the course of the week.

Meanwhile Greek Minister tells me confidentially that he believes that Bulgarian Government will continue to use every endeavour to force Chatalja lines.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14416] No. 587.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 30, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED substance of your telegram No. 49 of 28th March to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in writing.

German Minister, who received similar instructions later, saw Minister for Foreign Affairs later, who said that delay was not the fault of Greece, but due to the difficulty of communicating with allies, and especially of reaching the King of the Bulgarians at Adrianople.

[14417] No. 588.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, March 30, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 30th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes to reply on Tuesday.

He has had information respecting discussion at meeting of Ambassadors on

28th March and is very uneasy lest friends of Greece should allow a wrong decision as to allotment of coast of Epirus through want of comprehension of claims of Greece on ethnological and other grounds. If in consequence of commands of the Great Powers Greek populations lately liberated pass under rule of Mussulman Albanians not only will present strong Greek Government be overthrown but the new King will be shaken on his throne.

[14489] No. 589.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 40. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, March 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 96 of to-day's date, respecting the unsatisfactory state of affairs reported by His Majesty's vice-consul at Philippopoli as existing in the parts of Macedonia now in Bulgarian occupation, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a very able report by that gentleman of his recent journey on the public service through part of those territories, this being the second tour undertaken by him, with your sanction, for the purpose of distributing relief.

I would venture to draw your serious attention to this despatch, containing as it does a deplorable account of outrages committed by komitajis, the leaders of whom, he asserts, associated freely and on excellent terms with the Bulgarian officers and men. He further states that until the Bulgarian Government take steps to correct it "the impression will continue to prevail that an understanding did exist between it and the komitajis, giving the latter *carte blanche* during a certain period to make what they could out of the inhabitants of the occupied provinces, in payment of services rendered to the regular troops."

Mr Young also alludes to the forcible conversions of Moslem inhabitants, and reports the total disorganisation of all industry. He concludes his report by stating that he started on his work for the Balkan War Relief Fund very favourably disposed by what he had previously seen of the Bulgarians and heard of their aspirations; subsequent observation has, however, convinced him that so far as the districts referred to in his report are concerned—and they cover a very considerable area—it has been the official policy and endeavour of the Bulgarian Government to annihilate every element which is not susceptible of "Bulgarisation."

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 589.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 2. Confidential.)
Sir, *Philippopoli, March 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency herewith a report of my recent journey on the public service through parts of the occupied provinces, being the second which I have undertaken with the sanction of the Foreign Office for the purpose of distributing relief.

2. The journey in question occupied five weeks, and covered the following itinerary: From Philippopoli across the Rhodope mountains via Tumrush and Michaelkovo to Dovlen (the head-quarters of the Ruptchus district) and thence westwards to Bashmakli, and subsequently due south to Sketche (Xanthie). From Xanthie I proceeded to Cavalla and thence to Salonica, Serres, Drama, Gumuldjina and Dedeagatch. From Dedeagatch I returned to Gumuldjina, and thence recrossed the Rhodopes by a different route from that followed on my previous journey (*vide* despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January) to Kirdjali, Haskovo and Philippopoli. With the exception of the voyage Cavalla-Salonica and the railway journey Salonica-Xanthie and Gumuldjina-Dedeagatch the tour was entirely by road and consequently offered opportunities of seeing the condition of a considerable stretch of country. The first section, viz., Philippopoli-Xanthie (eight days) was the only one which presented physical obstacles, the tracks crossing the mountains at an altitude of sometimes

6,000 feet, being in places encumbered with snow and ice to a degree which made riding impossible, and necessitated a great part of the way being covered on foot. In the course of the tour relief was distributed in various forms, without distinction of race, or creed, to some 12,000 persons. A full report has been forwarded to the chairman of the Balkan War Relief Fund, in which, however, all reference to political matters in the districts dealt with has been carefully avoided. The purpose of the following notes is to give in as brief a form as possible a just idea of the general state of the country visited.

3. Leaving Philippopoli on the 6th January, I reached Tchouren in eight hours, a large and prosperous Pomak village within the Bulgarian frontier. At that date I saw no signs of its inhabitants having suffered in any way from the war, though I hear now from a Bulgarian source that there have since been forced conversions to Christianity.

4. *Tumrush.*—I did not actually pass through the village of Tumrush, which is slightly off the route, having been assured by the general in command at Philoppopoli that military exigencies had necessitated its entire destruction, and that consequently there would be nothing to do there in the way of relief. Subsequently I met and relieved a large number of its inhabitants at Gumuldjina and other places. The Tumrushlis have the reputation in Bulgaria of being indomitable thieves and murderers, and in the old days they are said to have taken part in massacres of Christians at Perushitza and other places; Tumrush was the scene of one of the first engagements of the war (Friday, 18th October)—probably the only encounter of any note in this part of the field of operations. After their defeat at Tumrush the Turks seem to have offered no sort of resistance. At Dovlen I was told that the officers had been the first to fly, leaving behind them untold stores of playing cards and inferior spirits; and the rank and file, who, properly led, might have held these mountain passes for weeks, had no alternative but to follow suit, throwing down their arms, and exchanging their uniforms wherever they could for peasants' clothes. It was an evaporation rather than a retreat. The invaders never caught a glimpse of them.

5. *Pitvar: the Arrest of Pomak Men.*—On the 7th January I passed through Pitvar, a Pomak village of 80 houses, of which, however, only 20 are now standing—the remainder having been burnt. The full population is said to have been 518, but 83 of the men, *i.e.*, one from every household, or practically all the able-bodied males, are missing, having been arrested by the Bulgarian authorities after the occupation and transported to Philippopoli, Carlovo, or other places in Bulgaria, where they are still detained as prisoners.

6. *Michalkovo.*—This is a Pomak village, which has suffered greatly. It consisted, *i.e.*, before the war (originally), of 110 houses, and appears to have been very prosperous. Climate, position, and soil encouraged the cultivation of a great variety of crops, and its inhabitants produced a kind of homespun cloth, which was known and in demand in places as remote as Smyrna. This village is now little more than a heap of ruins. Its story is interesting, as being typical of what has occurred in a greater or less degree in most of the Pomak villages through which I passed on the earlier stages of my journey.

7. *Fate of the Pomak Villages.*—When news arrived of the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Bulgaria, and of the fate of Tumrush, &c., the entire village fled *en masse* towards the coast. In the case of Michalkovo, this would mean a journey of at least a week for a terrified crowd of some 700 men, women, and children, driving with them their oxen and all the beasts of burden they could get together, and transporting all their movable possessions. After remaining some days in the coast towns, *e.g.*, Cavalla, Sarishaban, &c., they were ordered by the Bulgarian authorities to return to their homes. In most cases the return journey would prove an even worse experience than the panic-stricken flight, as most of the animals had perished or been lost on the road, and it would have to be accomplished on foot—the men and women carrying their small children, bedding, pots and pans, and other belongings; but in the interval their homes had been reduced to ashes. Out of the 110 houses which they had left a few weeks before, only 10 were left. Nor was this all; shortly afterwards, 116 men (which in a village of 110 families means practically all the males between the ages of 20 and 50), were sent under arrest to Philoppopoli. Consequently, when I arrived early in January, I found some 600 women and children crowded together in ten houses and two granaries. As many as 19 were living and sleeping in a single room, and from 50 to 60 in a five-roomed house. The most elementary sanitary precautions were only too clearly neglected indoors and out, and the general condition of these unfortunate people, after all the suffering they had endured in that

precipitate rush to the coast and miserable return, was indescribably depressing. A fair quantity of last year's crop of maize remained to them, but otherwise they were entirely destitute. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a more helpless and hopeless situation than that of these women and children until their men-folk are permitted to return. In many cases the men never will return, as hundreds are known to have died in captivity of typhoid and other diseases. But still another misfortune was in store:—

8. *Forcible Conversions.*—Within the past few weeks Bulgarian priests, accompanied by soldiers or komitajis, have been passing from village to village forcing the inhabitants (for the reasons given above, just now mostly old men, women, and children) to renounce their religion and declare themselves Christians. Similar pressure is being put upon the younger men who are detained under arrest in Bulgaria. (N.B.) This matter forms the subject of a separate despatch.

9. *Dovlen (Pomak).*—After visiting other villages all of which have suffered more or less on the lines indicated above, I arrived at Dovlen on the evening of the 8th January. This was the head-quarters of the Ruptchus district, but of its 250 houses only 27 are now standing, the rest having been burnt to the ground. In these 27 houses 900 persons were living and their winter supplies were even then running short, in fact, I was assured that half of them were positively without means of subsistence. Dovlen having been the capital of a district, its inhabitants were largely employés and wage-earners, and they are now without employment. All the foregoing particulars were given me openly in the presence of the Bulgarian officials on the spot and they are not likely to be exaggerated. A village of 250 families represents a population of at least 1,000 souls; and, allowing for 100 to 200 able-bodied males missing or detained as prisoners in Bulgaria, this would leave about 900 to find shelter in the 27 houses which had escaped being burnt.

10. *Dovlen to Pallas.*—The route from Dolven lay westward through fine mountain and forest scenery to Shirokaloka and Bashmakli, a thriving village of 600 houses partly Bulgar and partly Pomak, which, however, has not suffered at all. From here onward the country was familiar to me, as I had taken this route in travelling last April from Philippopolis to Cavalla. On the 11th January I reached Pallas, picturesquely situated on the Arda with a beautiful old stone bridge. Nine months ago this place was a vision of beauty, it is now a wretched scene of desolation. For this, however, the invaders are not to blame, as at this particular point the flying Turkish troops seems to have plucked up courage and made some show of resistance. I was unable to ascertain what, if any, were the losses on either side, but it is of course conceivable that the destruction of Pallas may have been a necessity. After crossing the Turco-Bulgarian frontier in the neighbourhood of Tumrush this (Pallas) is the first and only point at which I heard of fighting having taken place.

11. *More forced Conversions.*—From Pallas the journey was continued due south to Elmali and Shahin. These two rich and beautiful villages have escaped devastation, but their inhabitants complain of the endeavours of Bulgarian priests and komitajis to force them to accept Christianity.

12. *Xanthie (Sketche).*—On the 13th January I reached Xanthie or Sketche, being my fourth visit to this place within nine months. It is too well known to need description here; but it may be recalled that as the centre of the tobacco business it is one of the most advanced and thriving towns in Macedonia and is in fact (through the constant coming and going of merchants and agents) in closer touch with most of the capitals of Europe than, perhaps, any other inland town in Turkey. Its population of about 20,000 is exclusively Turkish and Greek; there were no Bulgarians before the present occupation.

13. Since the beginning of the war there has been a great influx of destitute peasants not only from the neighbouring villages but from places such as Tumrush, five and even six days distant. Moreover, apart from these "suhajirs," a large section of the normal population composed of the wives and families of soldiers are in the most painful straits. The head of the family may be with his regiment, or a prisoner, or dead; his wife and children have had no news of him for four months, and in most cases are entirely without resources. To more than three thousand persons in this category in Xanthie alone assistance of a temporary kind was given by the Balkan War Relief Fund. It must be noted with regret that the Bulgarian authorities had already raised repeated subscriptions in Xanthie for their own Red Cross Society, for the reception of King Ferdinand, and for other purposes of little interest or benefit to the inhabitants; but they had done nothing to relieve this misery. On the contrary they had indirectly helped to increase it. Greek merchants, who, in the ordinary course of their business

would have imported flour, sugar, salt, petroleum, and other necessaries into the town, were again and again prohibited from doing so in order that a few favoured Bulgarians, profiting by a monopoly of transport, might sell at famine prices. It must be added that until now Xanthie has been peculiary unfortunate in the type of civilian officials who have been sent there from Sophia, and the administration appeared to be rife with abuses. Whether by accident or from motives of political expediency, it would seem that the Central Government have given opportunity to a crowd of disreputable adventurers to take up temporary appointments in the occupied provinces, and exploit the country to their hearts' content. These people seem to miss no chance of airing their unfriendly sentiments towards the Greeks and even towards Europeans. Amongst them was the sub-prefect of Xanthie. This representative of King Ferdinand, while dining at the hotel (whose proprietor is an Austrian) publicly insulted the Emperor Francis Joseph. From Sophia, where he edits a newspaper, he brought with him a large supply of cheap oleograph portraits of King Ferdinand which he forced people to buy from him at prices varying according to their supposed means, from 10 to 20 frs. What became of the proceeds of this sale seems uncertain. Here, as at Cavalla and elsewhere, I heard again and again that no service was to be got from a Bulgarian official without a bribe. This may be an exaggeration, but many specific cases were given, and I heard similiar complaints, not from Turks, but from Christians and Europeans, in almost every town I visited.

14. There was no general massacre by Bulgarians at Xanthie, but a very large number of isolated acts of violence and murder for the purpose of robbery. A bank-manager here informed me confidentially that many of his clients had "disappeared," while others had been imprisoned, beaten, threatened, and finally released on payment of a heavy ransom. The same gentleman told me that on the night before the arrival of King Ferdinand, happening to notice unusual lights beyond the railway station, he asked a Bulgarian officer what was going on. The officer replied that "they were about to get get rid of some of their Turkish prisoners." I am bound to add that personally I have no certain knowledge that the Bulgarians did on any occasion murder prisoners of war in this way, but I have several times heard it asserted, and both at Drama and Xanthie I was assured by Europeans that they had heard Bulgarian officers boast openly of such murdering of prisoners.

15. The principal mosque at Xanthie has been converted into a Bulgarian church, and the mufti has been forced to sign a deed of gift conveying another mosque and the cemetery in which it stands to the conquerors—a farcical proceeding which, it must be hoped for the credit of Bulgaria, may not be allowed to stand. Much private property has been seized by the Bulgarian bishop and other civilians under the ægis of the occupying forces.

16. *Forced Conversions.*—While at Xanthie many Pomak villagers came to me and begged my intervention to protect them from the violent measures which their conquerors were adopting to force them into Christianity. The village of Yasouren in particular was said to have been surrounded by a cordon while priests and komitajis, with threats and blows, endeavoured to force the people to renounce their religion. A party of women from this village escaped and came to Xanthie while I was there. I spoke and wrote unofficially to the local authorities; but the nature of my mission and the impossibility of communicating by post or telegraph with His Majesty's Legation precluded other action at that date. I should add that the sub-prefect tried to persuade me that these fanatical Moslems "had signed petitions of their own free will begging the Government to send priests to baptise them, and that after the ceremony they had danced a 'horo'"—a ludicrous untruth.

17. *Serres.*—From Xanthie I proceeded to Cavalla and thence to Salonica and Serres, where I distributed flour for the fund to about 2,000 persons.

Komitajis.—On arrival I went first to the principal hotel intending to put up there, but found it full of komitajis. Several of these were pointed out to me by name, amongst them Tchernopeief, the author of the Cavalla murders (*vide* No. 1 of the 2nd January). At this time (23rd–26th January) Serres was swarming with these criminals. Not only was the only hotel full of them, but one came across them everywhere—even at the Government building and in the ante-room of General Volkof, Acting Governor-General of Macedonia, with whom I had several interviews. They were constantly to be seen *tête-à-tête* with Bulgarian officers; and, whether from force of circumstances or policy, it was obvious that the Bulgarian Government had not yet seen fit to dissociate itself from them. An American tobacco merchant informed me that one of these ruffians had boasted to him of having murdered 700 Turks with his own hands.

18. *Massacre at Serres.*—Serres, like almost every considerable town in this part of Macedonia, sent emissaries to surrender to the Bulgarians some hours before the latter reached the town. How the massacre of more than 400 unarmed Mahommedans was subsequently permitted in front of the Government buildings and almost in the presence of the officer in command has yet to be satisfactorily explained. The victims were for the most part villagers who had taken refuge in the town. Part of the Moslem quarter was pillaged and burnt, and a very large number of houses were looted. The principal mosque was converted into a Bulgarian church; others were rased to the ground. When I visited Serres, more than two months after these catastrophes, many Moslems were still afraid to come out of their houses, and it was with difficulty that one found means to see them even for the purpose of relieving their distress. I believe that some of those whom I saw—chiefly ex-Turkish officials—were not far from starving in their homes. In justice to General Volkof, I must add that he urged me to devote the means at my disposal exclusively to the Mahommedans.

19. *District of Serres.*—The Serres district is notoriously one of the richest in European Turkey, producing perhaps a greater variety of crops of the highest quality than any other, and it is deplorable that a district which seems to have offered no resistance to the invading forces should have suffered so abominably. Here were some of the finest farms in Turkey, but it seems doubtful whether any are now standing. From one alone (at Kavakli) 1,496 head of cattle were driven off and damage done (including pillage of cereals and stock) to the extent of £T. 12,000. Many villages were burnt, and the number of peasants murdered cannot at present be even guessed at. At the Moslem village of Tchakova (four hours from Serres) out of 248 men only 14 are believed to have escaped. All the women are said to have been violated. While at Serres I visited the Medresse Osman Hoja, where I found eighty-four of the Tchakova survivors. Of these only three were men, the rest women and children. They were crowded together in one or ten little cells and absolutely destitute. It will be interesting to know what the Bulgarian Government does for these eighty-one homeless and utterly helpless victims if, indeed, they survive the winter.

20. *Drama.*—From Serres I proceeded to Drama. Here, again, the principal mosque has been converted into a Bulgarian church, while another has been handed over to the Bulgarian Protestant community. Several minarets have been shorn of their characteristic pointed tops; but, indeed, everywhere one of the most childish features of the occupation is the wanton damage which has been done to cemeteries, mosques, and ancient shrines. As the relief work here was being done by another agent of the Fund I remained only thirty-six hours, and returned to Xanthie and Gumuldjina.

21. *Gumuldjina.*—At Gumuldjina I found over 3,000 destitute Moslem refugees from the villages, mostly Pomaks, and to 2,500 of these I was enabled, by the liberality of the Balkan War Relief Fund to distribute some 240*l.* in cash and 14,000 okes of Indian corn. I use the word "liberality" advisedly, because this Fund makes no distinction of race or creed, and in the districts entrusted to me by far the greater portion of its relief has fallen to Mahommedans, as being most in need of help and encouragement.

22. *Forced Conversions.*—Here, again, I was repeatedly approached by Pomaks imploring British intervention to save them from Bulgarian religious persecution. I called the attention of General Petrof to the matter, and also that of the prefect, both of whom protested with obvious untruth that no forced conversions were taking place.

23. *Dedeagatch.*—From Gumuldjina the journey was continued to Dedeagatch (second visit). Here conditions were exceptionally painful. A port easily accessible from all parts of the interior, it became early in the war the refuge of an exceptionally large number of Turkish officials and their families, who no doubt hoped to escape to Constantinople or Asiatic Turkey, but who had not at that date (end of January) been permitted to leave. Temporary relief was given to some 1,200 of these unfortunate people—some of the saddest cases encountered in the course of the journey.

24. *Massacre at Dedeagatch.*—In my previous despatch I was careful not to hazard a guess at the number of Turks massacred by the Bulgarians on their first entry into Dedeagatch. I have now good (foreign) authority for saying that it was approximately 300. One sees no fezzes in Dedeagatch, the Bulgarians having forced the inhabitants to exchange their proper headgear for a black cloth cap. I do not know that this is in accordance with an official order, but on both occasions of my visiting this town I saw nothing else.

25. *Hospital.*—Hearing of the sad state of neglect in which some Turkish patients

had been left in one of the local hospitals. I left a small sum with the British vice-consul for the purchase of medicines and other necessaries. I regret to say that I have since been informed by Mr. Badetti that the Bulgarian authorities have now cut off the supply of fuel and petroleum and reduced the rations of these patients to dry bread.

26. *Return to Philippopoli.*—From Dedeagatch I returned to Gumuldjina, and thence recrossed the Rhodopes, viâ Kirdjali and Haskovo, to Philippopoli.

27. I do not wish to lay unfair stress upon the administrative mistakes and abuses with which I was repeatedly confronted in the course of the tour described above. Presumably all that is best in Bulgaria is still in the field, and the central authorities at Sophia have at present but scant and inferior material to choose from in finding officials for the occupied provinces. Moreover, I have been told by Bulgarians that the troops, and in particular the general officers, sent to the districts under report were all that is inferior in their army, the more efficient units and commanding officers having been selected for service in Thrace, where graver tests awaited them. Nevertheless, there are points to be noted which are fairly open to criticism.

28. Though the Bulgarian occupation has not yet been recognised formally, their officials have acted from the first as though in established possession, imposing their laws, language, and customs, and generally ignoring the status and rights of those with whom they came into contact, whether Turkish or foreign subjects.

29. In the districts dealt with in the foregoing report the invading forces met with very little opposition on the part of the Turkish troops, and none whatever on the part of the population; but they seem to have acted as though engaged in the suppression of a bloody and obstinate rebellion rather than in the occupation of an unresisting province. I refer in particular to the wholesale destruction of villages, of which those cited in my present despatch and in my No. 1 of the 2nd January are only a few instances. There can, I submit, be no justification for the burning of villages whose inhabitants had fled days before the arrival of the invaders. In the case, for instance, of Michaelkovo and Dovlen, Bulgarian officers and soldiers have admitted in my presence that both villages were deserted when they took possession. I am aware that it has been urged in extenuation in the press that here and there there were acts of treachery on the part of Pomaks. I can only say that I have heard no such suggestion made by Bulgarian officers or men who took part in the advance. On the contrary, I gather that the march from the Bulgarian frontier onwards was for the most part an uninterrupted "promenade"; nor are there any Christian villages in the Pomak country where they (the Pomaks) are accused of cruelties. Pallas (*vide* paragraph 10) is the only place at which I heard of an encounter with Turkish troops; and nowhere did I hear of resistance by the population. (*Note.*—Further light may be thrown on this point whenever reliable lists of the Bulgarian killed and wounded are available.) Whether the crimes in question, viz., burning of villages, pillage, &c., were committed by one arm or another of the Bulgarian forces (*i.e.*, by regular troops, komitajis, or other irregulars) is a matter for the Bulgarian Government to decide.

30. *Atrocities in the Towns.*—Serres, Cavalla, Xanthie sent out emissaries to meet the Bulgarian general, and formally surrendered to him long before the troops (regular or irregular) reached these towns. Yet at Serres 400 persons were massacred; at Cavalla 200 were methodically tortured to death on successive days; and at Xanthie there were numerous murders and "disappearances," and innumerable isolated acts of violance. At Dedeagatch some 300 persons were massacred, and the Moslem quarter looted. Women were stripped and their ornaments torn from them. Everywhere one hears of outrages on women and children. In the country, villages and farms were devastated, cereals pillaged, cattle driven off, and peasants murdered. I have no experience on which to base an estimate; but I have heard an American, judging from the results of the American Civil War, say that the Serres district will hardly recover from the events of the past five months in less than a generation—and this though there has been properly speaking no fighting.

The conduct of Bulgarian officers was in many cases deplorable; the proprietor of the Drama Hotel complained to me that he had been beaten because, his hotel being full, he was unable to provide the accommodation required of him; and that on the same occasion his wife was threatened with a drawn sword. On more than one occasion I heard naïve complaints on the part of the Bulgarian rank and file to the effect that, "not only they received no pay, but their officers pocketed what they (the private soldiers) stole"; and there can, I think, be no doubt that, apart from grave abuse of the privilege of unlimited requisitioning (*vide* my immediately preceding despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January), Bulgarian officers have laid themselves open to such

unfavourable criticism. One hears, for instance, of a general officer at Serres carrying off with him carpets and other valuables from a house where he had received a night's hospitality!

31. *Komitajis.*—The Cavalla atrocities were the work of komitajis; and perhaps some day it will be explained why General Kovatchef allowed these criminals a clear week's freedom of action in a defenceless town, which had formerly surrendered to him (*vide* despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January, 1913). As reported in section 17 of the present despatch; two months after the Cavalla murders, Tchernopeief and his companions were living "in great style," at Serres, on terms of seeming equality and friendly intercourse with the civil and military authorities. In these circumstances, and until the Bulgarian Government take steps to correct it, the impression will continue to prevail that an understanding did exist between it and the komitajis, giving the latter *carte blanche* during a certain period, to make what they could out of the inhabitants of the occupied provinces, in payment of services rendered to the regular troops. At all events, at present there seems no other way to account for the systematic intimidation and robbery of non-combatants, with imprisonment, violence, and murder, which were permitted to continue unchecked by the Bulgarian military authorities for a given time in various localities.

32. *Forcible conversions.*—Within a few weeks of the occupation large numbers of Pomaks were arrested all over the country (in many of the villages visited in the course of this tour practically the whole male population between the ages of 20 and 50) and deported as prisoners to Bulgaria where they are still detained. Meanwhile missionary priests accompanied by soldiers or komitajis, have been passing from village to village and forcing the remaining inhabitants to renounce Mohammedanism and declare themselves Bulgarians and Christians. Similar pressure is being put upon those who are under arrest in Bulgaria, many hundreds of whom, however, must have perished of disease and neglect. In defence of their policy the Bulgarians urge that "the Pomaks were at one time Bulgarians and Christians." This is true, but it is not by a very long way within living memory, and the fact remains that to-day they are fanatical Moslems. This matter, of which something will not improbably be heard before long in Egypt and India, forms the subject of a separate despatch.

33. *Disorganisation of industry, &c.*—It would be tedious and futile to attempt to detail the numerous instances of incompetence and corruption which have so far disfigured the Bulgarian administration of these rich provinces. They are perhaps only temporary blots which will be wiped out when circumstances allow of a less restricted choice of officials. But in the meanwhile the central Government seems to have gone out of its way needlessly to disorganise every branch of trade and industry. Dictates of elementary common sense have counselled the encouragement of the foreign tobacco companies, the régie, the public debt, the banks to continue their operations as far as possible unimpeded even if certain restrictions had to be imposed in the interest of the occupying state. But in each case gratuitous difficulties were raised, with the result that at the end of January, *i.e.*, twelve weeks after the commencement of the occupation, business was at a standstill and thousands of peasants who might have been manipulating tobacco for the American and other companies, were kept in idleness while the stock was in imminent danger of perishing, *i.e.*, of rotting for want of timely manipulation. As mentioned in a previous paragraph of this report, Greek and other merchants, who could, and would in the ordinary course, have brought provisions by road from Cavella and Porto Largos to Xanthie and Gumuldjina, were prohibited from doing so; and the task of relieving distress thus artificially enhanced was rendered correspondingly difficult and costly.

34. *Conclusion.*—In a recent letter to his paper, "the correspondent of the 'Times' in the Balkan Peninsula," pleading for the Bulgarians, draws a "wide distinction between acts of violence committed in time of war and similar crimes committed in time of peace with the connivance or sanction of the responsible Government." It is a reasonable distinction, but does not help the Bulgarian case. Can it, for instance, be suggested that the 200 cold-blooded murders perpetrated at Cavalla, after that town had formally placed itself under the protection of General Kovatchef, were in any sense acts of war? Moreover, in the provinces dealt with in the following pages the Turkish army "melted away," and it is pretty clear that the country might have been peacefully occupied and quietly administered; yet the population, though offering no sign of resistance or ill-will, has been "beaten, robbed, violated, murdered," and its land devastated. Nor is it possible to believe that all this can have happened entirely without "the connivance and sanction of the responsible Government." The Turkish population has been everywhere systematically

ruined, and at the present moment a vigorous anti-Moslem inquisition is being prosecuted throughout the Pomak country. Nor are indications wanting that the position of the Greek population will be rendered increasingly difficult.

Accompanied as I was on this journey by an escort with instructions to "prevent my seeing what was not desirable," it is likely that I saw and heard, if anything, less than the truth. Moreover, I started on this work for the Balkan War Relief Fund very favourably disposed by what I had previously seen of the Bulgars and heard of their aspirations. Subsequent observation, however, convinces me that, so far as the districts referred to above are concerned, it has been the official policy and endeavour to annihilate every element which is not susceptible of "Bulgarisation." How far this illiberal policy will be pursued depends, no doubt, upon the degree of active interest which Europe may take in the matter.

The tables have indeed been turned beyond expectation, but hardly, it would seem at present, to the advantage of civilisation. Until now I have not met a European official or man of business in the occupied provinces who does not regard the prospect with misgiving.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

[14490] No. 590.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 41. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday, enclosing the report of His Majesty's vice-consul at Philippopoli on his recent tour in Macedonia, in which he alluded, among other matters, to the forcible conversion of Moslems to Christianity by the Bulgarians, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a second report from Mr. Young dealing entirely with such conversions, of which he gives a deplorable account. He encloses, as you will note, copies in translation of two petitions addressed to him by the inhabitants of the Pomak districts of Aher-Chelebe and Dere-Dere, invoking the intervention of His Majesty's Government to save them from the religious persecution to which they are being subjected, also copy of an unofficial note addressed by him to the military commandant at Xanthie (Skutche), and a list of the villages from which complaints had reached him.

Mr. Young states that since his return from his journey other petitions in the same sense have reached him at Philoppopoli, and declares his "conviction that the peculiarly cynical and cruel persecution is now being carried on under the cloak of religion, with the purpose of forcing the entire Pomak population in the occupied provinces to become Bulgarian."

He further asserts that priests, soldiers, and komitajis are visiting the villages and compelling the inhabitants by means of threats and violence to say that they accept Christianity.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 590.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir, *Philippopoli, March 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency herewith translations which have been addressed to this vice-consulate by inhabitants of the Pomak districts of Aher-Chelebe and Dere-Dere respectively, invoking the intervention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to save them from the religious persecution to which they are being subjected.

On the 10th February I reported in general terms the fact that a barbarous attempt was being made throughout the districts from which I had then just returned to dragoon the Pomaks into renouncing the Mahommedan religion and into declaring

themselves "Christians." In the course of the tour, described in my despatch of the 7th instant, villagers came to me at almost every stopping-place imploring protection. In many cases they had travelled long distances and waited days in order to see me, thinking it a sure opportunity—perhaps the only one—of bringing their situation to the knowledge of the outside world. For at that date there were few, if any, Europeans travelling in the country, and the various districts were so many "water-tight compartments" from which there was no leakage of information. To a great extent this is even now the case. My position was somewhat difficult, it being impossible to communicate with you in cypher or, with safety, by post, and the nature of the mission upon which I was then engaged beyond the boundaries of my consular district precluded official action. I had consequently to confine myself to purely unofficial communication with the local authorities and to offering counsels of patience to those who appealed to me.

Since my return to Philippopoli other petitions have reached me, and, after very careful sifting of the information obtained in the course of the five weeks' journey referred to, and since I feel that no further time should be lost in submitting to you my conviction that a peculiarly cynical and cruel persecution is now being carried on under the cloak of religion, with the purpose of forcing the entire Pomak population in the occupied provinces to become "Bulgarian" (*vide* penultimate paragraph of my No. 2 of the 7th March). Priests, soldiers, and komitajis are visiting the villages and compelling the inhabitants by means of threats and personal violence to say that they accept Christianity.

In my despatch No. 2 of the 7th instant (sections, 5, 7, and 8) it was explained how the bulk of the able-bodied male population of the Pomak villages had been deported to Philippopoli and other places in Bulgaria soon after the occupation, with the result that there are now, for the most part, only old men, women, and children left. It is on these that the brunt of the persecution has fallen and is falling. Meanwhile, their relatives in prison here are being subjected to similar pressure. Last week I had occasion to visit the "Vacaro" tobacco factory in Philoppopoli for the purpose of distributing gifts of clothing, soap, and other necessaries to some 983 Pomaks who are detained there. During my visit a pencilled petition was slipped into my cavass's hand, stating that the wives and families of the twenty-nine signatories had been forcibly converted to Christianity, and begging me to save them (the writers) from the fate with which they themselves are now being threatened. According to the Bulgarian physician in charge, out of the 983 men, 203 were then seriously ill, most of them, I was given to understand, with typhoid, and all are, I fear, in a deplorable state of neglect and misery. Pressure is being put upon those who are still in health to become "Christians." It is said that some have accepted, and have been released and permitted to return to their homes. Those who refuse these terms will presumably be kept in durance "to take their chance" in their present insanitary surroundings.

Representations have also been made to me by Pomaks under retention in various mosques and schools in this town.

The foregoing is the gist of my own personal experience. I should add that it tallies in substance with accounts which reach me by more or less direct channels from Salonica, Cavalla, Nevrokop, and other places. It suffices, I venture to think, to dispose, once for all, of the Bulgarian pretension that these Pomak "conversions" are "voluntary." The Pomaks were indeed Christians at periods varying in remoteness from possibly 100 to 400 years ago, but it cannot be too emphatically stated that at the present day they were fanatical Moslems. It is in this that the cruelty and cynical blasphemy of these forced conversions for a political motive lie. Detailed information of them has probably not yet reached the Mahommedan world at large; but the outcry in England over the Armenian conversions to Islam at Biredjik in 1896 is not forgotten, and it will be seen that the principle involved is the same. At Biredjik it was a question of a handful of Armenians; here it is a population of at least 100,000 whose fate is at stake. With all respect, I venture to submit that, for the credit of civilization and for the good name of Christainity in the East, means must be found quickly to put an end to these outrages.

Decent Bulgarians profess to regard these forced "conversions" as the work solely of an ignorant and bigoted clergy, and they refuse to believe that King Ferdinand and his Ministers can be aware of what is going on. Probably King Ferdinand is in ignorance; but, as hinted in the telegram which I had the honour to address to you on this subject, the persecution is on too large a scale, too general, and too uniform in method to admit the hypothesis that the Bulgarian Government has not connived.

However this may be, it is greatly to be hoped that a Royal ukase may shortly be

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allowed to appear which will ensure absolute religious freedom to the inhabitants of the occupied provinces.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 590.

Petition addressed by the Inhabitants of Dere-Dere to British Vice-Consul at Philippopoli.

(Translation.)

DURING the war we all surrendered on the understanding that our honour and our religion would be safe.

They have taken our possessions, but that is a small thing compared with the fact that they are now trying, by every sort of persecution, to force us to change our ancient religion, and, after thus persecuting us, they compel us to sign a petition saying that we wished to become Bulgars (*i.e.*, Christians). They have forced the inhabitants of the capital of this district (Dere-Dere) and also of the village of Eliastche, who are all Mussulmans, to become Bulgars (Christians). Those who accept are left alone; those who refuse are persecuted to this day. They summoned the Imam and Mukhtars of Ouzoun-Dere to Dere-Dere and put this proposal before them, and, when they refused, they imprisoned and beat them. Fifteen days ago we went to the Mutessarif (*i.e.*, the Bulgarian Prefect of Gumuldjina), and obtained from him a paper promising us protection, but no attention has been paid to this paper, and we are persecuted as before.

Such doings not being acceptable to the law of nations, for deliverance we appeal to England.

(Signed and sealed) HOJA IBRAHIM (on behalf of the village of Ouzoundere).
HOJA MUSTAPHA-OGLOU-MEHMET (for Eliastche).
(And others.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 590.

Petition addressed by Inhabitants of Aher-Chelebe to British Vice-Consul at Philippopoli.

(Translation.)

WE all of us surrendered on the understanding that our honour and our religion would be protected.

Now they see fit to destroy our honour, and by force they take our goods and our flocks, and compel us to change our ancient religion. And, though we have attempted several times to approach the Governor, we are not permitted by those who stand at the door. And, as a people without a protector, look to England, so we appeal to you.

(Signed and sealed) ALI-OGLOU-HASSAN (on behalf of the district of Suutjuk).
UMER-OGLOU-SALIH (for the village of Arda).
HASSAN-OGLOU-YUNUS.
(And others.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 590.

List of Villages, &c., from which Complaints have been received.

Dere-Dere (district).
Aher-Chelebe (district).
Yasouren (400 houses).
Shahin (330 houses).
Elmali (200 houses).
Sinikova (250 houses).

Soujak (60 houses).
Ourlou (250 houses).
Mustafchouva (300 houses).
Ouzoun-Dere (500 houses).
Eliastche (200 houses).
Dovlen (250 houses).
Kohsander (30 houses).

The above are all in the recently occupied provinces, most of them being in the Gumuldjina district. While at Sketche (Xanthie), numbers of Pomaks from adjacent and even distant villages constantly lay wait for me at the door of my hotel; and finally, in their own interest, I had to refuse to see them. It was the same at Gumuldjina. The persecution is now being extended to Pomaks inhabiting villages within the Bulgarian frontier.

Enclosure 5 in No. 590.

Vice-Consul Young to Military Commandant at Xanthie (Sketche).

(Personnelle.)

Cher Colonel, *Xanthie, le 29 janvier*, 1913.

A PROPOS de la conversation que j'ai eu le plaisir d'avoir avec vous et M. Radef ce soir, je viens d'apprendre de bonne source que les habitants de Yasouren et d'autres villages ont été visités tout dernièrement par des brigands et d'autres malveillants individus qui les forcent par tous les moyens à accepter le christianisme.

Un tel procédé est une insulte à notre religion et je suis persuadé que vous, ainsi que M. Radef, serez les premiers à le condamner et que vous prendrez les démarches indiquées pour prévenir un outrage qui menacerait le prestige de la civilisation dans ce pays.

Il paraît que la seule raison qui ait empêché ces malheureux villageois de vous soumettre leurs griefs par écrit, ce serait la crainte d'une nouvelle violence de la part de leurs persécuteurs.

Persuadé que vous ne saurez méprendre l'estime pour vous-même qui inspire ces lignes, je saisis, &c.

H. E. W. YOUNG.

[14492] No. 591.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 20*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Grand Rabbi of Bulgaria called upon me recently in order to express the apprehension with which the Jewish community viewed the prospect of the cession to Roumania of any Bulgarian territory and the consequent transfer of its inhabitants to Roumanian rule, under which Jews do not enjoy the same rights and liberties as in Bulgaria.

I informed Dr. Ehrenpreis that I should not fail to report to you what he had said, nor to forward to you the enclosed letter, which he left with me, addressed to yourself and the Prime Minister, and signed by the president and members of the Central Israelite Consistory.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 591.

Copy of Letter left with Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Consistoire central israélite, Sophia, le 12 (25) février, 1913.

M. le Ministre-Président,

LA possibilité de la cession à la Roumanie d'un territoire bulgare inquiète au plus haut degré les israélites du royaume dans leur double qualité de citoyens bulgares et d'israélites.

Cette possibilité crée le péril pour une partie de nos coreligionnaires bulgares, habitant le territoire réclamé par la Roumanie, et qui jouissent en Bulgarie de tous les droits civils et politiques, d'être à l'avenir privés de ces droits en passant sous la domination roumaine.

Il est universellement connu que la Roumanie, malgré ses engagements internationaux, pris par le Traité de Berlin, continue à traiter comme étrangers privés des droits civils et politiques les plus essentiels ses citoyens israélites, citoyens nés et vivant depuis des siècles dans ce pays, remplissant toutes leurs obligations civiques, y compris le service militaire. Dans ces circonstances le passage de nos coreligionnaires habitant le territoire en question (où existent de vieilles communautés israélites et de groupes importants d'agriculteurs juifs) du régime bulgare au régime roumain signifierait le passage de la liberté civique et de l'égalité à la pleine exclusion des droits et humiliation.

Devant ce péril, qui menace une partie des israélites de Bulgarie, nous, comme représentants du judaisme bulgare, estimons de notre devoir d'élever notre voix auprès de vous, M. le Ministre-Président, contre la cession du territoire bulgare à la Roumanie, en priant l'honorable Gouvernement de bien vouloir, en toute éventualité, sauvegarder dans les prochaines négociations les droits de nos coreligionnaires.

Agréez, &c.

Le Président, Grand Rabbin de Bulgarie,
DR. M. EIRENPREIS.

Membres,
S. PENHAS, E. ARIÉ, D. S. FARHY,
EL SIDI, de Philippopoli.

[14509] No. 592.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Bucharest, March 20, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 60, I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his weekly reception on the 18th instant, read to me a telegram which he had just received from the Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburgh, in which M. Nano, when giving a forecast of the attitude of the *Entente* Powers in the coming mediation discussions, said that he thought the British attitude would be "hostile." M. Nano added that he thought France would be "adverse." As regards Russia, it was not clear what attitude M. Nano foreshadowed, as the portion of his telegram referring to that country was mutilated.

After reading to me this telegram the Minister for Foreign Affairs proceeded to elaborate what he had said to me on the 11th instant, as reported in my telegram No. 59, regarding the expediency, in the interests of future peace, of giving Silistria to Roumania. It was evident that the country which had to forgo Silistria would be dissatisfied. It was now for Europe to decide which that country was to be. If it was Roumania the grievance would be lasting; the thorn planted in her side by Russia at the time of the Congress of Berlin would remain, and the temptation to intervene in any future complications in the Balkans would be irresistible, and there was always the danger of such intervention's giving rise to a European conflagration. On the other hand, should it be decided that Bulgaria was to cede Silistria to Roumania, although there might be some resentment for a time in Bulgaria, the latter country was confronted with so many problems that the loss of Silistria would sink into insignificance. The organisation of the administration of her newly-acquired territory, the improvement of the ports of Kavalla and Dedeagatch, railway construction, and the general development of the country would absorb her attention. Moreover, it was more than likely that complications would arise between Bulgaria and her present allies, in which eventuality Roumania's friendship would be of the highest importance to Bulgaria, and this of itself made it unlikely that Bulgaria would find it profitable to nurse her grievance for long.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

P.S., *March 25.*—Since writing the above I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum setting forth the above considerations in more detail. I do not, however, enclose a copy, as I understand that the memorandum has been communicated to the six Powers by the Roumanian representatives.

[14493] No. 593.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Sophia, March 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence received from the British vice-consul at Dedeagatch and of my note to the Bulgarian Government on the subject of complaints brought by the inspector of the Ottoman Public Debt in that town against the attitude of the local Bulgarian director of customs, who appears to have been acting in a manner contrary to the regulations of the Ottoman Customs Law with regard to the Administration of the Public Debt.

I also have the honour to enclose a letter from the vice-consul containing further complaints against the same official with regard to dues levied on re-exported goods, though it is not clear whether these are altogether justified.

It would appear from a memorandum enclosed herewith, which has been drawn up by Mr. Vice-Consul Heard, that the Bulgarian Government themselves are anxious so far as possible to follow the Turkish regulations in regard to all matters relating to the customs and to avoid unnecessary friction, but they are ill-supplied with data on the subject, and the suggestion made by Mr. Heard that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration should be invited to send a delegate to Sophia, if adopted, would probably be of considerable assistance in removing further grounds for misunderstanding and in assisting the Bulgarian Government in controlling the actions of its subordinates in Macedonia, who, in their dealings with the Debt officials, doubtless often err through ignorance.

I have requested His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to supply me with copies of the latest regulations of the Ottoman Customs and Debt for the use of the Ministry of Finance.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 593.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Excellence, *Dédéagatch, le 6 mars, 1913.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre dépêche du 9 (22) de l'écoulé.

Je prête toujours mon assistance à l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane dès que nécessité existe. Je ne manquerai pas d'intervenir pour lui obtenir le sauf-conduit, au cas où il aura à se rendre aux salines de Muselim.

Pour ce qui concerne les autorités bulgares, leurs décisions sont bien lentes. Je ne sais à quoi attribuer cela. Je pense que leur amour-propre doit être en jeu, attendu que, dès l'occupation de notre ville, elles commencèrent à appliquer tous les droits existants en Bulgarie, sans tenir aucune considération que leur situation n'est pas précisément définitive, tant que la paix n'est pas signée. Revenir aujourd'hui sur leur empressement prématuré, ceci n'est pas en leur faveur vis-à-vis du public.

Un inspecteur des finances a promis d'aplanir les difficultés créées à l'encontre des intérêts se trouvant sous la protection des Grandes Puissances. Actuellement il se trouve à Gumuldjina et sous peu il doit retourner de nouveau ici. Nous le verrons à l'œuvre et je ne manquerai pas, Excellence, de vous tenir au courant du suivi.

Le directeur de notre douane est le fonctionnaire le plus hostile vis-à-vis de la Dette publique. Pour mieux vous rendre compte de sa conduite, je me permets de vous remettre ci-incluse la copie de la lettre que lui adresse par mon canal l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane. Par son libellé vous vous rendrez à l'évidence de sa conduite.

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Je vous prierai d'user de votre influence auprès de qui de droit pour l'inviter à être plus régulier dans ses relations avec l'administration intéressée.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 593.

Vice-Consul Badetti to the Military Commandant at Dédéagatch.

M. le Colonel, *Dédéagatch, le 13 mars*, 1913.

JE reçois à l'instant une requête de l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane se plaignant de la conduite du directeur de notre douane vis-à-vis de cette administration.

Notre Légation de Sophia, par sa dépêche du 9 de l'écoulé, m'avise que votre Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a donné des ordres catégoriques pour ce qui concerne les intérêts de l'administration se trouvant sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Sa conduite est donc tout à fait injustifiable et je ne puis tolérer les caprices d'un fonctionnaire n'ayant pas voix au chapitre.

Je vous remets ci-inclusse une lettre à son adresse et je vous prierai de lui donner des ordres voulus pour faire cesser cette anomalie et pour laquelle je le tiens responsable.

Veuillez, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 593.

Inspector of Ottoman Public Debt to Director of Customs.

M. le Directeur, *Dédéagatch, le 21 février (6 mars)*, 1913.

L'ÉPOQUE de la clôture des comptes de fin d'année étant proche, je me permets de vous rappeler que lors de la prise de possession de la douane de Dédéagatch, sur l'invitation que vous m'aviez faite, je m'étais présenté à deux reprises à votre bureau, la seconde fois accompagné de notre contrôleur de la surtaxe douanière, M. Michael Younan.

J'avais eu au cours de notre entretien la promesse de votre part que les intérêts de l'Administration de la Dette publique seraient sauvegardés, tant en ce qui concerne la surtaxe douanière que les droits de "ressmi miri" sur les alcools étrangers. Et autant que je m'en souviens, aucun changement ne devait être apporté dans les formalités d'ordre administratif établies déjà entre l'Administration des Douanes de l'Empire ottoman et la Dette publique ottomane.

Cependant, trois mois se sont écoulés depuis lors et notre bureau n'a reçu—même à fin de mois—aucun compte de perception sur le "ressmi miri" d'alcool et la surtaxe douanière.

Du moment que le fonctionnement de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane a été reconnu par le Gouvernement bulgare, récemment encore par une dépêche du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, dont M. le délégué des Finances Tcholof m'en a communiqué la teneur, et qu'en ce qui concerne spécialement Dédéagatch et les régions occupées par les armées Royales bulgares, la protection de la Légation britannique à Sophia nous est acquise, je me vois dans l'obligation de vous rappeler les promesses que vous m'avez faites.

En vous priant de bien vouloir m'accuser réception de la présente et de nous remettre en même temps que les comptes les fonds provenant de droits perçus, veuillez, &c.

E. DUSSI.

Enclosure 4 in No. 593.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to M. Gueshof.

M. le Président du Conseil, *Sophia, March 1 (14)*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter addressed by the inspector of the Ottoman Public Debt, through the British vice-consul,

to the director of customs at Dedeagatch, complaining of the failure of that official to hand over to him the accounts of the "ressmi miri" duty on alcohol and the customs surtax, the revenues of which accrue to the Administration of the Debt.

It is with great regret that I am compelled to point out to your Excellency that the frequent complaints which I continue to receive from the British vice-consul at Dedeagatch of the arbitrary and irregular behaviour of the Bulgarian authorities, both military and civil, in his consular district cannot fail to produce an unfavourable impression on His Majesty's Government.

I have the honour to request that your Excellency will be so good as to cause instructions to be sent to the director of customs at Dedeagatch to conform his attitude to that of the Royal Government, which, as I had the honour to remind your Excellency in my *note verbale* of the 21st January (3rd February), had given verbal assurances that "the rights of the Ottoman Public Debt would duly be taken into consideration."

I avail, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 5 in No. 593.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Excellence, *Dédéagatch, le 12 mars*, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous confirmer, Excellence, ma dépêche du 6 courant, laquelle vous entretenait, au dernier paragraphe, de la conduite de notre directeur de la Douane vis-à-vis de la Dette publique ottomane.

Ce fonctionnaire fait aussi au commerce des difficultés et je me permettrai de vous en citer une qu'il vient de créer. Lorsque la ville, c'est-à-dire le 19 novembre dernier, a été occupée par les comitadjis, il y avait dans les dépôts de la douane une certaine quantité de marchandises en souffrance. Parmi elles il s'en trouvait pour compte de négociants assiégés à Andrinople et il était donc impossible d'en effectuer le retrait. Les expéditeurs, voyant cet état de choses, et n'ayant pas touché leur avoir, ont pris la décision de les faire retourner au pays d'origine.

Suivant le Règlement de la Douane ottomane, article 170, en cette occurrence l'intéressé pouvait bénéficier de cette faculté moyennant le payement d'un droit de magasinage pour une période de soixante jours et tout était terminé.

Or, notre directeur actuel ne veut rien entendre et force les négociants, si le cas se présente, de payer pour le séjour en entier, et en outre il impose un droit de sortie de 1 pour cent *ad valorem*.

Tout cela est illégal, attendu que nous ne pouvons pas assimiler d'ores et déjà le pays annexé; par conséquent, il y a lieu de maintenir les règlements ottomans.

La prétention surtout d'imposer aux marchandises étrangères, qui ne sont pas un produit du pays le droit de 1 pour cent est tout à fait inadmissible et arbitraire.

De même, mon collègue de France n'a pas manqué de saisir ses chefs de ces procédés, qui sont nuisibles au commerce.

Il est à espérer que des ordres seront donnés sans retard pour faire cesser ces irrégularités.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 6 in No. 593.

Memorandum by Vice-Consul Heard.

IN the course of a conversation yesterday with the director-general of customs on the subject of the various complaints received concerning the attitude of the Bulgarian military and customs officials towards the functionaries of the Ottoman Public Debt, I gathered that the Bulgarian Government were sincerely anxious to avoid unnecessary friction, and desired to respect the privileges which the administration had previously enjoyed under the Ottoman Government.

At the same time he confessed that the Ministry of Finance were ill-provided with information on the subject of the Administration of the Debt and of the rights accorded to it under the previous régime, and he stated that it would be of great assistance if

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a representative of the Debt could be sent to Sophia to discuss the whole question relating to the collection of the Debt revenues in Macedonia, so as to enable the Bulgarian Government better to direct its subordinates, who, as was natural, were unfamiliar with the regulations of the Debt Administration.

I enquired whether the Bulgarian Government proposed to make their desire known in any quarter, to which he replied evasively, whence I gathered that it would be considered preferable that the suggestion should come from the other side. It would therefore appear to be of advantage to all parties concerned if means could be found of bringing this point to the notice of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

It appears also that the Bulgarian Government have no recent copy of the Ottoman Customs Law, Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman" being their most up-to-date authority on the subject. I promised to endeavour to obtain for his department copies of the Ottoman Customs Law and Debt Regulations to assist his Ministry in dealing with the various questions which are continually arising in connection with the administration of the customs and public debt in the Turkish provinces now in Bulgarian occupation.

W. B. HEARD.

Sophia, March 20, 1913.

[14510] No. 594.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Bucharest, March* 23, 1913.

M. CATARGI, formerly Roumanian Minister in London, called on me yesterday on his return from a visit to England. M. Catargi went at length into Roumania's case, urging especially his view that a fortified Silistria was indispensable to Roumania in order to secure her from attack from Bulgaria.

M. Catargi told me that he felt that now was the psychological moment for winning Roumania over to the Triple *Entente*, and the latter would be wise not to let the opportunity slip.

M. Catargi said that he had found you, Sir, and Sir Arthur Nicolson very reserved. He hoped this did not imply an unfavourable disposition; it would be exceedingly painful to him if in the mediation discussions the attitude of England, a country which he so loved and admired, and with which he had been so long and so closely associated, should prove to be adverse to Roumania's claims.

I told M. Catargi that you had not informed me of your views on the question, and that you had told M. Misu a day or two ago that while you were ready to listen to what he had to say, you could not, in view of the coming mediation at St. Petersburgh, enter upon a separate discussion with him.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[14578] No. 595.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 23, 1913.

THE resolutions of the meeting of Ambassadors of the 15th March reached me, with your instructions, on the following day; that of the 19th March on the 20th (your telegrams to Sophia Nos. 78 of the 15th and 150 of the 20th March).

My colleagues received similar instructions at various intervals, with the exception of the German Minister, who has not yet received from his Government the text of the four points which, in the opinion of the Great Powers, should form the basis of the negotiations for peace. As, however, the newspapers informed us that the communication was being made in the other Balkan capitals, he agreed to wait no longer for it, provided that all our texts agreed. This proved to be the case, except that in the last phrase of the resolution of the Ambassadors of the 19th March: "Les représentants des Puissances déclareront en même temps que dès l'acceptation de ces bases les hostilités *devront*

prendre fin," the text received by three of my colleagues read "*devraient*." As this reading appeared more in accordance with the intention of the meeting of Ambassadors, as recorded in their resolution of the 15th March, we agreed to adopt it.

Having obtained an appointment from M. Coromilas at 7 o'clock this evening, the six representatives waited upon him in a body, and I, as doyen, read to him, as a collective communication from us all, the paper, of which a copy is enclosed, and which I afterwards handed to him. No conversation ensued, the Minister merely remarking that at Belgrade the first paragraph appeared to have been communicated by itself, and that he must consult the allied Governments before giving us a reply.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 595.

Collective Note.

LES Grandes Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de l'acceptation de la médiation des Puissances par les alliés, en leur faisant observer qu'avant d'ouvrir une discussion sur les conditions de la paix il appartient aux Puissances de formuler leurs vues sur les bases de négociations qui devraient être adoptées.

Elle estiment que les bases de négociations devraient être les suivantes :—

1. Frontière ottomane en Europe: Énos–Ergene–Midia. Tous les territoires à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux Etats alliés à l'exception de l'Albanie, dont le régime et la délimitation sont réservés aux Puissances.

2. Le règlement de la question des îles de la mer Égée sera laissé à la décision des Puissances.

3. La Turquie devra se désintéresser complètement de l'île de Crète.

4. Les Puissances ne peuvent se montrer favorables à une demande d'indemnité, mais elles admettent les alliés à prendre part aux discussions de la commission internationale de Paris pour un règlement équitable de leur participation à la dette ottomane et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués. La Turquie sera invitée à prendre part aux délibérations de cette commission.

Enfin, elles déclarent en même temps que dès l'acceptation de ces bases les hostilités devraient prendre fin.

Athènes, le 10 (23) *mars*, 1913.

[14579] No. 596

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 24, 1913.

EVER since it became known that, during the peace negotiations in London, both public and official opinion in England was favourable to the claims of Greece in the Ægean Islands, the Greek newspapers have been publishing stories of the intention of His Majesty's Government to complete their benefits by ceding Cyprus to Greece.

I avoid, as I have always done, alluding to the subject of Cyprus in conversation with the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. Only once, at the time of the riots in Cyprus some months ago, has it been mentioned between us. M. Coromilas then, after receiving the first telegraphic reports, began a remonstrance against the evident bias shown by the police in favour of the Mussulman and against the Christian mob. I told him he had better verify his facts, and then, if he liked, he could speak to me again, but he never did.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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[14494] No. 597.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 25, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 41 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to state that when passing through Philippopoli recently, Her Majesty the Queen sent for Mr. Vice-Consul Young in order to thank him for the work he had done on behalf of the Balkan Relief Fund. Her Majesty said at the same time how much she was distressed by the reports which had reached her of the forcible conversion of Pomaks to Christianity, and expressed the wish that Mr. Young should have an interview with the Prime Minister on the subject. Subsequently, M. Gueshof told me that he thought that Mr. Young had spoken very judiciously to the Queen, and himself expressed a desire to see him. An interview was consequently arranged yesterday, of which I have the honour to enclose a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Young.

You will note from it that his Excellency was not disposed to believe in the likelihood of the so-called conversions being voluntary. He gave Mr. Young confidentially to understand that he did not attach importance to the impressions of Mr. Wallis, who had lately been to see him with reports of voluntary conversions among these people. He said quite frankly that he had repeatedly forbidden the use of force in this matter, and that he would repeat his instructions.

His Excellency said that Tchakof was already in prison, and that they were "looking for" Tchernopeief, who should also certainly be arrested, these being, as you will remember, the band leaders specially mentioned in the representations which I made in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your despatch No. 24 of the 4th February.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 597.

Memorandum by Vice-Consul Young.

(Confidential.)

I CALLED on M. Gueshof this morning by appointment. His Excellency opened the conversation almost abruptly by remarking, with a note of enquiry, that he supposed that I had seen many terrible things in the course of my recent tours. I replied that I had, and mentioned in particular my impressions of ruined villages and a destitute population without oxen to plough or grain to sow.

When opportunity offered, I referred to the question of the Pomak conversions to Christianity, and ventured to say that, so far as my experience and observation went, I was convinced that there were very few, if, indeed, any, cases of voluntary conversions. I mentioned the appeals which had been made to me at every stage of my journey, the unofficial representations I had made to the local authorities, the petitions which had continued to reach me after my return to Philippopoli, and my reasons for believing that pressure was being put upon the prisoners at Philippopoli to accept Christianity. Some of this seemed to be news to his Excellency, but he was evidently not disposed to believe in the likelihood of the so-called conversions being voluntary. Speaking in confidence, he gave me to understand that he did not attach importance to the impressions of Mr. Wallis, who had lately been to see him with reports of voluntary conversions among the Pomaks. He said quite frankly that Mr. Wallis was necessarily in the hands of those who accompanied him, and not at all in a position to form an independent judgment. His Excellency went on to say that he had repeatedly forbidden the use of force in this matter, and that he would repeat his instructions.

M. Gueshof afterwards touched upon Cavalla, and I ventured to say that what had occurred there, after the town had surrendered, struck me as being the most deplorable of all the incidents which had come to my notice. I mentioned the circumstances under which I had seen Tchernopeief at Serres more than two months afterwards—an honoured guest at the only hotel, and clearly on terms of friendly intercourse with the authorities. M. Gueshof said that Tchakof was already in prison, and that they were looking for Tchernopeief, who also would certainly be imprisoned.

I then referred to the condition of the Mahommedan prisoners at Philippopoli, and the danger to the public health which must follow from a continuance of those

conditions. His Excellency took note in writing of one or two points to which I called attention.

M. Gueshof was most kind and encouraging, and detained me close upon three quarters of an hour. He seemed glad to get first-hand information, and showed no disposition to throw doubt upon anything I told him. Indeed, judging rather from his tone than his actual words, I should say he was fully prepared, if not for the details, at least for the substance of what I was able to tell him.

H. W. YOUNG.

Sophia, March 24, 1913.

[14495] No. 598.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 25, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 38 of the 19th instant, forwarding copy of a letter received by you from the O'Mahony, enclosing communications from M. Matthéef and Mr. Wallis on the subject of excesses committed in territories in Bulgarian occupation.

Whilst thanking you for the tenour of your reply to the O'Mahony, I would venture to make the following observations on the correspondence.

M. Matthéef, in his letter of the 26th February, states that on his return from the excursion to Ludjane he found that I had made certain communications to the Bulgarian Government repecting excesses, the purport of which communications he professes to describe. As to this, I would venture to point out that the only communications which have up to the present date been addressed by me to the Bulgarian Government on this subject are the following:—

1. The memorandum drawn up at the Foreign Office and enclosed in your despatch No. 14 of the 15th January.

2. A verbal communication respecting damage to property in the Ghevgheli district, made to M. Gueshof on the 13th February, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your despatch No. 25 of the 4th of that month, on which occasion I left with his Excellency, at his request, an extract, referring chiefly to the destruction of mulberry trees, from Mr. Lamb's despatch to Sir R. Paget of the 11th January.

3. The memorandum of the 14th February, written by your instructions, copy of which was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 21 of the 20th February.

It will be noted from the above that M. Matthéef's statements as to the tenour of my communications with the Bulgarian Government are entirely without foundation, and I may add that I have carefully limited my entire action in the matter to the wording of my instructions.

With regard to Mr. Wallis's letter to M. Matthéef, containing his report of two interviews which he had with me on the 12th January and 14th February, I can only describe it as grotesquely inaccurate. No information has been received at this legation from either official or unofficial sources as to the "impalement of a woman in the presence of Bulgarian regular troops." I enclose copy of a letter which I addressed to Mr. Wallis on the 5th instant in reply to one received from him of the same tenour as his communication brought to your notice by the O'Mahony.

With reference to the remarks made by M. Matthéef and Mr. Wallis respecting the opinion of the Prime Minister, I need only refer you to the Confidential memorandum drawn up by Mr. Vice-Consul Young of his interview with M. Gueshof yesterday and enclosed in my immediately preceding despatch.

Finally, as to Mr. Wallis's qualifications as an observer, I would draw your attention to the enclosed copy of a memorandum by Mr. Young of an interview with Mr. Wallis at Philippopoli on the 14th instant.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 598.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Mr. Wallis.

Sophia, March 5, 1913.

Dear Sir,

I HAVE duly received your letter, dated the 3rd instant, in which you write, with reference to your conversation with me on the 3rd instant:—

"I understood you to say this morning that you have Sir E. Grey's permission to give the name of your informant (and, I presume, his address) as to any particular outrage reported through your legation."

I fear that you must have mistaken the language I used, and I will therefore repeat to you the words I used.

Sir E. Grey's instructions to me, and I repeat them from the document from which I read them to you, with regard to this question are to the effect that "if any British subject calls at His Majesty's consulates at Salonica or Philippopoli he should be informed that His Majesty's representatives are satisfied that outrages have been committed, but they should give him no details. Any such person can enquire himself from the same people who have given information to the consuls, to whom they can refer him."

From these instructions it is evident that His Majesty's Legation, as I informed you, are not in a position to make any definite statement regarding the accuracy, or otherwise, of any of the alleged excesses, the reports regarding which are merely transmitted by this legation to His Majesty's Secretary of State for his information and for such action as may be deemed desirable by His Majesty's Government.

This attitude has been studiously adhered to since the commencement of the circulation of the rumours in question, and is one from which it is impossible for me to depart in the present as in the past.

With reference to the further specific enquiry contained in your letter as to whether I can give you the name and address of the gentleman who reported to me the impalement of a woman in the presence of Bulgarian troops, I note that you state that I repeated or read the above from some letter or despatch that I had sent or was sending on a certain Sunday when you called upon me. In view of the attitude I have throughout adopted on this question, and having no recollection of having given you any such information, I caused a very careful search to be made in the archives of this legation, with the result that no mention of any such deplorable incident is to be discovered in any correspondence which has passed with this legation.

It seems to me, therefore, that you must have made some mistake in this assertion, and that the story which you state was related to you by me must have reached you from some other source.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 598.

Memorandum by Vice-Consul Young.

(Confidential.)

A MR. WALLIS, of the Society of Friends, called here this afternoon and was apparently desirous of obtaining official information about the Pomak "conversions." No details were given him, but it appeared that Mr. Wallis had been travelling in the country about four months under the guidance of a Bulgarian (M. Mateief) and was disposed to believe that these "conversions" had not been "unduly forced." He cited as an indication the circumstance that on one occasion he had attended service in a mosque which had been converted into a church, and that several hundred Pomaks were present "apparently of their own free will." The possibility did not seem to have occurred to Mr. Wallis that an order might have been given to the headman of the village to ensure the attendance of these people. Somewhat naively he also mentioned the fact that a number of prisoners had been released from Tatar Pazardjik, and had each received a suit of clothes after being converted to Christianity!

Mr. Wallis also mentioned that emissaries had been coming of late from the Pomak villages to Pazardjik to tell the prisoners that their relatives at home had

already been converted and to advise them to follow suit. Evidently he had heard nothing of the wholesale deportation of villagers, and seemed to think that the prisoners he had seen were "soldiers."

Mr. Wallis remarked that he supposed that the Pomaks did "not understand Turkish!" He seemed vague as to the boundaries of the districts they inhabited, and his knowledge of the country in general, languages, and conditions of life did not point to the likelihood of a first-hand or even an independent enquiry. His observations, however, particularly in view of the auspices under which they were made, throw a significant side-light upon some of the information on this subject submitted in despatches Nos. 2 and 3 of the 7th and 14th instant respectively from this vice-consulate.

Philippopoli, March 14, 1913.

[14511] No. 599.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 37.)

Sir,

Bucharest, March 26, 1913.

SINCE my despatch No. 32 of the 14th instant I have noticed no signs of any revival of the agitation in favour of mobilisation, and the result of the mediation discussions in St. Petersburgh, which it is reported are to begin to-day, is awaited patiently. Indeed, the atmosphere here is more tranquil than at any time since the beginning of the year, and, if appearances are not misleading, the King and the peace section of the Cabinet should have no great difficulty in imposing, at any rate, temporary acquiescence in some compromise falling short of the cession of Silistria, should such a compromise be recommended by the Powers, though it would probably lead to the resignation of a portion of the Ministry. I cannot but feel, however, that there is much to be said for the view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, recorded in the memorandum referred to in the postcript to my despatch No. 35, that Roumania will not in the long run rest satisfied without Silistria, and that she will seek to take advantage of future complications in the Balkans to obtain it.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[14477] No. 600.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 243)

Sir,

Constantinople, March 27, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the recent fighting on the Chatalja front.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 600.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No 16.)

Sir,

Constantinople, March 26, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that there would seem to have been more or less continuous fighting between the outposts of the two armies west of the Chatalja lines from about the 16th to the 19th. Though the Turkish official bulletins are so edited as to give the idea of a somewhat slow but continuous and progressive advance, to which an occasional hostile attack presented no serious obstacle, all along the line, and make no mention of reverses, yet it is clear that the Bulgars have been holding their own and that the fighting has been of a give-and-take character. For instance, it was announced that the Turks had occupied Kalfakeui on the 16th, and then again on the 19th, the inference being that they were driven back, or at least found it advisable to retire, on some occasion between those dates. The line reached by the Turkish troops, after two days of what is described as severe fighting on the 18th and 19th, is given as Serbeli, Sivaskeui, Kalfakeui, Akalan, Injegiz.

Previous to this the Bulgarians had burned the station and village of Kabakje, and it has been reported from a usually reliable though unofficial source that the Turks occupied Kabakje on the 20th, on which day there does not seem to have been any fighting.

On the Turkish left, from which side, thanks to the presence of a Red Cross hospital, we get some detailed news, the position on the 17th seems to have been that the Turks held Boghados, Surgunkeui, and Albasan, while a Bulgarian detachment was holding Kadikeui and a hill, known locally as Red Hill and situated south-west of Albasan, which they had entrenched. The Turks advanced all along the line on the 18th and captured Red Hill after an obstinate resistance, the fight lasting all day. But our informant says that they, for some reason unexplained, evacuated it again during the night, as well as an eminence between Boghados and Silivri, which a detachment operating further south had occupied during the day.

These advanced-guard operations on the Turkish left are directed by the German Colonel Back, who is also the commander of the 2nd division, as previously reported. The head-quarters of the 1st Army Corps are at Kalikratia. Behind, at Kuchuk Chekmejc, is the 4th division, being a part of the newly-formed IVth Army Corps, and in further support are the troops of the Xth Army Corps at Buyuk Halkali and San Stefano and the Amasia redif division at Makrikeui.

As reported in my immediately preceding despatch, the fighting above alluded to savours rather of pretty severe skirmishing between covering troops than of a concerted offensive movement or of a general advance, while there has hitherto been no sign of a move on the part of the divisions in rear. From the 20th onwards the official bulletins have maintained a discreet silence, which may be due to there having been nothing to report or to things not going too well.

From the 18th to the 22nd, 1,136 wounded have been reported to me as arriving here, of which 356 came by sea.

On the 25th instant I was informed that all the troops at San Stefano and Makrikeui had hurriedly left for the front during the night. On the same day considerable activity was apparent in Constantinople, and, though it is too early to have figures yet, I am told that some 3,000 infantry left by rail during the day. The artillery of the Xth Army Corps, which had been disembarked here at the end of February on the return of the expeditionary force from Sharkeui and Gallipoli, was embarked again, and the Kurdish tribal cavalry, which has been transported from the Selimiyeh barracks during the last three days, has also left for the front.

The reason for this movement was generally believed to be that the Bulgarians had attacked the Turkish positions about Kadikeui suddenly and in unexpected force on the evening of the 24th, and that things were not going well with the 2nd division.

To-day's news would seem to show that the Bulgarians commenced a forward movement all along the line, with troops evaluated at three divisions, on the evening of the 24th, that their advance continued yesterday, and that fighting, with results on the whole unfavourable to the Turks, was still in progress to-day. From the guarded official reports it looks as if the Bulgarian attacks north of the railway line had been so far successful that the Turks were falling back on the main Chatalja position. Information from the south is to the effect that on 5 P.M. on the 25th the Turks, having evacuated Boghados, were holding a line Shaiteros–Yenije. The troops from San Stefano had arrived that afternoon, and some of them had reached Kum Burgas, passing over the Buyuk Chekmeje lagoon by the new pontoon bridge.

Though the news is so far rather confused and mostly rumour, it will be seen from the above statement that during the last few days events have developed rapidly and in a rather unexpected direction. So far from the Turkish army having begun its much-talked-of advance, the Bulgarians have, after a lull of three or four days, suddenly appeared in a strength which the Turkish reconnaissances had apparently quite failed to reveal, and are driving the Turkish advanced troops back on the Chatalja lines. Except on the south, as mentioned above, the Turks do not seem to have attempted to support their advanced troops, but seem rather to be allowing them to be driven in on the main position. It is, perhaps, too early to say yet whether they mean to accept what is in the circumstances tantamount to a defeat, or whether to use the superior forces which they undoubtedly possess at this point to attack the Bulgarians in their turn and re-establish their advanced line.

The Bulgarian surprise attack is the more astonishing in view of the fact that the "Mars" biplane made a very successful flight on the 23rd, remaining in the air for four hours and two minutes. It was again flown by the aviator Scherf, but this time

carried a Turkish officer as observer. It is said to have gone as far as Chorlu, to have thoroughly searched the intervening country, covering about 250 miles in all, and to have reported exactly the Bulgarian positions and strengths. Anyhow, the results of this reconnaissance were at the time considered to be very gratifying and its information regarding the enemy very comforting.

It was reported to me a week ago that the 29th division was concentrating at Turshunkeui (behind the right centre of the Turkish line) preparatory to an advance. A German officer, Colonel Mathiess, has recently been appointed to the command of this division, making the third German officer now so employed, the other two being Colonel Back, commanding the 2nd division, and Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossow, commanding a redif division on the extreme right.

With reference to the dispatch of more troops from Asia Minor, I think I have already reported that the 28th division (Erzeroum) had been ordered to mobilise. I am now informed that orders were sent a few days ago from the Ministry of War to Van for the immediate dispatch of three batteries (probably a battalion of mountain artillery), of the 102nd regiment, and of a Nishanji battalion from Erzeroum.

Three battalions of the Sivas redif division, which were last reported at Jimovassi, south of Smyrna, have recently been moved to Dikilli, where there are also four battalions of Mustahfiz.

Four thousand men, described as Nizams from Tripoli, and 141 officers passed through Konia for the front a fortnight ago.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[14497] No. 601.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 18.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram, No. 81 of the 10th March, in which I alluded to the probability of a bombardment and assault upon Adrianople taking place as soon as an improvement in the weather should allow of such operations, I have the honour to report that the intended attack was carried out on the 25th and 26th instant and resulted in the capture of the city and fortress after heavy fighting.

The following is a summary of the official account of the operations preceding the fall of Adrianople.

On the 23rd instant, General Ivanof commanding the second army, received orders to attack and occupy the Turkish advanced positions in the E. sector of the perimeter, whilst the troops in all the remaining sectors were to support this movement by a vigorous offensive.

At 11 P.M. the General issued the following order:

1. Siege and field artillery to start at 1 P.M. next day a preliminary bombardment on all sectors.

2. The infantry to advance during the night of the 24th and 25th under cover of siege and field artillery fire and to carry the enemy's advanced positions at dawn, according to the instructions issued on the 14th March.

(N.B.—The 14th March would thus appear to be the date on which the attack had originally been intended.)

On the 24th March at 2 P.M. a general preliminary bombardment began all along the line and lasted until 8 P.M., the Turks replying with all their fortress artillery. At 8 P.M. the Bulgarian fires slackened so as to allow the assaulting troops to take up their position for attack.

On the following day at 3·30 A.M. the infantry in the E. sector began its advance and crossed Kum-Deré at 4·15 A.M. The Bulgarian artillery opened a covering fire whilst the Turks replied with a heavy artillery and infantry fire directed against the attacking columns. At dawn the latter assaulted and carried with the bayonet the advanced positions on the E. sector whilst on the north a daring attack was made on the girdle of forts between Aivas-Baba and Tash-Tabia. In the outer positions 12 guns and 300 prisoners were captured.

On the E. front the attacking force had by 10 A.M. established itself within 200–300 yards of the inner line of forts, where they passed the night of the 25th.

Meanwhile, simultaneous attacks had been made on the S. and E., the Servians

making some headway on their own front, capturing the hill N.E. of Kadikeui and the Ekmekji farm and assaulting vigorously the Papas-Tepé position.

Towards the close of the day the Bulgarian artillery had established a superiority over that of the Turks and many of the Turkish heavy batteries were silenced.

1,000 prisoners, 21 guns and 6 machine guns were captured in the course of the operations on the 25th March.

A lively artillery duel was maintained all night, whilst the infantry worked at destroying the obstacles in its path.

At dawn, on the 26th, the following forts were carried with the bayonet:—

Aivas-Baba, Aidji-Oghlou, Kestenlik, Kourou-Tchechmé, Yildiz-Tabia, Top-Yolou, Kavkaz-Tabia and Kaik, and all available field-guns and howitzers were run up to the new line of positions occupied.

Towards 8·30 A.M. the Turks began burning their depôts, barracks, hospitals, &c., causings fires to start in the town itself.

At 2 P.M. Shukri Pasha finally surrendered to general Ivanof.

According to the official bulletins an attack on the Chatalja front was carried out on the 24th instant by the Bulgarian advanced Divisions, the Turkish force opposed to them being estimated at five Infantry divisions and one Cavalry Brigade, supported by the Turkish fleet in the Marmora.

During the three days' fighting which followed, the Turks were driven back on their main positions, the Bulgars establishing themselves on the line Arnaut-Keui-Osmanli, and thus occupying their old positions held before the armistice.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[14455] No. 602.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 118. Confidential.)

Berlin, March 27, 1913.

Sir,

THE Roumanian Minister here, M. Beldiman, called upon me yesterday to hand me, by order of his Government, a copy of a note which he had just addressed to the Imperial Government.

M. Beldiman, who is both clever and long-sighted, holds very moderate views, and is entirely against Chauvinism of every sort. He is, therefore, more inclined than many of his countrymen to look upon the practical side of the Roumano-Bulgarian question and to eliminate the sentimental side, which, to his great regret, internal politics have caused to loom too largely in the Roumanian public mind. His idea is that the possession of the wretched town of Silistria is, now that Bulgaria has practically ceded to Roumania the forts that dominate it, a matter of small importance to Roumania compared to the improvement of her position on the Black Sea coast. He personally would never have allowed Silistria to become the chief point of issue between the two countries and its acquisition a matter of national prestige, but would have made a show of desiring to acquire it, with the ultimate intention of giving it up at the psychological moment in return for an arrangement which would give them what they want on the Black Sea. He had written privately in this sense to the Roumanian President of the Council, and suggested that perhaps it was now still not too late to effect a compromise of this nature. He had, however, been informed in reply that it would be difficult to suggest such a compromise at this moment, when the Ambassadorial Conference at St. Petersburgh was about to discuss the question. If, however, their discussions should result in a deadlock, *i.e.*, if the Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance were in favour of Silistria being incorporated in Roumania and those of the Triple *Entente* held the opposite view, then the compromise suggested by M. Beldiman might be advantageously put forward.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[14533] No. 603.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 64.)

Belgrade, March 27, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 47 of the 25th April concerning the levying of unjustifiable impositions in the territories occupied by Servian troops, I have the honour to report that the other representatives of the Great Powers in Belgrade having finally received instructions, I yesterday presented to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the absence of the Prime Minister, the memorandum, copy of which I enclose, embodying the five points set forth in your above-mentioned telegram.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 603.

Memorandum communicated to Servian Government.

DANS les territoires turcs occupés actuellement par les alliés balkaniques, le régime douanier turc tel qu'il était avant la guerre doit être rétabli et doit rester en vigueur jusqu'au règlement définitif des questions territoriales.

Les Grandes Puissances ne peuvent pas admettre—

La double perception des droits de douane pour les marchandises importées;

La perception de surtaxes sous le nom de contributions de guerre pratiquée par la Serbie;

La perception de surtaxes sous le nom de taxes de consommation ou l'équivalent de taxes de monopole;

La prohibition d'importer certains articles à raison qu'ils sont des articles de monopole dans les États balkaniques;

Le traitement préférentiel appliqué aux provenances des États alliés importées dans les territoires occupés au détriment des marchandises pareilles provenant des autres pays.

[14535] No. 604.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 66.)

Belgrade, March 28, 1913.

Sir,

THE execution of your instructions to me at various times for joint action together with my colleagues of the Great Powers has been considerably hampered, inasmuch as on two occasions the Russian Minister had either received no instructions, or professed to have received none, and on one occasion his instructions did not altogether tally with those of his colleagues.

I quote the following instances:

1. Instructions to protest against war contribution and other illegal imposts in occupied territory reached me on the 25th February. M. de Hartwig did not receive his until the 25th March, just one month later, and apparently only then because His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh pressed the Russian Government to send them.

2. Proposals of the Powers for peace negotiations bases. Although the Russian Minister received instructions concerning these approximately at the same time with his colleagues, they omitted the important direction that "Les représentants des Puissances déclareront en même temps que dès l'acceptation de ces bases les hostilités devront prendre fin." Consequently this declaration could not be made.

3. Your instructions to notify the Servian Government that the north and north-eastern frontiers of Albania had been determined by the Powers, and that as Scutari had been secured to Albania the siege should now be raised, were received by me on the 23rd instant. My French, German, Austrian, and Italian colleagues were in possession of theirs the following morning. Alone M. de Hartwig had none, and states that he has received none up to date.

The extent to which this dilatoriness on the part of the Russian Government may affect events may be judged by the fact that the Servian Government are merely waiting for such a communication to be made to them by the Powers to have an excuse for informing Montenegro that a continuation of the siege of Scutari would be useless and futile, and for withdrawing their troops. Naturally every day that this communication is delayed brings the Servian troops from Salonica nearer, and makes it more difficult for the Servian Government to avoid bringing about the fall of Scutari with its consequent complications. But quite apart from this, the effect of long delay when a joint *démarche* has to be made is deplorable. Everything is known in Belgrade. The outside public is just as much aware as the representatives of the Powers themselves of the fact that a *démarche* is completed, what the *démarche* consists in, and likewise, if there is delay, who is responsible. The conclusion which is naturally formed is that the Powers are disunited, consequently that they are incapable of any real pressure, and the *démarche*, if finally undertaken, has lost all its force.

Some of my colleagues are of opinion that M. de Hartwig is personally responsible for much of the delay. They maintain that he duly received instructions, but disagrees with them and questions them, and refers to St. Petersburgh with a view to gaining time. I am unable to say whether this is correct; a comparison with the dates on which the joint representations have been carried out at other posts would probably show; but I may, however, say that it has been patent ever since the commencement of the present crisis that M. de Hartwig appears to consider it almost a loss of dignity, and that it is exceedingly distasteful to him to act in conjunction with his colleagues.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

[15164] No. 605.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, March 31, 1913.

D'APRÈS M. Sazonof, la ligne frontière devrait être Énos–Midia, mais en ligne droite rectifiée, au lieu de suivre le cours de l'Ergene. A son avis, le Gouvernement ottoman devrait immédiatement faire savoir au Cabinet de Londres et aux Puissances qu'il accepte cette ligne.

La démarche collective à faire auprès de la Sublime Porte a été retardée jusqu'à présent du fait que le Gouvernement français n'avait pas muni son Ambassadeur des instructions nécessaires. La Russie, à son tour, vient de soulever une nouvelle difficulté en recommandant au Gouvernement Impérial de demander la rectification de frontière précitée. Or, le Gouvernement ottoman ayant accepté la médiation des Puissances à l'effet de fixer les conditions de paix, attend la communication de ces conditions arrêtées depuis dix jours. Il ne semble pas possible dans ces conditions qu'il puisse s'adresser aux Puissances pour demander une modification de frontière qui lui est défavorable. La frontière Midia–Ergene–Énos arrêtée par les Puissances, et qui est délimitée presque entièrement par des cours d'eaux, présente des avantages pour la défense de Constantinople et empêchera pendant la paix des incidents de frontière, tandis que la frontière Midia–Énos en ligne droite mettrait le Gouvernement Impérial devant des difficultés insurmontables.

M. Sazonof aurait aussi dit à notre Ambassadeur que d'après ses informations, les Bulgares, après la prise d'Andrinople, insisteraient pour une indemnité de guerre. Or, les Puissances avaient pris en considération les difficultés financières auxquelles la Turquie est en butte et les dépenses extraordinaires provoquées par une guerre injuste, et qu'elle n'avait nullement provoquée d'ailleurs, pour acquérir la conviction que le Gouvernement Impérial se trouve dans l'impossibilité de payer une indemnité de guerre, eu égard aussi aux vastes territoires prospères dont la cession lui est imposée.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 31 mars, 1913.

[14998] No. 606.

Aide-mémoire communicated by Count Mensdorff, March 31, 1913.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has been instructed to express Count Berchtold's sincerest thanks to Sir Edward Grey for his attitude in the collective *démarche* at Belgrade and Cettinjé, as well as for the measures taken by the British Government in view of a joint naval demonstration in Montenegrin waters.

The delay in the execution of the collective *démarche* at Belgrade caused by the belated arrival of M. Hartwig's instructions (a fact already mentioned by Sir E. Grey in his conversations with Count Mensdorff), and also various other reports from Belgrade, have given Count Berchtold the impression that the attitude of the Russian representative with regard to the question of the evacuation of Northern Albania is liable to awaken doubts in the Balkan Governments as to the earnestness and force of the decisions arrived at in London, and might encourage them in their opposition against the will of Europe.

Only lately the Servians assured Great Britain and Austria-Hungary that they are only waiting for the communication of the Powers' decision to evacuate Albania, and to give up the siege of Scutari; now M. Pasic in a conversation with M. Ugron tries to deny that he had given his assent.

At the same time the Montenegrin Government make use of the excuse that they cannot withdraw their troops from before Scutari as long as they are not in possession of an answer from Belgrade.

It seems evident that the aim of the two Governments is to delay the matter so as to enable the Servians to land reinforcements (eighteen Greek transports with 11,000 men on board) on the Albanian coast.

Count Berchtold has also the impression that Servia and Montenegro still vainly hope to be able to defy the decisions of the Powers by creating a *fait accompli* in the event of the fall of Scutari.

In addition to these news Count Berchtold has received information that the bombardment of Scutari has been reopened. This fact would assume, should the unofficial report be confirmed, a very serious and demonstrative character indeed, the collective *démarche* having just taken place.

In the case of the bombardment of Scutari being reopened Count Berchtold deems it inevitable that a naval demonstration in Montenegrin waters—as proposed by Sir E. Grey at yesterday's conference, and accepted by the Ambassadors—should clearly express the will of Europe; in accordance with this proposal the Austro-Hungarian Government would be ready to send their warships to Montenegrin waters.

Count Berchtold feels confident that as soon as an official report of the bombardment of Scutari is received, British warships will be ordered to Montenegrin waters, and that Sir E. Grey will invite the other interested Powers to take part in the demonstration.

[14469] No. 607.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 30, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 33 of 26th March.

Collective representation made 28th March, but no answer yet received.

[14505] No. 608.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 30, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 29 of 24th March.

It has been agreed the Archbishop of Prisrend, Austrian consul at Uskub, and a Montenegrin ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs should enquire into the death of monk at

Djakova, and forced conversions to Orthodox Church. Austria agrees that representatives of the other Powers may be present at the enquiry, but the statements supplied here to the press that the latter will take part in it is incorrect.

The incident is thus settled for the present, but reports from Albanian source state that Albanians are much excited, and that a rising of Mirdites is not improbable.

[14538] No. 609.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 30, 1913.*

THE Austrian Minister urges that, in order to facilitate the King's acceptance of the Albanian frontier, representatives of the Powers here should recommend their respective Governments to declare that Montenegro, on the rapid evacuation of the Albanian territory, could rely on the support of Powers in its economic difficulties on the understanding that a vague formula might be adopted. My colleagues unanimously accepted the idea.

I declined to recommend the suggestion to you without further consideration. I venture to think that, apart from the objection you may feel to enter into an undefined obligation of this nature, such a proposal might at the present moment do more harm than good.

[14441] No. 610.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Adrianople, March 30, 1913.*

BRITISH colony and consul all right.

[14545] No. 611.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, March 30, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 30th March.

Having received a further report of last meeting of Ambassadors, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs has come again to say that Greece cannot give up the line of frontier between Epirus and Albania laid down in Greek memorandum presented in London, but proposes a plébiscite of the inhabitants of the contested districts, to be carried out under the eyes of delegates of the Great Powers, by result of which she would abide.

[14707] No. 612.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, March 31, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador here received last night urgent request from His Government for his views with regard to the new Russian proposal as to the frontier. This proposal is that a straight line should be drawn from Midia to Enos, and that the frontier should not follow the course of the Maritza and of the Ergene Rivers. Russia has apparently suggested to Turkey that the latter should herself propose the new line. The Turkish Ambassador thinks that the straight line suggested is impracticable and unacceptable from a military point of view. He believes that it has been suggested to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Bulgarian General Dimitri, now in St. Petersburgh.

[14710] No. 613.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, March 31, 1913.*

HEAD-QUARTERS staff admit loss of 11,000 Bulgarians killed and wounded at the capture of Adrianople. The number is probably considerably larger.

They minimise the Servian losses, concerning which I expect to be shortly informed.

Bayonet fighting is reported along the entire Chatalja lines.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14731] No. 614.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 31, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 159 of 28th March.

Collective *démarche* made to-day. Text of condition 1 runs as follows:—

"La frontière de l'Empire ottoman en Europe sera tracée suivant une ligne droite d'Enos à Midia. Tous les territoires," &c.

The impression seems to be that a favourable reply will be given very shortly.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[14732] No. 615.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, March 31, 1913.*

I HAVE just seen Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and asked him how he reconciled the Prime Minister's reply to representations of the Powers, viz., that Servia's attitude must depend upon Montenegro, with the statements so recently made by himself to my colleagues and myself, to the effect that notification sent to Constantinople of determination of frontiers of Albania would enable the Servian Government to refuse to take part in further operations against Scutari. He readily admitted that I was in no way mistaken about what he had said, and assured me that he had made these statements in good faith. The Prime Minister, however, now found the position very delicate, and must endeavour to argue with and bring Montenegro to reason first. Instructions had been sent to the Servian representative at Cettinjé to state that on no account would Servia be dragged into a fresh war, and that Montenegro must therefore bear the full responsibility for her actions.

If Montenegro proved obdurate, however, there remained nothing but a naval demonstration of the Powers, though he doubts whether even that would be effective.

As I was leaving he added that he thought that the situation would take a favourable turn in three or four days, only it required a little patience.

Possibly this remark was dictated by considerations in connection with meeting of Skupshtina on 3rd April, when the Prime Minister might be called to account for any refusal to support an ally.

The transports with Servian troops, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed me, had meanwhile arrived at Corfu, and it would take them some time still to reach San Giovanni di Medua. He hoped that peace was not far off.

[15163] No. 616.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 283.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 31, 1913.*

AT meeting of Ambassadors to-day it was agreed that, in view of latest news from Cettinjé, a naval demonstration at Antivari would be necessary.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 143), Sir E. Goschen (No. 147), Sir R. Rodd (No. 121), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 128).

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

When it takes place I would suggest that naval commanders should be instructed to advise the Governments what steps could be taken to bring any pressure to bear. A landing of international force is the most obvious step, but we ought first to know from naval commanders what this would involve.

[14419] No. 617.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 284.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

ACTION of Russian Minister at Belgrade in first delaying and then altering the joint representation is known to all the Governments through their Ministers at Belgrade. It was the subject of much animadversion at the meeting with Ambassadors to-day, which will no doubt be reported to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by Russian Ambassador. If it is mentioned to you, you should say that I think action of Russian Minister has been very unfortunate.

[15246] No. 618.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

THE meeting with Ambassadors has passed the following resolution to-day:—

"La réunion est d'avis qu'il y a lieu de donner des instructions aux représentants des Puissances à Sophia dans le but d'arrêter les opérations de guerre, à condition de l'acceptation de la ligne directe Enos–Midia et de la solution de toutes les questions d'ordre financier par la Commission technique à Paris, à laquelle prendraient part les délégués des belligérants."

You should act on it when your colleagues are instructed.

[14852] No. 619.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

INFORMATION on certain points is required by Sir P. Harvey, who will represent His Majesty's Government on International Commission, about to assemble at Paris to effect financial settlement in Balkans.

Sir P. Harvey states that if British formula respecting apportionment of shares of Ottoman Debt among allies is to be defended against French formula (see "Projet d'Articles" agreed to by Ambassadors' conference on 29th January, 1913, where British addition is printed in italics), it will be necessary to show that French formula will not do justice to bondholders. We must therefore be in position to prove by authoritative figures that French arrangement will yield substantially less than they are now receiving.

Please, therefore, obtain and forward, by post, as soon as possible best available figures of:—

1. Revenue of Turkish Empire for last three years, distinguishing, if possible, heads of revenue.

2. Same for territories about to be ceded.

Refer in each case to official documents from which figures are taken.

These figures will enable us to check Sir A. Block's figures giving percentage of 19·20 (see your telegram No. 91 of 16th February).

3. Ask Sir A. Block to explain how he reconciles his figure of £T. 1,162,000 (see same telegram) with those given in letter to you from President of Debt (see your despatch No. 969 of 17th November of last year). It looks as though whole of 3 per cent. customs surtax and salt revenue were excluded.

[14204] No. 620.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

THE Governments all seem to have sent some instructions more or less in accord with my telegram to you No. 159 of 28th March. You can join in any action your colleagues take.

[15031] No. 621.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

YOU should inform M. Venizelos that the Powers have notified at Belgrade and Cettinjé their agreement about the north and north-east frontiers of Albania, and that consequently there is no further occasion for hostilities in Albania. Greek transports should therefore not be used to convey further forces to Albania, especially to take part in the siege of Scutari. This is the more important as the Powers intend a naval demonstration against the continuance of the siege of Scutari.

[15701] No. 622.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

I HAVE spoken very strongly to M. Vesnitch about Scutari. I said that I heard Servia, contrary to what the Servian Foreign Office had led us and others to expect, persisted in prosecuting the siege of Scutari. If Scutari fell and there was a massacre, and the decision of the Powers was disregarded on this point, there was no security that the questions of Djakova and Dibra, and even Ipek and Prisrend, would not be reopened. If this occurred owing to action in which Servia had taken part, our diplomatic support would not only be lost to Servia, but would be given against her. It was only by great diplomatic strain that Dibra and Djakova had been obtained for Servia, and if after all our efforts Servia helped to upset the decision, sympathy here, which had been on her side, would be against her.

M. Vesnitch assured me that there was no danger of a massacre at Scutari, and that no outrages happened where there was Servian authority. I said I had some very disagreeable accounts to the contrary, especially from unofficial sources.

You should repeat my conversation to M. Pasitch, and say that I believe if Montenegro is helped by Servia to violate the agreement of the Powers Servia will run a real risk of losing everything that she has gained by the agreement now come to by the Powers and by her own efforts in the war with Turkey.

[15163] No. 623.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors to-day the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors commented very strongly upon the action of the Russian Minister in Belgrade in first delaying and then altering the joint representation.

I said that this was very unfortunate, though it did not touch the main points, which were the agreement about the frontier and the siege of Scutari.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 228), Sir E. Goschen (No. 118), Sir R. Rodd (No. 94), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 144).

The following resolution was come to, after the Austrian Ambassador had stated that the Montenegrins were determined to go on with the bombardment and assault of Scutari :—

"La réunion est d'avis que toutes les Puissances ayant acquiescé à une démonstration navale, il y a lieu de procéder le plus tôt possible par l'envoi à Antivari de bâtiments de guerre.

"Sir E. Grey dit qu'il est prêt à faire envoyer à des croiseurs se trouvant à Corfu l'ordre de se rendre à Antivari aussitôt qu'il sera informé de l'envoi de semblables instructions par d'autres Puissances.

There was considerable discussion upon whether any instructions should be sent to the ships that were to take part in the naval demonstration to stop the Greek transports taking Servian reinforcements to Scutari. The following resolution was agreed to :—

"Sir E. Grey annonce l'envoi d'instructions au Ministre britannique à Athènes pour aviser M. Vénizélos des résolutions des Puissances au sujet de la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie et de la démonstration navale, et pour attirer son attention sur la nécessité de ne pas permettre à la marine hellénique de prêter son concours à des envois de troupes et de munitions sur la côte albanaise.

"La réunion est d'avis qu'une démarche analogue devrait être prescrite aux autres représentants des Puissances à Athènes."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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